What vacuum do you think military aviation operates in? Honestly. The A-10 will loiter for an hour or two at most depending on loadout. The F-35 will do about the same.
Loiter time isn't as big of a variable as people make it out to be. We'll just throw more assets into the mix. What matters is getting there fast to be able to actually impact the fight in a meaningful way.
I'm not arguing that the F-35 solves every problem here. I'm trying to deconstruct this weird interpretation of CAS that many people have.
> Why would the A-10 (Or a light attack aircraft) be hauling ass from there instead of already being in the air near the AO since it has a lot more fuel and loiter time (and lower cost per flight hour)? Or being closer since they can launch from more austere airfields.
That's a bad way to frame it, I could just argue that a bunch of B-1s should have been at altitude already as well. I guess we'll prop up multiple airfields in Syria because .... well we don't have to, we'll just use other equally as good assets that can be rapidly fielded from regional bases. It simplifies cost, provides quick and effective fire all at a much lower risk. Ultimately the ground force commander builds their own stack and helps arrange and field assets before any major operation. In a low threat environment, hell yes have a bunch of A-10s in the stack ready to rock. But what about some ODA in Nigeria that randomly gets ambushed? That's how we need to be talking about CAS.
> Quoting JTACs saying dialling in the fast movers afer their arrival takes a lot longer than a slow-mover in a near-contact situation which can be a serious issue (and large removes the "haul ass" 8-minute rule advantage).
"Quoting JTACs" is like quoting the private news network in my eyes.
> Quoting army captains saying the loiter time is so low after the fast movers have arrived that enemy forces basically learned to stop the attack for 30 minutes then resume after the fast-mover has had to go to the nearest tanker to refuel.
I wouldn't say that the loiter time is what led to that outcome. Being all holed up in a COP on a mountain side isn't the best place to be in the first place. That's why local CAS must also come into the picture somewhere if you plan to sustain operations.
> Or when I read about Special forces literally having to do end-runs around official policy to get some A-29s to support them because the existing kit wasn't doing the job.
Special mission stuff will always be special mission stuff. We still have OV-10s doing high speed shit in Iraq. That doesn't mean we should build more OV-10s. Tailored solutions are just that.
Again, the fascination despite the facts. Quick is key. That A-10 does the job well in a VERY specific environment. One void of counter air or anti air wherein the launch base is within a reasonable distance to the target. This is highly unique to that AO. Building a CAS capability around a very narrow definition such as that is stupid, and that is why the Air Force isn't doing it.
That form of CAS it not at all unique to the "last war", it's the next evolution of CAS from lessons learned. CAS doesn't need to mean slow, fat, and scary. It needs to be effective and fast.
Even on an overcast day you could still throw a munition through a window of a building, I don't know why you think that cloud coverage diminishes our capability.
I won't argue with loiter time, but projecting that force is hard when those distances increase. The solution has and always will be in-air refueling which every other platform can do just as well.
CAS is more than just "staying", if anything it has a lot more to do with "getting there". We're very good at getting a lot of shit down range, what gets there QUICKLY makes the difference to those on the ground.
You must be a one of those "troops" then since you seem to know what they want?
"there is no aircraft on the planet that provides close air support as well as the A10"
Apache drivers love their guns, don't say that too loudly. Those Marine AH-1 guys hate their lives so they might not care so much you have that opinion. Those Air Force F-15, F-16, F-22 and B-2 drivers might however be a tad salty that despite the fact they are the ones present at those troop in contact missions most of the time they don't get any love because of LUL BRRRRT.
Troops if anything don't want the A-10 because they don't want a friggen strafe ran over them when they could've had a JDAM. But hey, BRRRRRT
Again the fascination with the A-10 despite the fact that it isn't a particularly effective CAS platform nowadays will be my constant struggle in a forum like this.
The issue right now isn't with loiter time or payload. Range is the enemy more than anything right now. We fight a global conflict and providing resources anywhere at anytime is alot harder than it sounds. Making A-10s into drones doesn't solve any particular problem. Once the Army fully realizes future vertical lift we'll have a better picture of what "local" CAS will look like moving forward. Right now we team 64s with UAVs all wholly owned and operated by the Army to project force locally.
Response time is key. An F-16 hauling ass from Al Udeid will give me more than an A-10 hauling ass from Al Udeid. Low risk precision is key. A UCAV at altitude raining hate in the from of hellfires presents very low risk to the asset and a great deal of precision for the troops on the ground. The A-10 can act great as a delivery platform, but it is slow and incredibly vulnerable. Time matters for those troops in contact, and providing fast precision is the key ingredient in CAS right now. Sustainment comes in the form of larger platforms such as the B-1 and the B-52. In a low to moderate risk environment you can start throwing in Army assets and special mission stuff like the AC-130. Air power is built as a stack, and the idea to to provide quick reaction to troops in contact with precision munitions. Bring in ISR platforms (or already have them in place) at altitude to develop the battlefield. Finally, sustain air power with larger platforms or locally employed assets (think short range long loiter) such as AH-64s, AH-6s, DAPS, etc.
The reason why the A-10 doesn't have a KEY role in all of this is because after decades at war, lessons were learned. Now the A-10 isn't SUPER BAD at CAS, we've just evolved. An F-35 will do the job just well in that it provides that critical speed, range, payload, precision and all with an amazing capability set. If we ever need to destroy battalions of tanks en-mass with zero risk of effective counter air or anti-air, I'm sure we'll see the A-10 again.
In terms of Khasham, you're also ignoring the dozen or so sorties flown that day by F-22s, F-15s, and B-52s that provided probably more than 80% of the total payload. Not to mention the many un-named ISR and UCAV platforms that probably stayed in the stack for the better part of that week. Going back to the "stack" mentioned above.
The idea that low cost STOL aircraft will suddenly solve the CAS conundrum is a Reddit-baked solution void of any actual data or understanding. I'm a military aviator and the public more than anything needs to understand that as with most things in this world, it simply isn't as simple as you make it out to be.
The data from the war in Afghanistan paints a pretty good picture of capability versus perception. The vast majority of the responses to troops-in-contact came in the form of precision munitions from F-16s or F-15s. What the "troops" want is not a good variable in understanding what the best method of providing CAS is. Everyone wants the A-10, it's sexy. The reality on the ground is that even in a low threat environment such as Afghanistan the A-10 doesn't nearly do the job as good as an F-16 for a number of reasons which I won't get into in a public forum.
The Airforce vision of CAS is precision munitions from both manned and un-manned platforms that present very little risk to both the operators of the platform and the infrastructure that support them. It would be a significant de-evolution of our capability as a military to continue to operate the A-10 purley on nostalgia and public perception of its' capabilities. I don't expect the public at large to look at this situation with nuisance or data, but let's use common sense if anything. The reason why the Afghan Airforce is operating A-29s and armed C-208Bs has much more to do with cost and sustainability than it does to do with effectiveness. In fact you can find multiple articles of Afghan brass complaining about how what we are giving them isn't particularly well suited to the mission they are expected to sustain. A couple of tool boxes and spare PT6 parts will keep that fleet flying for a couple of years. I don't see them really providing a meaningful impact on the battlefield however.
Being close to the ground is the Army's mission and they do it really well. Adding a couple gunned turboprops won't change anything on the ground today or tomorrow. We are training and developing doctrine for a near-peer threat. We've been focused on COIN too long, and developing budgets and technology for yesterday's conflicts is exactly what set us back in the early days of the GWOT. So consider for a moment that the F-35, despite it's many setbacks and runaway budget might actually do the CAS mission quite well. I'll take the laser guided 500LB bomb over a spray of Hyrda rockets when some asshole starts throwing IDF my way. By the time we procure, field, and properly employ something like the A-29 it's basically going to be limited to a low threat environment scout attack role. Hey doesn't the Army do that??!!
So I told you what this soldier wants, and what the Airforce is doing. Hopefully that's good enough.