*Interesting take, but I’d respectfully challenge the framing.*
Caring about human potential isn’t “right wing swagger” - it’s fundamental humanism that transcends political tribalism. When we reduce everything to left/right binaries, we lose the ability to have meaningful conversations about what actually matters.
Human potential, flourishing, achievement, agency - these aren’t owned by any political camp. They’re core to what it means to be human. The left has championed human development through education, healthcare, and social mobility. The right has emphasized individual capability and merit. Both perspectives contain truth.
What is a distraction is the endless culture war that forces us to pick teams on issues that should unite us. We can simultaneously recognize that:
- Systems and structures profoundly shape outcomes
- Individual agency and capability genuinely matter
- Excellence and equity aren’t mutually exclusive
- Human beings deserve conditions that let them thrive
Dismissing concern for human potential as politically coded says more about how polarized our discourse has become than about the substance of the issue itself.
We’re allowed to care about both structural justice and individual flourishing. That’s not swagger - it’s intellectual honesty.
You’re absolutely right on the forestalling - and this is actually a perfect illustration of the Laffer curve in action.
Yes, the OBR forecasts £19.7bn for 2025-26, up from £13.7bn in 2024-25. But here’s why this supports rather than contradicts the thesis:
*That’s a one-time spike from forestalling, not sustainable revenue*
The £19.7bn is driven by people rushing to sell before the rate increases - bringing forward disposals they would have made over several years. The OBR explicitly models this as forestalling that then reverses:
- 15% lower disposals in 2025-26 (after the spike year)
- 30% lower in 2026-27
- Then gradual recovery
So you get one bumper year, then years of depressed activity. The total revenue over 5 years is lower than if rates had stayed stable - classic Laffer dynamics.
*The £20bn downgrade you might have missed*
More tellingly, the OBR’s Spring Statement 2025 (March) found that CGT receipts over 2025/26-2029/30 would come in £20.6bn under the Autumn Budget forecasts made just months earlier. That’s a massive downgrade driven by “updated data on the composition of liabilities” - i.e., the behavioural responses were larger than modeled.
*Stable rates were already causing problems*
Your original point was “you can’t have a downward trend with rates stable and claim Laffer!” But that’s precisely the point - the decline from £16.9bn to £13.7bn happened before Labour’s rate increases, when rates were at 10%/20%.
What was driving it? Expectations. People knew changes were coming. Non-dom abolition was announced. Labour’s tax intentions were clear. International competition was intensifying. The behavioural response began before the policy was implemented.
*The real test*
The real question is what happens after the forestalling spike unwinds. OBR projects £25.5bn by 2029/30, but that’s based on equity prices rising with GDP and no further behavioural response. Given:
- 1,800 non-doms already left (50% above forecast)
- Carried interest moving to income tax framework at 34% in April 2026
- £20bn revenue downgrade between Autumn and Spring forecasts
- Continued international tax competition
…I’d wager the 2029/30 number ends up significantly below £25.5bn. We’ll know in 4-5 years, but the early indicators aren’t encouraging for the Treasury.
So yes - you’re right that forestalling creates a temporary spike. But temporary spikes that reverse aren’t evidence against the Laffer curve - they’re textbook examples of how tax policy distorts behavior and timing without increasing long-run sustainable revenue.
Fair points on the CGT comparisons - you’re right that some of those systems are more complex than headline rates suggest. Luxembourg and Netherlands do have their quirks.
But on the timing point - that’s actually my exact argument. The 19% CGT decline from £16.9bn (2022-23) to £13.7bn (2024-25) happened BEFORE Labour’s October 2024 rate increases. The decline occurred under the Conservative government while rates were still at the “low” levels you criticised.
That’s precisely the problem: revenues were already falling when rates were at 10%/20%. Then Labour increased them to 18%/24% in October 2024, likely accelerating the decline further (we’ll see in the next fiscal year’s data).
So the revenue decline can’t be blamed on Labour’s rate increases - it happened before them. Which suggests either:
1. Even the “low” rates were still high enough to trigger behavioural responses, or
1. Other factors (non-dom changes announced, anticipated tax increases, international competition) were already driving capital flight
Either way, it supports the Laffer curve thesis: the tax base was shrinking before the rate increases, and those increases are unlikely to reverse the trend.
The OBR’s £7.5bn shortfall report (March 2025) specifically attributes this to behavioural factors beyond just asset prices, which is why they classified £4.5bn as structural rather than temporary.
What’s your read on why CGT revenues fell 14% in 2023-24 if rates hadn’t changed yet?
You’re absolutely right that NATO membership already handles military cooperation, and UK doesn’t need Erasmus to fight alongside allies. The warmongering propaganda angle isn’t the mechanism here.
The argument isn’t about war causation, it’s about post-war political justification for domestic policy.
The problem Starmer faces isn’t “how does UK participate in European defense” (NATO solves that automatically). It’s “how does UK reverse Brexit without a referendum” (which 52% voted for and gave Johnson an 80-seat majority on).
*Without pre-existing EU integration:*
- War happens, UK fights via NATO
- Post-war: “Should we now join EU?” = new political fight, opposition says “Why? NATO worked fine”
*With pre-existing EU integration already operating:*
- War happens, UK fights via NATO while Erasmus/research/supply chains already running
- Post-war: “Should we dismantle what’s working?” = continuation not new initiative, opposition struggles to argue for dismantling cooperation that “helped win”
The £4-5bn isn’t buying military capability - it’s buying political narrative infrastructure that makes post-war EU integration defensible as “honoring the partnership that won the war” rather than “new Brussels control.”
Historical precedent: UK fought alongside Europe 1939-45 but didn’t join EU until 1973 (28 years later) because post-war integration had to be argued from scratch. Current spending changes the starting position.
Whether this is cynical pre-planning or just opportunistic positioning for probable crisis is debatable. But the logic works even if European publics already accept confrontation necessity - because the constraint isn’t European opinion, it’s UK domestic politics on EU membership specifically.
Could be completely wrong about this! But that’s the strategic coherence I’m seeing in the otherwise-inexplicable willingness to pay 4-5x markup for programs while claiming fiscal responsibility.
Thank you for taking the time to engage with the article. You raise several points worth addressing:
*On non-dom status:* You’re absolutely right that the old non-dom regime was indefensible as policy. The idea that someone could live in Mayfair for decades, contribute significantly to the UK economy and society, yet structure their affairs to avoid UK tax on worldwide income was indeed absurd. Lord Rothermere is the perfect example of the inequity. My point wasn’t to defend non-doms, but to note that their departure represents a revenue loss - which it objectively does, regardless of whether the previous regime was justifiable.
However, I’d push back on your characterisation that their only contribution was “Mayfair lunch bills and maids.” Many non-doms were significant employers, investors in UK businesses, property owners paying substantial SDLT and council tax, and contributors to UK charities and institutions. The departure of 1,800 people (50% above OBR forecasts) does represent a genuine fiscal impact beyond lunch bills.
*On CGT rates:* Here you’re on shakier ground. You say “it was tomfoolery having it at 10%” and claim this was the “lowest by far amongst industrialised countries.” That’s simply not accurate. Looking at OECD data:
- Switzerland: 0% (cantonal taxes vary but often much lower than UK)
- Belgium: 0% on shares
- New Zealand: 0% in most cases
- Luxembourg: 0% after 6 months
- Netherlands: effective rate often under 10%
- Germany: 26.4% but only on recent gains
The UK’s 10% rate for BADR was competitive but hardly an outlier. And your claim that “no founders have ever” made decisions based on tax planning simply doesn’t match reality. Talk to any M&A advisor or tax accountant - timing of exits around tax changes is absolutely a consideration for founders and investors. It may not be the primary driver, but it’s certainly a factor in a multi-million pound decision.
*On asset prices explaining the CGT decline:* This is a fair point worth examining. You’re correct that CGT receipts are volatile and correlate with asset prices. However, the OBR itself attributed the shortfall to factors beyond just asset price movements - they specifically noted behavioural responses and structural changes. The 19% decline from £16.9bn to £13.7bn over two years occurred during a period when equity markets were actually relatively stable or rising (FTSE 100 up, property prices mixed but not collapsing). If it were purely asset prices, we’d expect to see similar patterns in other countries with buoyant markets - but we don’t.
*On international competition examples:* You dismiss Dubai as a “complete red herring” but that’s where the wealthy are actually going - 9,800 millionaire inflows projected. Whether you or I like it is irrelevant; it’s happening. On Portugal, yes, they’ve tightened some golden visa rules, but they remain significantly more attractive than the UK for many tax purposes. And on Ireland, I deliberately picked corporation tax because that’s the rate that matters most for business location decisions - which is precisely what we’re discussing.
*The fundamental point:* You can argue about whether individual tax changes were justified on equity grounds (and I’d agree with you on non-doms), but that’s separate from whether they’re producing the revenue forecasted. The OBR’s £7.5bn shortfall is a fact, not opinion. The 50% higher-than-forecast non-dom departures are measurable. The CGT revenue decline is in the data.
Whether these policies are morally right is one question. Whether they’re achieving their fiscal objectives is another. The evidence suggests they’re not - and that’s the Laffer curve dynamic in action, regardless of how we feel about the underlying fairness of previous regimes.
What’s your view on the broader revenue shortfall and the OBR’s structural deficit assessment?
yes you have made a good point and I see that someone has also countered that as well. I think though if you look at governments around the world and how they themselves are operating almost in unison it is worth considering the psychological implications whether by design or not the digital age phenomenon is full of very plausible opportunity to manipulate and control the masses.
This pattern extends internationally, with similar expulsions reported in Green parties in Australia and Scotland, suggesting a broader ideological capture of the Green movement beyond environmental concerns.
The purpose of this document is to expose the deception and demand transparency. If politicians want to propose MMT, they must be honest about what it means - the institutional destruction required, the inflation risks, the loss of economic freedoms, and the massive expansion of state control over economic life.
The challenge becomes whether societies can develop forms of democratic accountability that function at the institutional and technical levels where actual power operates, or whether the complexity and specialization required for modern governance inevitably concentrates control beyond effective democratic reach. This question admits no easy answers and may represent the defining political challenge of the digital age.
What seems clear is that this strategy reveals as much about the state of British democracy as it does about Keir Starmer's political calculations. Whether voters ultimately view this as responsive governance or cynical manipulation may determine not just Labour's electoral prospects but the trajectory of British politics for years to come.
This is not an abstract economic discussion. These are real consequences that will shape the lives of real people for decades to come. Understanding the generational impact of fiscal policy is essential for anyone concerned with justice, fairness, and the kind of society we are building for the future.