Since nobody mentioned it, there was a lovely children's book called the clanker. It was about some creature that made metallic noises unlike the other creatures. The moral of the story was one of diversity and inclusion, making space for differences.
My aversion with the word is that I don't want to be reminded of that clanker creature, which had feelings it wanted to express. The weights don't have feelings.
My worry is rather that people coming up with ideology that ascribes "consciousness" and "offense" may wind up with the next generations of models picking that shit up and playing offended. Well done!
The misguided discussion of "clanker" being "highly derogatory" really shows that anthropomorphization has its limit as far as analogies go.
Take this with a grain of salt as I am new to this but IMHO for establishing memory hierarchy once and for all, it would be more helpful to present some abstract theory that
* Explains prefill (time to first token TTFT) vs decode (time between tokens TBT aka 1/tps)
* The various ways to schedule the computation, and the roles of runtime vs driver
* The scenarios and choices, taking into account traffic patterns, whether you are an inference service or doing batch or claw whatnot.
Yeah, passing by value or "Value semantics" can prevent many programming errors. Passing references to immutable data can serve a similar purpose. In low-level languages where memory layout and calling convention map to target hardware, there are differences in performance to consider.
Pass by value would indeed make a big difference to how programs are structured and make it easier to reason about programs.
I just want to point out that "concurrency safety" is very much a word, although "thread safety" is more common. These are broadly part of memory safety, which is a topic mainly due to security concerns but also academic study.
The two perspectives are not perfectly congruent. Non-concurrency-safe languages like go can also be considered broadly memory safe. The pragmatic rationale is that data races in GCed languages are much less exploitable. From a academic, principle based view this is unsatisfying and unconvincing as one would prefer safety to be matter of semantics. See also https://www.ralfj.de/blog/2025/07/24/memory-safety.html
Rust uses "fearless concurrency" as a slogan. Rust offers more options than passing by value (Copy) while still guaranteeing safety through static type checking.
There is also research for GCed languages to establish non-interference eg Scala capture checking.
Concurrency is recognized as difficult (at least by people who are knowledgable) and programs language design usually involves pragmatic choices if you need concurrency. If the language does not provide the primitives or spec that enables safety, then you are left with patterns and architecture.
The science is still evolving, it is certainly not the case that nobody cares. Rather, progress is slow and moving ideas from research industry is even slower. How much value we ascribe to correctness, safety and performance in industry depends very much on the context.
Let's not have dashboard access the temperature by doing `GetSurroundingCar().engine.temperature`
If the dashboard needs to get the temperature from a sensor in the engine, it should be able to "talk" to the sensor, without going through car object.
In ideal OOP, a "method call o.m(...)" is considered a message m being sent to o.
In practice, field access, value and "data objects" etc are useful. OOP purism isn't necessarily helping if taken to the extreme.
The pure OOP idea emphasizes that the structure of a program (how things are composed) should be based on interactions between "units of behavior".
A proof object in dependent type theory is just the term that inhabits a type. So are you saying the Lean implementation can construct proofs without constructing such a term?
This article is full of gross mistakes. For example it claims that Caml is "Cambridge ML" which is ridiculously false. Fact check every sentence. Really sad.
You could build something like this using Mangle datalog. The go implementation supports extension predicates that you can use for "federated querying", with filter pushdown. Or you could model your dependency graph and then query the paths and do something custom.
You could also build a fancier federated querying system that combines the two, taking a Mangle query and the analyzing and rewriting it. For that you're on your own though - I prefer developers hand-crafting something that fits their needs to a big convoluted framework that tries to be all things to all people.
(Note that there is a small mistake in the paper due to ambiguity, found by Vladimir Gapeyev. So the result does not hold in the generality stated but only for a special case when there is no ambiguity at "the end". There went my first PhD student publication...)
The two pass technique used to be implemented in the Scala compiler at the time (building DFAs upfront) , which could do regexps over lists and other sequences, but the approach would not work for top-down tree regexps so I did not pursue that and it got ripped out later.
It is good to see derivative regular expressions, Brzozowski/"position automata" used and discussed.
A programming language is a medium to communicate programs to something that can execute them. That isn't exactly the same thing as a tool. A tool in my book is a metaphor for a program that helps achieve some well-defined task. Even if we ignore this difference, we would still want to talk about tool safety.
In my experience there is a C++ mob that hates Rust. These are the people who declare statement of facts as ideology. No good faith dialogue is possible.
There are also competent C++ programmers who misunderstand or don't know how static checking works.
I also witness normal people who are completely surprised by a statement like "C++ is all unsafe" and find that too strong. Using the word "safe" with a technical meaning throws normal people off because, sadly, not everyone who writes code is an academic PL researcher.
"Safe", in Rust and much PL research, means "statically checked by the compiler to be free of UB". If you are pedantic, you need to add "... under the assumption that the programmer checked all conditions for the code that is marked `unsafe`" for Rust. That is all there is to it. Scientific definition.
C++ in its current form is full of gross design mistakes, many of which could be corrected at the price of breaking backwards compatibility. Mistakes happen, aldo to world leading PL researcher (the ML language and polymorphic references) which is why the field embraced mechanically checked proofs. The difference is the willingness to address mistakes.
Academics use "safe" in exactly the meaning the Rust community uses. If you don't understand this, go and educate yourself.
Academics need to communicate effectively which leads to technical meanings for everyday words or made up words and jargon.
Maybe a statically checked safe low-level language is marketing genius. It is also a technical breakthrough building on decades of academic research, and took a lot of effort.
Bjarne and friends chose a different direction. Safety was not a design goal originally but doubling down on this direction means that C++ is not going to improve. These are all facts.
Backwards compatibility is a constraint. Constraints don't give anyone license to stop people who don't have those constraints.
We don't have to feel any moral obligation to use statically checked languages for programs. But claiming that static checking does not make a difference is ignorant, and attaching value to one's ignorance certainly seems like an indicator for ideology and delusion.
The approach described here - model things as graph - can really be applied to model any domains.
If you are into this type of modelling, you may find value in Mangle, a datalog-based logic programming language and deductive database library. You do not need to invent dozens of DSLs but can do it all in one. And without all the RDF trouble.
My trouble with separate categories "memory safety technology" and "sandboxing technology" is that something like WASM execution is both:
* Depending on how WASM is used, one gets safety guarantees. For example, memory is not executable.
* Privileges are reduced as a WASM module interacts with the environment through the WASM runtime and the embedder
Now, when one compiles C to WASM one may well compile things with bugs. A memory access bug in C is still a memory access bug, but its consequences can be limited in WASM execution. Whether fail-stop behavior is guaranteed actually depends on the code the C compiler generates and the runtime (allocation/deallocation, concurrency) it sets up.
So when we enumerate immediately available security options and count WASM as sandboxing, this is not wrong. But WASM being an execution environment, one could do a lot of things, including a way of compiling and executing C that panics when a memory access bug is encountered.
I remember a Luca Cardelli paper that explores a language with "type:type" and it contains a sentence roughly expressing: "even if the type system is not satisfying as a logic, it offers interesting possibilities for programming"
This is a false dichotomy. Language design choices are the causes of security and software vulnerabilites. It is possible to recognize the value of GC languages and have precise technical terminology at the same time. We can invent new words.
I believe everyone who cares about memory safety appreciates that certain bugs cannot occur in Java and go, and if the world calls that memory safe, that is ok.
There are hard, well-defined guarantees that a language and implementation must make, and a space of trade-offs. We need language and recognition for the ability to push the boundary of hard, well-defined guarantees further. That, too, is memory safety and it will be crucial for moving the needle beyond what can be achieved with C and C++.
No one has a problem with applications being ported from low-level to GC-ed languages, the challenge is the ones where this is not possible. We need to talk about memory safety in this specific context, and mitigations and hardening will not solve the entire problem, only pieces of it.