How Philosophers Think(perell.com)
perell.com
How Philosophers Think
https://perell.com/essay/how-philosophers-think/
86 comments
> This article isn’t terrible
I totally disagree with this statement, the article looks like something from a cheap business webinar. He talks about Planck, Chomsky, Charlie Munger, Joseph Henrich and even talks about something cringely named “Quantum Thinking” yet he fails to mention a single philosopher born after 400BCE and only makes platitudinous references to Plato and Socrates.
I totally disagree with this statement, the article looks like something from a cheap business webinar. He talks about Planck, Chomsky, Charlie Munger, Joseph Henrich and even talks about something cringely named “Quantum Thinking” yet he fails to mention a single philosopher born after 400BCE and only makes platitudinous references to Plato and Socrates.
I fully agree. Philosophy is full of irregular thinkers whose only common trait seems to be the willingness to go into absurd depth about an idea.
What is always interesting to me is how you can spend a large amount of study in the subject and still end up finding out about a new philosopher (I’m going to read some Deleuze now.). For me, David Lewis has been the most interesting philosopher in the last 50 years. Maybe Thomas Nagel as well.
What is always interesting to me is how you can spend a large amount of study in the subject and still end up finding out about a new philosopher (I’m going to read some Deleuze now.). For me, David Lewis has been the most interesting philosopher in the last 50 years. Maybe Thomas Nagel as well.
Absolutely, the second paragraph:
"On the weekends, he’d take computers apart and put them back together, so he could understand how they work. He rarely reconstructed them in the same way he dismantled them, though. For the joy of play and the pursuit of efficiency gains, he searched for new ways to reconfigure the machines. Every now and then, he’d find a performance improvement that even the designers didn’t consider."
I guess this sounds impressive to some people, but to someone in the field it is absolute nonsense. And it sets the stage for the rest of the article.
Here he gets all gatekeepy:
"Charlie Munger calls this the difference between “real knowledge” and “chauffeur knowledge.” "
Ugh. It just goes on:
"The alternative is Quantum Thinking, which is holding multiple contradictory ideas in your head at the same time. "
Aaaaand I'm done.
This type of writing is better suited to the self-congratulatory content over on Quillette.
"On the weekends, he’d take computers apart and put them back together, so he could understand how they work. He rarely reconstructed them in the same way he dismantled them, though. For the joy of play and the pursuit of efficiency gains, he searched for new ways to reconfigure the machines. Every now and then, he’d find a performance improvement that even the designers didn’t consider."
I guess this sounds impressive to some people, but to someone in the field it is absolute nonsense. And it sets the stage for the rest of the article.
Here he gets all gatekeepy:
"Charlie Munger calls this the difference between “real knowledge” and “chauffeur knowledge.” "
Ugh. It just goes on:
"The alternative is Quantum Thinking, which is holding multiple contradictory ideas in your head at the same time. "
Aaaaand I'm done.
This type of writing is better suited to the self-congratulatory content over on Quillette.
Continental (non-analytic) philosophers seem to me to be somewhat like impressionist painters. (Does anyone else see that similarity?) And the absence of this "clarity of thought" focus might be why it feels that way to me.
I would be less kind. Scott Aaronson said it well in https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/FwiPfF8Woe5JrzqEu/philosophy...
One final note: none of the positive or hopeful things that I said about philosophy apply to the postmodern or Continental kinds. As far as I can tell, the latter aren’t really “philosophy” at all, but more like pretentious brands of performance art that fancy themselves politically subversive, even as they cultivate deliberate obscurity and draw mostly on the insights of Hitler and Stalin apologists. I suspect I won’t ruffle too many feathers here at MIRI by saying this.
I have less experience of them than Scott Aaronson does. But what I've seen has not suggested that he is in any way mistaken.
One final note: none of the positive or hopeful things that I said about philosophy apply to the postmodern or Continental kinds. As far as I can tell, the latter aren’t really “philosophy” at all, but more like pretentious brands of performance art that fancy themselves politically subversive, even as they cultivate deliberate obscurity and draw mostly on the insights of Hitler and Stalin apologists. I suspect I won’t ruffle too many feathers here at MIRI by saying this.
I have less experience of them than Scott Aaronson does. But what I've seen has not suggested that he is in any way mistaken.
Lumping postmodern and continental together is a sure sign that Mr. Aaronson doesn’t know what he’s talking about.
I've yet to see a claim of obscurantism leveled against a post-structuralist that I felt had any serious weight. They're mostly just awful prose writers (and even worse, French).
Glibly casting off an entire intellectual tradition as a case of the emperor having no clothes is, to me, a really tragic dismissal of an electrifying body of ideas.
For anyone who's been put off by the language of continental philosophy, I'd recommend Peter Barry's book called Beginning Theory. It's written in very clear English and gives concrete examples of the terms you usually just hear bandied about (deconstruction, semiotics, whatever).
Glibly casting off an entire intellectual tradition as a case of the emperor having no clothes is, to me, a really tragic dismissal of an electrifying body of ideas.
For anyone who's been put off by the language of continental philosophy, I'd recommend Peter Barry's book called Beginning Theory. It's written in very clear English and gives concrete examples of the terms you usually just hear bandied about (deconstruction, semiotics, whatever).
Glibly casting off an entire intellectual tradition as a case of the emperor having no clothes is, to me, a really tragic dismissal of an electrifying body of ideas.
Where do you get the impression that I'm merely being glib?
I'm not being put off by the language. I can make my way through that (though I do a lot better in English translations than the original French). But whenever I make the effort, I find that "there is no there there". And I have the effort on a number of occasions because someone I respected swore that a particular work was particularly important.
But the more I did, the more I found myself agreeing with Paul Graham in http://www.paulgraham.com/philosophy.html. And I've found the hard way that whenever there is a topic of interest that both philosophy and science touch on, I always prefer to read what science has to say about it.
My reasoning is different than his. Whenever we think of something, our odds of being on the right path are low. We need feedback to steer by. And "applicability" makes feedback much clearer than any other standard that I can think of.
Where do you get the impression that I'm merely being glib?
I'm not being put off by the language. I can make my way through that (though I do a lot better in English translations than the original French). But whenever I make the effort, I find that "there is no there there". And I have the effort on a number of occasions because someone I respected swore that a particular work was particularly important.
But the more I did, the more I found myself agreeing with Paul Graham in http://www.paulgraham.com/philosophy.html. And I've found the hard way that whenever there is a topic of interest that both philosophy and science touch on, I always prefer to read what science has to say about it.
My reasoning is different than his. Whenever we think of something, our odds of being on the right path are low. We need feedback to steer by. And "applicability" makes feedback much clearer than any other standard that I can think of.
I followed the Paul Graham link.
It is true that "philosophy" refers to a bunch of apparently-unrelated disciplines. What they share doesn't have a name that I know of; it is that they all depend on how to think, in broad terms (perceive, remember, how to reason etc.).
Paul Graham certainly knows how to think. But I think he doesn't give enough credit for that to his philosophy training.
It is true that "philosophy" refers to a bunch of apparently-unrelated disciplines. What they share doesn't have a name that I know of; it is that they all depend on how to think, in broad terms (perceive, remember, how to reason etc.).
Paul Graham certainly knows how to think. But I think he doesn't give enough credit for that to his philosophy training.
> I've yet to see a claim of obscurantism leveled against a post-structuralist that I felt had any serious weight.
Did you read e.g. Sokal and Bricmont's Intellectual Impostures, aka Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals' Abuse of Science?!
Set out to show how numerous key intellectuals have used concepts from the physical sciences and mathematics incorrectly, Sokal and Bricmont intentionally provide considerably lengthy extracts in order to avoid accusations of taking sentences out of context. Such extracts pull from such works as those of Jacques Lacan, Julia Kristeva, Paul Virilio, Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, Luce Irigaray, Bruno Latour, and Jean Baudrillard, who—in terms of the quantity of published works, invited presentations, and of citations received—were some of the leading academics of continental philosophy, critical theory, psychoanalysis, and/or the social sciences at the time of publication.
The book provides a chapter to each of the above-mentioned authors, "the tip of the iceberg" of a group of intellectual practices that can be described as "mystification, deliberately obscure language, confused thinking and the misuse of scientific concepts." For example, Luce Irigaray is criticised for asserting that E=mc2 is a "sexed equation" because "it privileges the speed of light over other speeds that are vitally necessary to us;" and for asserting that fluid mechanics is unfairly neglected because it deals with "feminine" fluids in contrast to "masculine" rigid mechanics. Similarly, Lacan is criticized for drawing an analogy between topology and mental illness that, in Sokal and Bricmont's view, is unsupported by any argument and is "not just false: it is gibberish."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fashionable_Nonsense
Did you read e.g. Sokal and Bricmont's Intellectual Impostures, aka Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals' Abuse of Science?!
Set out to show how numerous key intellectuals have used concepts from the physical sciences and mathematics incorrectly, Sokal and Bricmont intentionally provide considerably lengthy extracts in order to avoid accusations of taking sentences out of context. Such extracts pull from such works as those of Jacques Lacan, Julia Kristeva, Paul Virilio, Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, Luce Irigaray, Bruno Latour, and Jean Baudrillard, who—in terms of the quantity of published works, invited presentations, and of citations received—were some of the leading academics of continental philosophy, critical theory, psychoanalysis, and/or the social sciences at the time of publication.
The book provides a chapter to each of the above-mentioned authors, "the tip of the iceberg" of a group of intellectual practices that can be described as "mystification, deliberately obscure language, confused thinking and the misuse of scientific concepts." For example, Luce Irigaray is criticised for asserting that E=mc2 is a "sexed equation" because "it privileges the speed of light over other speeds that are vitally necessary to us;" and for asserting that fluid mechanics is unfairly neglected because it deals with "feminine" fluids in contrast to "masculine" rigid mechanics. Similarly, Lacan is criticized for drawing an analogy between topology and mental illness that, in Sokal and Bricmont's view, is unsupported by any argument and is "not just false: it is gibberish."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fashionable_Nonsense
It's difficult to dispute a philosophic framework on its own terms. It's not that difficult to be self-consistent. But when you dig into these philosophies I always find myself asking, "So what?".
Compare Jean Baudrillard's Simulcra to Benedict Anderson's Imagined Communities. IMO, they both identify the same basic phenomenon--that the reality we inhabit is socially constructed, including much or all of what we consider our physical reality, if only because it's difficult if not impossible (except through contrivances like math) to disentangle socially imbued meaning from even the most mundane of objects and events. But Baudrillard builds an exaggerated philosophical framework with little if any additional descriptive power.
Similarly, Baudrillard's philosophy is often used, including my himself, in an excessively prescriptivist manner, unrestrained by any admission of incompleteness. (Continental philosophers have always loved indulging in supposedly universal philosophies that can be used to explain and dictate everything.) By contrast Anderson's Imagine Communities concept is principally descriptive, emphasizing as it does the emergence and importance of nationalism in particular. That makes it, among other things, more easily analyzed, critiqued, and even falsified. Extrapolating the framework into a more universal philosophy is something you would have to do entirely on your own, and at your own peril. Importantly that makes it much more difficult to weaponize Anderson's concepts, directly or indirectly, in political and cultural rhetoric. Yet, at the end of the day, you can ride Anderson's concept anywhere you might Baudrillard--in the abstract it doesn't limit you; in fact, arguably it can take you more places by being less categorical.
There's a hilarious chapter, "Foreword to Newt Gringrich's Post-structuralism for Republicans: TrumpTruth and How to Make It, By Betsy DeVos" in the book Moving Forward: Real Introductions to Totally Made-up Books. I feel like the author tore the entire story straight from my head; thus, unsurprisingly, I find it hilarious. But in any event it IMO perfectly encapsulates not only the shortcomings in post-structuralism and related philosophies, but the dangers.
FWIW, I don't think all non-analytical philosophies are problematic. I far prefer Camus' writings over Satre's precisely because Camus evinces a laudable restraint. He doesn't emphasize implications; at most he hints at that them. Whether that's because he was just a good storyteller (letting the reader fill in the gaps), or because he was conscious of the inherent incompleteness of his perspectives and was capable of admitting to himself uncertainty, I don't know, but it makes for a far more mature and, ultimately, truthful examination of the human condition.
Compare Jean Baudrillard's Simulcra to Benedict Anderson's Imagined Communities. IMO, they both identify the same basic phenomenon--that the reality we inhabit is socially constructed, including much or all of what we consider our physical reality, if only because it's difficult if not impossible (except through contrivances like math) to disentangle socially imbued meaning from even the most mundane of objects and events. But Baudrillard builds an exaggerated philosophical framework with little if any additional descriptive power.
Similarly, Baudrillard's philosophy is often used, including my himself, in an excessively prescriptivist manner, unrestrained by any admission of incompleteness. (Continental philosophers have always loved indulging in supposedly universal philosophies that can be used to explain and dictate everything.) By contrast Anderson's Imagine Communities concept is principally descriptive, emphasizing as it does the emergence and importance of nationalism in particular. That makes it, among other things, more easily analyzed, critiqued, and even falsified. Extrapolating the framework into a more universal philosophy is something you would have to do entirely on your own, and at your own peril. Importantly that makes it much more difficult to weaponize Anderson's concepts, directly or indirectly, in political and cultural rhetoric. Yet, at the end of the day, you can ride Anderson's concept anywhere you might Baudrillard--in the abstract it doesn't limit you; in fact, arguably it can take you more places by being less categorical.
There's a hilarious chapter, "Foreword to Newt Gringrich's Post-structuralism for Republicans: TrumpTruth and How to Make It, By Betsy DeVos" in the book Moving Forward: Real Introductions to Totally Made-up Books. I feel like the author tore the entire story straight from my head; thus, unsurprisingly, I find it hilarious. But in any event it IMO perfectly encapsulates not only the shortcomings in post-structuralism and related philosophies, but the dangers.
FWIW, I don't think all non-analytical philosophies are problematic. I far prefer Camus' writings over Satre's precisely because Camus evinces a laudable restraint. He doesn't emphasize implications; at most he hints at that them. Whether that's because he was just a good storyteller (letting the reader fill in the gaps), or because he was conscious of the inherent incompleteness of his perspectives and was capable of admitting to himself uncertainty, I don't know, but it makes for a far more mature and, ultimately, truthful examination of the human condition.
> I've yet to see a claim of obscurantism leveled against a post-structuralist that I felt had any serious weight.
I've yet to see a claim made by a post-structuralist that I felt had any serious weight. The awful prose just makes it worse.
I've yet to see a claim made by a post-structuralist that I felt had any serious weight. The awful prose just makes it worse.
In some sense I agree. The Continental tradition has always been frustrated by the innate limits of language, so a tendency towards impressions over concrete, clinical terminology makes sense to me.
I do see the similarity.
I also agree that among many of them, there's an 'impressionistic' approach to presenting their work. Handwavy, you could say. But that's not to say their work isn't the expression of deep and clear philosophical insight.
There are notable continental philosphers whose presentation is tightly-argued; Hegel and Kant come to mind, but there are many others.
I also agree that among many of them, there's an 'impressionistic' approach to presenting their work. Handwavy, you could say. But that's not to say their work isn't the expression of deep and clear philosophical insight.
There are notable continental philosphers whose presentation is tightly-argued; Hegel and Kant come to mind, but there are many others.
For analytic philosophy, where should one go, specific philosophers, or...?
Yeah I’d start here, especially the names in the second paragraph.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analytic_philosophy
Also I recommend Blackwell’s Anthology of Analytic Philosophy.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analytic_philosophy
Also I recommend Blackwell’s Anthology of Analytic Philosophy.
I think the previous poster is being a bit heavy handed about the analytic tradition being the jumping off point. You'll get some mileage with some of Bertrand Russell's non-technical stuff, but there are lots of conversations going on that have to do with historical ideas.
Typically the direction starts with Descartes, then Hume, then Kant, and after that, there is a real break between continental and analytic traditions. So, jumping into Wittgenstein might be a really bad idea for someone without a background, but who knows. The Philosophical Investigations is a fairly approachable book.
Typically the direction starts with Descartes, then Hume, then Kant, and after that, there is a real break between continental and analytic traditions. So, jumping into Wittgenstein might be a really bad idea for someone without a background, but who knows. The Philosophical Investigations is a fairly approachable book.
I think some of the TLP can be approached almost as a poem. I havn't read it in German, but in translation I think the poetic parts are expressive language, organised into stanzas. That's close to poetry.
You don't need a background, unless you want to read the middle section, which is close to advanced maths.
You don't need a background, unless you want to read the middle section, which is close to advanced maths.
"the TLP"?
<Googles "works of Wittgenstein">. Ohh, the Tractatus. Ok. "You don't need a background" is absurd! Sure, you can physically read the words. But you won't have a clue why he's saying what he's saying, or what he meant by it. And Wittgenstein himself within a few years would've told you it's nonsense and not to go anywhere near it.
<Googles "works of Wittgenstein">. Ohh, the Tractatus. Ok. "You don't need a background" is absurd! Sure, you can physically read the words. But you won't have a clue why he's saying what he's saying, or what he meant by it. And Wittgenstein himself within a few years would've told you it's nonsense and not to go anywhere near it.
Try Derek Parfit. His book "Reasons and Persons" touches on some fascinating questions (identity) with clear thought experiments that actually reach the level of clarity this article suggests.
I would definitely not say "Reasons and Persons" is clear. It might be precise (I personally don't think so, I think he makes tons of subtle mistakes), but it's at least not clear. It's full of ideas like "rational irrationality" which is at best a poor choice of naming, IMO.
> I think he makes tons of subtle mistakes
That's true of (at least) all important philosophy books, isn't it?
That's true of (at least) all important philosophy books, isn't it?
Without context, sure, but when we're talking specifically about the precision of expression, I don't think so. Some philosophers operate closer to mathematical precision than others, and when those sorts of precision-oriented philosophers screw up their precision, it's a bigger problem. In Reasons and Persons, Parfit jumps through hoops to make his statements precise but ultimately trips all over himself (in my opinion).
Every time I've looked at philosophy in my life, I kept searching for this promise - where intellectual giants grapple the truth and discover their secrets.
What I've found, from famous books by famous philosophers all the way to pop philosophy books to vague philosophical discussions... is some of the muddiest and most convoluted self-indulgent thinking i've ever seen.
I am thus convinced that philosophers ENJOY the mud, not the clarity. If clarity comes, it seems more likely than not that it is an accident, and other philosophers come quickly to obfuscate it. "yes, we see the same color, but do we REALLY see the same color?", as if an infinite regress of definitions somehow makes their thought process more valuable. And, from what I can tell about famous philosophies, perhaps to other philosophers they do.
What I've found, from famous books by famous philosophers all the way to pop philosophy books to vague philosophical discussions... is some of the muddiest and most convoluted self-indulgent thinking i've ever seen.
I am thus convinced that philosophers ENJOY the mud, not the clarity. If clarity comes, it seems more likely than not that it is an accident, and other philosophers come quickly to obfuscate it. "yes, we see the same color, but do we REALLY see the same color?", as if an infinite regress of definitions somehow makes their thought process more valuable. And, from what I can tell about famous philosophies, perhaps to other philosophers they do.
> Every time I've looked at philosophy in my life, I kept searching for this promise - where intellectual giants grapple the truth and discover their secrets.
This expresses an approach to philosophy that I think is, at its roots, ineffective. It treats "philosophy" as "Philosophy", as some thing, some well-defined corpus that deals with truth and can be explored top-down systematically, something that you can "look at" or "come to" or whatever. But that's not really what "philosophy" is or, rather, there is no "philosophy" in that sense. There's just people in the world trying to understand it and to communicate their understanding. There's just questions and people all the way down, nothing else. We use the name "philosophy" because it's convenient but I'd say it's maybe the least useful name for anything we've ever come up with.
Philosophy is ultimately personal, it's the most personal, and most of the most famous philosophers can only be appreciated if you go out of your way to read them from a deeply psychological and empathetic perspective. At least this is my experience. It's not easy and takes a lot of work to get into the headspace of whoever you're reading, but once you get there you'll feel the lightbulb go off. This is especially important when you read older philosophers or philosophers who have a fundamentally different metaphysics from yourself. Of course, sometimes you just can't get there with certain thinkers. For example, I have a really really really hard time taking Hegel seriously.
This expresses an approach to philosophy that I think is, at its roots, ineffective. It treats "philosophy" as "Philosophy", as some thing, some well-defined corpus that deals with truth and can be explored top-down systematically, something that you can "look at" or "come to" or whatever. But that's not really what "philosophy" is or, rather, there is no "philosophy" in that sense. There's just people in the world trying to understand it and to communicate their understanding. There's just questions and people all the way down, nothing else. We use the name "philosophy" because it's convenient but I'd say it's maybe the least useful name for anything we've ever come up with.
Philosophy is ultimately personal, it's the most personal, and most of the most famous philosophers can only be appreciated if you go out of your way to read them from a deeply psychological and empathetic perspective. At least this is my experience. It's not easy and takes a lot of work to get into the headspace of whoever you're reading, but once you get there you'll feel the lightbulb go off. This is especially important when you read older philosophers or philosophers who have a fundamentally different metaphysics from yourself. Of course, sometimes you just can't get there with certain thinkers. For example, I have a really really really hard time taking Hegel seriously.
+1 to this point.
I also find it easier to read certain philosophers than others because they themselves seem to be empathetic in the way they write their thinking. Almost as if they know that they could be wrong about the conclusions they're coming to, and that the truths they uncover aren't necessarily absolutes but instead, at least to a certain degree, subjective and personal.
Reading phenomenology for instance doesn't get me feeling like the author is self-indulgent. I find it easier to empathize with the philosopher because the philosopher is trying to empathize with me.
I also find it easier to read certain philosophers than others because they themselves seem to be empathetic in the way they write their thinking. Almost as if they know that they could be wrong about the conclusions they're coming to, and that the truths they uncover aren't necessarily absolutes but instead, at least to a certain degree, subjective and personal.
Reading phenomenology for instance doesn't get me feeling like the author is self-indulgent. I find it easier to empathize with the philosopher because the philosopher is trying to empathize with me.
Have you read Kant? I've had a lot of trouble with Hegel as well, and everyone tells me it's because he's responding to or building on arguments that Kant makes that seem to be pulled from whole cloth without that context (Kantext?).
We're certainly not the only ones though, a lot of famous philosophers think Hegel is bullshit. I don't know how much respect the Hegelian lineage has outside of continental philosophy circles these days. I suppose Fukuyama is pretty Hegelian.
We're certainly not the only ones though, a lot of famous philosophers think Hegel is bullshit. I don't know how much respect the Hegelian lineage has outside of continental philosophy circles these days. I suppose Fukuyama is pretty Hegelian.
Maybe that's true but tbh I'm kinda over Hegel, I don't imagine there will ever be a time in my life where attempting to seriously understand Hegel will be worth the time.
Marxism is derived from Hegel's work.
> I have a really really really hard time taking Hegel seriously
I really enjoyed Schopenhauer 80+ pages rant in "Parerga & Paralipomena" on Hegel and why he considered him a fraud. Nothing in philosophy is as consistent as Schopenhauer's "Hegel bashing" or using the term "Hegelian" only in a dismissive way.
Maybe I ought to read Hegel since he is a central figure in Western philosophy. My excuse so far has been that he is only needed if I want to understand and keep up with what influenced thinkers like Marx, the "Frankfurt School", etc. So far I haven't felt not reading Hegel is a problem. It might have even shielded me from a lot of pretentious texts but idk.
Agreeing and emphasizing with Schopenhauer was perhaps my reason for why Hegel now feels like a waste of time. Putting the effort needed into fully understanding him will be pure uphill struggle. This limits my understanding on Hegel to how Schopenhauer understood and interpreted him.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parerga_and_Paralipomena
I really enjoyed Schopenhauer 80+ pages rant in "Parerga & Paralipomena" on Hegel and why he considered him a fraud. Nothing in philosophy is as consistent as Schopenhauer's "Hegel bashing" or using the term "Hegelian" only in a dismissive way.
Maybe I ought to read Hegel since he is a central figure in Western philosophy. My excuse so far has been that he is only needed if I want to understand and keep up with what influenced thinkers like Marx, the "Frankfurt School", etc. So far I haven't felt not reading Hegel is a problem. It might have even shielded me from a lot of pretentious texts but idk.
Agreeing and emphasizing with Schopenhauer was perhaps my reason for why Hegel now feels like a waste of time. Putting the effort needed into fully understanding him will be pure uphill struggle. This limits my understanding on Hegel to how Schopenhauer understood and interpreted him.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parerga_and_Paralipomena
I used to enjoy Schopenhauer, and am still fond of him, but his student Nietzsche has taken his place for me, a cheerier, funnier companion. Well, like me, Nietzsche was inspired by Emerson throughout his life. Emerson was never funny, but always inspiring.
Santayana's Egotism in German Philosophy is one of my favourite books in philosophy, a history of German/"continental" thought from Leibniz to the Nazis—published 1916. Chapter II, The Protestant Heritage[0] begins:
"The German people, according to Fichte and Hegel, are called by the plan of Providence to occupy the supreme place in the history of the universe.
A little consideration of this belief will perhaps lead us more surely to the heart of German philosophy than would the usual laborious approach to it through what is called the theory of knowledge."
Gold! I love Santayana's gentlemanly, restrained sense of humour, so superior to, say, Russell or Nietzsche's savage mocking.
The best short thing I've read on Hegel is William James' essay On Some Hegelisms[1], and the long Note at its end, where he recognized Hegel-style thinking in his own crazed thinking while on nitrous oxide. Very funny, insightful stuff. After all, psychological experiment was James' own field:
"It is impossible to convey an idea of the torrential character of the identification of opposites as it streams through the mind in this experience. I have sheet after sheet of phrases dictated or written during the intoxication, which to the sober reader seem meaningless drivel, but which at the moment of transcribing were fused in the fire of infinite rationality. God and devil, good and evil, life and death, I and thou, sober and drunk, matter and form, black and white, quantity and quality, shiver of ecstasy and shudder of horror, vomiting and swallowing, inspiration and expiration, fate and reason, great and small, extent and intent, joke and earnest, tragic and comic, and fifty other contrasts figure in these pages in the same monotonous way. The mind saw how each term belonged to its contrast through a knife-edge moment of transition which it effected, and which, perennial and eternal, was the nunc stans of life. The thought of mutual implication of the parts in the bare form of a judgment of opposition, as 'nothing — but,' 'no more — than,' 'only — if', etc., produced a perfect delirium of theoretic rapture. And at last, when definite ideas to work on came slowly, the mind went through the mere form of recognizing sameness in identity by contrasting the same word with itself, differently emphasized, or shorn of its initial letter."
[0] https://archive.org/details/egotismingermanp00santuoft/page/...
[1] https://archive.org/details/willtobelieveoth1910jame/page/26...
Santayana's Egotism in German Philosophy is one of my favourite books in philosophy, a history of German/"continental" thought from Leibniz to the Nazis—published 1916. Chapter II, The Protestant Heritage[0] begins:
"The German people, according to Fichte and Hegel, are called by the plan of Providence to occupy the supreme place in the history of the universe.
A little consideration of this belief will perhaps lead us more surely to the heart of German philosophy than would the usual laborious approach to it through what is called the theory of knowledge."
Gold! I love Santayana's gentlemanly, restrained sense of humour, so superior to, say, Russell or Nietzsche's savage mocking.
The best short thing I've read on Hegel is William James' essay On Some Hegelisms[1], and the long Note at its end, where he recognized Hegel-style thinking in his own crazed thinking while on nitrous oxide. Very funny, insightful stuff. After all, psychological experiment was James' own field:
"It is impossible to convey an idea of the torrential character of the identification of opposites as it streams through the mind in this experience. I have sheet after sheet of phrases dictated or written during the intoxication, which to the sober reader seem meaningless drivel, but which at the moment of transcribing were fused in the fire of infinite rationality. God and devil, good and evil, life and death, I and thou, sober and drunk, matter and form, black and white, quantity and quality, shiver of ecstasy and shudder of horror, vomiting and swallowing, inspiration and expiration, fate and reason, great and small, extent and intent, joke and earnest, tragic and comic, and fifty other contrasts figure in these pages in the same monotonous way. The mind saw how each term belonged to its contrast through a knife-edge moment of transition which it effected, and which, perennial and eternal, was the nunc stans of life. The thought of mutual implication of the parts in the bare form of a judgment of opposition, as 'nothing — but,' 'no more — than,' 'only — if', etc., produced a perfect delirium of theoretic rapture. And at last, when definite ideas to work on came slowly, the mind went through the mere form of recognizing sameness in identity by contrasting the same word with itself, differently emphasized, or shorn of its initial letter."
[0] https://archive.org/details/egotismingermanp00santuoft/page/...
[1] https://archive.org/details/willtobelieveoth1910jame/page/26...
thanks for this wonderful William James quote and the links. I've yet to read him and I already sense from this quote I like his way with words.
From what I understand Nietzsche himself didn't have too many great things to say about Schopenhauer. He must have rubbed people the wrong way wherever he went and perhaps the only way for him to ever be recognized is be dead long enough so the writing is removed as far as possible from the man.
I'm going to read Santayana - thanks for the tip. Much appreciated. If you appreciate funny philosophers do check out Peter Wessel-Zapffe[1] a crazy Norwegian who loved his mountains and is quite dark[2] in a brilliant way.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_Wessel_Zapffe
[2] https://philosophynow.org/issues/45/The_Last_Messiah
From what I understand Nietzsche himself didn't have too many great things to say about Schopenhauer. He must have rubbed people the wrong way wherever he went and perhaps the only way for him to ever be recognized is be dead long enough so the writing is removed as far as possible from the man.
I'm going to read Santayana - thanks for the tip. Much appreciated. If you appreciate funny philosophers do check out Peter Wessel-Zapffe[1] a crazy Norwegian who loved his mountains and is quite dark[2] in a brilliant way.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_Wessel_Zapffe
[2] https://philosophynow.org/issues/45/The_Last_Messiah
Welcome! Ok thanks, will check him out. Not really into dark though! <Checked him out> Arggh, yeah. He sounds miserable. Getting a headache reading that..well, it was 1933 I guess. Sounds a bit like Cioran, who I expected I might like but it's just continual depressed whining as if being smart means you must be miserable as hell, and pitying those whose don't share your misery. That doesn't sound smart. Mencken and Kierkegaard are about as far as I willingly go in that direction—not very far. But they're very funny and brilliant writers.
Well, one of Nietzsche's most amazing productions is one of his first, the short essay On Truth and Lie in a Nonmoral Sense (1873), somewhat in a similar vein to that Zapffe, but, uh, well, behold how it starts! :
In some remote corner of the universe that is poured out in countless flickering solar systems, there once was a star on which clever animals invented knowledge. That was the most arrogant and the most untruthful moment in "world history" — yet indeed only a moment. After nature had taken a few breaths, the star froze over and the clever animals had to die.
Someone could invent such a fable and still not have illustrated adequately how pitiful, how shadowy and fleeting, how purposeless and arbitrary the human intellect appears within nature. There were eternities when it did not exist; and someday when it no longer is there, not much will have changed.
Further on, one of his most quoted passages:
What is truth? a mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, anthropomorphisms, in short, a sum of human relations which were poetically and rhetorically heightened, transferred, and adorned, and after long use seem solid, canonical, and binding to a nation. Truths are illusions about which it has been forgotten that they are illusions, worn-out metaphors without sensory impact, coins which have lost their image and now can be used only as metal, and no longer as coins. We still do not know where the desire for truth originates; for until now we have heard only of the obligation which society, in order to exist, imposes: to be truthful, i.e., to use the customary metaphors, or in moral terms, the obligation to lie according to an established convention, to lie collectively in a style that is mandatory for everyone.
Actually he had a lot to say about him—check out Schopenhauer as Educator, a long essay from Nietzsche's first (full-sized) book, Untimely Meditations aka Unfashionable Observations aka Thoughts Out Of Season—it's a very grateful tribute.
William James wrote so many great essays, and one of the most accessible, and touching, is On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings and its sequel What Makes A Life Significant. OACBIHB has a lot of great long quotes from various places, actually that reminds me, I think I rediscovered Stevenson's essays from a long quote in that, which is itself a huge debt. I'm into writers who faced life with joy and courage, and who love passing on that gift—Emerson, Stevenson, Chesterton etc.
Santayana - I never got anything from the systemy Life of Reason or Realms of Being, maybe I should try again one day. Soliloquies in England etc are short nontechnical essays on all subjects. My favourite books of his are the ones with long essays on particular philosophers or philosophical/cultural scenes, like Character and Opinion in the US. And the chapters on Schopenhauer and Nietzsche in Egotism in German Philosophy are among the best things written on those guys, as seems so often the case with Santayana. Cheers!
p.s. Come to think of it, this page on my website has links to a fair bit of James' stuff, and a few good quotes by and about him! http://www.adamponting.com/william-james/
Well, one of Nietzsche's most amazing productions is one of his first, the short essay On Truth and Lie in a Nonmoral Sense (1873), somewhat in a similar vein to that Zapffe, but, uh, well, behold how it starts! :
In some remote corner of the universe that is poured out in countless flickering solar systems, there once was a star on which clever animals invented knowledge. That was the most arrogant and the most untruthful moment in "world history" — yet indeed only a moment. After nature had taken a few breaths, the star froze over and the clever animals had to die.
Someone could invent such a fable and still not have illustrated adequately how pitiful, how shadowy and fleeting, how purposeless and arbitrary the human intellect appears within nature. There were eternities when it did not exist; and someday when it no longer is there, not much will have changed.
Further on, one of his most quoted passages:
What is truth? a mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, anthropomorphisms, in short, a sum of human relations which were poetically and rhetorically heightened, transferred, and adorned, and after long use seem solid, canonical, and binding to a nation. Truths are illusions about which it has been forgotten that they are illusions, worn-out metaphors without sensory impact, coins which have lost their image and now can be used only as metal, and no longer as coins. We still do not know where the desire for truth originates; for until now we have heard only of the obligation which society, in order to exist, imposes: to be truthful, i.e., to use the customary metaphors, or in moral terms, the obligation to lie according to an established convention, to lie collectively in a style that is mandatory for everyone.
Actually he had a lot to say about him—check out Schopenhauer as Educator, a long essay from Nietzsche's first (full-sized) book, Untimely Meditations aka Unfashionable Observations aka Thoughts Out Of Season—it's a very grateful tribute.
William James wrote so many great essays, and one of the most accessible, and touching, is On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings and its sequel What Makes A Life Significant. OACBIHB has a lot of great long quotes from various places, actually that reminds me, I think I rediscovered Stevenson's essays from a long quote in that, which is itself a huge debt. I'm into writers who faced life with joy and courage, and who love passing on that gift—Emerson, Stevenson, Chesterton etc.
Santayana - I never got anything from the systemy Life of Reason or Realms of Being, maybe I should try again one day. Soliloquies in England etc are short nontechnical essays on all subjects. My favourite books of his are the ones with long essays on particular philosophers or philosophical/cultural scenes, like Character and Opinion in the US. And the chapters on Schopenhauer and Nietzsche in Egotism in German Philosophy are among the best things written on those guys, as seems so often the case with Santayana. Cheers!
p.s. Come to think of it, this page on my website has links to a fair bit of James' stuff, and a few good quotes by and about him! http://www.adamponting.com/william-james/
> I am thus convinced that philosophers ENJOY the mud, not the clarity.
As in programming, there's some truth to this, in that needless complexity can afford a certain job security.
But you've ignored another possible interpretation, which is that the subject matter is muddy. Until Frege, Russell, et al, not even mathematicians had a clear notion of "inference" or "proof"; it was always a case of "I can't define it, but recognize it when I see it".
Until, suddenly, we did define it, and all the muddy conversations that came before now seemed misguided. We see this movement very clearly in all sciences, but I especially like examples from the history of mathematics, e.g. when Paul Gordan said, of Hilbert's finiteness theorem, that "This is not Mathematics. This is Theology."
John Searle once said that "philosophy is the asking of questions that come naturally to children, and answering them with methods that come naturally to mathematicians". Once those methods are sufficiently formalized, the problem domain simply leaves philosophy and becomes some part of mathematics, or a new empirical science.
This comes off as extremely self-indulgent, because it is, since almost every school of philosophers is trying to take some muddy conceptual domain and give it shape and structure, to help the subject along the path towards quantitative inquiry.
Think of philosophical schools as analogous to systems architectures: with an eye towards certain desiderata, they're laying foundations for the rest of the system as it is likely to eventually exist.
As in programming, there's some truth to this, in that needless complexity can afford a certain job security.
But you've ignored another possible interpretation, which is that the subject matter is muddy. Until Frege, Russell, et al, not even mathematicians had a clear notion of "inference" or "proof"; it was always a case of "I can't define it, but recognize it when I see it".
Until, suddenly, we did define it, and all the muddy conversations that came before now seemed misguided. We see this movement very clearly in all sciences, but I especially like examples from the history of mathematics, e.g. when Paul Gordan said, of Hilbert's finiteness theorem, that "This is not Mathematics. This is Theology."
John Searle once said that "philosophy is the asking of questions that come naturally to children, and answering them with methods that come naturally to mathematicians". Once those methods are sufficiently formalized, the problem domain simply leaves philosophy and becomes some part of mathematics, or a new empirical science.
This comes off as extremely self-indulgent, because it is, since almost every school of philosophers is trying to take some muddy conceptual domain and give it shape and structure, to help the subject along the path towards quantitative inquiry.
Think of philosophical schools as analogous to systems architectures: with an eye towards certain desiderata, they're laying foundations for the rest of the system as it is likely to eventually exist.
Yes, philosophers love the mud. That's why they're philosophers.
Everything we call "science" is something that has been separated out, cleaned up, and polished. Darwin and Newton both considered themselves "philosophers", because they looked in the mud and took out a nice, separable piece of it.
What's left as "philosophy" is the mud, the stuff that we haven't taken away from the philosophy department by giving it a new name. We continue to take philosophy's successes: linguistics, economics, even cognitive science were originally done under the remit of a philosophy department.
You can't tell the serious work from the people just being self-indulgent until after the fact. Especially from the outside: a lot of the serious work looks ridiculous until it's successful. Getting to the point where you can tell requires more effort than most people are willing to put out -- which is fine, because it's not actually important whether you judge it well or not.
But in the interests of intellectual honesty, you'd do well not to judge a discipline with only a cursory understanding of it. And before you object to me describing your understanding as cursory, let me assure you that questions like "do we REALLY see the same color" are precisely not what real philosophy looks like. It's the same kind of red flag that "Can we use dark matter to go faster than light?" signals as not serious physics.
Everything we call "science" is something that has been separated out, cleaned up, and polished. Darwin and Newton both considered themselves "philosophers", because they looked in the mud and took out a nice, separable piece of it.
What's left as "philosophy" is the mud, the stuff that we haven't taken away from the philosophy department by giving it a new name. We continue to take philosophy's successes: linguistics, economics, even cognitive science were originally done under the remit of a philosophy department.
You can't tell the serious work from the people just being self-indulgent until after the fact. Especially from the outside: a lot of the serious work looks ridiculous until it's successful. Getting to the point where you can tell requires more effort than most people are willing to put out -- which is fine, because it's not actually important whether you judge it well or not.
But in the interests of intellectual honesty, you'd do well not to judge a discipline with only a cursory understanding of it. And before you object to me describing your understanding as cursory, let me assure you that questions like "do we REALLY see the same color" are precisely not what real philosophy looks like. It's the same kind of red flag that "Can we use dark matter to go faster than light?" signals as not serious physics.
I'm having a pretty hard time trying to figure out why people are so quick to toss out philosophy without trying to understand it.
The principles of liberal democracy, separation of church and state, and all that feel-good stuff is not something that "really exists". Its a bunch of stuff that a bunch of philosophers spent years observing society to create stuff to try and make a coherent framework for humans to live by.
I still think to this day that my philosophy of science course in college was one of the most defining classes of my life. It really changed how I look at existence and modes of thought
The principles of liberal democracy, separation of church and state, and all that feel-good stuff is not something that "really exists". Its a bunch of stuff that a bunch of philosophers spent years observing society to create stuff to try and make a coherent framework for humans to live by.
I still think to this day that my philosophy of science course in college was one of the most defining classes of my life. It really changed how I look at existence and modes of thought
A ton of it is plain Dunning-Kruger. They spend two minutes looking at something they don't understand, dub it stupid, and feel smug about being smarter than the people who do it.
That said, philosophy seems to practically beg people to do that, and I've spent some time trying to figure out how and why. Scientists flood the Internet to challenge bad science. Especially physics, which a lot of people practice in exactly the same way they approach philosophy -- without doing the math, or doing the experiment, or having any applications.
Philosophers don't do that, and I struggle with that. There may or may not be such a thing as "bad philosophy", but it's certainly true that people mis-represent the state of the art of philosophy. The most visible philosophers are rarely the ones doing the most important work.
People are quick to jump on the Sokal Hoax -- as if they had any idea what the journal Social Text was actually for. Who's out there to explain it? Science won the Science Wars -- but did anybody actually show up to fight against them?
Sciences aren't immune, either. A field like sociology is barely separated from philosophy, and gets a lot of derision -- as if it would be so much better if it would just realize that human beings are billiard balls with no more than three dimensions of freedom, and we could gin up experiments with N=10^20 every afternoon the way the LHC does. But if you were offered the answer to the question "How can we end homelessness?" or "What is the real nature of dark energy?", which one actually matters more?
It's easy to feel smug about the simplicity of physics and the tremendous power we can get out of that. A lot of people get a cheap thrill out of that. But it's lazy, and I really wish there were a way to talk about it.
That said, philosophy seems to practically beg people to do that, and I've spent some time trying to figure out how and why. Scientists flood the Internet to challenge bad science. Especially physics, which a lot of people practice in exactly the same way they approach philosophy -- without doing the math, or doing the experiment, or having any applications.
Philosophers don't do that, and I struggle with that. There may or may not be such a thing as "bad philosophy", but it's certainly true that people mis-represent the state of the art of philosophy. The most visible philosophers are rarely the ones doing the most important work.
People are quick to jump on the Sokal Hoax -- as if they had any idea what the journal Social Text was actually for. Who's out there to explain it? Science won the Science Wars -- but did anybody actually show up to fight against them?
Sciences aren't immune, either. A field like sociology is barely separated from philosophy, and gets a lot of derision -- as if it would be so much better if it would just realize that human beings are billiard balls with no more than three dimensions of freedom, and we could gin up experiments with N=10^20 every afternoon the way the LHC does. But if you were offered the answer to the question "How can we end homelessness?" or "What is the real nature of dark energy?", which one actually matters more?
It's easy to feel smug about the simplicity of physics and the tremendous power we can get out of that. A lot of people get a cheap thrill out of that. But it's lazy, and I really wish there were a way to talk about it.
Case in point, these days the question "Do we REALLY see the same color ?", is much more one about physics, signal processing and (neuro)biology.
> Darwin and Newton both considered themselves "philosophers"
The word "scientist" was only coined in the 1830s. Science for the vast majority of its history existed as a branch of philosophy called natural philosophy.
The word "scientist" was only coined in the 1830s. Science for the vast majority of its history existed as a branch of philosophy called natural philosophy.
Wittgenstein came to the same conclusion.
Whereof one cannot speak, one must remain silent.
And he’s just paraphrasing the Buddhists/Taoists (and a bunch of other lesser known religious orders) who had that same insight a few thousand years earlier.
Most people aren’t interested in silence though. The mud keeps humans entertained and hungry. Those humans build the societies we live in, monks living in silence in monasteries do not.
Whereof one cannot speak, one must remain silent.
And he’s just paraphrasing the Buddhists/Taoists (and a bunch of other lesser known religious orders) who had that same insight a few thousand years earlier.
Most people aren’t interested in silence though. The mud keeps humans entertained and hungry. Those humans build the societies we live in, monks living in silence in monasteries do not.
In the Tractatus (TLP), which you quoted, Wittgenstein came to a conclussion about language, not about philosophy itself. He rejected many of the major themes of the TLP in his later work, Philosophical Investigations (even jokingly calling the person who wrote the TLP an idiot)
Wittgensteins metaphilosophical thoughts are best captured in the Blue Book (a series of lecture notes) and Philosophical Investigations.
Wittgensteins metaphilosophical thoughts are best captured in the Blue Book (a series of lecture notes) and Philosophical Investigations.
I don't agree that he rejects much of TLP in Phlosophical Investigations, although most secondary sources say he did. So I'm deviant.
I wrote my undergraduate dissertation on this subject, 40 years ago.
I think it's a bad idea to write an undergraduate dissertation that implicitly criticises prominent philosophy writers; they are probably your examiner's drinking buddy.
I got a gamma (scrape pass).
I wrote my undergraduate dissertation on this subject, 40 years ago.
I think it's a bad idea to write an undergraduate dissertation that implicitly criticises prominent philosophy writers; they are probably your examiner's drinking buddy.
I got a gamma (scrape pass).
On the flip side, do you really thing every conversation Aristotle had with his students was a cloud of gilded exhalations that would echo down the millennia?
I don't think I would be surprised to learn the majority of the conversations that took place over the decades of Aristotle's life were a grueling, repeated, and mind-numbing grind to a treatise. As that is what is usually required to produce something original and authentic in my tech world.
If someone were to lay out a transcript of all of his discussions, could it be possible they read like today's internet posts? I've read books of correspondence between great minds (Einstein, Feyerabend, Franklin), but those were carefully curated exchanges. Not free-flowing arguments like discussion boards.
I don't think I would be surprised to learn the majority of the conversations that took place over the decades of Aristotle's life were a grueling, repeated, and mind-numbing grind to a treatise. As that is what is usually required to produce something original and authentic in my tech world.
If someone were to lay out a transcript of all of his discussions, could it be possible they read like today's internet posts? I've read books of correspondence between great minds (Einstein, Feyerabend, Franklin), but those were carefully curated exchanges. Not free-flowing arguments like discussion boards.
Are you willing to prioritize truth above that which is socially acceptable? If you do, your philosophy will probably remain hidden, and if not, your philosophy will probably be irrelevant like what you describe.
why would that be true? Many things that are true are socially uncomfortable and are still known.
History is chock full of examples of things which others in the field (and society) hated but could not disprove, and then became well known. I can think, off the top of my head, examples in math, human biology, plant biology, psychology, and martial arts, (the last one due to the wonders of the internet). It seems to happen all the time.
History is chock full of examples of things which others in the field (and society) hated but could not disprove, and then became well known. I can think, off the top of my head, examples in math, human biology, plant biology, psychology, and martial arts, (the last one due to the wonders of the internet). It seems to happen all the time.
Many things that are deemed socially uncomfortable are a part of the same board on which the socially comfortable game is played.
Moreover, the vast majority of examples one can come up in science are not truths, and in fact a core premise of science is each state of scientific knowledge is contingent and not final, i.e. it's not True, but it should be a more faithful description of what is happening than we had before.
Moreover, the vast majority of examples one can come up in science are not truths, and in fact a core premise of science is each state of scientific knowledge is contingent and not final, i.e. it's not True, but it should be a more faithful description of what is happening than we had before.
There are many examples in history of people who have risked their reputations or even lives to say certain things. I've no doubt the memory and works of some have been wiped out completely; humans are awfully petty at times.
It's all too easy to dismiss one's critics out of hand, yet if you want a relevant argument you at least have to consider some criticism dispassionately. I'm not sure that we as a society have got better at doing that.
It's all too easy to dismiss one's critics out of hand, yet if you want a relevant argument you at least have to consider some criticism dispassionately. I'm not sure that we as a society have got better at doing that.
It really depends who you read. Some philosophers are better writers than others, some philosophical traditions prioritize clarity more, and some translations are really bad. If you’re looking for relatively straightforward thinking, Plato is often where freshman philosophy students start and his work is considered background knowledge for basically all of the rest of western philosophy.
Name me two.
And I've read some Plato some years ago. I would not classify him as a clear thinker by any remotely modern standards.
And I've read some Plato some years ago. I would not classify him as a clear thinker by any remotely modern standards.
For amazing clarity, read Bertrand Russell and Karl Popper.
What of his work have you read that was so unclear?
I read about half of "The Republic". I would pull out the book again to find a good example, but I think I donated the book a few months ago.
You might like American Pragmatism: CS Peirce, FP Ramsey, CI Lewis, William James, John Dewey, etc.
Peirce's "How to Make Our Ideas Clear": https://courses.media.mit.edu/2004spring/mas966/Peirce%20187...
Peirce's "How to Make Our Ideas Clear": https://courses.media.mit.edu/2004spring/mas966/Peirce%20187...
Peirce also, along with Frege, independently discovered the existential and universal quantifiers, to name just one major contribution. His existential graphs[1] are extremely cool too. Peirce is grossly underappreciated largely due to the efforts of his less gifted but more politically astute childhood "friend" Simon Newcomb to obliterate his career and legacy. The Peirce gateway is full of great stuff[2][3]. This[4] is the companion paper to How To Make Our Ideas Clear.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Existential_graph
[2] https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/
[3] https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/menu/library/bycsp/bycsp.HTM
[4] https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/menu/library/bycsp/fixation/f...
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Existential_graph
[2] https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/
[3] https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/menu/library/bycsp/bycsp.HTM
[4] https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/menu/library/bycsp/fixation/f...
Also Richard Rorty. I seem to never agree with anything he says—he always goes too far—but have all his books and find him very stimulating. Hilary Putnam talks in his books about their disagreements, and Putnam always seems to take the more sensible side. Putnam is a very clear and stimulating writer—his Realism with a Human Face is perhaps his best and a good place to start, filled with remarkably good essays.
p.s. Dewey's Art as Experience changed my life. I'm a musician/artist and philosophy student, and it solved all my problems concerning art, which each further book of analytic philosophy of art had only multiplied.
p.s. Dewey's Art as Experience changed my life. I'm a musician/artist and philosophy student, and it solved all my problems concerning art, which each further book of analytic philosophy of art had only multiplied.
Thanks, I'll save that for later reading.
Two what?
I'm also curious what defines your standard for clear thinking. Philosophy is at a level of abstraction higher than any other intellectual discipline, and to a certain extent it's not possible to discuss philosophy in the way we discuss engineering, for example. It's the difference between relying on assumptions to communicate effectively and attempting to analyze the assumptions themselves.
I'm also curious what defines your standard for clear thinking. Philosophy is at a level of abstraction higher than any other intellectual discipline, and to a certain extent it's not possible to discuss philosophy in the way we discuss engineering, for example. It's the difference between relying on assumptions to communicate effectively and attempting to analyze the assumptions themselves.
Marcus Aurelius and Seneca
I find Nietzsche to be an extremely clear writer, but only if you have an understanding of his background and the topics he’s engaging with.
Kierkegaard plays a lot of games in his writings, but I think his ideas themselves are very straightforward.
Kierkegaard plays a lot of games in his writings, but I think his ideas themselves are very straightforward.
> I am thus convinced that philosophers ENJOY the mud, not the clarity.
I agree that this describes many philosophers, but "quietists" such as John McDowell and (late) Wittgenstein would disagree:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quietism_(philosophy)
I agree that this describes many philosophers, but "quietists" such as John McDowell and (late) Wittgenstein would disagree:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quietism_(philosophy)
>What I've found, from famous books by famous philosophers all the way to pop philosophy books to vague philosophical discussions... is some of the muddiest and most convoluted self-indulgent thinking i've ever seen.
I find philosophy to be highly irrational. It studies topics that are uniquely different yet it categorizes these topics as the same thing.
Aesthetics aka beauty is a philosophy, and so is logic. How do these things exist on the same level? Aesthetics is a human attribute and a human opinion and made up concept, logic is an observable phenomenon fundamental to the universe.
The infinite regressions are also pointless paths to explore. By induction we know it's infinite already so why continue to explore?
I find philosophy to be highly irrational. It studies topics that are uniquely different yet it categorizes these topics as the same thing.
Aesthetics aka beauty is a philosophy, and so is logic. How do these things exist on the same level? Aesthetics is a human attribute and a human opinion and made up concept, logic is an observable phenomenon fundamental to the universe.
The infinite regressions are also pointless paths to explore. By induction we know it's infinite already so why continue to explore?
> How do these things exist on the same level?
Through Mathematics ?
Through Mathematics ?
Mathematics makes beauty and logic equivalent fields of study that belong in the same category? How?
Geometry plays an important role in aesthetics (symmetry for instance). (Also math in music.)
That's applied math though. It is categorically on another level in the hierarchy.
Why would one specific application of math, the application of math in beauty be placed by philosophy on the same level as logic fundamentally. Math is derived from logic after all. Why isn't philosophy placing the study of the application of math to origami in the same category? Why does beauty arbitrarily take precedence over origami?
Why would one specific application of math, the application of math in beauty be placed by philosophy on the same level as logic fundamentally. Math is derived from logic after all. Why isn't philosophy placing the study of the application of math to origami in the same category? Why does beauty arbitrarily take precedence over origami?
Not historically. Also remember that Pythagoricians were a mystic cult.
That's just a further reason why it makes no sense. The categorization is developed as mysticism.
Good essay, but a little short on examples of how philosophers actually think. Here's a famous example, a paper written by philosophers to poke fun at their profession. A dialogue that opens with "if you believe that only material objects can exist, do holes exist?" and goes to pretty ridiculous depth. http://home.sandiego.edu/~baber/metaphysics/readings/Lewis&L...
I've read a lot of philosophical reasoning that was similar in spirit to this paper, and can't quite say if I'm a fan of it or not. All I can say is, it's not as good at finding definitive answers as mathematics (which I also love), but it sure can uncover a lot of questions.
I've read a lot of philosophical reasoning that was similar in spirit to this paper, and can't quite say if I'm a fan of it or not. All I can say is, it's not as good at finding definitive answers as mathematics (which I also love), but it sure can uncover a lot of questions.
An awful lot of philosophical disputes are disagreements about the definitions of words, but neither side states their definition - they just assume their definition. The different sides then have different things that are "obviously true" (once you assume their definition of some word), and they proceed to argue back and forth, each with their assumptions, but with neither side ever stating their assumed definition. The result is a complete waste of time on all sides.
Take "do holes exist", for example. This will turn on the definition of "exist". Clearly they exist in some sense, and clearly they don't in another sense. Once you realize this is what's going on, the discussion becomes uninteresting.
Take "do holes exist", for example. This will turn on the definition of "exist". Clearly they exist in some sense, and clearly they don't in another sense. Once you realize this is what's going on, the discussion becomes uninteresting.
I think this get things backwards. Philosophers (save maybe Austin) generally reject the authority of a definition. In the analytic tradition, words are just pointing at things or concepts, and a definition is a heuristic or shorthand.
Fighting over the definition of "exist" is exactly trying to take the concept(s) the two are thinking of, and decide whether they are internally consistent. If they are, all the better, they needn't even be the same, but if they are not internally consistent, then the concept is clearly wrong and not worth discussing.
Fighting over the definition of "exist" is exactly trying to take the concept(s) the two are thinking of, and decide whether they are internally consistent. If they are, all the better, they needn't even be the same, but if they are not internally consistent, then the concept is clearly wrong and not worth discussing.
I'd say that there are more than one concept that can be labeled by the word "exist". If you don't say which concept you're talking about, and the other person is running with a different concept that wears the same label, that discussion isn't worth having.
They could discuss either concept, and have a meaningful discussion (with quite a bit of agreement). But because they're actually discussing different concepts, but using the same word, the discussion just wastes everybody's time.
They could discuss either concept, and have a meaningful discussion (with quite a bit of agreement). But because they're actually discussing different concepts, but using the same word, the discussion just wastes everybody's time.
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This is really great, love the dialogue.
> Quantum Thinking, which is holding multiple contradictory ideas in your head at the same time. By oscillating between radical extremes, you put ideas at war with each other in the name of truth. By doing so, you stretch each idea to its logical conclusion.
Isn't this the 19th century Hegelian dialectic, not a quantum-whatchamacallit?
Isn't this the 19th century Hegelian dialectic, not a quantum-whatchamacallit?
Hegel was quantum before quantum was cool.
If you write a thinkpiece online that doesn't include the word quantum, commentariat assassins will personally break into your house and torture you.
There are some things that software engineering and philosophy have in common. One is that they are both about (abstract) concepts and their relationships. Another is that they are based on languages. Just like software engineers have the tendency to develop new programming language, philosophers of all ages, have come up with new words to represent certain ideas. Thus there must be some similarities between how philosophers and software engineers think.
Yet, I get the impression that many software engineers are rather suspicious about philosophy. (I do not know about the other way around.)
Maybe it is because as a software engineer you have the experience that you are often wrong about what you think is right. This especially comes from debugging, were you over and over discover that your idea about the cause of the bug is wrong when you finally have found a satisfying solution. And even then, you often realize that the fact that the bug was possible was due to some design decision made some years ago, and that an even better way to fix the bug is to revert that design decision.
Maybe it because you have learned that reality is always far more complex than you would have thought at first.
Maybe it is because we as software engineers have learned to deal with situations where the rubber meets the road, while many philosophers did not have to cope with that experience.
Yet, I get the impression that many software engineers are rather suspicious about philosophy. (I do not know about the other way around.)
Maybe it is because as a software engineer you have the experience that you are often wrong about what you think is right. This especially comes from debugging, were you over and over discover that your idea about the cause of the bug is wrong when you finally have found a satisfying solution. And even then, you often realize that the fact that the bug was possible was due to some design decision made some years ago, and that an even better way to fix the bug is to revert that design decision.
Maybe it because you have learned that reality is always far more complex than you would have thought at first.
Maybe it is because we as software engineers have learned to deal with situations where the rubber meets the road, while many philosophers did not have to cope with that experience.
"Yet, I get the impression that many software engineers are rather suspicious about philosophy."
I did my degree in philosophy, and was hired immediately by a seven-dwarfs mainframe company. No CS - a degree was enough in those days. I eventually graduated into "software enineering".
I did my degree in philosophy, and was hired immediately by a seven-dwarfs mainframe company. No CS - a degree was enough in those days. I eventually graduated into "software enineering".
I'm not impressed by this article. The author talks a lot about what he says is a desirable way to think, but fails to actually think that way.
For example:
"My Why You’re Christian essay demonstrates the process I use to interrogate my ideas."
So I go look at that essay, which can be summed up quite simply by quoting its last line:
"Ultimately, there are two ways to justify a belief in human rights: you can either construct a bottom-up, rational argument, or you can surrender to the supreme word of God."
And the whole essay is spent agonizing about the second option, without ever even discussing the first. Not only is the author apparently unaware of all the literature on constructing bottom-up, rational arguments for human rights (not to mention many other common values), he hasn't even tried to come up with one himself. Has it never even occurred to him that one obvious argument for human rights is that societies that respect them are better places to live?
For example:
"My Why You’re Christian essay demonstrates the process I use to interrogate my ideas."
So I go look at that essay, which can be summed up quite simply by quoting its last line:
"Ultimately, there are two ways to justify a belief in human rights: you can either construct a bottom-up, rational argument, or you can surrender to the supreme word of God."
And the whole essay is spent agonizing about the second option, without ever even discussing the first. Not only is the author apparently unaware of all the literature on constructing bottom-up, rational arguments for human rights (not to mention many other common values), he hasn't even tried to come up with one himself. Has it never even occurred to him that one obvious argument for human rights is that societies that respect them are better places to live?
> How Philosophers Think
I thought they went for dinner and try to eat with one fork in each hand
I thought they went for dinner and try to eat with one fork in each hand
I very much appreciate the section: The Dangers of Thinking Like a Philosopher. I was a philosophy major and then graduate school student, and if it weren't for the financial crisis in 2008, i would likely have attempted some career in academia.
After finishing graduate school, i found myself constantly sort of being referred to as awkward, out of touch, unpleasant person, because i was used to the university discourse of the philosophy department. A place where playing devil's advocate is required, not frowned upon. I thought people cared about the correctness of their ideas. I eventually had to unlearn, or re-learn how to talk to people.
I now deeply value my friends who want to engage in good-faith discussions in which "controversial" ideas (often just genuine curiosity) are allowed, and you're not seen as some sort of persona non grata for entertaining them. The true persona non grata, from my perspective, is entertaining these wrongthink ideas as a means to justify them, rather than good-faith explore them.
Now, as a way to avoid responding to certain people talking about certain subjects, i'll just say some subject should stay inside the walls of academia.
After finishing graduate school, i found myself constantly sort of being referred to as awkward, out of touch, unpleasant person, because i was used to the university discourse of the philosophy department. A place where playing devil's advocate is required, not frowned upon. I thought people cared about the correctness of their ideas. I eventually had to unlearn, or re-learn how to talk to people.
I now deeply value my friends who want to engage in good-faith discussions in which "controversial" ideas (often just genuine curiosity) are allowed, and you're not seen as some sort of persona non grata for entertaining them. The true persona non grata, from my perspective, is entertaining these wrongthink ideas as a means to justify them, rather than good-faith explore them.
Now, as a way to avoid responding to certain people talking about certain subjects, i'll just say some subject should stay inside the walls of academia.
"To that end, most of the time a philosopher spends writing doesn’t involve typing"
Most of the time a philosopher spends philosophising doesn't even involve thinking.
Bertrand Russel said that philosophy was very difficult, and even very good philosophers only succeeded in doing it for a few days a year.
Or something; I don't think it's from Problems Of Philosophy, and I can't lay my hands on my copy of In Praise Of Idleness.
Most of the time a philosopher spends philosophising doesn't even involve thinking.
Bertrand Russel said that philosophy was very difficult, and even very good philosophers only succeeded in doing it for a few days a year.
Or something; I don't think it's from Problems Of Philosophy, and I can't lay my hands on my copy of In Praise Of Idleness.
A great book on this topic: Intuition Pumps And Other Tools for Thinking by Daniel C. Dennett
A world-class philosopher of many decades (I read many of his books, highly recommend) shares his thoughts on this topic.
https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B00AR354AQ
A world-class philosopher of many decades (I read many of his books, highly recommend) shares his thoughts on this topic.
https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B00AR354AQ
One beautiful piece of advice from the book: articulate your opponent's point of view so well, they'll want to say "I couldn't word it better" -- because that is how you know you have correctly understood the opposing view (a must before you start trying to argue against it).
Great read.
Philosophy is a good example, because even “Western Philosophy” has so many fringe and irregular thinkers (Nietzsche, Deleuze, etc.) that trying to nail down how a “philosopher” thinks into one definition is impossible.
Deleuze, for example, basically saw philosophy as the creation of concepts. Many people find his ideas confusing or at least unclear. His method was definitely not as described as in the link. Yet I think he’s easily the most interesting philosopher of the last half century and someone whom technologists should read more about.
Having said all that, if you’re looking for the clarity of thought mentioned in the link, what you want is analytic philosophy. This is a specific “approach” obsessed with conceptual clarity.