The pattern across their repo is concerning: rebranding documented system features as "exploits."
Their GPU "hijacking" demo has the victim deliberately publish CUDA IPC handles to world-readable shared memory (0666), then calls normal CUDA IPC functionality an "attack."
Their eBPF paper on ArXiv lacks evaluation or performance metrics.
The company appears to be three people: the founder and his two teenage sons (10th and 8th grade) listed as paper co-authors. No customers, no team page, launched right before college application season. The technical work exists but reads like it's optimized for admissions committees rather than advancing security research.
LD_PRELOAD has been a standard Linux feature since the 90s. Calling it "The Invisible Key Theft" and pitching an eBPF product as the solution misrepresents both the threat model and what constitutes novel security research.