Norwegian Air cancels order for 97 Boeing aircraft, sues Boeing(airlinegeeks.com)
airlinegeeks.com
Norwegian Air cancels order for 97 Boeing aircraft, sues Boeing
https://airlinegeeks.com/2020/06/30/norwegian-air-cancels-order-for-97-boeing-aircraft-sues-boeing/
168 comments
How did they allow this sale to happen? It's like they're willingly giving themselves away to the Chinese gov't.
Norwegian is not the main airline of Norway (that would be SAS in conjunction with Sweden and Denmark). Norwegian is (was?) a low cost airline that expanded too fast and used various subsidiaries to incorporate most of their airline in other countries like Argentina or the UK. They have very little in actual assets, they’ve been hurt three times over by 787 engine issues, the 737 MAX, and now COVID, and now their creditors are taking whatever scraps are left.
Conversion of debt to equity. The alternative was bankruptcy, triggered by the coronavirus crisis. Norwegian is privately founded and owned. No government involvement. No bailout.
um.
Are you saying there needs to be a global ban on allowing Chinese entities to invest?
Why would not some entity in China be allowed to own a share?
Are you saying there needs to be a global ban on allowing Chinese entities to invest?
Why would not some entity in China be allowed to own a share?
I don't think that would be a bad idea given that any major Chinese firm is almost surely tied to their government, and we see what chaos they're causing world wide.
I kind of get it but I'm not sure it's fair when the other hand is boeing, who is as married to the govt as any American company could hope to be
Yes, ASAP.
Since we can't do the same in the Chinese market.
Don’t SoftBank and Yahoo own a huge chunk of Alibaba?
Uber also owns a large portion of DiDi.
Uber also owns a large portion of DiDi.
They just received foreign investment money for startups ( then) from companies not tied to a government.
All Chinese companies have a party leader in their board and seem to take over critical infrastructure ( telecom, finance, harbors, logistics, energy) or contain privacy-sensitive info.
Even if it's games, then suddenly censorship is applied ( tournaments/chats).
And I hope you know why Uber even has shares in Didi :)
All Chinese companies have a party leader in their board and seem to take over critical infrastructure ( telecom, finance, harbors, logistics, energy) or contain privacy-sensitive info.
Even if it's games, then suddenly censorship is applied ( tournaments/chats).
And I hope you know why Uber even has shares in Didi :)
12 2/3% is big, but it's not a majority.
Interesting. Anyone have any idea if this will lead to a Comac C919 order? [0] Just remembered, this would have to pass the EASA certification at a minimum, if that happens or they start pushing for it it might be an indicator. Belt and Road no doubt, and quite possibly seeking to capitalise on the duopoly having a hard time. May lead to EU / US shoring up their respective industries. Maybe also burying their WTO hatchets?
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comac_C919
[EDIT] asked further questions
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comac_C919
[EDIT] asked further questions
Zero reason for a Comac order when there’s tons of used A320s and 737s sitting around up for sale or lease.
Much more likely are replacements with Airbus if they can get the Boeing money back. Boing being now a hedgefund company, not an engineering company anymore (like VW), this sounds difficult and the lawsuit could last several years. So it looks like Norway has to stick with their Boing's.
I never heard of the 787 engine problems, this seems to be severe also.
The Comac is an interesting option, but it will still need several years. Airbus is the only option.
I never heard of the 787 engine problems, this seems to be severe also.
The Comac is an interesting option, but it will still need several years. Airbus is the only option.
My first thought as well -- would be interesting to see the C919 flown on more western routes.
Comac is expected to pass European certifications? I can’t be pissed more about MRJ/MSJ right now...
The entire airline industry (and travel as a whole) is under incredible stress right now. Many airlines have already gone bankrupt [1], and most others are near the brink. I don't think there's going to be any shortage of lawsuits going forward.
[1] https://www.businessinsider.com/coronavirus-airlines-that-fa...
[1] https://www.businessinsider.com/coronavirus-airlines-that-fa...
Most of the US airlines took the COVID bailout bill money. That bill required them to maintain specific service, and avoid layoffs through the end of September. Expect some chaotic changes in October.
Do you think the US gov won't renew those?
I don't think they will. There is no appetite for that sort of bill right now. There's general crisis fatigue, and the Senate won't take up a bill the President won't support. The President won't support anything that does not align with the theme of re-opening the economy.
For example, congressional discussions on a "Phase 4" financial support package have been pushed back and back for over a month now.
The sense of urgency is not helped by the fact that the deadline to apply for PPP funds passed yesterday, with over $130 billion unspent.
For example, congressional discussions on a "Phase 4" financial support package have been pushed back and back for over a month now.
The sense of urgency is not helped by the fact that the deadline to apply for PPP funds passed yesterday, with over $130 billion unspent.
I suspect several of the airlines are now itching to do layoffs. It's hard to sustain the same number of employees when the traveler numbers are down so badly. They are all losing money despite the bailout.
AA already laid off 30% of their management jobs, tho officially only starting October 1st.
True. I think this comes down to: will the US gov just continually print money while there is a slowdown from both top down lockdown and also people just trying to stay safe.
I suspect a lot of the lawsuits will outlive the airlines filing them.
Bankruptcies can take years or decades.
I know Lehman brothers is still working it’s way through. But that’s a financial institution that innovated too much making things complicated. But that’s more of a liquidation.
We have plenty of experience with airline bankruptcies, and they’re basically all the same.
United Airlines took 38 months. American Airlines, about 26 months. 2 years for Delta.
The problem is the domino effect: a newly recovered airline is much leaner and tends to put the non-bankruptcy filers at risk.
We have plenty of experience with airline bankruptcies, and they’re basically all the same.
United Airlines took 38 months. American Airlines, about 26 months. 2 years for Delta.
The problem is the domino effect: a newly recovered airline is much leaner and tends to put the non-bankruptcy filers at risk.
[deleted]
Maybe we can reboot it with dedicated per-route mini-airports with oriented runways that lob electric planes between cities, like high speed rail but without the right of way issues and monstrous capital cost (for a big country with a lot of empty space like the USA).
I wonder who is going to have the guts to kill the 737 Max for good. It's never going to fly with airline and passengers ever again,
Pre-covid I would have said of course it will fly. Because there is too much money at stake. Airlines aren't going to just cancel their orders and sell their MAX-8's and buy Airbus (suing Boeing for the difference).
Now with Covid, another possibility has opened up: a massive surplus of aircraft for the coming decade might actually make it redundant. Airlines will die left and right and there will be more than enough cheap planes to go around even without the MAX-8's.
I'd have no problem flying in one, as soon as authorities approve it.
Now with Covid, another possibility has opened up: a massive surplus of aircraft for the coming decade might actually make it redundant. Airlines will die left and right and there will be more than enough cheap planes to go around even without the MAX-8's.
I'd have no problem flying in one, as soon as authorities approve it.
It was already approved by authorities once...
The MAX-8 was meant to be more fuel efficient than previous 737s, and from what I understand fuel is a huge expense for airlines. Could airliners truly become so cheap that fuel costs are no longer a consideration?
Assuming the airliner surplus portends a medium term economic slowdown, then fuel will also likely be quite cheap.
The scenario I was considering was one where the half of the global fleet that is old/inefficient aircraft is kept grounded, but the modern part of the global fleet (e.g. A321 as an alternative to MAX8) is flying, and is big enough to cover the need.
Much easier to just increase ticket prices than offset fuel costs by buying more efficient jets.
In a healthy environment, there’s always downward pressure on ticket costs, and you have to find efficiencies elsewhere. We aren’t in a healthy environment anymore...
In a healthy environment, there’s always downward pressure on ticket costs, and you have to find efficiencies elsewhere. We aren’t in a healthy environment anymore...
Fuel costs are bigger consideration in long haul flights (planes fly 12 hours a day ) than short ones (planes fly only 4-5 hrs a day).
Long flights traditionally were serviced by wide body aircraft , in recent years with longer range and favourable ETOPS regulations narrow aircraft like 737 max and 320neo were desirable for low volume long haul routes.
Also at the time of design in 2010 jet fuel prices were at all time highs , fuel prices are at all time low now .
Given the surplus in the market , Low fuel prices, drop in demand the ROI for investing in 737 max may not simply exist anymore.
Long flights traditionally were serviced by wide body aircraft , in recent years with longer range and favourable ETOPS regulations narrow aircraft like 737 max and 320neo were desirable for low volume long haul routes.
Also at the time of design in 2010 jet fuel prices were at all time highs , fuel prices are at all time low now .
Given the surplus in the market , Low fuel prices, drop in demand the ROI for investing in 737 max may not simply exist anymore.
Most airliners, regardless of route length, will fly about 3000 hours per year. 737s might do 4, 5 or 6 legs per day. Fuel efficiency is an even larger concern for those planes because while a long haul aircraft will spend most of its working life at cruising speed, the short haul aircraft spend a good amount of time at takeoffs, landings, and lower altitudes, which burn more fuel per passenger/km.
The difference is not as high as I had originally thought and has been narrowing recently, it is still a substantial number.
Currently 7.5 hrs/day [3] for small narrow bodies, 10.09 hrs/day [2] for large narrow bodies and 12.48 hrs/day [1] for wide bodies.
[1] https://web.mit.edu/airlinedata/www/2019%2012%20Month%20Docu...
[2] https://web.mit.edu/airlinedata/www/2019%2012%20Month%20Docu...
[3] https://web.mit.edu/airlinedata/www/2019%2012%20Month%20Docu...
Currently 7.5 hrs/day [3] for small narrow bodies, 10.09 hrs/day [2] for large narrow bodies and 12.48 hrs/day [1] for wide bodies.
[1] https://web.mit.edu/airlinedata/www/2019%2012%20Month%20Docu...
[2] https://web.mit.edu/airlinedata/www/2019%2012%20Month%20Docu...
[3] https://web.mit.edu/airlinedata/www/2019%2012%20Month%20Docu...
In Cuba people drive classic American cars because that's the last model cars they could get before the embargo started. Huh, imagine flying on 201x plane models in 2050 because there's just so many left around.
(Yeah I know there are probably 30 year old airframes still flying nowadays, and they're still airworthy).
(Yeah I know there are probably 30 year old airframes still flying nowadays, and they're still airworthy).
Not really possible. 30 years is max service life for the hull. The regulations don’t let you go longer and the oem has no interest in providing support at that point.
The international regulators are getting their modifications made. The plane is undergoing new flight tests as of this week. It will be a slow restart due to COVID but the plane has survived the biggest obstacles already. It will be in passenger service again.
This reflects a lack of understanding how the U.S. Government works. There's essentially zero chance your statement is correct. There will be changes made to the aircraft, changes to training regimen, multiple reviews, etc., but the 737 Max will be recertified to fly. That shouldn't be taken as an endorsement, just an acknowledgement of reality.
Source: You can look up my profile and comment history. I don't work on the civil side, but I know how things work in the USG.
Source: You can look up my profile and comment history. I don't work on the civil side, but I know how things work in the USG.
That seems like a huge mistake to me. As it's been said many times, "Safety regulations are written in blood." At this point we probably know more about the flaws in the MAX than almost any other aircraft. And it's not like the plane was fundamentally unsound at a design level, but that bean counting, shortcuts and a failing culture made it unsound.
I mean, I haven't heard anyone of authority say the flaws with the Max aren't fixable. If the Max "never flies again", it will just be because it's rebranded, not because it's a fundamentally different aircraft.
I mean, I haven't heard anyone of authority say the flaws with the Max aren't fixable. If the Max "never flies again", it will just be because it's rebranded, not because it's a fundamentally different aircraft.
> And it's not like the plane was fundamentally unsound at a design level, but that bean counting
I'm not an airframe designer by any means but from the countless threads that I've read on this website about this subject (coming from people who seemed more knowledgable than me on the subject) it did seem like the plane was fundamentally unsound at a design level.
I'm not an airframe designer by any means but from the countless threads that I've read on this website about this subject (coming from people who seemed more knowledgable than me on the subject) it did seem like the plane was fundamentally unsound at a design level.
It's absolutely not unsound at any level. It simply handles differently than pre-MAX 737s in certain scenarios, which would have required pilot re-certification if not for the flawed MCAS software.
It was unsound in terms of having single points of failure in the flight computer. When a cosmic ray bit flip can send you into the ground, you cannot carry passengers.
The safety analysis was turbo hosed, the documentation was shat, they hid the issue from operators and regulators alike, and went out of the way to not make simulators.
They removed previous generation's safeties (the oh shit yank back hard electric trim switch override), and removed a level of granularity in terms of capability to isolate the flight computer from the trim motors (which they have to do because they can't certify the plane to carry passengers otherwise), they have electrical control and power circuits to the trim motors too close together, and not sufficiently protected from a thrown turbine blade.
The aerodynamics (without MCAS functional) fail to pass airworthyness requirements for passenger transport that have been in place since time immemorial, and critical structural components (pickle forks) are showing alarming degrees of premature failure given their design lifetime.
Explain to me how a plane that doesn't at all implement graceful degradation to a fundamentally safe configuration is not "fundamentally flawed". Explain to me how plane's assembled from components that are failing well before their designed lifetime (and yes, I understand MTBF) is not a sign fundamental flaws. Even with all the fixes they're doing, the design shows an astonishing lack of good engineering sense. You don't keep around an awkward, unpredictable, unergonomic tool built by someone who demonstrated a willful disregard for doing Generally Accepted Engineering Practices, and who have repeatedly been found to do stupid things like leaving tools or metal shavings to foul or clog up filters, damage gaskets/seals etc.. You bin it, and make/get one that won't kill 200 people a failure instead. I don't give a damn how expensive a mistake it was.
There are lines you don't cross. Supporting bad business is one of them. Bring on the Depression. Maybe it's time we all figured out what good business looks like all the way around again.
And no, all that isn't belief or mere opinion. It's fact laid bare for all to see. You can fly on them and risk your loved ones if you like. I know the mentalities that drive those types of boondoggle and I'll have none of it. Show me a massive culture revamp in Boeing first, then I'll consider it again.
The safety analysis was turbo hosed, the documentation was shat, they hid the issue from operators and regulators alike, and went out of the way to not make simulators.
They removed previous generation's safeties (the oh shit yank back hard electric trim switch override), and removed a level of granularity in terms of capability to isolate the flight computer from the trim motors (which they have to do because they can't certify the plane to carry passengers otherwise), they have electrical control and power circuits to the trim motors too close together, and not sufficiently protected from a thrown turbine blade.
The aerodynamics (without MCAS functional) fail to pass airworthyness requirements for passenger transport that have been in place since time immemorial, and critical structural components (pickle forks) are showing alarming degrees of premature failure given their design lifetime.
Explain to me how a plane that doesn't at all implement graceful degradation to a fundamentally safe configuration is not "fundamentally flawed". Explain to me how plane's assembled from components that are failing well before their designed lifetime (and yes, I understand MTBF) is not a sign fundamental flaws. Even with all the fixes they're doing, the design shows an astonishing lack of good engineering sense. You don't keep around an awkward, unpredictable, unergonomic tool built by someone who demonstrated a willful disregard for doing Generally Accepted Engineering Practices, and who have repeatedly been found to do stupid things like leaving tools or metal shavings to foul or clog up filters, damage gaskets/seals etc.. You bin it, and make/get one that won't kill 200 people a failure instead. I don't give a damn how expensive a mistake it was.
There are lines you don't cross. Supporting bad business is one of them. Bring on the Depression. Maybe it's time we all figured out what good business looks like all the way around again.
And no, all that isn't belief or mere opinion. It's fact laid bare for all to see. You can fly on them and risk your loved ones if you like. I know the mentalities that drive those types of boondoggle and I'll have none of it. Show me a massive culture revamp in Boeing first, then I'll consider it again.
You're missing OP's point. MCAS was flawed, but the plane would have been fine if they hadn't added MCAS. It would just have required pilot retraining (which Boeing desperately wanted to avoid). I have never seen a reliable source for the claim that the handling characteristics without MCAS would fail to meet airworthiness requirements.
Using a single AoA sensor to drive a safety-critical system -- a largely-undocumented one at that -- wasn't "unsound?"
If I have this wrong, btw, I'm more than open to correction. Downvoting without commenting doesn't say "You're wrong," it says, "You're right, but ptthhthhhth."
I was referring to the airframe itself. The plane is perfectly capable of flying without MCAS, it just doesn't handle the same as pre-MAX 737s.
From what I understand it would not get certified today if it were introduced as a new airplane completely unrelated to any others, for a variety of obscure reasons.
However if the original 737 in the 60s had the design of the MAX, its pilots would be taught how to fly it without any MCAS software and it would fly just fine.
However if the original 737 in the 60s had the design of the MAX, its pilots would be taught how to fly it without any MCAS software and it would fly just fine.
You understand incorrectly. The 737 MAX would have no trouble being certified as a new type without MCAS. Boeing did not forget how to design planes.
My understanding is that it would not have been certifiable under part 25.175, requiring a control stick force curve with stable slope across a wide variety of flight regimes.
https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/14/25.175
https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/14/25.175
The force curve precluded single-certification without MCAS, but I haven't seen any claim that it would not be certified at all. 'Stable' is the critical term, and is loosely defined.
In reality, the force curves always deviate from the ideal, save in fly-by-wire designs. There are two different issues at play:
The first is a force curve that deviates so much that it becomes unintuitive or unmanageable to fly. This would not be acceptable, but I have not seen someone claim the 737 MAX would be characterized this way.
The second is whether the force curves of the older 737s matched the MAX closely enough. These pilots are expecting a certain behavior, and under single certification, could be going back and forth between these models often. Even small differences in handling between these could be jarring and lead to bad stick inputs.
This is a much more demanding requirement because of the context; in the first case, a pilot is making one transition to a new aircraft that they expect will be different from what they flew before. In the second, they are switching between aircraft often, perhaps after long stretches of becoming accustomed to one model or the other. They must then constantly be aware of these differences and continually adjust for them, a situation ripe for error.
My understanding is that the 737Max flies kinda like a 757 without MCAS. It's not a big deal.
In reality, the force curves always deviate from the ideal, save in fly-by-wire designs. There are two different issues at play:
The first is a force curve that deviates so much that it becomes unintuitive or unmanageable to fly. This would not be acceptable, but I have not seen someone claim the 737 MAX would be characterized this way.
The second is whether the force curves of the older 737s matched the MAX closely enough. These pilots are expecting a certain behavior, and under single certification, could be going back and forth between these models often. Even small differences in handling between these could be jarring and lead to bad stick inputs.
This is a much more demanding requirement because of the context; in the first case, a pilot is making one transition to a new aircraft that they expect will be different from what they flew before. In the second, they are switching between aircraft often, perhaps after long stretches of becoming accustomed to one model or the other. They must then constantly be aware of these differences and continually adjust for them, a situation ripe for error.
My understanding is that the 737Max flies kinda like a 757 without MCAS. It's not a big deal.
Insightful clarification.
It is hard to find reliable sources on this, I must say.
I base my conclusion for example on these excerpts from [1]:
> MCAS would trigger in narrow circumstances. It was designed “to address potentially unacceptable nose-up pitching moment at high angles of attack at high airspeeds,” Boeing told the FAA in a proprietary System Safety Assessment
(This doesn't specify whether it would be unacceptable for certification, or for certification under the same type certificate.)
> Engineers determined that on the MAX, the force the pilots feel in the control column as they execute this maneuver would not smoothly and continuously increase. Pilots who pull back forcefully on the column — sometimes called the stick — might suddenly feel a slackening of resistance. An FAA rule requires that the plane handle with smoothly changing stick forces.
(This seems to indicate that it would be unacceptable under the general FAA rule.)
[1] https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/times-watchdog/the...
It is hard to find reliable sources on this, I must say.
I base my conclusion for example on these excerpts from [1]:
> MCAS would trigger in narrow circumstances. It was designed “to address potentially unacceptable nose-up pitching moment at high angles of attack at high airspeeds,” Boeing told the FAA in a proprietary System Safety Assessment
(This doesn't specify whether it would be unacceptable for certification, or for certification under the same type certificate.)
> Engineers determined that on the MAX, the force the pilots feel in the control column as they execute this maneuver would not smoothly and continuously increase. Pilots who pull back forcefully on the column — sometimes called the stick — might suddenly feel a slackening of resistance. An FAA rule requires that the plane handle with smoothly changing stick forces.
(This seems to indicate that it would be unacceptable under the general FAA rule.)
[1] https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/times-watchdog/the...
Without MCAS wouldn't the plane be unbalanced due to engine placement issues and excess weight?
From my understanding, the MCAS system was built to offset these problematic default states that come with using an old body not compatible with the upgrades made. I also heard the weight of these new engines caused wings to develop stress cracks.
Not sure how it could be considered safe without a better designed MCAS system and addressing the other issues.
From my understanding, the MCAS system was built to offset these problematic default states that come with using an old body not compatible with the upgrades made. I also heard the weight of these new engines caused wings to develop stress cracks.
Not sure how it could be considered safe without a better designed MCAS system and addressing the other issues.
You seem to be conflating ideas. jaywalk said it best with:
> It simply handles differently than pre-MAX 737s in certain scenarios
It handles differently than previous 737s due to airframe changes (namely engine position). MCAS was meant to "correct" this for the purpose of skipping re-certification. The airframe isn't fundamentally flawed, the process of certifying it this round was flawed. Which caused Boeing engineers to implement a flawed MCAS system.
> It simply handles differently than pre-MAX 737s in certain scenarios
It handles differently than previous 737s due to airframe changes (namely engine position). MCAS was meant to "correct" this for the purpose of skipping re-certification. The airframe isn't fundamentally flawed, the process of certifying it this round was flawed. Which caused Boeing engineers to implement a flawed MCAS system.
I believe this to be a myth. MCAS is not "just" so that it feels like the old 737. Without MCAS, it would not be certifiable.
See for example here:
https://aviation.stackexchange.com/questions/73132/did-boein...
See for example here:
https://aviation.stackexchange.com/questions/73132/did-boein...
That statement is incorrect. It would be perfectly certifiable with additional pilot training. The killer feature was the theory that MCAS would allow airlines to get away without additional training. Practice proved to be quite different, as is so often the case.
Do you have an authoritative reference for that, stating unambiguously that the plane without MCAS would fulfil all the regulatory requirements for manoeuvring stability in terms of stick force curve slope, for example during a wind-up turn?
(I agree, FWIW, that the plane would by flyable, easily in nearly all flight regimes, and carefully in some flight regimes, without MCAS. But that is not the issue at hand.)
(I agree, FWIW, that the plane would by flyable, easily in nearly all flight regimes, and carefully in some flight regimes, without MCAS. But that is not the issue at hand.)
I've read there are various details of the airplane unrelated to aerodynamics that are considered fine in a legacy design but would need to be revised if the 737 MAX were to be certified from scratch.
Here is one example: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-boeing-737max/boeing-prop...
My understanding of that issue: The 737 is wired in such a way that was considered fine when it was designed. In 1998 an MC-11 crashed which resulted in revised design standards that would render the 737's wiring invalid, except the 737 was already a proven design by this point and consequently has been allowed to continue flying the way it is. The 737 MAX continues to use this wiring configuration, which was initially considered fine because the the 737 MAX "is a 737", a proven legacy design.
> Boeing did not forget how to design planes.
I certainly did not and would not suggest otherwise. It's possible I'm mistaken about the above, I'm certainly not an expert on FAA matters, but I earnestly don't think I'm wrong. If you still think I'm wrong, I'd appreciate a substantive correction.
Here is one example: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-boeing-737max/boeing-prop...
My understanding of that issue: The 737 is wired in such a way that was considered fine when it was designed. In 1998 an MC-11 crashed which resulted in revised design standards that would render the 737's wiring invalid, except the 737 was already a proven design by this point and consequently has been allowed to continue flying the way it is. The 737 MAX continues to use this wiring configuration, which was initially considered fine because the the 737 MAX "is a 737", a proven legacy design.
> Boeing did not forget how to design planes.
I certainly did not and would not suggest otherwise. It's possible I'm mistaken about the above, I'm certainly not an expert on FAA matters, but I earnestly don't think I'm wrong. If you still think I'm wrong, I'd appreciate a substantive correction.
Same. My understanding is that adding larger engines, and moving them forward on the wing, make the the airframe unable to fly at level altitude without software automatically adjusting the pitch.
I believe that is overstating things. From what I gather, it is during specific flight conditions, namely high angles of attack at high airspeeds, encountered during an extreme manoeuvre (definitely not straight and level flight), namely a wind-up turn (a turn at increasing bank angle and constant speed and constant power (note that this implies accelerating descent), rarely if ever encountered during a routine flight).
This is flown to test the stick force as a function of load factor. Now, it is a certification requirement that the stick force increases basically linearly with the load factor ("The stick force curve must have a stable slope" [3]), and that was not given - the stick slacked.
This is what MCAS was designed to address.
From what I gather, a 737 MAX without MCAS would not be certifiable, but safely flyable, possibly with some surprising, but manageable behaviour under very rare circumstances: namely, flying at a high angle of attack with high speed would require you to release some stick force instead of having to pull hard to keep the nose up.
Having said that, the whole saga has revealed so many problems at Boeing and the FAA that I am reluctant to fly the 737 MAX and 787 myself.
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/times-watchdog/the...
https://www.scribd.com/document/53095046/NASA-Information-Su...
[3] https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/14/25.175
This is flown to test the stick force as a function of load factor. Now, it is a certification requirement that the stick force increases basically linearly with the load factor ("The stick force curve must have a stable slope" [3]), and that was not given - the stick slacked.
This is what MCAS was designed to address.
From what I gather, a 737 MAX without MCAS would not be certifiable, but safely flyable, possibly with some surprising, but manageable behaviour under very rare circumstances: namely, flying at a high angle of attack with high speed would require you to release some stick force instead of having to pull hard to keep the nose up.
Having said that, the whole saga has revealed so many problems at Boeing and the FAA that I am reluctant to fly the 737 MAX and 787 myself.
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/times-watchdog/the...
https://www.scribd.com/document/53095046/NASA-Information-Su...
[3] https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/14/25.175
My own understanding is that the whole problem is to avoid the costly pilot training on the MAX by making it behave like a regular 737. That's where the automatic pitch adjustment at high angles of attack comes from. Had Boeing decided that companies would have to train the pilots for a new type of aircraft (which the MAX actually is), none of this would have happened.
This is actually the problem. If they were willing to change the type certification, they would have been free to raise the airplane up and keep the engines in their proper position. The need to keep type certifications the same is the root cause of a whole series of bad decisions, including engine placement and the unwillingness to change pilot training & documentation.
> free to raise the airplane up
How do you suppose they might do that without completely redesigning the plane? I don't think type recertification is why they kept the landing gear the same length.
How do you suppose they might do that without completely redesigning the plane? I don't think type recertification is why they kept the landing gear the same length.
There certainly would be other costs associated with that, but the primary motivator for not redesigning their aircraft was maintaining type certification, not the cost of a clean redesign. If the Max8 could keep the same type certification, pilots could cross over without long and expensive training, and without losing their rating on their prior aircraft, making adoption a no brainer. If the Max8 doesn’t keep a type rating, there’s less of an incentive for current 737 customers to buy a Max8, since they’ll have to go through the same logistical hurdles that introducing a A321neo would have.
Plus Southwest basically won’t buy anything but 737s, so maintaining that type rating was critical to selling the new plane to one of their biggest customers.
Plus Southwest basically won’t buy anything but 737s, so maintaining that type rating was critical to selling the new plane to one of their biggest customers.
It absolutely is. Boeing already made a stretched 737 with larger engines. It's called the 757 and they stopped making it because airlines wanted bigger 737s.
Since the 787 is somewhat a clean sheet redesign of the 767, Boeing wants to do the same with the 757 and is currently trying to get the traction with airlines to do that.
Boeing had initially proposed a clean sheet redesign of the 737, but the market for that aircraft is very sensitive to training and operation costs.
Boeing had initially proposed a clean sheet redesign of the 737, but the market for that aircraft is very sensitive to training and operation costs.
As of very recently they’re looking into putting new engines under a 757 and adding some carbon composite for lightness. They’re referring to it as the 757-Plus.
That’s basically what airbus did to create the A320neo series; add in larger engines (including the same one the MAX8 uses, actually), and make a few minor tweaks to improve weight or aerodynamic efficiency. Done correctly it’s a brilliant move; 15-20% fuel savings without the need to significantly change pilot or maintenance (sans engines) protocols. Sadly the MAX8 was not done correctly.
Lengthening the landing gear is a non-trivial design change. It might be more feasible to shorten the fuselage on a 757 than reengineer the gear on the MAX.
The point is not “raising the vehicle height would be cheap”; it obviously wouldn’t. The point is that one of the key requirements was maintaining the 737 type certification. If that requirement was thrown out, they would’ve made a better airplane that wouldn’t have sold anywhere near as well as the MAX8.
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> making it behave like a regular 737
Not really. Without MCAS, the plane would not have been certifiable. (So, MCAS does make it more similar to the regular 737 in that it is certifiable, but that was not the only reason.)
Not really. Without MCAS, the plane would not have been certifiable. (So, MCAS does make it more similar to the regular 737 in that it is certifiable, but that was not the only reason.)
I don't believe that is the case. The MCAS system was added because the handling of the plane was different to previous models at higher angles of attack. The system was meant to compensate to give the same handling 'feel' as older 737s to pass certification without requiring significant re-training of pilots.
Not quite. The issue is that, due to the engine placement and its effect on center of gravity, the aircraft will tend past a certain angle of attack to start nosing into a stall, rather than away from one. MCAS was added to counteract this highly counterintuitive and dangerous tendency by automatically driving the horizontal stabilizer to nose the aircraft back toward level flight.
As I understand it, the 737 MAX was the first commercial airframe ever approved by the FAA with this sudden inflection point in behavior when approaching a stall. (There's a term for it, something like "positive rate characteristic", but I forget. Perhaps someone who knows it will mention it here.) Seeing how well that worked out, one hopes it'll also be the last such airframe approved.
As I understand it, the 737 MAX was the first commercial airframe ever approved by the FAA with this sudden inflection point in behavior when approaching a stall. (There's a term for it, something like "positive rate characteristic", but I forget. Perhaps someone who knows it will mention it here.) Seeing how well that worked out, one hopes it'll also be the last such airframe approved.
> the aircraft will tend past a certain angle of attack to start nosing into a stall, rather than away from one.
Virtually all aircraft will do that, including the original 737. Different aircraft do this at different points; provided the pilot is trained for the aircraft, it's not a fundamental problem.
The problem for the MAX is they wanted pilots to be able to treat it like an airplane it wasn't.
Virtually all aircraft will do that, including the original 737. Different aircraft do this at different points; provided the pilot is trained for the aircraft, it's not a fundamental problem.
The problem for the MAX is they wanted pilots to be able to treat it like an airplane it wasn't.
https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/14/25.203 seems to say otherwise - specifically, that you shouldn't be able to stall a certifiable aircraft unless you maintain a positive (ie nose-up, pulling back) control force "up to and throughout the stall". If that were true of the 737 MAX without MCAS, then MCAS wouldn't need to exist. All you'd need to do to avoid a stall would be to stop pulling back on the yoke, and let the aircraft settle on its own. Stick shakers exist to warn the pilot that they need to stop pulling, and the 737 MAX has one.
But evidently the stick shaker isn't enough, because the 737 MAX also has MCAS, which operates to actively deflect the nose back down as the aircraft approaches stall. That shouldn't be necessary. That's the thing that other airframes, including prior marks of the 737, do not do. In those airframes, you don't need to push the nose down to get away from a stall. You only need to stop pulling the nose up. MCAS exists to try to replicate this behavior in the 737 MAX, but that MCAS needs to exist for that purpose is enough to demonstrate that the 737 MAX does not behave that way by default.
I agree that the falsely shared type certification, and the consequent lack of training on the MAX's type-unique and dangerous stall behavior without MCAS, is a problem. Where we disagree is that I don't consider acceptable a design that exhibits that behavior at all in the absence of an active control system that can fail or be turned off. Neither do the relevant regulations for certification - I linked them above; they make no mention of an exception for an airframe with something equivalent to MCAS - and neither, historically, has the FAA. Not, at least, until the 737 MAX was itself type-certified, and the way that process played out is itself highly suggestive of significant corruption, in the form of regulatory capture if nothing else.
But evidently the stick shaker isn't enough, because the 737 MAX also has MCAS, which operates to actively deflect the nose back down as the aircraft approaches stall. That shouldn't be necessary. That's the thing that other airframes, including prior marks of the 737, do not do. In those airframes, you don't need to push the nose down to get away from a stall. You only need to stop pulling the nose up. MCAS exists to try to replicate this behavior in the 737 MAX, but that MCAS needs to exist for that purpose is enough to demonstrate that the 737 MAX does not behave that way by default.
I agree that the falsely shared type certification, and the consequent lack of training on the MAX's type-unique and dangerous stall behavior without MCAS, is a problem. Where we disagree is that I don't consider acceptable a design that exhibits that behavior at all in the absence of an active control system that can fail or be turned off. Neither do the relevant regulations for certification - I linked them above; they make no mention of an exception for an airframe with something equivalent to MCAS - and neither, historically, has the FAA. Not, at least, until the 737 MAX was itself type-certified, and the way that process played out is itself highly suggestive of significant corruption, in the form of regulatory capture if nothing else.
They're pretty adamant that it's not an anti-stall feature - those normally have 'stick pushers' or shakers.
Considering that both crashes occurred because of MCAS acting as intended on the basis of invalid data from a failed AoA sensor with no backup, I feel like that would be a surprising lie for Boeing to have told.
edit: And, having checked the Wikipedia page for the system, I find myself surprised that that is in fact a lie Boeing has told.
They may as well go ahead and try to rebrand the damned thing, I guess. On top of everything else they've done, I can't see how it would make their problems any worse...
also edit: Via Wikipedia, 14 CFR 25.203: "No abnormal nose-up pitching may occur. The longitudinal [pitch] control force must be positive up to and throughout the stall." This is the characteristic the MAX lacks due to the engine placement. If you want to add an active system to correct for that, the AoA sensor is what you use to drive it, since that's what tells you the difference between the direction of airflow and the angle of the wing. That's how you know you're approaching a stall, and need to add a negative pitching moment. But if that sensor jams, which being a mechanical device it can do, and you don't have input from another sensor so you can see the disagreement, you risk spurious activation of the system when it isn't needed, potentially forcing the aircraft out of level flight.
I get that it's in Boeing's interest to claim MCAS isn't an anti-stall system. Why would they say anything else? To do so would implicitly admit not only that they built an aircraft that would fail dangerously in a common situation, but also that the FAA let them get away with selling it and selling it as type-identical with prior versions lacking the fail-dangerous characteristic. Neither admission would serve their interests.
But, equally, why should we take them at their word on this, or indeed anything? It's pretty clear that their corporate interests have ceased to align with ours as potential airline passengers. It's generous unto foolishness, in light of that, to give them the benefit of any doubt whatsoever.
https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/14/25.203
edit: And, having checked the Wikipedia page for the system, I find myself surprised that that is in fact a lie Boeing has told.
They may as well go ahead and try to rebrand the damned thing, I guess. On top of everything else they've done, I can't see how it would make their problems any worse...
also edit: Via Wikipedia, 14 CFR 25.203: "No abnormal nose-up pitching may occur. The longitudinal [pitch] control force must be positive up to and throughout the stall." This is the characteristic the MAX lacks due to the engine placement. If you want to add an active system to correct for that, the AoA sensor is what you use to drive it, since that's what tells you the difference between the direction of airflow and the angle of the wing. That's how you know you're approaching a stall, and need to add a negative pitching moment. But if that sensor jams, which being a mechanical device it can do, and you don't have input from another sensor so you can see the disagreement, you risk spurious activation of the system when it isn't needed, potentially forcing the aircraft out of level flight.
I get that it's in Boeing's interest to claim MCAS isn't an anti-stall system. Why would they say anything else? To do so would implicitly admit not only that they built an aircraft that would fail dangerously in a common situation, but also that the FAA let them get away with selling it and selling it as type-identical with prior versions lacking the fail-dangerous characteristic. Neither admission would serve their interests.
But, equally, why should we take them at their word on this, or indeed anything? It's pretty clear that their corporate interests have ceased to align with ours as potential airline passengers. It's generous unto foolishness, in light of that, to give them the benefit of any doubt whatsoever.
https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/14/25.203
They were pretty desperate to maintain the 737 type certification, to reduce airline adoption cost. So the question is: are they right, or are they stretching the truth via motivated reasoning?
This is a remarkably generous framing of the question. Why exclude the possibility that they were simply lying? Oh, I'm sure the engineers didn't like it, and said so. I believe the news has reported to that effect, based on internal emails. But when did people with golden parachutes start deserving the benefit of the doubt, in this industry or any other?
That's not really an accurate depiction. All planes constantly change the control settings required during different flight conditions in order to maintain level flight, often with software. Different speeds, flaps, weather conditions all require different trims to those control settings. If your plane gets new flight characteristics through a design change, the configurations your training told you should work will probably not work anymore.
What Boeing did was hide the change in flight characteristics caused by the new engines using software, so pilots didn't need to retrain, and they borked the implementation.
What Boeing did was hide the change in flight characteristics caused by the new engines using software, so pilots didn't need to retrain, and they borked the implementation.
> threads that I've read on this website
I strongly recommend not getting your 737-MAX facts from HN. Every time the topic comes up, the discussion continues to be riddled with inaccuracies, many of them strongly held beliefs.
I strongly recommend not getting your 737-MAX facts from HN. Every time the topic comes up, the discussion continues to be riddled with inaccuracies, many of them strongly held beliefs.
There is nothing wrong with using software to correct for instability; the B-2 Spirit is far less aerodynamically stable then the Max and it's only had one crash in its entire 23 year service history.
Boeing failed to provide sufficient redundancy for the MCAS system and proper training to the air crews.
Boeing failed to provide sufficient redundancy for the MCAS system and proper training to the air crews.
Military planes fly a little differently from passenger planes and the humans inside those planes expect different handling characteristics.
It wouldn't surprise me, though, if in its entire service history, the B-2 has had fewer total flights than the 737 Max has...
One way to look at it is that 5% of all B-2s ever built have crashed.
Not to mention to most rigorously trained pilots and the face of the planet. Not to mention the tops minds designing the Aircraft and the software, rather than outsourcing it to code-by-the pound shops like Boeing did.
Freight carriers still fly MD-11 as they’re economical and its flaws are well understood, but passenger carriers don’t touch it or the TriStar with a 10ft pole, I think that’s the answer.
Not sure the 737 Max is big enough to be a freighter, though.
Alaska Airlines operates a number of 737 freighters because of how Alaska the state works logistics wise.
People in Alaska will do things like come down to Anchorage and buy all their supplies for several months from Fred Meyers and Costco and box it all up on a freight pallet and have Alaska Air ship it back to the remote area these people live in.
People in Alaska will do things like come down to Anchorage and buy all their supplies for several months from Fred Meyers and Costco and box it all up on a freight pallet and have Alaska Air ship it back to the remote area these people live in.
> probably know more about the flaws in the MAX
The thing is, we do know a lot about those flaws and the only way to really fix those flaws is with a clean-sheet redesign.
The MAX would have flown again, for sure, pre-COVID. However, designs without known fundamental design flaws can handle worldwide airline lift needs for the foreseeable future.. and it's legitimate to wonder what that means for the future of the MAX.
The thing is, we do know a lot about those flaws and the only way to really fix those flaws is with a clean-sheet redesign.
The MAX would have flown again, for sure, pre-COVID. However, designs without known fundamental design flaws can handle worldwide airline lift needs for the foreseeable future.. and it's legitimate to wonder what that means for the future of the MAX.
> The thing is, we do know a lot about those flaws and the only way to really fix those flaws is with a clean-sheet redesign.
That's just not true. People seem to be conflating the fact that the design required software-controlled stability (e.g. MCAS) as a "fundamental" design issue. That's just not the case. The problems were:
1. MCAS was not sufficiently redundant.
2. Boeing tried to get away with the changes to the MAX without requiring recertification or pilot retraining, which was just wrong.
Both #1 and #2 have straightforward fixes.
That's just not true. People seem to be conflating the fact that the design required software-controlled stability (e.g. MCAS) as a "fundamental" design issue. That's just not the case. The problems were:
1. MCAS was not sufficiently redundant.
2. Boeing tried to get away with the changes to the MAX without requiring recertification or pilot retraining, which was just wrong.
Both #1 and #2 have straightforward fixes.
#1 requires fitting another AOA sensor vane. This is not being done. It would void the existing type certification, at which point the reason to avoid a clean-sheet redesign is gone. If they could have designed a new aircraft around the more efficient engines at the same size and have airlines buy it they would have. But without a 737 type certificate Southwest (their largest single customer for 737s, Southwest only flys 737s) won't buy and many others will be more reluctant to buy.
#2 is being changed.
#2 is being changed.
> #1 requires fitting another AOA sensor vane
This is baloney. There are already 2 AOA sensors on the plane, but MCAS originally only read from one of them: https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2019/03/boein...
This is baloney. There are already 2 AOA sensors on the plane, but MCAS originally only read from one of them: https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2019/03/boein...
There need to be at least 3. With two a disagreement cannot be resolved by majority, so the new MCAS will have to disable itself. Pilots will need to be trained to handle this failure mode, and the indicators will need to be added to all the planes (and will need to work, that was an additional issue).
This is a fundamental design flaw for a system which can have catastrophic consequences. This should have been classified as a DO-178B level A system (capable of crashing the plane) but was misclassified by Boeing. DO-178B level A systems require triple redundancy.
This is a fundamental design flaw for a system which can have catastrophic consequences. This should have been classified as a DO-178B level A system (capable of crashing the plane) but was misclassified by Boeing. DO-178B level A systems require triple redundancy.
Yes, I'm kinda surprised they didn't use the COVID lockdown period to do proper pilot training.
Most pilots and planes were basically sitting idle anyway. It's good for them to remain somewhat active. And fuel was given away for pretty much free because the overproduction was filling up expensive storage space.
This would have been the ideal moment to teach 737 pilots to properly handle the Max aircraft without needing MCAS.
Most pilots and planes were basically sitting idle anyway. It's good for them to remain somewhat active. And fuel was given away for pretty much free because the overproduction was filling up expensive storage space.
This would have been the ideal moment to teach 737 pilots to properly handle the Max aircraft without needing MCAS.
> This would have been the ideal moment to teach 737 pilots to properly handle the Max aircraft without needing MCAS.
Well, its not legal to have the 737 MAX without MCAS, so its a moot point.
MCAS exists to compensate for undesired control forces as high (near-stall) angles of attack, its not legal to have those performance characteristics in an aircraft.
If this was Airbus, this would have been done in software since the A320 series is fly by wire.
Well, its not legal to have the 737 MAX without MCAS, so its a moot point.
MCAS exists to compensate for undesired control forces as high (near-stall) angles of attack, its not legal to have those performance characteristics in an aircraft.
If this was Airbus, this would have been done in software since the A320 series is fly by wire.
I think this might have some truth to it.
For example, the DC-10 was also a flawed airplane with a terrible safety record in the 70's which was grounded by the FAA as a result. But the flaws were fixed and the plane is still in operation today, now with a safety record comparable to other similar planes.
For example, the DC-10 was also a flawed airplane with a terrible safety record in the 70's which was grounded by the FAA as a result. But the flaws were fixed and the plane is still in operation today, now with a safety record comparable to other similar planes.
Cargo bay doors was the problem with the DC-10. The doors were re-engineered so they were fail safe. They did have other problems but fixing the door latches was it. This is in a different league of design fault to the 737 Max and MCAS.
Furthermore this was in a different era before the internet. People only had the mainstream news to go on.
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-birmingham-26259236#:~....
Furthermore this was in a different era before the internet. People only had the mainstream news to go on.
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-birmingham-26259236#:~....
How is it in a different league? We know why the planes crashed, and we know what to do to fix it. Add some AOA redundancies, and get a new type certification that requires pilot retraining.
Safety is not a complicated goal to achieve. You identify hazards and you rectify them. The hard part is identifying them, which in this case has already tragically happened.
Safety is not a complicated goal to achieve. You identify hazards and you rectify them. The hard part is identifying them, which in this case has already tragically happened.
Not really. The fix for the cargo doors was not affecting the aerodynamics, centre of gravity and how the plane handled. The pilots didn't need updated type certification for the fixed cargo doors.
Your easy fixes for the dreaded 737 max sound like those of an armchair expert.
Your easy fixes for the dreaded 737 max sound like those of an armchair expert.
It is my understanding that the inherent handling characteristics of the 737 Max would have been acceptable under a new type certification, without MCAS. Is this incorrect?
My guess is Russia or China. Then the US will be fomented into supporting this terrible plane as a patriotic duty. People will start taking "Freedom Flights" to prove to those bad people "over there" that America is #1!
Or just rebrand it.
I'm sort of amazed they haven't done that already...
I'm sort of amazed they haven't done that already...
Last July:
>A Boeing 737 Max due to be delivered to Ryanair has had the name Max dropped from the livery, further fuelling speculation that the manufacturer and airlines will seek to rebrand the troubled plane once it is given the all clear to fly again.
>Photos have emerged of a 737 Max in Ryanair colours outside Boeing’s manufacturing hub, with the designation 737-8200 – instead of 737 Max – on the nose. The 737-8200 is a type name for the aircraft that is used by aviation agencies.
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/jul/15/boeing-737-...
>A Boeing 737 Max due to be delivered to Ryanair has had the name Max dropped from the livery, further fuelling speculation that the manufacturer and airlines will seek to rebrand the troubled plane once it is given the all clear to fly again.
>Photos have emerged of a 737 Max in Ryanair colours outside Boeing’s manufacturing hub, with the designation 737-8200 – instead of 737 Max – on the nose. The 737-8200 is a type name for the aircraft that is used by aviation agencies.
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/jul/15/boeing-737-...
This is a special model for RyanAir called the MAX 200.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_737_MAX#737_MAX_200
Basically, the high density requires an extra set of exit doors, so this is a MAX 8 with two more overwing exit doors. Its still branded as a 737 MAX.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_737_MAX#737_MAX_200
Basically, the high density requires an extra set of exit doors, so this is a MAX 8 with two more overwing exit doors. Its still branded as a 737 MAX.
I don't know about you, but I never want to fly on a 737 MAX no matter what they rename it. Every time I have booked a ticket online the website tells me what kind of aircraft I would be flying on.
As nice as this info is, is there any actual guarantee that it is valid? I wouldn't be surprised if airlines switch planes around all the time, so by the time you check in you may be flying a MAX plane (and possibly not even be aware).
This is anecdotal, but I've never once out of hundreds of flights experienced what you're describing. Sure, replacement flights when things got cancelled may have been on a different aircraft, but then it's a different flight altogether so not particularly surprising. I'd be curious to know if under normal circumstances they ever fly a plane other than the one listed, I have no idea.
Edit: to clarify a bit, I know this because I'm a nerd and sometimes pick flights specifically because of the type of plane used. I quite enjoyed the A380. :o)
Edit: to clarify a bit, I know this because I'm a nerd and sometimes pick flights specifically because of the type of plane used. I quite enjoyed the A380. :o)
It doesn't happen on something like an A380 (especially since there isn't exactly any other plane type to switch to from an A380 without huge issues), but it's pretty common on smaller jets, especially in the A320 family or 737 family where they are nearly-identically-sized jets that can be swapped out easily.
If you're scheduled to fly on a 737-800 but there's a problem with the jet, they might swap it out for a 737-400 (which is pretty much just an older generation of the -800, similar to how the -800 is an older generation of the MAX 8) and it would go completely unnoticed by almost every passenger. That happens less often nowadays that most (all?) of the -400s are retired, but I would expect it to start happening again once the MAXs return to service and they are being deployed side-by-side with the NGs.
If you're scheduled to fly on a 737-800 but there's a problem with the jet, they might swap it out for a 737-400 (which is pretty much just an older generation of the -800, similar to how the -800 is an older generation of the MAX 8) and it would go completely unnoticed by almost every passenger. That happens less often nowadays that most (all?) of the -400s are retired, but I would expect it to start happening again once the MAXs return to service and they are being deployed side-by-side with the NGs.
Yep. I've booked several flights originally scheduled to be operated by a 737-300 or a 737-400 and had it swapped out for the other on the day (as the airline operated a mixed fleet with both types regularly swapped around to better match demand and/or respond to maintenance issues). Also had a 757 swapped out for a 320 a few weeks prior to the flight. Or a 777-300 swapped out for a 777-200 several days before the flight. Even a 787 was swapped out for a 330. I suspect some of the changes are demand driven e.g. swapping to a smaller or bigger aircraft. I have observed this cross multiple airlines: Qantas, Air NZ, British Airways, China Southernm etc. Quite common especially for mixed fleet airlines.
I imagine it's possible, but if the replacement craft does not have identical seating configuration, there can be headaches around that, especially with airlines moving to doing things like charging premium prices for certain coach seats etc.
I've never had the plane model changed in my flying experience.
I've never had the plane model changed in my flying experience.
I have had several times. I was even switched to another airline once, they had an issue with their own plane and grabbed a charter :)
I believe bigger airline alliances actually have a pool for such mishaps, spare planes with just the alliance branding on them, I've seen them at airports though not sure how the ownership worked.
I believe bigger airline alliances actually have a pool for such mishaps, spare planes with just the alliance branding on them, I've seen them at airports though not sure how the ownership worked.
These aircraft are always owned by a specific airline and not the alliance itself. Just look closer, you'll see the airline's branding somewhere on the aircraft. The alliance branding is just meant to promote the alliance. These aircraft are part of their respective airline's fleet and operated as normal flights by the airline that owns it (just like other normally branded aircrafts).
There is no guarantee, in order to not fly on the max8 you’ll either need to use someone who flies airbus (not a bad idea based on my a320neo flight), or be willing to cancel your flight day of.
That’s exactly what the rebranding is for.
Rebrand when it’s past certification. If it is rejected, then the new brand is contaminated.
They have been rebranding it silently.
Boeing and some of their customers have switched back to using just numbers and leaving out the 'max' from the name.
If they did a public rebranding, it would defeat the purpose of trying to hide the name from the public.
Boeing and some of their customers have switched back to using just numbers and leaving out the 'max' from the name.
If they did a public rebranding, it would defeat the purpose of trying to hide the name from the public.
If the US recertifies the B738-MAX8 with the automatic attitude management, a much more relevant brand will get tarnished.
> It's never going to fly with airline and passengers ever again,
What are Boing's alternatives here? I guess they should go back to the drawing board and scrap this idea of just adding some large engines on a plane that was not made for them. But that fatal idea, have put them in a horrible position.
The airline business seems to be very much about saving money on fuel, and creating a new fuel efficient airplane is going to take a lot of time (which is guess is why they did this quick and dirty hack the last time, to stay competitive).
In a business like that trust is everything, and I feel the more they are trying to force people into that flawed airplane, the less likely it seems that people will trust them ever again.
What are Boing's alternatives here? I guess they should go back to the drawing board and scrap this idea of just adding some large engines on a plane that was not made for them. But that fatal idea, have put them in a horrible position.
The airline business seems to be very much about saving money on fuel, and creating a new fuel efficient airplane is going to take a lot of time (which is guess is why they did this quick and dirty hack the last time, to stay competitive).
In a business like that trust is everything, and I feel the more they are trying to force people into that flawed airplane, the less likely it seems that people will trust them ever again.
Yep. Trust is everything. Boeing is already on thin ice.
Just imagine, there is one more crash related to this, and what the fall out would be. Boeing as a company would be toast.
That's the risk Boeing is dealing with on hand.
And it won't be just Boeing's problem, it will also be airlines' problems for not taking firmer stance.
Just imagine, there is one more crash related to this, and what the fall out would be. Boeing as a company would be toast.
That's the risk Boeing is dealing with on hand.
And it won't be just Boeing's problem, it will also be airlines' problems for not taking firmer stance.
Boeing's passenger plane business would be done
But the Space and Defense Contracts would be more than enough to keep the company around
But the Space and Defense Contracts would be more than enough to keep the company around
No need to keep the company around, the assets can be absorbed by another player.
Who in their right mind will ever trust any forthcoming Boeing passenger aircraft? Airbus will totally dominate aircraft sales to commercial airline fleets until they exhibit wreckless negligence and cause their brand to sink to Boeing's level.
As long as the court system refuses to hold airlines accountable it's always going to come down to price. If the Airlines were directly liable for a crash no matter the circumstance, then they might employ their own safety testing and quit purchasing equipment based solely on price.
Well, now is the time for a clean sheet design. There isn't going to be any near term demand anyway.
When production really kicks in ten years from now, the world will look different - everybody is flying really old gas guzzler planes.
When production really kicks in ten years from now, the world will look different - everybody is flying really old gas guzzler planes.
The reason Boeing went with adding bigger engines to small a plane that couldn't have them is because airlines also like to save money in training and certification. If Boeing made them spend money in new training, they could spend money in better planes from the competition as well.
Of course it will. Software is much cheaper to iterate on than say wing design.
I would assume that most work is done in something like Dassault Systèmes Catia etc, so the wing is software also for most of its life...
As soon as the tooling begins manufacture, it's a heck of a lot more difficult to make revisions. It takes about 2 years from the beginning of tooling manufacture until the first wing parts touch it (validation testing). And another year or three before actual, meant-to-fly, wing parts touch it. Any changes to wing design risk rebooting the entire process I just described.
Additionally, the people doing this work are an extremely limited resource. Major schedule changes disrupt all the future work they previously scheduled. You can't just bring in some contractors to fill in because the work is rather new/novel every time.
Additionally, the people doing this work are an extremely limited resource. Major schedule changes disrupt all the future work they previously scheduled. You can't just bring in some contractors to fill in because the work is rather new/novel every time.
Boeing has terrible management and deserves to go under for the 737 Max fiasco but...
...it seems like maybe Norwegian Air is reeling from coronavirus-induced low demand and is trying to escape its responsibilities.
...it seems like maybe Norwegian Air is reeling from coronavirus-induced low demand and is trying to escape its responsibilities.
Bit of both. Norwegian Air needs money, no doubt. But Boeing took a deposit and didn’t deliver a usable product. Under certain circumstances it makes sense for Boeing to return the deposit; they didn’t uphold their end of the deal. The lawsuit will almost certainly hinge on the terms of the deal and whatever local precedence and law might exist in this area.
> Boeing has terrible management and deserves to go under for the 737 Max fiasco
This seems a bit like throwing the baby out with the bathwater. Boeing employees 145,000 people. You're advocating making the equivalent of a small city jobless based on the actions of a very small contingent.
Additionally, aerospace is a capital intensive business. To give up Boeing would mean the likely-permanent loss of sophisticated manufacturing capabilities in the United States.
Nobody is starting a new aircraft manufacturer on AWS using Javascript. It would take tens of billions of dollars to even begin to attempt to re-create a company with Boeing's capabilities.
This seems a bit like throwing the baby out with the bathwater. Boeing employees 145,000 people. You're advocating making the equivalent of a small city jobless based on the actions of a very small contingent.
Additionally, aerospace is a capital intensive business. To give up Boeing would mean the likely-permanent loss of sophisticated manufacturing capabilities in the United States.
Nobody is starting a new aircraft manufacturer on AWS using Javascript. It would take tens of billions of dollars to even begin to attempt to re-create a company with Boeing's capabilities.
> You're advocating making the equivalent of a small city jobless based on the actions of a very small contingent.
No one has ever advocated that every person at Boeing be fired and that's not what happens in large corporate bankruptcies. So no, that's not what the other poster was advocating.
In general, I've seen people advocating that Boeing's shareholders be wiped out, senior management fired and the company be rebooted with a thorough dedication towards "safety first" as opposed to "short-term profits first".
No one has ever advocated that every person at Boeing be fired and that's not what happens in large corporate bankruptcies. So no, that's not what the other poster was advocating.
In general, I've seen people advocating that Boeing's shareholders be wiped out, senior management fired and the company be rebooted with a thorough dedication towards "safety first" as opposed to "short-term profits first".
Aren't most "shareholders" actually index funds or pensions at this point? The effects of wiping out such a large chunk of stock all at once would be felt pretty widely.
They shouldn't have invested in a badly managed company then.
As long as investors don't feel their moral Hazzard, companies will keep doing the same things. Because investors will keep investing in them because they'll get bailed out at the end.
Why wouldn't you invest in boeing if you know they are going to prioritize short term profits (good for you) and as soon as that comes back to bite the company it's going to be bailed out.
And if you keep bailing them out, it's in the companies best interest to prioritize short term profits over long term consequences, because that's what's best for investors.
Government bailouts pervert the market in extreme ways (you are essentially subsidizing risk), and it's the very reason why too big to fail companies keep doing the stuff they do.
The point of the "market" is leaving the pricing to investors, if they fail to price the company correctly then it's their loss, just like it's their win when the stock goes up.
The best option for too big to fail businesses failing is to buy 100% of it's shares when it declares bankruptcy (at close to $0), fire all top level management and the board, inject the cash needed and fix the companies culture to a prdoduct focused instead of finance focused (that's why the people rescued it), then IPO once it's numbers are in the green (or give one share to every tax paying resident)
As long as investors don't feel their moral Hazzard, companies will keep doing the same things. Because investors will keep investing in them because they'll get bailed out at the end.
Why wouldn't you invest in boeing if you know they are going to prioritize short term profits (good for you) and as soon as that comes back to bite the company it's going to be bailed out.
And if you keep bailing them out, it's in the companies best interest to prioritize short term profits over long term consequences, because that's what's best for investors.
Government bailouts pervert the market in extreme ways (you are essentially subsidizing risk), and it's the very reason why too big to fail companies keep doing the stuff they do.
The point of the "market" is leaving the pricing to investors, if they fail to price the company correctly then it's their loss, just like it's their win when the stock goes up.
The best option for too big to fail businesses failing is to buy 100% of it's shares when it declares bankruptcy (at close to $0), fire all top level management and the board, inject the cash needed and fix the companies culture to a prdoduct focused instead of finance focused (that's why the people rescued it), then IPO once it's numbers are in the green (or give one share to every tax paying resident)
Reading between the lines of hype, this is the most important fact in the article:
> [Norwegian Air] delayed general shareholders meeting on Tuesday and on the same day Boeing started re-certification tests for MAX aircraft
> [Norwegian Air] delayed general shareholders meeting on Tuesday and on the same day Boeing started re-certification tests for MAX aircraft
There was recent news(April/March) about Norwegian actually running extremely low on cash to a point of bankruptcy and the airline laid off like 90% of their workforce due to Covid19 pandemic and lack of flights/demand.
I really hope this doesn’t happen - Norwegian is the best low cost long haul airline out there. Round trip AUS-LGW tickets can be found for sub $500 on Norwegian. The premium is also very competitive for the same flight ($800-1200) when competitors doing similar route (BA) charge more than double that, and the service certainly isn’t doubled. They are also flying very new planes and as such are a much nicer experience. There are always plugs under the seats, IFE is modern and available on every seat. Also the way they handle seat service is much more convenient, you order and pay through the IFE console instead of having to wait for the cart to come around and as such you have complete service all the way though the flight.
Even on domestic flights in Europe they are a pretty reasonable experience, much better than Ryanair and Easyjet at least. They are often priced about 10-20% more expensive than Ryanair and Easyjet when you probably get double the comfort and service and half the annoyances. I might sound like a shill for Norwegian but I think they really fill the Southwest niche here - a decently low cost (but not lowest) airline that doesn’t treat you or it’s employees like shit.
That’s not to say they are without flaws either. I and others have had some sketchy times where Norwegian has fought awarding the EU mandated reimbursement for delayed/cancelled flights. But no other international airline in Europe straddles the line between legacy carrier level of service and barebones low-cost as well as Norwegian.
Even on domestic flights in Europe they are a pretty reasonable experience, much better than Ryanair and Easyjet at least. They are often priced about 10-20% more expensive than Ryanair and Easyjet when you probably get double the comfort and service and half the annoyances. I might sound like a shill for Norwegian but I think they really fill the Southwest niche here - a decently low cost (but not lowest) airline that doesn’t treat you or it’s employees like shit.
That’s not to say they are without flaws either. I and others have had some sketchy times where Norwegian has fought awarding the EU mandated reimbursement for delayed/cancelled flights. But no other international airline in Europe straddles the line between legacy carrier level of service and barebones low-cost as well as Norwegian.
The article talks about the airline focusing on shorter routes and cutting the longer routes that they were losing money on. Even if the airline doesn't go through bankruptcy the long haul routes at the same price will probably no longer be around.
"However, with the scheduled flights gradually resuming, the airline is restructuring its fleet and focusing on short- and medium-range destinations. Europe’s fourth-largest low-cost carrier will likely completely discontinue the long-haul flights that sank the company into debt."
"However, with the scheduled flights gradually resuming, the airline is restructuring its fleet and focusing on short- and medium-range destinations. Europe’s fourth-largest low-cost carrier will likely completely discontinue the long-haul flights that sank the company into debt."
it's too bad really, the long-haul price competition they created on their routes was fantastic
For what it’s worth, I also deeply enjoyed every long haul flight I’ve taken on Norwegian B787s. The value was definitely there.
Fought is expressing it mildly; they're outright refusing unless you threaten them with court action.
Aerospace is taking a massive hit, in the UK we've seen redundancies and are seeing more today.
Imagine getting to break your contract and then sue to try to get your initial deposit back. Isn't that the whole point of a deposit?
Their argument seems to be roughly akin to a claim on the common law's implicit warranty of merchantability. You could also think of it as a "lemon law" claim, maybe.
It'll be interesting to see how that plays out, for Boeing as well as for Norwegian. I doubt they're the only airline that's been considering this kind of action.
It'll be interesting to see how that plays out, for Boeing as well as for Norwegian. I doubt they're the only airline that's been considering this kind of action.
But what if the supplier cannot deliver what they promised? If Tesla cannot deliver the <XZY>, can they keep your deposit?
I'm sure the deposit has conditions on it. No one would ever put down so much money just to eat all of the future risk.
Couldn't the contract also have some clause with respect to timelines for delivery. Then they'd have the right to sue and get their money back.
If the people you gave the deposit to break their side of the contract, why not?
Imagine collecting a deposit, not delivering a usable product, and expecting to keep the deposit.
Sounds perfectly normal if the reason for breaking the contract is failure to deliver.
Not necessarily. A refundable deposit is not unheard of. It's a good way to verify that your customer's are truly interested and at least partially capable of paying for the final product.
For example, Tesla's deposit is refundable: https://www.tesla.com/support/model-3-reservation-deposit
For example, Tesla's deposit is refundable: https://www.tesla.com/support/model-3-reservation-deposit
Except that in practice, getting your refund back is not easy at all. Tesla marketing and Tesla reality are often far apart.
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/21/tesla-refund-and-return-prob...
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-20/tesla-wou...
https://forums.tesla.com/forum/forums/deposit-refund-3
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/21/tesla-refund-and-return-prob...
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-20/tesla-wou...
https://forums.tesla.com/forum/forums/deposit-refund-3
Tesla has gotten better. A friend had their Solar Roof deposit returned within a week after Tesla cancelled their order.
Will it be just as easy if Cybertruck doesn't live up to the hype? I'll report back.
Will it be just as easy if Cybertruck doesn't live up to the hype? I'll report back.
That is indeed a good sign, and might have a positive effect on people's willingness to make a deposit in the first place.
Agreed. Deposits signal intent to both Tesla and the capital markets they rely on, but you have to treat the customer relationship with respect to not poison the well.
Imagine selling a(n extremely expensive) product that does not do what it was promised to do and is a money sink even when not running
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https://www.thelocal.no/20200520/china-become-norwegians-big...