You don’t have free will, but don’t worry(backreaction.blogspot.com)
backreaction.blogspot.com
You don’t have free will, but don’t worry
http://backreaction.blogspot.com/2020/10/you-dont-have-free-will-but-dont-worry.html
49 comments
It's pretty strange: it seems that the person writing should be quite advanced in physics and mathematics (though I am not able to comment on her actual scientific merit), but it clearly misses very important and well-known facts.
For example, the fact that it is not true that any differential equation has uniqueness of solutions given its boundary conditions (there are very simple example, which are usually covered in any introductory class not more than half an hour after the concept of differential equation has been introduced, see for example https://math.stackexchange.com/a/1319537/59728). In reality, the proof of uniqueness of solutions is usually a very difficult for every new class of equations being introduced, if it is true at all. There is no general result.
Also, it seems to me a completely non trivial point that the physics is actually governed by (a system of) differential equations. The physical laws we currently know are commonly if not always expressed as differential equations, but every physicist is aware that there are a lot of inconsistencies and holes in our current understanding of the universe. Where do we get the assurance that the "ultimate law" is again a differential equation? Maybe we are not finding it just because we expect it to be a differential equation, but it is not, and we first have to revolutionize the way we think physical laws (maybe more or less as we had to do when we realized quantum physics).
In short, it seems a rather naive position.
For example, the fact that it is not true that any differential equation has uniqueness of solutions given its boundary conditions (there are very simple example, which are usually covered in any introductory class not more than half an hour after the concept of differential equation has been introduced, see for example https://math.stackexchange.com/a/1319537/59728). In reality, the proof of uniqueness of solutions is usually a very difficult for every new class of equations being introduced, if it is true at all. There is no general result.
Also, it seems to me a completely non trivial point that the physics is actually governed by (a system of) differential equations. The physical laws we currently know are commonly if not always expressed as differential equations, but every physicist is aware that there are a lot of inconsistencies and holes in our current understanding of the universe. Where do we get the assurance that the "ultimate law" is again a differential equation? Maybe we are not finding it just because we expect it to be a differential equation, but it is not, and we first have to revolutionize the way we think physical laws (maybe more or less as we had to do when we realized quantum physics).
In short, it seems a rather naive position.
All models are wrong, but some are useful. There's a favourite professor of mine, teaching evolutionary psychology. He always reminds students that there are many models that can explain something - like why did the chicken crossed the road - from chemistry to motivation theories.
This article seems to argue that because we don't have a good enough model to explain the experience of free will, therefore free will does not exist. Pack it up boys. Also - neurology deals with disorders of the nervous system. And when somebody tries to write a scientific article and relies on arguments such as "makes no sense" - just wow.
Note: I research what is called behavioural causality. And in my subjective experience the concept of free will has less and less relevance. As the ability to choose between different possible courses of action unimpeded - just try to have the same conversation with somebody on a full stomach or hungry. We may not realise this, most of the time we are unaware. Our will is influenced by our contexts, internal chemistry, stimuli we were exposed to all our lives.
It is arrogant, if not delusional, to think that in an universe where everything is connected, somehow the human mind found a way to break free and be... something else - influencing the world but without being influenced back. Like that doesn't break the laws of physics!
/rant
This article seems to argue that because we don't have a good enough model to explain the experience of free will, therefore free will does not exist. Pack it up boys. Also - neurology deals with disorders of the nervous system. And when somebody tries to write a scientific article and relies on arguments such as "makes no sense" - just wow.
Note: I research what is called behavioural causality. And in my subjective experience the concept of free will has less and less relevance. As the ability to choose between different possible courses of action unimpeded - just try to have the same conversation with somebody on a full stomach or hungry. We may not realise this, most of the time we are unaware. Our will is influenced by our contexts, internal chemistry, stimuli we were exposed to all our lives.
It is arrogant, if not delusional, to think that in an universe where everything is connected, somehow the human mind found a way to break free and be... something else - influencing the world but without being influenced back. Like that doesn't break the laws of physics!
/rant
>Suppose you have a computer that evaluates whether an equation has a real-valued root. The answer is yes or no. You can predict the answer. But now you can change the algorithm so that if you input the correct answer, the code will output the exact opposite answer, ie “yes” if you predicted “no” and “no” if you predicted “yes”. As a consequence, your prediction will never be correct. Clearly, this has nothing to do with free will but with the fact that the system you make a prediction for gets input which the prediction didn’t account for. There’s nothing interesting going on in this argument.
This is an odd philosophical conjecture. Who created this hypothetical computer and why? Could you willingly create something that negates the premise of free will?
This is an odd philosophical conjecture. Who created this hypothetical computer and why? Could you willingly create something that negates the premise of free will?
> Could you willingly create something that negates the premise of free will?
The author only meant to point out the innate nature of a QM particle.
Why that is the way it is is a different topic.
The author only meant to point out the innate nature of a QM particle.
Why that is the way it is is a different topic.
This is a great point.
No, you cannot actually create anything that negates the premise of free will. Even if the Universe is 100% deterministic, it would take a computer the size of the universe to predict anything. Therefore, determinism may or may not be true, but from within the confines of this universe, we will never be able to observe it fully (e.g. there does not exist the possibility for an Oracle who could predict every action).
To prove this consider the opposite: If such an Oracle was able to exist, you could simply ask it whether you would select Red or Blue next, then do the opposite of whatever it predicted.
No, you cannot actually create anything that negates the premise of free will. Even if the Universe is 100% deterministic, it would take a computer the size of the universe to predict anything. Therefore, determinism may or may not be true, but from within the confines of this universe, we will never be able to observe it fully (e.g. there does not exist the possibility for an Oracle who could predict every action).
To prove this consider the opposite: If such an Oracle was able to exist, you could simply ask it whether you would select Red or Blue next, then do the opposite of whatever it predicted.
At the risk of sounding dismissive...
Who cares? Whether free will is an illusion or not has no practical application to my life, my behavior, or the lives and behaviors of other people.
If an illusion is so strikingly believable that you take it for reality, what separates it from BEING reality?
Who cares? Whether free will is an illusion or not has no practical application to my life, my behavior, or the lives and behaviors of other people.
If an illusion is so strikingly believable that you take it for reality, what separates it from BEING reality?
Free will in Hinduism is called "Maya" or illusion.
"What is really going on if you are making a decision is that your brain is running a calculation, and while it is doing that, you do not know what the outcome of the calculation will be"
"Taken together we therefore have determinism with the occasional, random quantum jump, and no combination of these two types of laws allows for anything resembling this intuitive idea that we can somehow choose which possible future becomes real." How do we know that the present moment is deterministic, the whole of the present is only the result of the whole of the past? Don't we have to know/understand everything to draw such a conclusion?
I keep reading the same rehearsed arguments: Quantum mechanics, computer-related analogies, yada yada.
Can we just state the obvious about free will: We still don't know if it exists.
Can we just state the obvious about free will: We still don't know if it exists.
"Why am I telling you this? Because I think that people who do not understand that free will is an illusion underestimate how much their decisions are influenced by the information they are exposed to."
I find this sort of ultra deterministic take on things renders articles like these pointless. I mean, what are we supposed to do now, 'choose' to expose ourselves to different information? Isn't too late, in a way before we were ever born kind of way? Wouldn't our "underestimating" be an imperative beyond reproach. Not to mention that free-will is not a factor in our being influenced by information. This is true in both cases, free-will and not.
Personally, I'm a non-compatibilist but believe the jury is still out on determinism. Despite having lots of evidence in support of it, I think there is still a lot of room for conformation bias, simply because the scope of such claims is so large. Overall, it takes a lot of hubris to make the claims stated in this article.
Also as a sort of pseudo-biological question: What would be the purpose be of evolving an illusion of free-will?
I find this sort of ultra deterministic take on things renders articles like these pointless. I mean, what are we supposed to do now, 'choose' to expose ourselves to different information? Isn't too late, in a way before we were ever born kind of way? Wouldn't our "underestimating" be an imperative beyond reproach. Not to mention that free-will is not a factor in our being influenced by information. This is true in both cases, free-will and not.
Personally, I'm a non-compatibilist but believe the jury is still out on determinism. Despite having lots of evidence in support of it, I think there is still a lot of room for conformation bias, simply because the scope of such claims is so large. Overall, it takes a lot of hubris to make the claims stated in this article.
Also as a sort of pseudo-biological question: What would be the purpose be of evolving an illusion of free-will?
> what are we supposed to do now, 'choose' to expose ourselves to different information?
Yes? If there is no free will just input and output, the input of this article might change your internal state such that you as a machine process subsequent input differently. Free will or not does not change this. A lack of free will doesn't me we just stop even trying to change how people behave.
Cars are deterministic machines but we still get oil changes and repairs.
EDIT: Or to put it differently, a lack of free will does not mean a lack of internal state. But it might mean that we should pay more attention to that internal state and what we do with it.
Yes? If there is no free will just input and output, the input of this article might change your internal state such that you as a machine process subsequent input differently. Free will or not does not change this. A lack of free will doesn't me we just stop even trying to change how people behave.
Cars are deterministic machines but we still get oil changes and repairs.
EDIT: Or to put it differently, a lack of free will does not mean a lack of internal state. But it might mean that we should pay more attention to that internal state and what we do with it.
But if we don’t have free will, how can we choose to pay more attention?
Simple, you just choose to as nothing stops you from doing so except yourself. The lack of free will doesn't stop you from doing anything or being anything you want. What you want (ie, will) may or may not be predetermined, but it feels remarkably like it isn't, and for all intents and purposes of living, it isn't predetermined.
If free will doesn't exist, so what? It still doesn't change anything when it comes to living day to day. Perhaps the only thing it would impact is ethics and morality, but even then, it's a far stretch to say you don't have a choice in doing the "wrong thing" and the "right thing" because you obviously do. The thing it might teach us, is that it's even more important to make sure we teach "the right thing" to our children and students. To make sure we predispose them to doing the "right thing" when a decision is presented, and not the "wrong thing." Shouldn't we be doing that anyway?
If free will doesn't exist, so what? It still doesn't change anything when it comes to living day to day. Perhaps the only thing it would impact is ethics and morality, but even then, it's a far stretch to say you don't have a choice in doing the "wrong thing" and the "right thing" because you obviously do. The thing it might teach us, is that it's even more important to make sure we teach "the right thing" to our children and students. To make sure we predispose them to doing the "right thing" when a decision is presented, and not the "wrong thing." Shouldn't we be doing that anyway?
I think the author underestimates how much this changes things.
Assuming we know for certain there is no free will; the way we treat bad behaviour should change - people who behave badly should simply be retrained.
There should be no punishment; there is no concept of individual guilt or personal accountability; there are only behaviours that need to be modified to conform with a social norm.
There should be no execution of killers; no prison terms, people would be held for as long as it takes (potentially indefinitely) to change unacceptable behaviour.
A lot of popular religious concepts also fly out of the window.
> the way we treat bad behaviour should change - people who behave badly should simply be retrained
Does this hinge on us knowing/believing that free will doesn't exist? I'd say it's mostly that we cannot "simply retrain" somebody. If we had an injection that we could give people who's violence threshold is too low, we'd give it to them. But we don't, not even close. That's what stops us, not our belief in free will.
Does this hinge on us knowing/believing that free will doesn't exist? I'd say it's mostly that we cannot "simply retrain" somebody. If we had an injection that we could give people who's violence threshold is too low, we'd give it to them. But we don't, not even close. That's what stops us, not our belief in free will.
> Assuming we know for certain there is no free will; the way we treat bad behaviour should change
If there is no free will, the word “should” doesn't mean anything, there is only “is” and “is not”.
If there is no free will, the word “should” doesn't mean anything, there is only “is” and “is not”.
I don't see a difference in this regard. In my opinion, punishment that isn't intended to reform the criminal is done so three rest of us can feel good. I consider it sadism, but can understand if others object to that term.
>There should be no execution of killers
If they are likely to only be a danger to society, and the society does not hold all lives sacred, the death penalty would fit. In my opinion, this needs to be an extreme case. For example, a drug lord who, despite being in jail, repeatedly finds ways to hire hitmen.
>no prison terms
Prisons make perfect sense for some cases, especially violent criminals. It'd be foolish not to separate them from society of they're likely to cause harm again. Also, it would be a good guarantee they would attend behavioral therapy.
>people would be held for as long as it takes (potentially indefinitely) to change unacceptable behaviour
This does make me feel unsure of an answer, but luckily I can use a simple cop-out: removing sentencing limits would be too ripe for abuse.
>There should be no execution of killers
If they are likely to only be a danger to society, and the society does not hold all lives sacred, the death penalty would fit. In my opinion, this needs to be an extreme case. For example, a drug lord who, despite being in jail, repeatedly finds ways to hire hitmen.
>no prison terms
Prisons make perfect sense for some cases, especially violent criminals. It'd be foolish not to separate them from society of they're likely to cause harm again. Also, it would be a good guarantee they would attend behavioral therapy.
>people would be held for as long as it takes (potentially indefinitely) to change unacceptable behaviour
This does make me feel unsure of an answer, but luckily I can use a simple cop-out: removing sentencing limits would be too ripe for abuse.
>In my opinion, punishment that isn't intended to reform the criminal is done so three rest of us can feel good. I consider it sadism, but can understand if others object to that term.
Punishment is arguably intended first and foremost to be a deterrent to committing crime in the first place, and secondary as a way to take dangerous criminals off the street. Reform of the criminal should probably be considered a bonus, not the primary intention. I think almost no one, aside from direct victims and their families, want punishment purely for punishment's sake (i.e. sadism).
Punishment is arguably intended first and foremost to be a deterrent to committing crime in the first place, and secondary as a way to take dangerous criminals off the street. Reform of the criminal should probably be considered a bonus, not the primary intention. I think almost no one, aside from direct victims and their families, want punishment purely for punishment's sake (i.e. sadism).
[deleted]
>And we do not guess, we know, that we can derive from the laws for the constituents what the whole object does. If you make a claim to the contrary, you are contradicting well-established science. I can’t prevent you from denying scientific evidence, but I can tell you that this way you will never understand how the universe really works."
I mean this is just flat out wrong and actually terrible science. Everyone who has taken a class on complex systems is aware of the phenomenon of emergence. You cannot understand the dynamics of a bird flock by breaking it down to the individual birds, and you cannot understand the dynamics of a hurricane by looking at each individual particle. A steering wheel cannot drive, an exhaust pipe cannot drive and a tire cannot drive, but a car can drive. The human mind is of course another important example. You can pry someone's head open and break the brain down to its constituent parts, but you will not find a mind anywhere in there.
Systems can have properties that are not found in any of its parts, because it's the interaction of the parts, not the parts themselves, that produce those properties. That is why reductionism has never been a successful enterprise, and why we indeed do not have a "unified science" (as some of the logical positivists imagined) which explains the totality of all things in one formal language. (i.e. physics).
I mean this is just flat out wrong and actually terrible science. Everyone who has taken a class on complex systems is aware of the phenomenon of emergence. You cannot understand the dynamics of a bird flock by breaking it down to the individual birds, and you cannot understand the dynamics of a hurricane by looking at each individual particle. A steering wheel cannot drive, an exhaust pipe cannot drive and a tire cannot drive, but a car can drive. The human mind is of course another important example. You can pry someone's head open and break the brain down to its constituent parts, but you will not find a mind anywhere in there.
Systems can have properties that are not found in any of its parts, because it's the interaction of the parts, not the parts themselves, that produce those properties. That is why reductionism has never been a successful enterprise, and why we indeed do not have a "unified science" (as some of the logical positivists imagined) which explains the totality of all things in one formal language. (i.e. physics).
> Everyone who has taken a class on complex systems is aware of the phenomenon of emergence.
Interactions (any observed results) are side effects of deterministic properties. Not knowing all initial states or the complexity of the intetactions being incomprehensible in aggregate (by humans) is not relevant. Emergence is not incommensurate with determinism. Full stop.
Once you figure out that time is an illusion of local shared human memory (if you travel to nonlocal spacetime you will have a divergent memory), the situation becomes clearer.
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=-6rWqJhDv7M
Wake me up when there's something new to talk about.
Interactions (any observed results) are side effects of deterministic properties. Not knowing all initial states or the complexity of the intetactions being incomprehensible in aggregate (by humans) is not relevant. Emergence is not incommensurate with determinism. Full stop.
Once you figure out that time is an illusion of local shared human memory (if you travel to nonlocal spacetime you will have a divergent memory), the situation becomes clearer.
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=-6rWqJhDv7M
Wake me up when there's something new to talk about.
> deterministic properties.
Thing is, I don't see this addressing quantum mechanics.
The randomness in QM is _truly_ random, it's not just a deterministic system where we can't learn the initial state. I'm not saying that means there is free will, but it does counter the argument that everything is _deterministic_.
The other wrinkle is that you can have a deterministic system in an infinite space - I'm not sure if that setup still precludes free will.
Thing is, I don't see this addressing quantum mechanics.
The randomness in QM is _truly_ random, it's not just a deterministic system where we can't learn the initial state. I'm not saying that means there is free will, but it does counter the argument that everything is _deterministic_.
The other wrinkle is that you can have a deterministic system in an infinite space - I'm not sure if that setup still precludes free will.
You’re making the assumption that nondeterministic QM is the right one. There are other interpretations that are deterministic[1].
Even if it is not deterministic, it’s not determined by free will so it’s a nonissue.
1. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pilot_wave_theory
Even if it is not deterministic, it’s not determined by free will so it’s a nonissue.
1. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pilot_wave_theory
>Interactions (any observed results) are side effects of deterministic properties
That's my understanding as well.
I'm trying find utility in the 1st comment, but I don't see the direction of causality - e.g. emergence of culture from physics (bottom up) - is relevant in determining whether something non-deterministic.
That's my understanding as well.
I'm trying find utility in the 1st comment, but I don't see the direction of causality - e.g. emergence of culture from physics (bottom up) - is relevant in determining whether something non-deterministic.
>I'm trying find utility in the 1st comment, but I don't see the direction of causality - e.g. emergence of culture from physics (bottom up) - is relevant in determining whether something non-deterministic.
physical determinism isn't relevant for the concept of free will, that is the point of the comment.
Emergent properties of the system by definition do not exist at the reductionist level of physics, but that does not render them "not real". It's simply a category error to say that free will does not exist because constituent parts of a system are deterministic, in the same sense as saying that consciousness does not exist because you cannot find it at the level of a neuron, or that the car cannot drive because none of its parts can.
Also on the issue of causality which is important, complex systems don't just exhibit bottom-up causality, but the reverse, the system can only made sense of if one takes into account the downward causality from the macro to the micro level which explains why the system functions the way it does and that is what 'will' is in the context of a human to begin with. It's because the system cannot be reduced to bottom-up processes that it is complex, and it is for that reason that concepts such as 'freedom', autonomy', 'intentionality' and so on make sense.
physical determinism isn't relevant for the concept of free will, that is the point of the comment.
Emergent properties of the system by definition do not exist at the reductionist level of physics, but that does not render them "not real". It's simply a category error to say that free will does not exist because constituent parts of a system are deterministic, in the same sense as saying that consciousness does not exist because you cannot find it at the level of a neuron, or that the car cannot drive because none of its parts can.
Also on the issue of causality which is important, complex systems don't just exhibit bottom-up causality, but the reverse, the system can only made sense of if one takes into account the downward causality from the macro to the micro level which explains why the system functions the way it does and that is what 'will' is in the context of a human to begin with. It's because the system cannot be reduced to bottom-up processes that it is complex, and it is for that reason that concepts such as 'freedom', autonomy', 'intentionality' and so on make sense.
>Everyone who has taken a class on complex systems is aware of the phenomenon of emergence.
Reminds me of some conference (lost the URL) of Robert Laughlin, where he said (if I recall correctly) that rigidity (e.g. of a steel bar) was an emergent property, to which someone in the audience objected that sure enough it should be deducible from quantum mechanics, which he dismissed.
That would mean that emergence can occur even in simple systems (regularly packed atoms), and for quite basic properties.
Reminds me of some conference (lost the URL) of Robert Laughlin, where he said (if I recall correctly) that rigidity (e.g. of a steel bar) was an emergent property, to which someone in the audience objected that sure enough it should be deducible from quantum mechanics, which he dismissed.
That would mean that emergence can occur even in simple systems (regularly packed atoms), and for quite basic properties.
There are no uncontroversial examples of non-reductive emergence. Of course you could understand the dynamics of a hurricane by analyzing each individual particle. There are practical limits in doing so, but there are no theoretical limits to predicting the behavior of the whole from the parts.
>Of course you could understand the dynamics of a hurricane by analyzing each individual particle
that's actually an article of faith because scientifically speaking we can't. And that's important because it's where reductionism subtly goes from being treated as a scientific method to a sort of belief system.
It's not actually obvious at all that say, complex mind states or intentionality can be reduced to physics. It even seems extremely unlikely, because there's no conceivable way to me how the 'aboutness' of intentional mind states are supposed to be reduced to particles.
Another good example is maybe life itself. Schrödinger in his book What is Life? categorised life as local 'negative entropy', ordering matter at a local level and exporting excess entropy to the outside, in a sense locally 'breaking' the second law of thermodynamics. When our civilisation warms the planet up and produces heat what it really does is exporting disorder, I think it's quite a good description actually.
Aside from the fact that we scientifically haven't proven it, it's hard to imagine how this sort of top-down causal behaviour and complexity is supposed to be reduced to mostly linear particle interactions.
that's actually an article of faith because scientifically speaking we can't. And that's important because it's where reductionism subtly goes from being treated as a scientific method to a sort of belief system.
It's not actually obvious at all that say, complex mind states or intentionality can be reduced to physics. It even seems extremely unlikely, because there's no conceivable way to me how the 'aboutness' of intentional mind states are supposed to be reduced to particles.
Another good example is maybe life itself. Schrödinger in his book What is Life? categorised life as local 'negative entropy', ordering matter at a local level and exporting excess entropy to the outside, in a sense locally 'breaking' the second law of thermodynamics. When our civilisation warms the planet up and produces heat what it really does is exporting disorder, I think it's quite a good description actually.
Aside from the fact that we scientifically haven't proven it, it's hard to imagine how this sort of top-down causal behaviour and complexity is supposed to be reduced to mostly linear particle interactions.
It's certainly unproven whether complex systems are reducible, but this doesn't mean the alternative is on equal footing. Science since its inception has been one long process of reducing that which was previously thought irreducible. Standard physical processes, like hurricanes, can easily be though of as reducible by inference to the best explanation, as they present no apparent difficulties with reduction aside from access to information and sufficient computation. There are other phenomena from which one can make a case for non-reduction, but I don't think even the best case to be made is all that strong.
In my opinion, the only phenomena to present a real challenge for reduction is phenomenal consciousness. I don't personally consider intentionality and life to be insurmountable problems for reduction. The 'negative entropy' of life is really just a computational problem: find the configuration that has the property of being self-sustaining in the face of disordering forces. But some natural processes have a natural computational description, e.g. systematically producing variations of states, and preserving 'successful' states to seed the next generation of state space search. In other words, evolutionary processes are natural computational processes. I don't see the need for an extra ingredient.
Intentionality is about meaning, i.e. how can some process have some intrinsic meaning. The answer is probably similar in spirit to the answer of negative entropy. Meaning has an external relation in the sense of being substantiated by context (e.g. a binary digit means heads/tails vs day/night depending on its context). But if you have enough of these meaning units in relation to one another, the system as a whole bootstraps the meaning of itself. E.g., some neuron in a brain means Jennifer Aniston because of the context it sits in the milleu of neurons that collectively create a disposition to respond appropriately to Jennifer Aniston.
In my opinion, the only phenomena to present a real challenge for reduction is phenomenal consciousness. I don't personally consider intentionality and life to be insurmountable problems for reduction. The 'negative entropy' of life is really just a computational problem: find the configuration that has the property of being self-sustaining in the face of disordering forces. But some natural processes have a natural computational description, e.g. systematically producing variations of states, and preserving 'successful' states to seed the next generation of state space search. In other words, evolutionary processes are natural computational processes. I don't see the need for an extra ingredient.
Intentionality is about meaning, i.e. how can some process have some intrinsic meaning. The answer is probably similar in spirit to the answer of negative entropy. Meaning has an external relation in the sense of being substantiated by context (e.g. a binary digit means heads/tails vs day/night depending on its context). But if you have enough of these meaning units in relation to one another, the system as a whole bootstraps the meaning of itself. E.g., some neuron in a brain means Jennifer Aniston because of the context it sits in the milleu of neurons that collectively create a disposition to respond appropriately to Jennifer Aniston.
I think it is likely that we do not have free will. However, it is such a complex system, and it would be so incredibly difficult to make meaningful predictions for how humans really are about to behave in any given moment, that we effectively have free will. If it is effectively impossible to predict behavior, it doesn't matter if you're technically right.
We have free will, at least as a group of apes. Think of the problem from a protons point of view. I once read, a human is a protons way to look at itself. All these protons were stuck in this gravity well, being tossed around this way and that. Until. Voyager. Some of those protons aren't rattling around with us anymore. Because a group of apes willed it so.
When you look at yourself, I'm afraid you only see the electrons. The protons are the bones, but we see only the skin.
John McCarthy did not consider full determinism incompatible with free will:
http://jmc.stanford.edu/articles/freewill.html
http://jmc.stanford.edu/articles/freewill.html
Thank you for sharing this
I would go even a step further and question the randomness of the quantum realm, but IANAP and I might be saying something terribly stupid: apologies in advance.
What if the source of quantum randomness is not really random in the Kolmogorov sense? If any finite (computable, as physics seems to be) process has a bounded Kolmogorov complexity, is it correct to assert that infinite complexity can be originated only from an unbounded process? Then what about the constituent parts of that unbounded process? Shouldn't they have unbounded mass/energy and collapse into a blackhole? Equivalenty: shouldn't something with infinite entropy collapse into a blackhole per Bekenstein bound?
Somehow I feel that this cosmic TRNG is as shady as the embedding of the real numbers in the real world.
N.B.: - I don't think this line of reasoning contradicts Bell's theorem. - I reckon that, as digital cowboys, we have a bias for finiteness and discreteness
I'm really curious about this, please contradict me. There must be something beautiful that I'm not seeing.
What if the source of quantum randomness is not really random in the Kolmogorov sense? If any finite (computable, as physics seems to be) process has a bounded Kolmogorov complexity, is it correct to assert that infinite complexity can be originated only from an unbounded process? Then what about the constituent parts of that unbounded process? Shouldn't they have unbounded mass/energy and collapse into a blackhole? Equivalenty: shouldn't something with infinite entropy collapse into a blackhole per Bekenstein bound?
Somehow I feel that this cosmic TRNG is as shady as the embedding of the real numbers in the real world.
N.B.: - I don't think this line of reasoning contradicts Bell's theorem. - I reckon that, as digital cowboys, we have a bias for finiteness and discreteness
I'm really curious about this, please contradict me. There must be something beautiful that I'm not seeing.
With a deterministic universe, you'll need some way to produce discontinuous outcomes.
For example, let's say you're on a walk on a trail in a deterministic universe, and there's a pole in the middle of the path. Let's assume you'll always walk left or right of it, as a function of your initial left/right position across the width of the path, in a bounded time t_max. (We assume there isn't some unstable center position, or set of positions, where you get stuck an arbitrarily long length of time before deciding which side to take, because you're human.) It follows that the laws of physics are discontinuous.
It feels kind of like Arrow's Impossibility Theorem -- in both cases your cleanest way out of this jam is nondeterminism.
For example, let's say you're on a walk on a trail in a deterministic universe, and there's a pole in the middle of the path. Let's assume you'll always walk left or right of it, as a function of your initial left/right position across the width of the path, in a bounded time t_max. (We assume there isn't some unstable center position, or set of positions, where you get stuck an arbitrarily long length of time before deciding which side to take, because you're human.) It follows that the laws of physics are discontinuous.
It feels kind of like Arrow's Impossibility Theorem -- in both cases your cleanest way out of this jam is nondeterminism.
Or, instead of nondeterminism, you have determinism + a separate free will package, which generates the discontinuity. Free will =~ being able to compute a decision in bounded time on a continuum of inputs.
I can see your point, but the problem remains. Suppose to have a closed system that contains a random number generator and an observer. The observer can measure and extract (not store) an infinite amount of entropy. Where does that comes from? It seems to me to be unphysical.
Possible way outs of this:
- The randomness source has a state which is huge but finite. The finiteness should clash with the QM assumption that this kind of randomness is absolutely unpredictable
- You can't even take an upper-bound of the Kolmogorov complexity of that bitstream without storing the bits. It's like saying: the universe can cheat because your are not looking (hypothesis that has a strong QM flavor)
- The universe conspires to incrementally build one additional state for every measurement taken (non-sense)
- The randomness source is not immanent in our physical universe (Occam's razor says no)
Regarding your point, there are two options: discontinuous functions can be approximated with truncated series, for instance. Plus: the photoelectric effect doesn't logically need (for what I know) randomness to happen, there are already discontinuities without postulating non-determinism, discreteness suffices.
Possible way outs of this:
- The randomness source has a state which is huge but finite. The finiteness should clash with the QM assumption that this kind of randomness is absolutely unpredictable
- You can't even take an upper-bound of the Kolmogorov complexity of that bitstream without storing the bits. It's like saying: the universe can cheat because your are not looking (hypothesis that has a strong QM flavor)
- The universe conspires to incrementally build one additional state for every measurement taken (non-sense)
- The randomness source is not immanent in our physical universe (Occam's razor says no)
Regarding your point, there are two options: discontinuous functions can be approximated with truncated series, for instance. Plus: the photoelectric effect doesn't logically need (for what I know) randomness to happen, there are already discontinuities without postulating non-determinism, discreteness suffices.
I always believed that the best proof for free well is when we question it
We’re meant to question it.
Here's Sabine again stating things without further reasoning. I'm sorry but I have a hard time reconciling Laplacian determinism with quantum physics, I'd like to see more details.
Anyway, I don't think it matters really because as long as I can choose to do the opposite of what I want every time I feel like it just because I can, the philosophical debate about free will doesn't add too much to my own experience of it.
Anyway, I don't think it matters really because as long as I can choose to do the opposite of what I want every time I feel like it just because I can, the philosophical debate about free will doesn't add too much to my own experience of it.
> I'm sorry but I have a hard time reconciling Laplacian determinism with quantum physics, I'd like to see more details.
As I understand it, it's not really Laplacian determinism. We still have the chaos and quantum randomness. But the argument is, your "decision", what you perceive as free will is the result of it. Not the other way around.
At a certain scale (time and scope-wise) it can be predicted what you will "decide" before you think you consciously take a decision.
I picture it for myself a bit like a partly covered Pascal's marble run. The upper covered part standing for quantum randomness.
Neurosciences don't make a claim on being able to predict that, but they can (more or less) accurately observe the lower uncovered part and seeing where the marble goes. (Or at least which side)
And then we have the subject of the experiment, which becomes conscious of the marble when it drops, claiming that it willed the marble to drop there.
I hope my picture helps more than distract, as it will have its own flaws.
As I understand it, it's not really Laplacian determinism. We still have the chaos and quantum randomness. But the argument is, your "decision", what you perceive as free will is the result of it. Not the other way around.
At a certain scale (time and scope-wise) it can be predicted what you will "decide" before you think you consciously take a decision.
I picture it for myself a bit like a partly covered Pascal's marble run. The upper covered part standing for quantum randomness.
Neurosciences don't make a claim on being able to predict that, but they can (more or less) accurately observe the lower uncovered part and seeing where the marble goes. (Or at least which side)
And then we have the subject of the experiment, which becomes conscious of the marble when it drops, claiming that it willed the marble to drop there.
I hope my picture helps more than distract, as it will have its own flaws.
> "What is really going on if you are making a decision is that your brain is running a calculation, and while it is doing that, you do not know what the outcome of the calculation will be. ... So, the impression of free will comes from our self-awareness, that we think about what to do, combined with our inability to predict the result of that thinking before we’re done."
What is the difference between "free will" and "the impression of free will"?
That is, what does "free will" have that "the impression of free will" does not?
What is the difference between "free will" and "the impression of free will"?
That is, what does "free will" have that "the impression of free will" does not?
> In quantum mechanics some events are truly random and cannot be predicted. Does this mean that quantum mechanics is where you can find free will? Sorry, but no, this makes no sense. These random events in quantum mechanics are not influenced by you, regardless of exactly what you mean by “you”, because they are not influenced by anything. That’s the whole point of saying they are fundamentally random. Nothing determines their outcome.
This is wrong, sorry. Rather, QM is contextual; the response to a measurement is both influenced locally by the measurement's orientation and non-locally by its causal history.
QM gives us indeterminism. Further, if we have free will, then so do subatomic particles. It is neither good or bad, but it is how it is.
This is wrong, sorry. Rather, QM is contextual; the response to a measurement is both influenced locally by the measurement's orientation and non-locally by its causal history.
QM gives us indeterminism. Further, if we have free will, then so do subatomic particles. It is neither good or bad, but it is how it is.
Before we can discuss the question of whether we have free will, we need to properly define and characterize what the "we" here refers to. It is individual particles? Our consciousness? Or something else?
And thus the question of free will is not resolvable without resolving the hard problem of consciousness. I suspect the two questions are facets of the same fundamental problem.
And thus the question of free will is not resolvable without resolving the hard problem of consciousness. I suspect the two questions are facets of the same fundamental problem.
A conceit is fine if it helps you feel comfortable -- it is serving its purpose -- but if you try to make a rational argument out of it you end up with nonsense.