That’s a fair question.
Signal is a very good messenger, but it makes a number of explicit trade-offs that EncroGram intentionally does not.
The main difference is not cryptography, but assumptions.
Signal encrypts message content very well, but it still relies on: – a global, centralized service – long-lived identifiers (phone numbers) – server-side knowledge of who communicates with whom and when – push-based delivery models that inherently leak metadata
EncroGram starts from a different premise: what metadata is structurally unavoidable, and what exists only because it’s convenient?
The project focuses on minimizing retained and observable metadata at the architectural level, even when that comes at the cost of convenience, instant delivery, or UX polish.
This does not make EncroGram “better” in a general sense. It makes it different.
Signal optimizes for usability and adoption under a realistic threat model. EncroGram optimizes for users who are willing to trade convenience for a smaller metadata footprint and clearer trust boundaries.
In short: – Signal is not the wrong solution. – EncroGram is for people who are dissatisfied with the remaining metadata Signal intentionally accepts.
Whether that trade-off is worth it depends entirely on the user’s threat model.