Essentially, the problem is that these voluntary relationships become not-so-voluntary as the privacy-compromising tools become more necessary to participate in society.
That's a reasonable concern, but at this meta level there are two things going in cryonics' favor: there's a good chance you're overconfident about its non-utility[1], and there's a chance that your reanimation comes much earlier than expected, so the cumulative risks don't add up to much.
And FWIW, Alcor and Cryonics Institute don't require power for storage; they require deliveries of liquid nitrogen. I don't think either facility has much earthquake/tsunami risk, either.
[1] Personally, I would want to be > 99% sure about this before completely giving up on cryonics.
Anyone remotely interested in cryonics should go read about it on LessWrong[1], instead of reading the same ol' ambivalent/pro-death comments. The only good reasons (that I can think of right now) not to sign up are if (1) you can't afford the ~$50/month or whatever your life insurance premiums + member dues would be, or (2) you rely on the financial support of people who are strongly anti-cryonics.
Keep in mind that after you suffer your serious accident/illness, you won't have the time/money/energy to sign up for cryonics, and you'll have more trouble convincing your next of kin to support you. And you probably won't be able to get any life insurance to pay for it, obviously.
(BTW, if you save everything you find interesting, you realize just how much disappears from the Internet. The half-life of the average link is about 4.5 years.)
It's been a while since I've watched it, but I didn't get the impression that Blank lost it. As I remember, Andrew just made a big deal out of his minor misstep and focused on the misstep rather than getting the interview back on track. I think most interviewees, not just Blank, would find this annoying.
If you don't trust Apple's FDE solution to not have a backdoor, you probably shouldn't use their operating system at all, as it has access to all of your data.
Computers get stolen, but they're usually already off, or turned off during the theft. But let me get this straight: you're worried about an attacker reading out everything on your hard drive, but not worried about them reading out all the unencrypted stuff in RAM? I'm not against disk encryption, I just don't see the point of this specific protection.
Edit: now that I think of it, if a company laptop with customer data had full disk encryption and was stolen, do you still have to notify everyone? Does it matter whether it was off or on/suspended? Maybe people will be relieved when they find out that "8GB of data was probably not stolen" (with AES-in-CPU-only) instead of "300GB of data was probably not stolen".
If the attacker has enough physical access to pull out your memory, I doubt they'll be very disappointed by AES-in-CPU-only protection. They're still getting 8-32GB of other private data (passwords, everything in your page cache, etc). The real solution is to physically protect your computer.
It's instructive that we've already engineered ways of preventing the problems TEPCO is experiencing at their Fukushima. Many newer reactor designs have a passive residual heat removal system that removes decay heat even without electrical power to run cooling pumps.