UN Security Council Passes Ceasefire Resolution(nytimes.com)
nytimes.com
UN Security Council Passes Ceasefire Resolution
https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/03/25/world/israel-hamas-war-gaza-news
12 comments
Jared won't be happy about this... those waterfront properties are still going to need land to be built on and the Gazans aren't going to evict themselves
Here is a summary of the very short resolution as describe by the UN news page https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/03/1147931:
* The Council would demand “an immediate ceasefire for the month of Ramadan respected by all parties leading to a permanent sustainable ceasefire”
* It would also demand “the immediate and unconditional release of all hostages, as well as ensuring humanitarian access to address their medical and other humanitarian needs” and “that the parties comply with their obligations under international law in relation to all persons they detain”
* Other provisions would have the Council emphasize “the urgent need to expand the flow of humanitarian assistance to and reinforce the protection of civilians in the entire Gaza Strip.
* In this regard, the draft would have the Council reiterate its demand for the lifting of all barriers to the provision of humanitarian assistance at scale, in line with international humanitarian law as well as resolutions 2712 (2023) and 2720 (2023).
The resolution it self is up on the UN web page. However I’m having problems accessing it.
https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-adopt...
* The Council would demand “an immediate ceasefire for the month of Ramadan respected by all parties leading to a permanent sustainable ceasefire”
* It would also demand “the immediate and unconditional release of all hostages, as well as ensuring humanitarian access to address their medical and other humanitarian needs” and “that the parties comply with their obligations under international law in relation to all persons they detain”
* Other provisions would have the Council emphasize “the urgent need to expand the flow of humanitarian assistance to and reinforce the protection of civilians in the entire Gaza Strip.
* In this regard, the draft would have the Council reiterate its demand for the lifting of all barriers to the provision of humanitarian assistance at scale, in line with international humanitarian law as well as resolutions 2712 (2023) and 2720 (2023).
The resolution it self is up on the UN web page. However I’m having problems accessing it.
https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-adopt...
[deleted]
as usual theres no enforcement mechanism
if hamas refuse to release all hostages, what is supposed to happen?
if hamas refuse to release all hostages, what is supposed to happen?
This is a UN security council resolution. The enforcement mechanism is [kinda; see child] implied. The resolutions them selves hardly ever specify how enforcement works. It is assumed that they are obeyed, and then other member states will decide punitive measures when non-compliance is evident. This usually means sanctions, breaking of diplomatic ties, etc. and—in the case of Israel—probably arms embargo.
> If hamas refuse to release all hostages, what is supposed to happen?
That is not really the most important question right now. Hamas has shown compliance with previous hostage release plans. If there is a ceasefire, hostages will probably be released (at least the civilian ones).
Now the resolution calls for all hostages to be released unconditionally. I don’t think anybody is under the illusion that Hamas will comply with that. Instead what most organizations are hoping for is hostage negotiations, where the military hostages will be released in exchange for Palestinians illegally detained in Israeli prisons. In any other context this would be called a prisoner swap.
That said, the main issue is Israeli compliance, if there is no ceasefire, no hostages will be released. Not only is it against Hamas’s interest to release the hostages without a ceasefire, but it is also a logistical nightmare, and it puts the lives of the hostages in even further danger. This is what most states and organizations are worried about. And Israel is giving people ample justification for those worries.
> If hamas refuse to release all hostages, what is supposed to happen?
That is not really the most important question right now. Hamas has shown compliance with previous hostage release plans. If there is a ceasefire, hostages will probably be released (at least the civilian ones).
Now the resolution calls for all hostages to be released unconditionally. I don’t think anybody is under the illusion that Hamas will comply with that. Instead what most organizations are hoping for is hostage negotiations, where the military hostages will be released in exchange for Palestinians illegally detained in Israeli prisons. In any other context this would be called a prisoner swap.
That said, the main issue is Israeli compliance, if there is no ceasefire, no hostages will be released. Not only is it against Hamas’s interest to release the hostages without a ceasefire, but it is also a logistical nightmare, and it puts the lives of the hostages in even further danger. This is what most states and organizations are worried about. And Israel is giving people ample justification for those worries.
> This is a UN security council resolution. The enforcement mechanism is implied.
No, it is not (unless by the “enforcement mechanism” that “is implied” you mean “returning to the council to debate a subsequent resolution on enforcement”.) UN Security Council resolutions that want, or even permit, enforcement beyond countries acting as they would be legally empowered under international law without a resolution explicitly authorize nations to enforce it by either particular means or with language like “by all necessary means”.
See, e.g.. SC Res 678 (1990), in relevant part:
---
1. Demands that Iraq comply fully with resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions, and decides, while maintaining all its decisions, to allow Iraq one final opportunity, as a pause of goodwill, to do so;
2. Authorizes Member States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before 15 January 1991 fully implements, as set forth in paragraph 1 above, the above-mentioned resolutions, to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore International peace and security in the area;
---
EDIT: But, as that resolution and its reference to 660 illustrates, it is common practice to have a pure demand resolution followed by a demand-with-enforcement resolution; its far less common to jump straight to demand-with-enforcement, IIRC. So, this isn't inconsistent with the pass to a materially enforced resolution, but its still in the pure demand phase.
OTOH, its pretty hard to see enforcement against either side not getting vetoed by each sides P5 supporters, and it doesn't look like either side is inclined to comply voluntarily.
No, it is not (unless by the “enforcement mechanism” that “is implied” you mean “returning to the council to debate a subsequent resolution on enforcement”.) UN Security Council resolutions that want, or even permit, enforcement beyond countries acting as they would be legally empowered under international law without a resolution explicitly authorize nations to enforce it by either particular means or with language like “by all necessary means”.
See, e.g.. SC Res 678 (1990), in relevant part:
---
1. Demands that Iraq comply fully with resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions, and decides, while maintaining all its decisions, to allow Iraq one final opportunity, as a pause of goodwill, to do so;
2. Authorizes Member States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before 15 January 1991 fully implements, as set forth in paragraph 1 above, the above-mentioned resolutions, to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore International peace and security in the area;
---
EDIT: But, as that resolution and its reference to 660 illustrates, it is common practice to have a pure demand resolution followed by a demand-with-enforcement resolution; its far less common to jump straight to demand-with-enforcement, IIRC. So, this isn't inconsistent with the pass to a materially enforced resolution, but its still in the pure demand phase.
OTOH, its pretty hard to see enforcement against either side not getting vetoed by each sides P5 supporters, and it doesn't look like either side is inclined to comply voluntarily.
Yeah, that is kind of what I meant. But also that individual UN members often issue punitive measures individually, which is looks to the language of the reaction to this one. There is a loud talk e.g. among EU countries—as well as EU it self—about the importance of enforcing this particular resolution. The way I understand it is basically telling Israel to obey or else.
https://archive.is/3NSzZ
> a resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire in Gaza for the month of Ramadan
> The United States, after vetoing earlier resolutions, abstained.
Here's more on the resolution from the horse's mouth.
https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/03/1147931
> a resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire in Gaza for the month of Ramadan
> The United States, after vetoing earlier resolutions, abstained.
Here's more on the resolution from the horse's mouth.
https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/03/1147931