California sent residents' personal health data to LinkedIn(themarkup.org)
themarkup.org
California sent residents' personal health data to LinkedIn
https://themarkup.org/pixel-hunt/2025/04/28/how-california-sent-residents-personal-health-data-to-linkedin
130 comments
I'm sure they did it for money. Those trackers weren't put there for nothing. At least government websites funneling citizen's data to Google by using Google Analytics on their sites can argue that they're just selling out taxpayers to get easy site metrics. When you've got 60 trackers on a single page though, somebody is stuffing their pockets with cash in exchange for user data.
I assume some of it was to show targeted ads on social media platforms. I'm sure an internal KPI is new customers, just like any e-commerce site.
Quick reminder that state of California takes a DNA sample from every newborn and sells it to third parties
Covered California, the state’s health insurance marketplace, leaked deeply sensitive health information and pregnancy status, domestic abuse disclosures, and prescription drug use to LinkedIn via embedded ad trackers.
It’s a pattern we’ve seen across government and private sectors: infrastructure designed for care is being exploited for behavioral targeting through advertising motions. The public doesn’t expect their health decisions to be fed into social ad networks, but the platforms already assume ownership of that data trail.
And of course, it’s all connected. The same companies monetizing behavioral profiling at scale are now running the most powerful generative AI systems. Microsoft, which owns LinkedIn, is also the key infrastructure partner of OpenAI. Meta's ad tools were present on these health sites too. Google’s trackers are everywhere else.
When you strip away the techno-mystique, what’s driving the AI and data arms race isn’t wisdom. It’s ego, power consolidation, and a pathological fear of being second.
And Sam Altman? He’s not stupid. But brilliance without wisdom is just charisma in a predator suit. Why do you think all these services tie directly into AI?
It’s a pattern we’ve seen across government and private sectors: infrastructure designed for care is being exploited for behavioral targeting through advertising motions. The public doesn’t expect their health decisions to be fed into social ad networks, but the platforms already assume ownership of that data trail.
And of course, it’s all connected. The same companies monetizing behavioral profiling at scale are now running the most powerful generative AI systems. Microsoft, which owns LinkedIn, is also the key infrastructure partner of OpenAI. Meta's ad tools were present on these health sites too. Google’s trackers are everywhere else.
When you strip away the techno-mystique, what’s driving the AI and data arms race isn’t wisdom. It’s ego, power consolidation, and a pathological fear of being second.
And Sam Altman? He’s not stupid. But brilliance without wisdom is just charisma in a predator suit. Why do you think all these services tie directly into AI?
Would we be surprised to learn of 10x this level of leakage to Facebook? Based on the social tracking I've casually observed via browser tools when signing up to a variety of services, I'd be surprised if it's not. The weird thing here is that it's LinkedIn getting the data, not that it's being sent.
jajko(2)
For the last week, LinkedIn kept showing me ads for some specific dental procedure, near the top of my feed.
It's an optional follow-on procedure for the dental surgery procedure I had scheduled for this week.
I'm much more careful than most people about keeping Web search and browsing history private. But there's a chance that last week I browsed some question about the scheduled procedure, from my less-private Web browser, rather than from the Tor Browser that I usually use for anything sensitive that doesn't require identifying myself.
If I didn't make a Web OPSEC oops, it looks like maybe someone effectively gave private medical information to LinkedIn, of all places (an employment-matchmaking service, where employers are supposed to be conscientious of EEOC and similar concerns).
It's an optional follow-on procedure for the dental surgery procedure I had scheduled for this week.
I'm much more careful than most people about keeping Web search and browsing history private. But there's a chance that last week I browsed some question about the scheduled procedure, from my less-private Web browser, rather than from the Tor Browser that I usually use for anything sensitive that doesn't require identifying myself.
If I didn't make a Web OPSEC oops, it looks like maybe someone effectively gave private medical information to LinkedIn, of all places (an employment-matchmaking service, where employers are supposed to be conscientious of EEOC and similar concerns).
Why does a state have ad tracking data? Are they really that hard up for cash that they need to have ad campaigns for people selecting insurance?
I understood it to be the reverse - they advertise on LinkedIn, and the trackers determine whether the users convert once they click through. Not great, but at least not as ill intentioned
Not sure I understand this, but "I" (coveredca) pay linkedin to place my ads, for which "I" have to use their libraries? That then scrape "my" clients/customer data to linkedin? for them to make more money selling that data?
Does this also mean that those pious popups about "Do not sell my information" are essentially vacuous?
Does this also mean that those pious popups about "Do not sell my information" are essentially vacuous?
It could be insiders getting kickbacks.
1024core(1)
How is this not a HIPAA violation??
While I wish it was a HIPAA violation, I am not sure it qualifies.
"The HIPAA standards apply to covered entities and business associates “where provided” by §160.102. Covered entities are defined as health plans, healthcare clearinghouses, and healthcare providers who electronically transmit PHI in connection with transactions for which HHS has adopted standards"
https://www.hipaajournal.com/what-is-a-hipaa-violation/#what...
Covered California is a health insurance marketplace. It is not an Insurance Carrier or an Insurance Clearing house. Perhaps they're guilty of something else?
Covered California is a health insurance marketplace. It is not an Insurance Carrier or an Insurance Clearing house. Perhaps they're guilty of something else?
However, it may violate the state's Electronic Communication Privacy Act.
https://calmatters.org/health/2025/05/covered-california-lin...
https://calmatters.org/health/2025/05/covered-california-lin...
the state will do an investigation on itself and find no wrongdoing
Sounds like HIPAA needs some adjustments made to cover marketplaces.
HIPAA is not designed to protect consumer or patient privacy. That is a silly fiction that voters and constituents believe in order to prop up the legislation.
HIPAA is designed to protect the privacy of providers, clinics, hospitals, and insurance carriers. HIPAA is designed to make it maximally difficult to move PHI from one provider to the next. HIPAA is designed to make it maximally difficult for plaintiff attorneys to discover incriminating malpractice evidence when suing those providers. HIPAA is a stepping-stone to single-payer insurance.
HIPAA also makes it maximally difficult to involve other people, providers, and entities in your health care. No entity under HIPAA can legally divulge the slightest tidbit to your brother, your parents, or anyone who contacts them, unless an ROI is on file. Those ROIs are a thing you have to go pursue on your own -- they are never offered or suggested by the provider -- and those ROIs will expire at the drop of a hat -- and you never know if an ROI is valid until it is tested at the point of that entity requesting information.
HIPAA is designed to protect the privacy of providers, clinics, hospitals, and insurance carriers. HIPAA is designed to make it maximally difficult to move PHI from one provider to the next. HIPAA is designed to make it maximally difficult for plaintiff attorneys to discover incriminating malpractice evidence when suing those providers. HIPAA is a stepping-stone to single-payer insurance.
HIPAA also makes it maximally difficult to involve other people, providers, and entities in your health care. No entity under HIPAA can legally divulge the slightest tidbit to your brother, your parents, or anyone who contacts them, unless an ROI is on file. Those ROIs are a thing you have to go pursue on your own -- they are never offered or suggested by the provider -- and those ROIs will expire at the drop of a hat -- and you never know if an ROI is valid until it is tested at the point of that entity requesting information.
The other person who replied to you is much more accurate.
> HIPAA also makes it maximally difficult to involve other people, providers, and entities in your health care.
If I am a provider (and I am, or have been) of yours, I can get information from other providers on the care they've provided you. In fact, as appropriate, I can get it without your permission or consent (particularly useful in situations of pill-seeking, or mental health, but other situations too, that I encountered as a paramedic).
While many providers will get you to sign paperwork consenting to this, it is mostly CYA.
> HIPAA also makes it maximally difficult to involve other people, providers, and entities in your health care.
If I am a provider (and I am, or have been) of yours, I can get information from other providers on the care they've provided you. In fact, as appropriate, I can get it without your permission or consent (particularly useful in situations of pill-seeking, or mental health, but other situations too, that I encountered as a paramedic).
While many providers will get you to sign paperwork consenting to this, it is mostly CYA.
IANAL, but I work in healthcare, and a portion of my work is trying to ensure obligations under HIPAA are met.
> HIPAA is designed to protect the privacy of providers, clinics, hospitals, and insurance carriers.
No? I can practically quote the law directly here, though it is a bit dense:
> A covered entity or business associate may not use or disclose protected health information, except as permitted or required by this subpart or by subpart C of part 160 of this subchapter.
I.e., the privacy of your, the patient's PHI is protected.
That's a privacy regulation, and it is talking about and protecting the privacy of patient data, not provider's, etc.
> HIPAA is designed to make it maximally difficult to move PHI from one provider to the next.
It does no such thing. But [1].
> HIPAA is designed to make it maximally difficult for plaintiff attorneys to discover incriminating malpractice evidence when suing those providers.
Plaintiffs can divulge their own PHI directly to lawyers. Otherwise, no, lawyers don't get to access random people's PHI … but that's directly because the privacy of that PHI is protected. Further, one of the exceptions to HIPAA's protections is judicial order … so if plaintiffs can get a judge to agree, they can get a limited window into people's PHI. But … no, they don't just get to see?
> HIPAA is a stepping-stone to single-payer insurance.
… clearly not, or where is it?
> HIPAA also makes it maximally difficult to involve other people, providers, and entities in your health care.
People: you're always permitted to divulge whatever you want, to whomever you want, about your own PHI. But no, a doctor cannot divulge PHI to, e.g., an adult's parents without authorization. Again, this is to protect the patient's privacy: for example, so that a woman can keep something medically private from her husband if she chooses, or an (adult) patient can not have nosy parents learning things that are not their business, etc.
(Parents/guardians of non-adult children are treated differently, of course. There are other exceptions, and exceptions to the exceptions, but generally, they follow pretty common sense lines.)
Providers, entities: again, HIPAA only prevents this without your consent, and that's basically what privacy is.
And … you know this:
> unless an ROI is on file.
(An ROI is a "release of information", for others.) Yes, if you consent, then your PHI can be divulged. This is like the very definition of patient privacy.
> Those ROIs are a thing you have to go pursue on your own -- they are never offered or suggested by the provider -- and those ROIs will expire at the drop of a hat -- and you never know if an ROI is valid until it is tested at the point of that entity requesting information.
This isn't true, either; I've had providers ask for ROIs, and nothing prevents a provider from taking initiative. (Perhaps you need a better provider.) Yes, to a large extent, you must own your own outcome in American healthcare, but I think this is more a function of other failing in HC than HIPAA.
Also, … yes, ROIs are scoped: they're only good for a specific instance of releasing information, i.e., they're not carte blanche to the provider to release your information to the world. Again, that's a privacy protection.
In the specific case covered by TFA, upstream is right: it is unfortunate that marketplaces might not be covered entities, and probably should be. This would be a common sense update to the law, so call your congressperson. Were they, HIPAA prohibits what occurred here, and other covered entities have been fined for exactly this type of error/behavior. I.e., HIPAA has prior examples of preventing exactly the badness here!
[1] I empathize that moving data between providers is not easy, but this is hardly due to HIPAA, which permits such, assuming patient consent. I'd say this is more a function of providers not adhering to standards like they ought to; I've seen precious little use of FHIR (for others: standardized format for HC data) in my time in the industry, and the state of tech for inter-provider transfers is such that most providers probably do find it easier to just recollect the data they need. Heck, even within a provider, I've witnessed struggles to transfer data.
> HIPAA is designed to protect the privacy of providers, clinics, hospitals, and insurance carriers.
No? I can practically quote the law directly here, though it is a bit dense:
> A covered entity or business associate may not use or disclose protected health information, except as permitted or required by this subpart or by subpart C of part 160 of this subchapter.
I.e., the privacy of your, the patient's PHI is protected.
That's a privacy regulation, and it is talking about and protecting the privacy of patient data, not provider's, etc.
> HIPAA is designed to make it maximally difficult to move PHI from one provider to the next.
It does no such thing. But [1].
> HIPAA is designed to make it maximally difficult for plaintiff attorneys to discover incriminating malpractice evidence when suing those providers.
Plaintiffs can divulge their own PHI directly to lawyers. Otherwise, no, lawyers don't get to access random people's PHI … but that's directly because the privacy of that PHI is protected. Further, one of the exceptions to HIPAA's protections is judicial order … so if plaintiffs can get a judge to agree, they can get a limited window into people's PHI. But … no, they don't just get to see?
> HIPAA is a stepping-stone to single-payer insurance.
… clearly not, or where is it?
> HIPAA also makes it maximally difficult to involve other people, providers, and entities in your health care.
People: you're always permitted to divulge whatever you want, to whomever you want, about your own PHI. But no, a doctor cannot divulge PHI to, e.g., an adult's parents without authorization. Again, this is to protect the patient's privacy: for example, so that a woman can keep something medically private from her husband if she chooses, or an (adult) patient can not have nosy parents learning things that are not their business, etc.
(Parents/guardians of non-adult children are treated differently, of course. There are other exceptions, and exceptions to the exceptions, but generally, they follow pretty common sense lines.)
Providers, entities: again, HIPAA only prevents this without your consent, and that's basically what privacy is.
And … you know this:
> unless an ROI is on file.
(An ROI is a "release of information", for others.) Yes, if you consent, then your PHI can be divulged. This is like the very definition of patient privacy.
> Those ROIs are a thing you have to go pursue on your own -- they are never offered or suggested by the provider -- and those ROIs will expire at the drop of a hat -- and you never know if an ROI is valid until it is tested at the point of that entity requesting information.
This isn't true, either; I've had providers ask for ROIs, and nothing prevents a provider from taking initiative. (Perhaps you need a better provider.) Yes, to a large extent, you must own your own outcome in American healthcare, but I think this is more a function of other failing in HC than HIPAA.
Also, … yes, ROIs are scoped: they're only good for a specific instance of releasing information, i.e., they're not carte blanche to the provider to release your information to the world. Again, that's a privacy protection.
In the specific case covered by TFA, upstream is right: it is unfortunate that marketplaces might not be covered entities, and probably should be. This would be a common sense update to the law, so call your congressperson. Were they, HIPAA prohibits what occurred here, and other covered entities have been fined for exactly this type of error/behavior. I.e., HIPAA has prior examples of preventing exactly the badness here!
[1] I empathize that moving data between providers is not easy, but this is hardly due to HIPAA, which permits such, assuming patient consent. I'd say this is more a function of providers not adhering to standards like they ought to; I've seen precious little use of FHIR (for others: standardized format for HC data) in my time in the industry, and the state of tech for inter-provider transfers is such that most providers probably do find it easier to just recollect the data they need. Heck, even within a provider, I've witnessed struggles to transfer data.
> Providers, entities: again, HIPAA only prevents this without your consent, and that's basically what privacy is.
Not even, it specifically allows providers who are actively caring for you to share, even without your consent. Straight from the horse's mouth:
"Does the HIPAA Privacy Rule permit doctors, nurses, and other health care providers to share patient health information for treatment purposes without the patient’s authorization? Answer: Yes. The Privacy Rule allows those doctors, nurses, hospitals, laboratory technicians, and other health care providers that are covered entities to use or disclose protected health information, such as X-rays, laboratory and pathology reports, diagnoses, and other medical information for treatment purposes without the patient’s authorization."
Source: https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/faq/481/does-hip...
> I empathize that moving data between providers is not easy, but this is hardly due to HIPAA, which permits such, assuming patient consent.
It doesn't even really always require consent, but a provider relationship. Consent can grease the wheels though.
It's like you said, very little use of FHIR or still so so much HL7. And anyone who has dealt with those standards knows that just because EHR vendor A says they support them, and EHR vendor B does, doesn't mean data sharing will be smooth.
Not even, it specifically allows providers who are actively caring for you to share, even without your consent. Straight from the horse's mouth:
"Does the HIPAA Privacy Rule permit doctors, nurses, and other health care providers to share patient health information for treatment purposes without the patient’s authorization? Answer: Yes. The Privacy Rule allows those doctors, nurses, hospitals, laboratory technicians, and other health care providers that are covered entities to use or disclose protected health information, such as X-rays, laboratory and pathology reports, diagnoses, and other medical information for treatment purposes without the patient’s authorization."
Source: https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/faq/481/does-hip...
> I empathize that moving data between providers is not easy, but this is hardly due to HIPAA, which permits such, assuming patient consent.
It doesn't even really always require consent, but a provider relationship. Consent can grease the wheels though.
It's like you said, very little use of FHIR or still so so much HL7. And anyone who has dealt with those standards knows that just because EHR vendor A says they support them, and EHR vendor B does, doesn't mean data sharing will be smooth.
Yeah. (I didn't include that as it seemed like the person above was writing specifically about provider-provider sharing, and while I know provider-BA sharing is fine in the course & context of administering care, I was less sure about provider-provider. But I think there are plenty of examples of this in my own HC, such as when I go for a blood draw and I get 8 bills. But again: HIPAA really doesn't throw too many surprising curve balls here.)
And yeah, lots of HL7v2. (for readers: HL7v2 is a protocol for medical data sharing. Predates FHIR, and is muuuuch uglier. FHIR is JSON/HTTP, albeit complicated, because medical. HL7v2 is custom binary (or I think there's an XML variant that I pray I never run into?). Not to be confused with the organization HL7.
HL7v2 is also the reason for a lot of having to deal with IPSec tunnels, something else I could stand to never see again.)
> And anyone who has dealt with those standards knows that just because EHR vendor A says they support them, and EHR vendor B does, doesn't mean data sharing will be smooth.
Yep. Some unintentional (the standard is complex, people make mistakes), some intentional (the standard permits extension, and obviously custom extensions might not port).
And that's like every other standard an eng on HN is going to interact with, really.
And yeah, lots of HL7v2. (for readers: HL7v2 is a protocol for medical data sharing. Predates FHIR, and is muuuuch uglier. FHIR is JSON/HTTP, albeit complicated, because medical. HL7v2 is custom binary (or I think there's an XML variant that I pray I never run into?). Not to be confused with the organization HL7.
HL7v2 is also the reason for a lot of having to deal with IPSec tunnels, something else I could stand to never see again.)
> And anyone who has dealt with those standards knows that just because EHR vendor A says they support them, and EHR vendor B does, doesn't mean data sharing will be smooth.
Yep. Some unintentional (the standard is complex, people make mistakes), some intentional (the standard permits extension, and obviously custom extensions might not port).
And that's like every other standard an eng on HN is going to interact with, really.
Two reasons: The marketplace is not a covered entity (it doesn’t provide healthcare or process transactions), and the information is not a medical record (it’s typed in by the user, not generated by a healthcare provider).
However, California has its own more general privacy law about using medical information for marketing purposes.
However, California has its own more general privacy law about using medical information for marketing purposes.
So if I fill out my medical record form at the doctors office its not a medical record because me the user filled it out before handing it over the front desk?
Because you filled it out in the context of interacting with a medical provider, then gave it to them for their records, that is a medical record. (Just like a conversation with your doctor about your history would be.)
If you filled out the same form just to keep in your desk drawer for your family’s reference, it would not be. Also, if you ask for a copy of your record, as soon as you take personal possession of it, HIPAA no longer cares about it, because you aren’t a covered entity.
(Source: I founded a startup that spent a lot of money on attorneys to confirm this.)
If you filled out the same form just to keep in your desk drawer for your family’s reference, it would not be. Also, if you ask for a copy of your record, as soon as you take personal possession of it, HIPAA no longer cares about it, because you aren’t a covered entity.
(Source: I founded a startup that spent a lot of money on attorneys to confirm this.)
Filling out forms at the doctor's office is one way they trick you into authorizing them to sell your data and no matter how careful you are about it you can still end up having your data sold. https://www.statnews.com/2023/04/07/medical-data-privacy-phr...
Who says it's not? It looks like a HIPAA violation to me.
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California will investigate and find no wrong. Also, LinkedIn==Microsoft
They published ("leaked" lol no -- it was all available through a polished portal) the name and address of all CCW and DROS registered firearm holders (including judges, DV victims, prosecutors, etc) and nothing happened.
They use your information for political warfare.
They use your information for political warfare.
If you routinely clear your cookies, does that protect you from long term tracking?
Not if you use Chrome 135 or later, which is every browser now except Firefox/LibreWolf.
Federated Learning of Cohorts (FLOC) proved that cookies aren't actually necessary to track you with 98%+ precision, which, given how the internet works, is just 2 clicks.
The only way to stay anonymous is to stay on the radar. Sandbox your browser, have multiple physical-on-the-filesystem profiles and never mix business with pleasure or banking with youtube.
If you use Linux, create a Windows 11 VM to browse anonymously. Because Linux makes you already stick out as a sore thumb due to its TCP fingerprint.
Federated Learning of Cohorts (FLOC) proved that cookies aren't actually necessary to track you with 98%+ precision, which, given how the internet works, is just 2 clicks.
The only way to stay anonymous is to stay on the radar. Sandbox your browser, have multiple physical-on-the-filesystem profiles and never mix business with pleasure or banking with youtube.
If you use Linux, create a Windows 11 VM to browse anonymously. Because Linux makes you already stick out as a sore thumb due to its TCP fingerprint.
Won't VM be detected by GPU name which is exposed by WebGL and similar technologies? What computer has a GPU with a name like "QEMU GPU"?
If you do that, at least change GPU name to NVIDIA or something.
If you do that, at least change GPU name to NVIDIA or something.
Fingerprinting is an active area of research (both attack and defense), so the answer is, maybe, depending on just how unique your setup is. EFF has a nice demo that will try to fingerprint you and tell you how trackable you are based on non-cookie data: https://coveryourtracks.eff.org
Of course, new techniques are invented all the time, so that may not cover everything.
Of course, new techniques are invented all the time, so that may not cover everything.
Unless they are targeting a specific individual for spying purposes, is there any benefit to doing such deep fingerprinting at the individual level, given that multiple people might use the same computer? It seems like knowing every single thing done at that computer may be too much information that might not have value but having more broad-based tracking patterns would be cheaper and more profitable, no?
Advertisers say that the better they can target advertisements, the more valuable they are. If so, then every bit of fingerprinting helps. Maybe multiple people use a computer which degrades it for those particular people, but then many other computers are used by only one person, so it's helpful in aggregate. I'm skeptical this actually works, given the atrocious quality of ads that I see when they sneak past my ad blocker, but that's what they say.
Is Covered California a government entity, for profit, non profit, other...? Not that it matters.
"Leak" is not the right term. By default a "website" is a 404. Throw some HTML on there and users can see something. Adding LinkedIn tracking is a deliberate choice. Calling the data "leaked" is like saying a raft sprung a "leak" when the person in the raft punctured it 60 times (number of trackers). The data was shared and pushed to LI, on purpose. They (Covered CA) installed LinkedIn's code on their site. The code did exactly what it was intended to do, send data to LinkedIn.
A leak is accidental, this was a choice by Covered CA.
"Leak" is not the right term. By default a "website" is a 404. Throw some HTML on there and users can see something. Adding LinkedIn tracking is a deliberate choice. Calling the data "leaked" is like saying a raft sprung a "leak" when the person in the raft punctured it 60 times (number of trackers). The data was shared and pushed to LI, on purpose. They (Covered CA) installed LinkedIn's code on their site. The code did exactly what it was intended to do, send data to LinkedIn.
A leak is accidental, this was a choice by Covered CA.
The reality is that anyone in the medical field can put any kind of information in your medical records for any reason. Many motivations exist to compel this kind of behavior. Sometimes this can be in a part of your permanent record that they do not have to provide to you, even if you follow the rules and laws to request the information. Many exceptions exist under the disclosure laws.
Your information then can be freely shared with others but not given to you or give you any way to correct the false information in your record.
For what it's worth, in the United States at least, you have several permanent records that follow you everywhere you go. Your medical records work in a similar way to your former employers. In fact, employer confidentiality to other employers allows them to say almost anything about you and neither has to share it with you and you have no chance to have any kind of fair process to correct it.
Now add all the data brokers and the other bribery kind of situations and the whole system is basically broken and corrupt.
Your information then can be freely shared with others but not given to you or give you any way to correct the false information in your record.
For what it's worth, in the United States at least, you have several permanent records that follow you everywhere you go. Your medical records work in a similar way to your former employers. In fact, employer confidentiality to other employers allows them to say almost anything about you and neither has to share it with you and you have no chance to have any kind of fair process to correct it.
Now add all the data brokers and the other bribery kind of situations and the whole system is basically broken and corrupt.
That is misinformation. HIPAA covered healthcare providers are legally required to give you copies of your health information upon request, and can only charge a nominal fee for this service (in practice it's usually free). Any patient who is blocked from accessing their own medical records should file a formal complaint with HHS; they have fined multiple provider organizations for violations.
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-individuals/guidance-materials...
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/compliance-enfor...
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-individuals/guidance-materials...
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/compliance-enfor...
" Two categories of information are expressly excluded from the right of access:
The devil is in the details.
It is not misinformation. Thank you.
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/guidance...
Several others listed here: https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-45/subtitle-A/subchapter-...
Psychotherapy notes, which are the personal notes of a mental health care provider documenting or analyzing the contents of a counseling session, that are maintained separate from the rest of the patient's medical record. See 45 CFR 164.524(a)(1)(i) and 164.501.
Information compiled in reasonable anticipation of, or for use in, a civil, criminal, or administrative action or proceeding. See 45 CFR 164.524(a)(1)(ii).The devil is in the details.
It is not misinformation. Thank you.
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/guidance...
Several others listed here: https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-45/subtitle-A/subchapter-...
My understanding is that people would have to intentionally click on the ad on LI to get access to the cookie that contains the sensitive info from the insurance signup flow (which was triggered by clicking the ad). Is that correct?
Amazing to me that an article like this doesn't have a big section discussing how a provider sharing personal health data without permission is blatantly illegal under the HIPAA act. It only mentions as an aside that there are various related lawsuits.
Covered California's privacy policy explicitly says they follow HIPAA and that "Covered California will only share your personal information with government agencies, qualified health plans or contractors which help to fulfill a required Exchange function" and "your personal information is only used by or disclosed to those authorized to receive or view it" and "We will not knowingly disclose your personal information to a third party, except as provided in this Privacy Policy".
Those privacy policy assertions have been in place since at least October 2020, per the Internet Archive wayback machine record. [2]
[1] https://www.coveredca.com/pdfs/privacy/CC_Privacy_Policy.pdf
[2] https://web.archive.org/web/20201024150356/https://www.cover...
Covered California's privacy policy explicitly says they follow HIPAA and that "Covered California will only share your personal information with government agencies, qualified health plans or contractors which help to fulfill a required Exchange function" and "your personal information is only used by or disclosed to those authorized to receive or view it" and "We will not knowingly disclose your personal information to a third party, except as provided in this Privacy Policy".
Those privacy policy assertions have been in place since at least October 2020, per the Internet Archive wayback machine record. [2]
[1] https://www.coveredca.com/pdfs/privacy/CC_Privacy_Policy.pdf
[2] https://web.archive.org/web/20201024150356/https://www.cover...
Companies outright lie in their privacy polices all the time. The legal risk in doing so is basically zero because nobody bothers to sue and it's impossible to show damages.
> Amazing to me that an article like this doesn't have a big section discussing how a provider sharing personal health data without permission is blatantly illegal under the HIPAA act.
Being really clear, I despise this whole situation. But there's a lot of contortion to get to a government healthcare marketplace being consider a healthcare provider, which has a definition in the law.
Being really clear, I despise this whole situation. But there's a lot of contortion to get to a government healthcare marketplace being consider a healthcare provider, which has a definition in the law.
People like to say "big tech sells their data." This is actually rare. Almost every other company you deal with willing gives it to big tech, and they just hoard it and run ads with it.
That's nothing. The Federal governemnt sent residents' personal health data to xAI.
Bright to you by the state reinventing gdpr for the American audience another 80IQ moment which will be lauded by some as a brave new world...
Get your act together and either resign or stop handling public data let alone the sensitive stuff. I'm serious, draft that letter now.
Get your act together and either resign or stop handling public data let alone the sensitive stuff. I'm serious, draft that letter now.
Even with the absolute incompetence shown in this article (Meta or Google would never make a mistake like this), no one has been actually harmed.
If you have a value sliding scale of "actually harmed", then almost no privacy breach harms anyone, right? Is the threshold for harm actually being scammed, physically hurt, reputation damaged?
Thankfully, those the law is not based on such thresholds.
Thankfully, those the law is not based on such thresholds.
Relative to the actual harms caused, HN freaks about this kind of stuff too much.
>The Markup found that Covered California had more than 60 trackers on its site. Out of more than 200 of the government sites, the average number of trackers on the sites was three. Covered California had dozens more than any other website we examined.
Why is Covered California such an outlier? Why do they need 60 trackers? It's an independent agency that only deals in health insurance, so they obviously (and horribly) thought it was a good idea to send data about residents' health insurance to a third party.