Boeing Knew the AOA Disagree Alert on the 737 Max Didn’t Work(aviationtoday.com)
aviationtoday.com
Boeing Knew the AOA Disagree Alert on the 737 Max Didn’t Work
https://www.aviationtoday.com/2019/05/06/boeing-angle-of-attack-disagree-alert/
68 comments
More important than "the execs believed all planes have the feature" is that the claim after the Lion Air's crash was that at least these companies which did pay for the "extra" would be able to not fly the dangerous planes, as the technicians would discover that one of AoA vanes is not working while the plane is still on the ground. But that was also a lie (from the NYT article):
"“We were told that if the A.O.A. vane, like on Lion Air, was in a massive difference, we would receive an alert on the ground and therefore not even take off,” said Dennis Tajer, a spokesman for the union representing American Airlines pilots. “That gave us additional confidence in continuing to fly that aircraft.”
But in the last several weeks, Boeing has been saying something different. Mr. Tajer said the company recently told American pilots that the system would not alert pilots about any sensor disagreement until the aircraft is 400 feet above the ground."
"“We were told that if the A.O.A. vane, like on Lion Air, was in a massive difference, we would receive an alert on the ground and therefore not even take off,” said Dennis Tajer, a spokesman for the union representing American Airlines pilots. “That gave us additional confidence in continuing to fly that aircraft.”
But in the last several weeks, Boeing has been saying something different. Mr. Tajer said the company recently told American pilots that the system would not alert pilots about any sensor disagreement until the aircraft is 400 feet above the ground."
"Senior company leadership was not involved in the review and first became aware of this issue in the aftermath of the Lion Air accident."
i.e. the buck stops somewhere else!
i.e. the buck stops somewhere else!
Scapegoating begins...
And the damning thing was that they still thought it was ok to keep it absent
There are a couple of reasons why "the existing functionality was acceptable" is a poor excuse:
- It was present on early models (it was not an optional feature)
- Its triggering indicate to the pilots that something is amiss. Especially after the 1st accident there should have been an association "AOA problems -> potential MCAS problems"
There are a couple of reasons why "the existing functionality was acceptable" is a poor excuse:
- It was present on early models (it was not an optional feature)
- Its triggering indicate to the pilots that something is amiss. Especially after the 1st accident there should have been an association "AOA problems -> potential MCAS problems"
It is possible to not be in a review or aware and still be responsible if you instill a culture of fear and instruct your team that the plane should keep flying whatever the means.
I don't have any information whatsoever to say it happened at Boeing, but saying you were not aware is sometimes not enough.
I don't have any information whatsoever to say it happened at Boeing, but saying you were not aware is sometimes not enough.
First line: In 2017, Boeing learned that the angle-of-attack (AOA) disagree alert — a standard feature on all 737 MAX aircraft — didn't work on the majority of the planes. The company determined that the alert was not necessary for safe operation, so it did not inform operators or the FAA.
So all those lives could have been saved and they knew it in 2017? And they let two crashes happen? Explain that to the ones who got left behind...
So all those lives could have been saved and they knew it in 2017? And they let two crashes happen? Explain that to the ones who got left behind...
Previously, the thinking was that most airline pilots weren't using the AOA information anyway - they had included the feature because some airlines had ex-military staff who were used to having it, but most didn't. So the AOA being wrong wouldn't necessarily be that urgent a problem, if it was only the pilot we were talking about.
Unfortunately, it wasn't only used by a small number of pilots, but also by MCAS. It seems that MCAS kicks in during scenarios that weren't originally intended - i.e. take-offs as well as stall scenarios - and they got two other things wrong:
* MCAS was revised to be more aggressive toward the end of testing;
* MCAS has a bug / design flaw that allowed the system to command an increasingly steep nose-down each time a pilot overrode it.
There were lots of little signs all over the place that there was a problem. Unfortunately, they didn't seem to join the dots, and each seemingly-reasonable decision they made when taken together added up to a dangerous scenario.
Unfortunately, it wasn't only used by a small number of pilots, but also by MCAS. It seems that MCAS kicks in during scenarios that weren't originally intended - i.e. take-offs as well as stall scenarios - and they got two other things wrong:
* MCAS was revised to be more aggressive toward the end of testing;
* MCAS has a bug / design flaw that allowed the system to command an increasingly steep nose-down each time a pilot overrode it.
There were lots of little signs all over the place that there was a problem. Unfortunately, they didn't seem to join the dots, and each seemingly-reasonable decision they made when taken together added up to a dangerous scenario.
> "they didn't seem to join the dots" is what it will be made to look like.
IMO, there would have been engineers and even some of the management chain who knew these risks, but for whatever reason, would have been pressured to make this go away. It seems like a conspiracist thing to say, but I've seen this in software engineering for years. There are heaps of perfectly legitimate pressures which will result in reduced quality and cutting of corners.. just in my work, lives are not at risk.
IMO, there would have been engineers and even some of the management chain who knew these risks, but for whatever reason, would have been pressured to make this go away. It seems like a conspiracist thing to say, but I've seen this in software engineering for years. There are heaps of perfectly legitimate pressures which will result in reduced quality and cutting of corners.. just in my work, lives are not at risk.
Or alternatively they didn't want to join the dots.
I would be sceptical that anyone wouldn't want to join the dots if it meant that their most popular product stayed popular and they didnt end up with blood on their hands after many many people died because those dots remained unjoined.
At worst it might be plausible that in a very specific scenario some people knew about enough of those dots that they knew it would be a PITA to go back and make everything right, but they almost certainly didn't know about enough of those dots to actually understand the scale of their fuck up there.
In which case I would say it's still a matter of someone not joining the dots, it's just makes them moderately more culpible, then steeply more incompetent the more of those dots they knew about but still didn't flag as problems.
At worst it might be plausible that in a very specific scenario some people knew about enough of those dots that they knew it would be a PITA to go back and make everything right, but they almost certainly didn't know about enough of those dots to actually understand the scale of their fuck up there.
In which case I would say it's still a matter of someone not joining the dots, it's just makes them moderately more culpible, then steeply more incompetent the more of those dots they knew about but still didn't flag as problems.
That's possible but unlikely.
I'd be willing to bet there are engineers who are experiencing a lot of guilt about this right now. Not many.. but maybe even a handful. These are people who might not have been able to do anything about the problem had they realised the true scale of the risk. But I'd guarantee they exist, even if only in a number one can count on one hand.
It's a failing of the company culture where these engineers were not made safe to speak up; a missing facility for those who knew, to get the message to those who would do something about it had they known. It was likely a function of unhealthy (toxic?) company culture which precluded this psychological safety.
I bet these folks feel pretty bad.. maybe even responsible. They won't speak up tho, lest being labelled or even targeted with the full blame. They will suffer in silence, in some ways like the many soldiers ordered to do things they didn't think were right, but did anyway.
I'd be willing to bet there are engineers who are experiencing a lot of guilt about this right now. Not many.. but maybe even a handful. These are people who might not have been able to do anything about the problem had they realised the true scale of the risk. But I'd guarantee they exist, even if only in a number one can count on one hand.
It's a failing of the company culture where these engineers were not made safe to speak up; a missing facility for those who knew, to get the message to those who would do something about it had they known. It was likely a function of unhealthy (toxic?) company culture which precluded this psychological safety.
I bet these folks feel pretty bad.. maybe even responsible. They won't speak up tho, lest being labelled or even targeted with the full blame. They will suffer in silence, in some ways like the many soldiers ordered to do things they didn't think were right, but did anyway.
Possibly. But the point is, there's practically no way they can scape-goat at lower levels over this: management's role is exactly to connect those dots (or, at least, put in the safety culture which ensures the dots are connected, and manage it appropriately).
A systemic failing like this, combined with the more relaxed attitude the FAA took with them, is probably about as clearly a management failing as they could get. I'd put it as even worse than the VW scandal: at least in that instance there were specific cases of malpractice / collusion.
A systemic failing like this, combined with the more relaxed attitude the FAA took with them, is probably about as clearly a management failing as they could get. I'd put it as even worse than the VW scandal: at least in that instance there were specific cases of malpractice / collusion.
No, your deduction logic is wrong. They did not "know in 2017 that all those lives could be saved". Because in 2017 they believed it's not a security issue.
Well, when first plane crash, and the second one, they blamed the pilots ...
Because they still believed that this was not the issue. They did _not_ know this was they issue and they did _not_ let things happen.
They were wrong about this of course, but you are suggesting malice while incompetence seems much more likely.
They were wrong about this of course, but you are suggesting malice while incompetence seems much more likely.
It would only be malice if Boeing were trying to kill passengers - which seems unlikely.
But not knowing this would be an issue in a context like this is the definition of corporate incompetence. And that doesn't make things any better for Boeing.
This is literally mission critical design. You don't walk away from the wreckage shrugging and saying "Who knew?"
It doesn't matter if this was an engineering failure, a management failure, or an accounting failure. What matters is that it was a failure that killed people, and Boeing cannot be trusted to make safe air liners until the failure mode is discovered and eliminated.
But not knowing this would be an issue in a context like this is the definition of corporate incompetence. And that doesn't make things any better for Boeing.
This is literally mission critical design. You don't walk away from the wreckage shrugging and saying "Who knew?"
It doesn't matter if this was an engineering failure, a management failure, or an accounting failure. What matters is that it was a failure that killed people, and Boeing cannot be trusted to make safe air liners until the failure mode is discovered and eliminated.
> failure mode is discovered and eliminated
Maybe. But it won't be. That's not how corporate engineering works. And there's no appropriate pressure to change this. Boeing have far too much influence over the governing devices that are supposed to apply the healthy pressure which would result in the outcome you describe.
Maybe. But it won't be. That's not how corporate engineering works. And there's no appropriate pressure to change this. Boeing have far too much influence over the governing devices that are supposed to apply the healthy pressure which would result in the outcome you describe.
That's not how corporate engineering works
I'd wager that corporate engineering standards are supposed to be a lot more stringent when you're not manufacturing widgets, but objects like buildings, bridges, or commercial airliners.
That they didn't go into introspection mode, being the only entity who could (and should) have known what the potential issue was after the LionAir crash, and didn't move hell and high water to get to the ground of it (and they very obvisously didn't) is pretty much inexcusable.
That they're still smearing the pilots, puts them, in my book, into the scum of the earth category.
There should be a special place in hell for Boeing's senior management.
edit: clarification
I'd wager that corporate engineering standards are supposed to be a lot more stringent when you're not manufacturing widgets, but objects like buildings, bridges, or commercial airliners.
That they didn't go into introspection mode, being the only entity who could (and should) have known what the potential issue was after the LionAir crash, and didn't move hell and high water to get to the ground of it (and they very obvisously didn't) is pretty much inexcusable.
That they're still smearing the pilots, puts them, in my book, into the scum of the earth category.
There should be a special place in hell for Boeing's senior management.
edit: clarification
No: one can still be malicious without outright intendending to kill passengers.
Boeing had their very existence and dominance in the aerospace sector severely threatened by A320neo. They needed MAX to be a hit at all costs, and this impetus, combined with the bean counterism their culture was infected with after the McDonnell Douglas merger ensured that any internal obstacles that threatened the time table for MAX would get dealt with in the short term cheapest and minimally effective way possible.
This is gross negligence at a minimum, blatant malfeasance at worst.
Boeing had their very existence and dominance in the aerospace sector severely threatened by A320neo. They needed MAX to be a hit at all costs, and this impetus, combined with the bean counterism their culture was infected with after the McDonnell Douglas merger ensured that any internal obstacles that threatened the time table for MAX would get dealt with in the short term cheapest and minimally effective way possible.
This is gross negligence at a minimum, blatant malfeasance at worst.
The legal term is gross negligence, and it's worse than it sounds.
Put Hanlon's razor away before you cut yourself.
They already have an internal whistleblower willing to testify that driving MCAS from a single sensor was a deliberate regulatory hack.
Hanlon's razor only applies when no evidence to the contrary exists. That is not the case here.
See the Austrailian 60 Minustes expose.
They already have an internal whistleblower willing to testify that driving MCAS from a single sensor was a deliberate regulatory hack.
Hanlon's razor only applies when no evidence to the contrary exists. That is not the case here.
See the Austrailian 60 Minustes expose.
I'd say it's somewhere in between.
It can't incompetence because there will absolutely be engineers and designers who knew of the risks inherent to moving the CG and CoL and the deeper concerns of replacing these risks with a software solution (MCAS) which can relieve a human pilot of control. There is no way any self-respecting engineer with enough design influence would have been ignorant of the potential risks with this design.
It's probably not malice either because people generally aren't evil - especially those building planes which carry humans.
In saying that tho, there was almost certainly a "trade off" decision which was made, and thoroughly justified which traded safety for something else: most likely project delivery schedule. Was this motivated by economic reasons? Who knows. But the trade-off decision which sacrificed safety (even if in largely unknown, distant terms) would have definitely been there and was certainly a conscious decision. IMHO.
It can't incompetence because there will absolutely be engineers and designers who knew of the risks inherent to moving the CG and CoL and the deeper concerns of replacing these risks with a software solution (MCAS) which can relieve a human pilot of control. There is no way any self-respecting engineer with enough design influence would have been ignorant of the potential risks with this design.
It's probably not malice either because people generally aren't evil - especially those building planes which carry humans.
In saying that tho, there was almost certainly a "trade off" decision which was made, and thoroughly justified which traded safety for something else: most likely project delivery schedule. Was this motivated by economic reasons? Who knows. But the trade-off decision which sacrificed safety (even if in largely unknown, distant terms) would have definitely been there and was certainly a conscious decision. IMHO.
They better explain to me why I should trust a Boeing aircraft after the 777 (in my humble opinion the last aircraft built by the engineering-driven Boeing Company rather than McDonnell-Douglas masquerading as Boeing).
I'd be curious to read more about those cases when MCAS was engaged, but the pilots were able to recover. There were a number of them.
IIRC there was one on the Lion Air plane that crashed, but because they had a 737 instructor aboard helping aleviate the pressures when things started going wrong they were able to land.
This is an interesting point. Some will argue that the AOA disagree indicator wouldn't have made any difference in either crash. But it seems like it would have caused Lion Air to take their aircraft out of service and fix the problem after it occurred on the penultimate flight.
Of course, the fact that they kept the aircraft in service without bothering to diagnose the issue that almost got everyone killed on the previous flight is a counterargument in itself. There's more than enough gross negligence to go around in this case, unfortunately.
Edit: actually, it appears that Lion didn't spring for the "optional" warning indicator feature in the first place.
Of course, the fact that they kept the aircraft in service without bothering to diagnose the issue that almost got everyone killed on the previous flight is a counterargument in itself. There's more than enough gross negligence to go around in this case, unfortunately.
Edit: actually, it appears that Lion didn't spring for the "optional" warning indicator feature in the first place.
> actually, it appears that Lion didn't spring for the "optional" warning indicator feature in the first place.
AIUI, there was no "optional warning indicator feature" at all. The AOA disagree warning should have been a standard feature. Only the indicator of the current AOA was the optional feature.
AIUI, there was no "optional warning indicator feature" at all. The AOA disagree warning should have been a standard feature. Only the indicator of the current AOA was the optional feature.
Optional indicator that was previously - and should have been - standard issue. With the MAX being sold with the explicit promise that there is little/no additional pilot training need.
Clear negligence on both sides, with Boeing being responsible at much grander scale.
Clear negligence on both sides, with Boeing being responsible at much grander scale.
Boeing should be fined enough that "shareholder value" would be roughly zero after all the assets are sold to pay the fine.
That (besides any personal penalty that might be appropriate, of course) might realign the incentives for the next set of managers facing similar choices somewhere else, but it won't happen.
That (besides any personal penalty that might be appropriate, of course) might realign the incentives for the next set of managers facing similar choices somewhere else, but it won't happen.
Check out their balance sheet. It’s already at zero! They already have been spending so much on buybacks (9B a year, ~eq to net income) that there isn’t any equity left in the company since their liabilities have exploded.
On a side note check a lot of large companies today, corporate debt has gone crazy due to buybacks. They’ve converted any stockholder equity remaining into debt, especially after tax cuts and low interest rates. In a bankruptcy, bond holders get paid first.
On a side note check a lot of large companies today, corporate debt has gone crazy due to buybacks. They’ve converted any stockholder equity remaining into debt, especially after tax cuts and low interest rates. In a bankruptcy, bond holders get paid first.
Yet they have 500m shares outstanding with a market value of $200b.
Yep interesting times. Valuation models at these levels depend on EPS growth where buybacks reduce number of shares = more earnings per share. The side effect is a ballooning balance sheet. Can that go on indefinitely? Are upper management (typically near retirement age) at all concerned with the long term effects?
Passive investment and Fed also plays part. Joe 401k and systemic index tracking leads to no public awareness of companies financial health. Buy no matter what the largest cap stocks in proportion to size. Fed is completely aware of all this. Interest rates must never rise otherwise everything seizes. December’s reaction was just that.
Passive investment and Fed also plays part. Joe 401k and systemic index tracking leads to no public awareness of companies financial health. Buy no matter what the largest cap stocks in proportion to size. Fed is completely aware of all this. Interest rates must never rise otherwise everything seizes. December’s reaction was just that.
No, you should not destroy businesses for any transgressions, even for extremely serious ones.
Would it be correct to say that your suggestion stems from a general dislike of corporations, rather than from the circumstances of this particular case?
Would it be correct to say that your suggestion stems from a general dislike of corporations, rather than from the circumstances of this particular case?
No; I don't trust corporations, but I don't have a specific a priori distaste for them.
I want to point out that I don't want everyone working for Boeing out of a job, I want people that invested in Boeing to lose that investment (so that other boards in the future are incentivized to hold other management teams accountable) and to erase the obviously dangerous safety culture that currently exists in the company. I'm sure that their employees and assets could be useful for their competitors.
I want to point out that I don't want everyone working for Boeing out of a job, I want people that invested in Boeing to lose that investment (so that other boards in the future are incentivized to hold other management teams accountable) and to erase the obviously dangerous safety culture that currently exists in the company. I'm sure that their employees and assets could be useful for their competitors.
There's a philosophical argument to be made wrt corporate personhood. If we lock up and/or execute people for serious transgressions, are corporations let off too easily (fines usually a fraction of their yearly profit, and therefore just a cost of doing business)?
Well, the intent is precisely that they cease to exist. They shouldn't be making airplanes because they are a threat to public safety, it's not a mere "dislike".
It might feel good to do that, but you’d be putting tens of thousands out of work, and handing the industry over to Airbus, which last I read, had an ever so slightly worse safety record (though both are quite good). That’s bad for cost and safety long term.
By all means I support axing those responsible and criminal charges where/if appropriate, but a company death sentence does not serve the public interest.
By all means I support axing those responsible and criminal charges where/if appropriate, but a company death sentence does not serve the public interest.
> Airbus, which last I read, had an ever so slightly worse safety record
[citation needed]
[citation needed]
Someone linked it during previous discussions, but it was summary posted on Quora here. I'd consider them equivalent:
https://www.quora.com/How-many-plane-crashes-does-Boeing-hav...
https://www.quora.com/How-many-plane-crashes-does-Boeing-hav...
...which concludes:
With the exception of the MD-11, there is no statistically significant safety record difference between jet transports put into service since 1980, Airbus and Boeing included.
With the exception of the MD-11, there is no statistically significant safety record difference between jet transports put into service since 1980, Airbus and Boeing included.
I think the argument for making it a corporate death sentence is that future companies and shareholders will know it is in their interest to make airplanes that don't kill people.
More abstractly, if you value human life at a high enough dollar value and make corporations liable for loss thereof, they will expend effort to preserve human life. It appears that currently the externality of killing people is priced at a level where Boeing does not mind killing people.
I don't know if lawsuit liability is the best way to police corporate behavior, but it is big part of the system we currently have in the USA.
More abstractly, if you value human life at a high enough dollar value and make corporations liable for loss thereof, they will expend effort to preserve human life. It appears that currently the externality of killing people is priced at a level where Boeing does not mind killing people.
I don't know if lawsuit liability is the best way to police corporate behavior, but it is big part of the system we currently have in the USA.
They do make airplanes that don’t kill people. More people die per mile in cars than have ever died in airplanes. The train fatality rate in the United States is higher than that of airplanes — the majority of those airplanes being Boeing. More people died in cars yesterday than in all of 2018 for Boeing. And given fatalities per mile, air travel on Boeing airplanes is safer than any other form of transportation. Suggesting that Boeing makes planes that “kill people,” is about as ridiculous as saying that Specialized makes bikes that kill people. The safety record of American aviation is unmatched — and most of those planes are Boeing. Let’s tamp down on the hyperbole.
Because its relative. You cant get car traffic as safe as airplanes. Its not reasonable to hold Boeing to the same standards as automotive traffic. Automotive traffic is simply far more dangerous then flying. You also wouldnt be ok with people dying from bread as long as its fewer then the amount of people dying to e.coli or fish poisoning. The question is always how easy it is to prevent deaths not how many are acceptable for a given branch.
Like those factories and workers would just disappear. Something new would be established, hopefully something better. We can't keep looking away when companies behave like Boeing did, actively killing people, only because we would put people out of work.
Those factories and workers would disappear from the US to the EU / elsewhere. If you were ordering planes, why would you risk ordering brand new planes from the remnants of a company killed by its own government?
Again, I'm not saying they did no wrong. I'm just saying criminal accountability for those responsible is better than corporate death sentences.
Again, I'm not saying they did no wrong. I'm just saying criminal accountability for those responsible is better than corporate death sentences.
So break off the civilian plane division and kill it off. No reason to hurt all 100,000 employees, just the division that was responsible. It sucks to hear “sheesh I wish there were more competitors” after Boeing just kicked Bombardier in the Crown Jewels for daring to compete with the C-Series, which is only an Airbus product now because Boeing took advantage of the US political system in the first place (a severe miscalculation in retrospect).
Monopolies aren’t capitalist. Monopolies keep putting us in uncomfortable situations like this. There’s a reason we have regulations to keep them from happening (or at least break them apart post facto) even if we choose not to use them.
Monopolies aren’t capitalist. Monopolies keep putting us in uncomfortable situations like this. There’s a reason we have regulations to keep them from happening (or at least break them apart post facto) even if we choose not to use them.
If you have companies who are to big to fail they behave that way. We just had that with banks and the financial crisis. Leaving such institutions as is is incredibly dangerous and incentives risky and reckless behavior at the cost of society as a whole.
If saving those jobs is the goal, we should work towards that instead of saving the company in hopes that this will also save jobs.
If saving those jobs is the goal, we should work towards that instead of saving the company in hopes that this will also save jobs.
So destroy the company, put at least 165k people out of a job as punishment? Can we sell off Airbus for their numerous bribery scandals?[1] Should we destroy Tesla because of their autopilot crashes, battery fires and other mishaps?
[1] https://www.spiegel.de/international/business/suspicions-of-...
[1] https://www.spiegel.de/international/business/suspicions-of-...
Yes. I see no issues here.
If you can't do what you set out to do without being grossly negligent, or resorting to bribery, then perhaps you shouldn't be doing what you are at all.
Businesses seem to have forgotten they are not money pumps first and foremost. They are there to do a job, and are currently failing epically at doing so in an ethical manner.
I'd put down a corporation like I'd put down a dog should it show a tendency for wanton destruction and bloodshed..
If you can't do what you set out to do without being grossly negligent, or resorting to bribery, then perhaps you shouldn't be doing what you are at all.
Businesses seem to have forgotten they are not money pumps first and foremost. They are there to do a job, and are currently failing epically at doing so in an ethical manner.
I'd put down a corporation like I'd put down a dog should it show a tendency for wanton destruction and bloodshed..
Airbus should absolutely be punished if found guilty for bribery. Same goes for Tesla, if found guilty of neglicence (including lying in their marketing literature).
The difference, however, is that you can hardly acuse them of mass murder for corporate greed and profit.
And that's exactly what Boeing management did after the Lion Air crash. They knew, or must have known, that they're selling a potential death trap and did exactly shit about it (except promising a fix, delivered eventually, which should compensate for "incompetent pilots").
Look up whataboutism. Because your argument is quite a perfect example.
The difference, however, is that you can hardly acuse them of mass murder for corporate greed and profit.
And that's exactly what Boeing management did after the Lion Air crash. They knew, or must have known, that they're selling a potential death trap and did exactly shit about it (except promising a fix, delivered eventually, which should compensate for "incompetent pilots").
Look up whataboutism. Because your argument is quite a perfect example.
<The company said that a Boeing-convened safety review board affirmed in December that the absence of the AOA disagree alert from flight displays would not have presented a safety issue.
The FAA confirmed the discussion and that it deemed the issue "low risk" at the time.>
So the FAA is culpable as well as Boeing
The FAA confirmed the discussion and that it deemed the issue "low risk" at the time.>
So the FAA is culpable as well as Boeing
That is true, but at some point it's hard to distinguish between parts of the FAA and parts of Boeing, owed to the simple fact that Boeing have so much influence over the FAA. Statements about how Boeing more or less "certified itself" speak to this. Just go and look at the LinkedIn history of the folks that move between Boeing/FAA.
If you accept this, then the question might turn to how it was possible for the FAA to be weakened to such a degree that this corporate influence was possible. FAA are the regulator - at the end of the day, safety lies with them. Perhaps it's the responsibility of committee and congressional oversight to the aviation regulator? Perhaps the buck stops with the government representatives who have allowed this mess to be possible in the first place?
If you accept this, then the question might turn to how it was possible for the FAA to be weakened to such a degree that this corporate influence was possible. FAA are the regulator - at the end of the day, safety lies with them. Perhaps it's the responsibility of committee and congressional oversight to the aviation regulator? Perhaps the buck stops with the government representatives who have allowed this mess to be possible in the first place?
How is the FAA culpable? No American planes crashed? The FAA doesn’t control regulations for Indonesia do they? Indonesian maintenance standards are atrocious. Look at Lion Air’s record. Is it a coincidence that one of the world’s worst airlines also happen to crash the 737 and yet Southwest Airlines that flew an order of magnitude more flights on the Max never had even a scratch? Lion Air knew they had a problem on the penultimate flight — but they ignored it. The FAA would never allow that level of negligence in the US: that plane would have been grounded. The FAA has a better safety record than anyone else — and that includes the Europeans.
Doesn't matter. The design itself was unsafe. The reason the FAA has historically been so highly regarded is that it has fostered a design environment of generally implicit design safety.
Ironically, however, Europe has called the FAA to task before on several models of Boeing aircraft that weren't implicitly design safe. See the D.P. Davies Interview w.r.t the Boeing 727 certification process.
They cut corners, and did not inform pilots of the inherent risk that existed in a manner concomitant with the severity of the result. This originated in a desire to submit an aerodynamically deviant aircraft, yet attain type airworthyness certification with minimal friction.
Lion Air may be last in safely operating aircraft, but the design standards were generally written in such a way where even the worst operators stood a good chance of going up, and getting back down free of harm.
Obviously, that is no longer the case.
Ironically, however, Europe has called the FAA to task before on several models of Boeing aircraft that weren't implicitly design safe. See the D.P. Davies Interview w.r.t the Boeing 727 certification process.
They cut corners, and did not inform pilots of the inherent risk that existed in a manner concomitant with the severity of the result. This originated in a desire to submit an aerodynamically deviant aircraft, yet attain type airworthyness certification with minimal friction.
Lion Air may be last in safely operating aircraft, but the design standards were generally written in such a way where even the worst operators stood a good chance of going up, and getting back down free of harm.
Obviously, that is no longer the case.
The FAA let Boeing do the certification of its own plane. The system is broken.
Still wondering about why 737 NGs (-600,-700,-800,-900) are still deemed "airworthy" despite the 2010 investigative report on Boeing's intentional deception and cover-up of Ducommun's absurdly dangerous and substandard critical structural fuselage components. Several passengers have already died from fuselage breakups from hard landings and runway overruns when previous aircraft have survived similar situations intact; plus the possibility of aircraft catastrophically breaking up in heavy turbulence.
Boeing has over 100,000 employees. What does it mean when a sentence says that "Boeing knew X"?
At least 1 of the engineering teams knew X, is my interpretation.
This was my question too.
The real question isn't whether someone in the company knew. It's whether someone with decision power knew, and who was that person? And also, if people with decision power did not know - then why?
I tend to agree.
And if this can be traced to someone with influence, how was it possible for the company to be structured so that a single point of failure was possible - that speaks to a larger problem and then puts the senior exec on the chopping block too.
And if this can be traced to someone with influence, how was it possible for the company to be structured so that a single point of failure was possible - that speaks to a larger problem and then puts the senior exec on the chopping block too.
It’s not clear the AOA disagree light would have saved the two flights, so waiting for the next release was reasonable.
The critical jump pilots had to make was that this was a trim runaway event. AOA indicators were not connected to the trim system before.
The critical jump pilots had to make was that this was a trim runaway event. AOA indicators were not connected to the trim system before.
> It’s not clear the AOA disagree light would have saved the two flights
Unless you change it to "It’s certain the AOA disagree light would not have saved the two flights", you are basically arguing for presence of AOA disagree light.
Unless you change it to "It’s certain the AOA disagree light would not have saved the two flights", you are basically arguing for presence of AOA disagree light.
The FAA provides time to fix issues if its deemed to not be a critical issue - because if every problem results in grounding planes then people just won't report issues. The added stress of millions in losses could also result in subpar fixes that cause more problems.
In this case I agree with the FAA's initial decision for this indicator. Its extremely unlikely having it working would have prevented the two crashes. The mere fact that it might have helped doesn't make the original decision incorrect.
In this case I agree with the FAA's initial decision for this indicator. Its extremely unlikely having it working would have prevented the two crashes. The mere fact that it might have helped doesn't make the original decision incorrect.
Here's the official release from Boeing that this is just reiterating (from May 5): https://boeing.mediaroom.com/news-releases-statements?item=1...
NYTimes article: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/05/business/boeing-737-max-w...
HN discussion of that article: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19835608