Emirates’ Tim Clark says Boeing ‘not getting it’ on 737 Max, 787(theaircurrent.com)
theaircurrent.com
Emirates’ Tim Clark says Boeing ‘not getting it’ on 737 Max, 787
https://theaircurrent.com/industry-strategy/emirates-tim-clark-says-boeing-not-getting-it-on-737-max-787/
200 comments
[deleted]
This is a natural consequence of too-big-to-fail. Boeing needs to be broken up.
Genuine question, would anyone want to buy planes like this from a company that's small enough to fail?
I'm guessing not.
I'm guessing not.
The idea is that if it's small enough to fail, then the incentives are much stronger to avoid failure. If it's too big to fail, why would they put effort into avoiding failure? So yes, buying from a small enough to fail company could be seen as safer.
Note that too big to fail, and small enough to fail has less to do with the size of the company and more to do with market position and government perception.
Note that too big to fail, and small enough to fail has less to do with the size of the company and more to do with market position and government perception.
Playing devils advocate. I’m guessing long term maintenance would be a concern when ones buying something as expensive as a plane. How do you trust a new small company with this?
Yes, it would. But right now the long term maintenance of the A380 is shaky despite Airbus still being around. Devils advocate to long term maintenance with a large company: they could just stop caring about you as a customer or refuse to support you.
It's a difficult space to make decisions in and I think it's difficult to make any broad statements about reliability of product or company. Someone would need to actually run some numbers.
It's a difficult space to make decisions in and I think it's difficult to make any broad statements about reliability of product or company. Someone would need to actually run some numbers.
[deleted]
Maybe they'd put effort into avoiding failure if we held decision makers liable for negligence when appropriate, rather than shielding them with the entire company employing thousands.
I think the reverse of the question is also important: why would anyone want to fly on a plane made by such a colossal company that any blame for flaws (design/technical or decision process) is diluted to the point that hundreds of deaths result in no measurable punishment?
You generally don't have a choice - true you can see the type of plane when you book, but airlines swap them out all the time.
Besides, it's the regulatory environment and the reputation of the airline that provides most of the actual safety. Aircraft failures are in fact very rare. Even the 737 MAX is a profoundly safe aircraft compared to almost any car brand in terms of passenger miles, and usually by passenger minutes too.
I don't disagree. My point I guess is, if you're buying a plane that will potentially be in service for many decades you need some kind of reassurance the manufacturer will still be around to support it?
There are dozens of small airplane manufacturers. Cessna nearly failed in the '90s, but they're doing fine today. They're still small enough to fail. Also there are bizjet manufacturers that could fail. Aircraft producers usually sell the right to own parts and service at a discount through chapter 11 work, so it's not like the parts and service aircraft need to keep flying vanish if the parent company fails. Usually.
Companies like Pipistrel that are producing innovative aircraft are usually small enough to fail.
Companies like Pipistrel that are producing innovative aircraft are usually small enough to fail.
Yeah I guess I wasn't really sure that would work with commercial airliners, given their probable lifespan/complexity. If the manufacturer goes out of business, who has the expertise to maintain the planes for the rest of their working life?
In the United States, aviation mechanics are trained primarily to be generalists who can safely operate on any aircraft. Airline regulation may create specializations. The manufacturer needs to provide parts and certain highly specialized services (like rebuilding damaged wings, for example.) That parts and service supply is wrapped up in a "Type Certification Ownership". That type ownership is a valuable thing, because it's a guaranteed population of customers. Therefore, when aviation companies fail, the type ownership is auctioned off, and it will be bought.
[deleted]
Bombardier's C-series was just starting to sell well among big carriers (Delta) before the US sabotaged them to protect Boeing, which brought them to their knees, forced them to sell everything off and they probably won't survive the pandemic, so yes.
I'm not sure what you are implying with "too-big-to-fail" specifically? What if, even at a smaller size they manage to "distribute" responsibility enough so there is no one with actual "skin in the game" yet again?
Just thinking about that, maybe it's both? A combination of little "skin in the game" and short sighted incentives ("budget efficiencies") that lead to a "lack of imagination"?
How did NASA solve this problem after Columbia?
Just thinking about that, maybe it's both? A combination of little "skin in the game" and short sighted incentives ("budget efficiencies") that lead to a "lack of imagination"?
How did NASA solve this problem after Columbia?
As the last manufacturer of large passenger airplanes in the USA, Boeing's role in the US psyche and US economy is too big for the US government to let it fail.
NASA, despite being part of the US government, faced a much larger risk of being shut down after Columbia (more so than Challenger, since the Cold War was over).
NASA, despite being part of the US government, faced a much larger risk of being shut down after Columbia (more so than Challenger, since the Cold War was over).
That's an insightful perspective on the matter. Thanks for sharing. I wish Boeing could revive that old spirit of craftsmanship and safety above everything else.
> This is a natural consequence of too-big-to-fail. Boeing needs to be broken up.
Isn't Boeing the result of having many "small enough to fail" aerospace companies actually fail?
Isn't Boeing the result of having many "small enough to fail" aerospace companies actually fail?
Yeah, pretty much. It's an industry where it's really hard to get a start, and if you survive at all you become too big to fail.
Being bought isn't failing, it's falling prey to global financialization
-needs to be broken up
not the best choice of wording. i'm sorry, that's all i can see.
not the best choice of wording. i'm sorry, that's all i can see.
The problem isn't their size, the problem is regulatory capture.
If the intent was to circumvent the paywall at "Continue reading" (which is fair enough for The Air Current to do) then this archive.is link does not do that.
737 Max fiasco was the first thing that actually made me look at which plane I might be flying on when booking tickets outside of the flights on the Airbus A380.
As a casual plane nerd I always checked which plane type I am on and have even made ticket decisions based on it (and have been disappointed when the airline changes the plane type last-minute!).
That being said, in my experience, airlines very rarely advertise which 'sub-type' of narrow-body you'll be flying on (at least until you've bought the ticket). Finding a flight which is definitely on an A320-neo (as opposed to ceo) for example is very difficult. I would assume that especially now airlines will do their best to hide the fact that they are flying a 737 Max.
That being said, in my experience, airlines very rarely advertise which 'sub-type' of narrow-body you'll be flying on (at least until you've bought the ticket). Finding a flight which is definitely on an A320-neo (as opposed to ceo) for example is very difficult. I would assume that especially now airlines will do their best to hide the fact that they are flying a 737 Max.
Boeing has also changed the name of the 737 MAX to the 737-8, at the request of airlines, since people know the former name but not the latter yet.
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2020/aug/20/boeing-737-....
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2020/aug/20/boeing-737-....
[deleted]
On the other hand, if this is important to you, it is generally quite practical to choose airlines that do not fly 737s. For example, JetBlue and not SouthWest.
That really depends on the airport. Portland, for example. If you try to avoid 737s then you just cut yourself out of 75-80% of all available flights.
Also, the 737NG is arguably the safest airliner ever produced (by statistics, not speculation), so why would I want to avoid it?
Also, the 737NG is arguably the safest airliner ever produced (by statistics, not speculation), so why would I want to avoid it?
I always do because I despise exit seats on A320s, at least on Alaska.
If you tell the flight crew that you don't want to be seated there, they will reseat you.
It's more an issue, in the case of Alaska, that they treat exit row seats as a premium selection, so it's more of a "If 737 then my life is slightly better for a few dollars, if A320, it's slightly worse, so check beforehand."
> outside of the flights on the Airbus A380
What do you mean by this part?
What do you mean by this part?
Guessing: he wanted to fly on the A380, because it's an awesome experience if you're above average interested in planes. Opposite sign of the attention given to the 737max, in other words.
I would imagine so as well.
I'm in the same position. Before the 737 Max fiasco, the only plane I would really look out for, and woudl change tickets for, was the A380. For long distance flights it's way more comfortable especially in economy. The seats tend to be more comfortable, and it's significantly quieter, than competing planes on long distance routes.
I'm in the same position. Before the 737 Max fiasco, the only plane I would really look out for, and woudl change tickets for, was the A380. For long distance flights it's way more comfortable especially in economy. The seats tend to be more comfortable, and it's significantly quieter, than competing planes on long distance routes.
Yes, exactly this. Also, I have only flown these on Emirates and they are great with a kid.
The A380 has not had a single incident.
I'd say I'm in general biased in favor of Airbus, but what you say just isn't true.
Oh, it's had incidents. Just not any fatal ones.
The early Quantas Flight 32 engine failure [1] was quite severe and the plane was lucky to continue to fly, for instance.
"a turbine disc in the aircraft's number-two engine (on the port side nearest the fuselage) was found to have disintegrated, causing extensive damage to the nacelle, wing, fuel system, landing gear, flight controls, and engine controls, and a fire in a fuel tank "
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qantas_Flight_32
The early Quantas Flight 32 engine failure [1] was quite severe and the plane was lucky to continue to fly, for instance.
"a turbine disc in the aircraft's number-two engine (on the port side nearest the fuselage) was found to have disintegrated, causing extensive damage to the nacelle, wing, fuel system, landing gear, flight controls, and engine controls, and a fire in a fuel tank "
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qantas_Flight_32
IIRC they were unable to shut down the outboard engine after landing, and had to get the fire department to shoot water into the engine. They did not have control over the engine the entire flight, nor did they have full control over the ailerons. Few people can really appreciate how hard it is to land an airplane with partial controls.
Yes, it could have gone bad very rapidly. It helps that they had a 35-year captain in command, and 5 pilots in the cockpit - including 2 check pilots. All accounts are that the decision making of the crew was top-notch.
And their instruments were telling them the truth.
Nobody had "omitted" documenting flight-altering automation in the training required to dodge certification requirements...
Nobody had "omitted" documenting flight-altering automation in the training required to dodge certification requirements...
This is one of those comments that just does the perfect job of bringing the thread back into the context of the original topic.
Indeed it's astonishing to think that one of the tasks that lead to safety and victory for an aircraft which is simple (as opposed to the many which are complex) is the single point of this particular failure.
Indeed it's astonishing to think that one of the tasks that lead to safety and victory for an aircraft which is simple (as opposed to the many which are complex) is the single point of this particular failure.
I always finding myself adding in a U in Qantas, but it's an acronym: "Queensland and Northern Territory Aerial Services"
> the plane was lucky to continue to fly, for instance.
It seems that the better a plane is designed, the "luckier" it gets! Strange how that works.
It seems that the better a plane is designed, the "luckier" it gets! Strange how that works.
He probably wanted to fly on that aircraft so he specifically looked for a flight with that plane?
[deleted]
I'm guessing he means he'd prefer to fly on the A380.
It was the first time I looked at my prior tickets to determine if I had ever flown on one. But nope, all Boeing Dreamliners which are phenomenal and fantastic!
A380 is a great plane, very fun to fly on. Too bad they're being grounded on most airlines for the foreseeable future due to their economics.
So much quieter than the comparable Boeing aircraft. Flying trans-Pacific on the 757 is like mowing the lawn for a day and a half.
Isn’t that roughly a 15000 km ocean and 7000 km range?
You're comparing a 1982 narrow-body to a 2006 super wide-body aircraft; a better comparison would be between the A380 and 747-8i (which are both supposed to be very comfortable).
It sounds like they're comparing planes they've actually flown on. I've never flown on a 747, so if I fly on a 787 I'm not going to make comments about how much better the 787 is than the 747.
You'd have a point if they didn't say "the comparable Boeing aircraft". There is nothing "comparable" about the two given Boeing's other offerings, they're not in the same class or generation.
[deleted]
> comparing planes they've flown on
The airline matters too - some have larger seats with more amenities and more space between rows. Those extra inches really matter on long haul flights for those of us who are tall!
The airline matters too - some have larger seats with more amenities and more space between rows. Those extra inches really matter on long haul flights for those of us who are tall!
I think you're right that they're comparing planes they've flown on, but they're trying to compare very different designs from very different eras.
Why would you say the comparable aircraft is a 757, and not the 777 or 787? The 757 is a 40-year-old narrowbody design, not a modern widebody.
I seriously enjoyed flying on the Boeing 787 myself (two roundtrips to Japan, one round trip to Germany). So much quieter compared to the 777s and 737s I'm used to flying on. Never been on an A380.
787's are super cool. I happened to fly back from Japan on one before their (first?) grounding and it was quite enjoyable. The additional cabin pressure for a "lower altitude feeling" and lower noise do really help reduce fatigue.
Ohhh they have additional cabin pressure? I could swear the air quality was MUCH better after spending about 10 hours in the plane and not feeling any fatigue.
I thought the air was less dry too, but didn't really have means to measure that.
I thought the air was less dry too, but didn't really have means to measure that.
It is less dry. The 787 can be held to a higher RH% because of its carbon fuselage. No worries about rust. Furthermore, it's not pressurized with engine bleed air which is very hot and dry.
787 is indeed comfortable but during landing every single time I thought the plane is going to burst into pieces - the loud rattling noise and visible bending of the interior was just crazy. But other than that really cool.
Aluminum planes also bend visibly if you're sitting in a rear aisle.
[deleted]
Eh, I have a different experience. The A380 porpoises on autopilot cruise, alternating between lifting you slightly, and settling slightly. The regular drop induces a startle reflex that makes it really hard to sleep.
My favorite plane for long distance is the 787. The mechanical bits are pretty noisy on climb out, but when cruising it's a really comfortable ride.
My favorite plane for long distance is the 787. The mechanical bits are pretty noisy on climb out, but when cruising it's a really comfortable ride.
> The regular drop induces a startle reflex that makes it really hard to sleep.
I like that actually; makes me sleep better. But the 787 is nice too.
I like that actually; makes me sleep better. But the 787 is nice too.
Crossed the Pacific on 777, 747, and A380. A380 is the only one that wound up dumping grey water from the upper deck on our seats for the entire flight and forcing my wife to stand in the aisle for the entire flight.
There are always some number of reserved seats on a large, long haul flight. If your wife wasn’t found an alternative seat, that’s on the airline or it’s staff.
Also it’s unlikely to have been upper deck gray water. More likely it was condensate.
Also it’s unlikely to have been upper deck gray water. More likely it was condensate.
A350 as well, it's probably the best plane in the skies atm for passengers on long haul flights.
Fortunately there is tremendous innovation in aerospace, just outside of Boeing
Starship will be better for international flights (30 minutes to anywhere), and Boom Supersonic for shorter flights
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zqE-ultsWt0
EDIT: Willing to make a bet with naysayers, email in profile (just fixed it, thanks)
Starship will be better for international flights (30 minutes to anywhere), and Boom Supersonic for shorter flights
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zqE-ultsWt0
EDIT: Willing to make a bet with naysayers, email in profile (just fixed it, thanks)
I can’t tell if this is satirical, but rockets have not proven their reliability much better than 94% for an unmanned rocket and 99% for manned. Airplanes have reliabilities on a per journey basis around 99.9999%. Even if SpaceX is full of 10x engineers who can produce rockets 10x safer than before, that gets them to 99.9% reliability.
The airline industry, for all of its faults, is multiple orders of magnitude safer than rockets. Perhaps rocket based vehicles are the future, but rocket failures must first become drastically more rare or at least less prone to everyone dying onboard in the case of a failure to be used in lieu of traditional airplanes.
Rockets - https://space.stackexchange.com/questions/8566/what-is-the-s...
2020 Airline safety - https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-airlines-safety/aviation-...
The airline industry, for all of its faults, is multiple orders of magnitude safer than rockets. Perhaps rocket based vehicles are the future, but rocket failures must first become drastically more rare or at least less prone to everyone dying onboard in the case of a failure to be used in lieu of traditional airplanes.
Rockets - https://space.stackexchange.com/questions/8566/what-is-the-s...
2020 Airline safety - https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-airlines-safety/aviation-...
It will be definitely interesting too watch Starship development progress - even just because it's actually in a big part a lot simpler vehicle than an airliner.
You see, there are those very top notch and quite a bit complex raptor engines powering it, but modern efficient jet engines are also pretty complex. The rest is basically "just" two cans of propelant and some very basic cold gas thrusters and big but simple aerosurfaces.
Also while indeed the energies Starship needs to handle at any given time are much bigger, it needs to handle them for minutes at a time (launch, landing) versus an airliner fighting air resistance and 10 different types of weather during a 12 hour transcontinental flight. Not to mention passenger and crew amenities you dont need to lug with you with a ~30 minute hop time.
Rocket engines also have their own oxidizer on board so FOD ingestion or birdstrike is not an issue.
And for launch and landing you need an isolated but rather simple and small area compared to the many kilometers of runways, taxiways and other airport infrastructure.
Lastly they run on liquid oxygen & methane, which might be actually cheaper and easier to get than jet grade kerosene, at least over time.
So indeed, Starship definitely is rocket science but it also does not have many pain points of modern airliners.
You see, there are those very top notch and quite a bit complex raptor engines powering it, but modern efficient jet engines are also pretty complex. The rest is basically "just" two cans of propelant and some very basic cold gas thrusters and big but simple aerosurfaces.
Also while indeed the energies Starship needs to handle at any given time are much bigger, it needs to handle them for minutes at a time (launch, landing) versus an airliner fighting air resistance and 10 different types of weather during a 12 hour transcontinental flight. Not to mention passenger and crew amenities you dont need to lug with you with a ~30 minute hop time.
Rocket engines also have their own oxidizer on board so FOD ingestion or birdstrike is not an issue.
And for launch and landing you need an isolated but rather simple and small area compared to the many kilometers of runways, taxiways and other airport infrastructure.
Lastly they run on liquid oxygen & methane, which might be actually cheaper and easier to get than jet grade kerosene, at least over time.
So indeed, Starship definitely is rocket science but it also does not have many pain points of modern airliners.
There are requirements for commercial flights which would be extremely hard to achieve with a rocket architecture.
For instance, you cannot have a single failure (whatever its probability) that leads to a catastrophic condition. Meaning, for every component and at every moment, you have to assume the component fails and still have to ensure you don't kill your passengers.
For instance, you cannot have a single failure (whatever its probability) that leads to a catastrophic condition. Meaning, for every component and at every moment, you have to assume the component fails and still have to ensure you don't kill your passengers.
Airliners can glide. Rockets can't. That's your big difference right there.
Wings are also way simpler than rockets.
You also have way more time to try to fix or workaround issues.
Reliability wise, airplanes will always be much better than rockets, especially if you include a propulsive landing.
Wings are also way simpler than rockets.
You also have way more time to try to fix or workaround issues.
Reliability wise, airplanes will always be much better than rockets, especially if you include a propulsive landing.
Sure, gliding helped to avoid many catastrophes (Gimli Glider, Hudson miracle, etc.) but the thing is - does it make sense for a rocketship ? On a point to point flight you are going to land (or impact) somewhere and you need a couple working engines to land safely, the same as you need working control systems to glide to an airport.
Still, Starship does not really need an airport for emergency landing - anything reasonably level will very quickly become a landing pad once the raptors get going for landing.
Also as for wings - those seem very complex to me on a modern airliner - flaps, spoilers, ailerons, wingless, integral fuel tanks, etc. In comparison to that starship is a lightweight water tower with a couple metal barn doors attached - much simpler structure with far less moving parts.
Still, Starship does not really need an airport for emergency landing - anything reasonably level will very quickly become a landing pad once the raptors get going for landing.
Also as for wings - those seem very complex to me on a modern airliner - flaps, spoilers, ailerons, wingless, integral fuel tanks, etc. In comparison to that starship is a lightweight water tower with a couple metal barn doors attached - much simpler structure with far less moving parts.
Wings are certainly not complex. They are passive, and ailerions/flapse/spoilers are hydraulically operated.
SpaceX scheduled to make a new Starship every 2.5 days by 2025
You might want to look at the early days of airplane safety, not the 2020 numbers. Look up reliablity learning curve, safety comes from doing a huge volume of flights. All existing rockets have a small number of flights
EDIT: am a SpaceX shareholder and I’ve met with Elon more than once, so not sure what you mean by parasocial
You might want to look at the early days of airplane safety, not the 2020 numbers. Look up reliablity learning curve, safety comes from doing a huge volume of flights. All existing rockets have a small number of flights
EDIT: am a SpaceX shareholder and I’ve met with Elon more than once, so not sure what you mean by parasocial
Whenever something related to Elon Musk comes up it becomes hard to sort out what is a reasonable claim versus an unreasonable one fueled by a parasocial relationship with Elon Musk.
As an aside, I do get amused when Person A makes an argument that may not have explicit references, Person B rebuttals with explicit references, and Person A responds by instructing Person B to go look up their own references for Person A's own argument.
Reminds me of the "All Birds are Cats" sketch by Clarke and Dave: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eIl1VuGTk3g (Relevant bit starts at 51s)
Reminds me of the "All Birds are Cats" sketch by Clarke and Dave: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eIl1VuGTk3g (Relevant bit starts at 51s)
[deleted]
No, rockets have not proven their reliability. Reliability is something that gets developed through volume of operations combined with a safety and feedback procedure that slowly catches ever rarer problems. And then gets proven through an even larger volume of successes. Airplanes have gone through that learning curve, rockets have not.
There have been around 6000 orbital launches, in total. That's across all countries, all companies, and all time. This is simply insufficient volume to learn how to do it safely. When airplanes were at a similar level of maturity they crashed regularly for every reason from mechanical failure to the fact that people didn't know how to fly into a cloud and not fall out of the sky. (It turns out that in about 15 minutes the inner ear gets confused and you're almost certainly trapped in a spiral if you don't have the right instruments.)
Judging from their public comments, SpaceX is hoping to get 3 launches per day from each Starship, and is hoping to produce hundreds of starships per year. Which means that after a few years, they intend to get to more orbital launches per day than we have had orbital launches in all of human history.
If they do so, there is every reason to believe that they will learn how to make rockets safer. Not by a factor of 5 or 10 because they have good engineers. But to the level of, say, car travel. Because they will develop the volume of operations that will let them find the things that go wrong one flight out of 10,000.
(It will take rockets a long time to get to the volume of operations that enables them to match airplanes. But in the long run there is no reason that rockets can't become that good.)
There have been around 6000 orbital launches, in total. That's across all countries, all companies, and all time. This is simply insufficient volume to learn how to do it safely. When airplanes were at a similar level of maturity they crashed regularly for every reason from mechanical failure to the fact that people didn't know how to fly into a cloud and not fall out of the sky. (It turns out that in about 15 minutes the inner ear gets confused and you're almost certainly trapped in a spiral if you don't have the right instruments.)
Judging from their public comments, SpaceX is hoping to get 3 launches per day from each Starship, and is hoping to produce hundreds of starships per year. Which means that after a few years, they intend to get to more orbital launches per day than we have had orbital launches in all of human history.
If they do so, there is every reason to believe that they will learn how to make rockets safer. Not by a factor of 5 or 10 because they have good engineers. But to the level of, say, car travel. Because they will develop the volume of operations that will let them find the things that go wrong one flight out of 10,000.
(It will take rockets a long time to get to the volume of operations that enables them to match airplanes. But in the long run there is no reason that rockets can't become that good.)
> (It will take rockets a long time to get to the volume of operations that enables them to match airplanes. But in the long run there is no reason that rockets can't become that good.)
You know, I've read about easy rocket transportation in science fiction for decades. I'm reading _The Man in the High Castle_ to my son now, and it's an example of this.
But I honestly have trouble buying it, and I'd love if you could tell me why you believe it.
For one thing, it will take ages. I'm having trouble finding good numbers, but I think a reasonable SWAG is that there have been on the order of 100 million airplane flights in human history. Rockets have decades of catchup.
And rockets have an inherently worse failure mode. Many airplanes that fail during flight can still land. I don't think this is true of rockets. Failures are vastly more likely to be catastrophic. Is it possible to ameliorate this at all?
You know, I've read about easy rocket transportation in science fiction for decades. I'm reading _The Man in the High Castle_ to my son now, and it's an example of this.
But I honestly have trouble buying it, and I'd love if you could tell me why you believe it.
For one thing, it will take ages. I'm having trouble finding good numbers, but I think a reasonable SWAG is that there have been on the order of 100 million airplane flights in human history. Rockets have decades of catchup.
And rockets have an inherently worse failure mode. Many airplanes that fail during flight can still land. I don't think this is true of rockets. Failures are vastly more likely to be catastrophic. Is it possible to ameliorate this at all?
We have had commercial flights for 80 years. We have had commercial rockets for 0 years.
The same arguments could've been made for train travel against planes at first. In my opinion, rockets are likely safer than planes in a non-fuel incident since they are built to have parachutes and other safety devices built in from the beginning beyond just gliding with the hopes rudders and flaps aren't affected.
Below a few thousand feet (if I recall), both rockets and planes have similar risks in my opinion. The most deadly planes crashes are in the first or last few minutes of the flight when they have the least altitude and speed to figure out a plan; similarly, if an incident occurs with a rocket in the first 90 seconds, there is a good chance of high fatalities.
Maybe I would argue that rockets _could_ be safer since they will spend less time in this dangerous altitude but I am neither an aerospace engineer nor a rocket scientist.
The same arguments could've been made for train travel against planes at first. In my opinion, rockets are likely safer than planes in a non-fuel incident since they are built to have parachutes and other safety devices built in from the beginning beyond just gliding with the hopes rudders and flaps aren't affected.
Below a few thousand feet (if I recall), both rockets and planes have similar risks in my opinion. The most deadly planes crashes are in the first or last few minutes of the flight when they have the least altitude and speed to figure out a plan; similarly, if an incident occurs with a rocket in the first 90 seconds, there is a good chance of high fatalities.
Maybe I would argue that rockets _could_ be safer since they will spend less time in this dangerous altitude but I am neither an aerospace engineer nor a rocket scientist.
Fundamentally with a machine, if it goes right it works. It is just a question of making sure that it goes right often enough. Planes have the advantage that there are more ways for them to fix things that go wrong. Rockets have the advantage of being simpler so less can go wrong. If we had equal experience in both, it isn't obvious which would be safer.
And yes, it is possible to make rockets safer. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Launch_escape_system for one of the ways. But there are limits. If you're next to something that decides to explode, that explosion is a problem.
And yes, it is possible to make rockets safer. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Launch_escape_system for one of the ways. But there are limits. If you're next to something that decides to explode, that explosion is a problem.
> Judging from their public comments, SpaceX is hoping to get 3 launches per day from each Starship, and is hoping to produce hundreds of starships per year. Which means that after a few years, they intend to get to more orbital launches per day than we have had orbital launches in all of human history.
This sort of talk has always seemed to be really infeasible to the point of being nonsensical. What could possibly drive the need for 6000 orbital launches per day? Where are the fuel resources going to come from?
This sort of pie-in-the-sky thinking I don't find motivating at all, I just find it to be so excessive that I have no choice but to immediately dismiss it.
The double-standard with eco-consciousness gets me too. Green cars, green home power, green everything... but 6000 orbital launches per day. What?
I'm not trying to be a SpaceX hater - although I admit to being very sick of the Musk fanboyism - I just genuinely don't understand where these claims are coming from.
This sort of talk has always seemed to be really infeasible to the point of being nonsensical. What could possibly drive the need for 6000 orbital launches per day? Where are the fuel resources going to come from?
This sort of pie-in-the-sky thinking I don't find motivating at all, I just find it to be so excessive that I have no choice but to immediately dismiss it.
The double-standard with eco-consciousness gets me too. Green cars, green home power, green everything... but 6000 orbital launches per day. What?
I'm not trying to be a SpaceX hater - although I admit to being very sick of the Musk fanboyism - I just genuinely don't understand where these claims are coming from.
SpaceX is operating on the theory that if you build it, they will come.
That said, rapid delivery of materials from one spot on Earth to another is inherently valuable. I'm sure that most of their flights will actually be suborbital instead. As in point to point travel between two places on Earth. The ability to do transcontinental trips in an average of 30 minutes is of interest to a lot of people, and doing so with physical packages is acceptable at higher risk than doing so with humans.
That said, rapid delivery of materials from one spot on Earth to another is inherently valuable. I'm sure that most of their flights will actually be suborbital instead. As in point to point travel between two places on Earth. The ability to do transcontinental trips in an average of 30 minutes is of interest to a lot of people, and doing so with physical packages is acceptable at higher risk than doing so with humans.
For as much environmental good as Tesla has done with pushing forwards electric cars, moronic schemes like this would totally wipe away the gains in 6 months.
The tiny amount of work being accomplished for the ludicrous amount of fuel being used is just silly.
The tiny amount of work being accomplished for the ludicrous amount of fuel being used is just silly.
If anyone wants some insights into rocket pollution: https://everydayastronaut.com/rocket-pollution/
Even compares Starship and airplane.
Even compares Starship and airplane.
Three to six times worse, ouch.
Also, the article is full of baloney, like assuming rocket fuel will be made using renewable energy - it won't, because it's magnitudes cheaper to just extract it from fossil fuels, and if it was viable you could do the same for airplanes, but at an even lower cost.
Also, the article is full of baloney, like assuming rocket fuel will be made using renewable energy - it won't, because it's magnitudes cheaper to just extract it from fossil fuels, and if it was viable you could do the same for airplanes, but at an even lower cost.
Actually, I wonder how it compares when you consider 12 hours of fighting the air resistance versus a sub orbital hop covering the same distance in 30 minutes with only a couple minutes of draggy atmospheric flight time.
Also the methane used by Starship could be synthetised possibly used captured CO2 if you had enough power available for that.
Also the methane used by Starship could be synthetised possibly used captured CO2 if you had enough power available for that.
Depends on your definition of "better", if you mean quicker, then sure. The Concorde was also quicker, but it was nonetheless not successful. People typically make decisions on a cost/benefit basis whenever they can, and the cost of going fast is very high ... both monetarily and otherwise.
This issue isn't about lack of innovation, if anything the inverse: Lack of safety during innovation.
I had a thought the other day that if Musk got in a time machine with a pile of money, how far back in time could he go and still build SpaceX?
SpaceX can only do what they do because there is no human pilot on those test flights. I know that the Navy pilots argued and argued that you need a human on board but is that really true, or did that end up destroying the space program by making the cost of failure so impossibly high?
SpaceX can only do what they do because there is no human pilot on those test flights. I know that the Navy pilots argued and argued that you need a human on board but is that really true, or did that end up destroying the space program by making the cost of failure so impossibly high?
The space race of the 60s had plenty of unmanned tests before they started manning them. Humans were not the first Earth creatures in space. If Musk wanted to go back further than maybe the 70s or 80s, his issues would have been:
1. the science hadn't been fully developed ahead of time
2. he would have had a harder time getting other people on board with his idea -- he would have been labelled a complete crackpot
3. governments may have not have been so willing to allow him to do it
1. the science hadn't been fully developed ahead of time
2. he would have had a harder time getting other people on board with his idea -- he would have been labelled a complete crackpot
3. governments may have not have been so willing to allow him to do it
The issue is really actually landing rockets vertically without humans. NASA had the concept of reusable rockets that landed vertically, but didn't action it because landing without a human didn't seem feasible.
So pretty much, not before computers were good enough to autonomously land, so at best the 2000s.
So pretty much, not before computers were good enough to autonomously land, so at best the 2000s.
1993?
Friction stir welding was invented in 1991. Full flow staged combustion was tried out in the 1960s. GPS was available 1993. Not sure how much computing power it needs.
SpaceX was founded in 2002.
Friction stir welding was invented in 1991. Full flow staged combustion was tried out in the 1960s. GPS was available 1993. Not sure how much computing power it needs.
SpaceX was founded in 2002.
Looks like there may have been an inflection point for CAD and CNC hardware around 1990 as well that might have informed the sort of iterative process that his team likes to use.
They had no pilot on board for most of the equivalent. Ariane had no pilot on board either for the whole program.
So no. That is not the reason. Try again.
So no. That is not the reason. Try again.
I already have anxiety when my airliner takes off. I think if I started hearing "T minus 10, 9 ..." every time I traveled internationally I would need to have a pacemaker installed.
Would the starship do the belly flop maneuver for passenger flights? That part would scare me the most.. playing chicken with the ground and hoping the engines fire up well and you don't just pancake and explode.
I don't think the design has any other choice. I have heard that since it is large and it is a 90 degree turn it could be worked out so you go from falling back first to sitting upon landing. I think that an escape system would be fitted to the passenger capsule as in Falcon 9 [1]
[1]: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mhrkdHshb3E
[1]: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mhrkdHshb3E
Lol. Let's not bring Musk's fantasies into this! The Starship as a competitor to long haul flights is about as ludicrous as the Hyperloop as a competitor to short haul flights. It's all Musk bullshitting.
Tangent, but i just had this discussion. The hyperloop, despite all the flaws, is overall a good idea. And unlike fusion and supraconductivity at 250+K, the flaws are actually solvables! I thought i couldn't be done before 2070 or something, but someone just recently showed me the flwas left, the tech we have at teh moment, and he convinced me that a commercial Hyperloop could be available on SOME short haul flight before 2040.
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There is no way to salvage the hyperloop.
Do you know what is the actual limiting factor in train speed? It's not energy, or friction - we can make really fast trains. No, the limiting factor is radius of curvature needed to maintain confort while turning.
Otherwise, we can already make maglev trains that go 600+km/h, for cheaper than the hyperloop, and without the awful design flaws. But you'd need to destroy a lot of property to do so, so pretty much no one is interested outside of China.
Do you know what is the actual limiting factor in train speed? It's not energy, or friction - we can make really fast trains. No, the limiting factor is radius of curvature needed to maintain confort while turning.
Otherwise, we can already make maglev trains that go 600+km/h, for cheaper than the hyperloop, and without the awful design flaws. But you'd need to destroy a lot of property to do so, so pretty much no one is interested outside of China.
China is not doing maglev either. The only long-distance maglev line actually under construction in the entire world is the Chuo Shinkansen in Japan, and to avoid the property-destruction issue that requires digging 256 km (!!!) of tunnels between Tokyo and Nagoya.
Indeed, there is no long distance maglev line in China, but there are rumors and state funded development in long distance maglev.
> The hyperloop, despite all the flaws, is overall a good idea.
No. Its flaws make the vacuum tunnel version entirely unfeasible. Therefore not a good idea. The non-vacuum version is just a tunnel – Musk doesn't get to call that a "Hyperloop" just because he put Teslas in it.
> the flaws are actually solvables
No. But we don't have to have that debate. We can just sit back, and relax, and our lord and savior Elon Musk will solve the solvables. Then I promise to be the first in line to sing his praises and ride the Hyperloop when the problems are solved. (Hint: they won't be).
Can we please stop praising Musk for things he says he will do? Why does this man get to promise all kinds of shit, and harvest the praise immediately?
No. Its flaws make the vacuum tunnel version entirely unfeasible. Therefore not a good idea. The non-vacuum version is just a tunnel – Musk doesn't get to call that a "Hyperloop" just because he put Teslas in it.
> the flaws are actually solvables
No. But we don't have to have that debate. We can just sit back, and relax, and our lord and savior Elon Musk will solve the solvables. Then I promise to be the first in line to sing his praises and ride the Hyperloop when the problems are solved. (Hint: they won't be).
Can we please stop praising Musk for things he says he will do? Why does this man get to promise all kinds of shit, and harvest the praise immediately?
No one really wants Musk to build tunnels below their homes and putting in a HyperLoop above ground to anywhere would be near impossible as well. So no HyperLoop. Musk should take the idea to China they would do it, maybe Mexico above ground.
I want him to build one under my home. As long as he pays me.
No. Unless you mean the latest version, which is essentially Teslas in ordinary tunnels. Then, sure. But what's new? I've been in a Tesla in a tunnel before. That's not something Musk can just call Hyperloop.
For some people, time is worth a lot of money, even enough money to make a trip across space worthwile. Not to mention selling the "experience" of no/low gravity, or the opportunity for extremely time critical transports (organs, spare parts for factories).
At some point humanity will have to come to the conclusion that "money" and "experiences" are worth nothing if the planet is destroyed. I don't give a damn if Bezos wants to save 3 hours of his life or if some random dude has a hard on for Musk
Even if the risk of death is 1/1000 it wouldn't be worth it to save 12-20 hours.
Your email is not in your profile. I will bet.
I keep wondering how much longer Mitsubishi Heavy Industries is gonna keep making airplane parts for other people before they decide to stop going white label on anything bigger than a regional jet.
That would be an extremely hard sell. Look at Bombardier. They built the CS300. Once it started to gain any traction, it was trade bombed by the US government. The CS300 is now the Airbus A220.
Well let's wait and see if they can actually deliver the regional jet first. It's delays have been huge and are ongoing.
I had to fly to get some official paperwork done, they tried to put me on a 737Max, fortunately they changed my flight at no cost
"The wake up call of the Max was something that told them that all was not right."
What exactly was the nature of this ""The wake up call"?
What exactly was the nature of this ""The wake up call"?
Here are gruesome, firsthand details about production and management problems with the 737NG in a documentary from Al Jazeera.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IaWdEtANi-0
The following summary is my own:
The whole story is shown in the first seconds: three aircraft encountering more force than a usual landing (such as a runway overrun). All three fuselages breaking into three parts in exactly the same two places! All three aircraft exactly eight years old.
Aluminum members called chords run the length of the fuselage and around the circumference to make up the fuselage structure. The chords are joined to each other and to reinforcing surrounds for large openings like doors.
Poorly fitting chords and bear plates around openings were redrilled when mounting holes were misplaced, reshaped and pounded with hammers in order to mate them. This weakened of the structure to below design margins. In addition excessive metal fatigue due to hand processing led to accelerated corrosion, likely causing structural failure in three eight-year-old NG aircraft that broke up on landing. The aircraft were engineered to survive an emergency landing intact and were designed for 30-year airframe life.
More to the story as the government colluded with Boeing to cover these deficiencies and frustrate the actions (eventually lawsuits) by a team of whistleblowers.
Basically, the subcontractor agreed to use computer controlled manufacturing processes, then did 90% of the work by hand. The resulting substandard parts were beaten into shape on Boeing's production line.
Watching this, I can better understand a recent story on local TV about developments in the US airline industry. They forecast that many companies will using the the opportunity of the pandemic to retire older aircraft.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IaWdEtANi-0
The following summary is my own:
The whole story is shown in the first seconds: three aircraft encountering more force than a usual landing (such as a runway overrun). All three fuselages breaking into three parts in exactly the same two places! All three aircraft exactly eight years old.
Aluminum members called chords run the length of the fuselage and around the circumference to make up the fuselage structure. The chords are joined to each other and to reinforcing surrounds for large openings like doors.
Poorly fitting chords and bear plates around openings were redrilled when mounting holes were misplaced, reshaped and pounded with hammers in order to mate them. This weakened of the structure to below design margins. In addition excessive metal fatigue due to hand processing led to accelerated corrosion, likely causing structural failure in three eight-year-old NG aircraft that broke up on landing. The aircraft were engineered to survive an emergency landing intact and were designed for 30-year airframe life.
More to the story as the government colluded with Boeing to cover these deficiencies and frustrate the actions (eventually lawsuits) by a team of whistleblowers.
Basically, the subcontractor agreed to use computer controlled manufacturing processes, then did 90% of the work by hand. The resulting substandard parts were beaten into shape on Boeing's production line.
Watching this, I can better understand a recent story on local TV about developments in the US airline industry. They forecast that many companies will using the the opportunity of the pandemic to retire older aircraft.
Small Nit. Airplane expected life is normally rated in pressurization cycles, not years. It is how many times it takes off to normal flight and lands that really matter most for airframe lifetime so if the plane was flown more cycles than average, an 8 year life could be easily be the expected max.
The source in this video, a former FAA inspector, gave figures in years rather than pressurization cycles.
Probably an estimate for non-technical audiences
A single aisle aircraft will do around 2-6 cycles per day.
Of course what makes aircraft fly is money so there are major overhauls needed to keep them flying after a certain number of cycles (a D check)
A single aisle aircraft will do around 2-6 cycles per day.
Of course what makes aircraft fly is money so there are major overhauls needed to keep them flying after a certain number of cycles (a D check)
What is the maximum number of cycles, then?
First link on google. ~75,000 flights depending on model.
https://www.boeing.com/commercial/aeromagazine/articles/2012...
https://www.boeing.com/commercial/aeromagazine/articles/2012...
737NG is not MAX. 737NG was launched in ‘97. This was before the MD merger was completed.
The internal problems may be shared.
Also the whistleblower efforts to get problems recognized continued for a decade.
The article/interview also specifically alleges that the problems with Boeing aren’t restricted to one single airplane model, but are at the board level. If the above is true (and I have no reason to doubt it), it would be another example of systemic issues at the company. Which is sad to see, and if so, it’s a problem that needs to be addressed.
I’ve read somewhere that this all started with the McDonnel-Douglas merger. Boeing used to be an engineering company, but the suits took over after the merge to maximize profit - if a couple hundred innocent people die, you gotta break some eggs right? They probably fly LearJet themselves
The phrase I heard somewhere was that when Boeing bought McDonnel-Douglas, what ended up happening was that MD acquired Boeing and convinced Boeing to pay for it. I don’t remember where I read that, but it stuck with me. Maybe we read it in the same place :).
The bit about retiring older aircraft is not really due to safety.
It is because each generation of aircraft keeps getting vastly more fuel efficient, and fuel makes up most of the cost of flying.
It is because each generation of aircraft keeps getting vastly more fuel efficient, and fuel makes up most of the cost of flying.
The 737MAX burns 15% less fuel than the 737, which is the entire reason for building the MAX.
Due mostly to the new engines, I presume?
From the Wikipedia:
> In mid-2011, one design objective was matching fuel burn of the 737 MAX to that of the Airbus A320neo's 15% fuel-burn advantage. The initial 737 Max reduction was 10–12%; it was later enhanced to 14.5%. The fan was widened from 61 in (150 cm) to 69.4 in (176 cm) by raising the nose gear and placing the engine higher and forward. The split winglet added 1–1.5% fuel burn reduction, a re-lofted tail cone added an additional 1% reduction. Electronically controlling the bleed air system improved efficiency. The new engine casings included chevrons, similar to those of the Boeing 787, which also helped to reduce engine noise.[100]
But yes, mostly the engines.
> In mid-2011, one design objective was matching fuel burn of the 737 MAX to that of the Airbus A320neo's 15% fuel-burn advantage. The initial 737 Max reduction was 10–12%; it was later enhanced to 14.5%. The fan was widened from 61 in (150 cm) to 69.4 in (176 cm) by raising the nose gear and placing the engine higher and forward. The split winglet added 1–1.5% fuel burn reduction, a re-lofted tail cone added an additional 1% reduction. Electronically controlling the bleed air system improved efficiency. The new engine casings included chevrons, similar to those of the Boeing 787, which also helped to reduce engine noise.[100]
But yes, mostly the engines.
Watched the first 20 minutes, this is surreal. Critical fuselage parts didn't fit together because workers at the subcontractor (Ducommun) traced a template with magic marker onto the material and cut and drilled the part by hand. Officially, the parts were manufactured by high precision CNC machinery with extremely little tolerances. At Boeing, if drill holes didn't match up in parts A and B, workers were told to just put the parts together and re-drill the hole in part B through the hole in part A, or hammer the parts into place. Internal Boeing investigators who found out and documented the issues were threatened to be sued if they spoke up.
I watched about 40 minutes.
The two investigators were later fired, after (they imply) the US government leaked their identities to Boeing.
I wonder if they thought to report this to the European aviation regulator, after getting nowhere in the US.
The two investigators were later fired, after (they imply) the US government leaked their identities to Boeing.
I wonder if they thought to report this to the European aviation regulator, after getting nowhere in the US.
At this point you Whistleblow to Airbus, they'll find a way to make it known, and make it stop.
You'll be better off contacting the EASA. A competitor will not want to meddle in this kind of topics, nor should they have to.
Airbus will do nothing, they are not interested in harming Boeing as they would suffer retaliation from US government
Wasn’t this the exact problem with the 787? Particularly in Boeing’s factory in the carolinas which is the only plant producing the 787?
I’m definitely not flying the 737MAX, and this seriously makes me question the 787 as well as 737NG or in fact Boeing as a whole.
I’m definitely not flying the 737MAX, and this seriously makes me question the 787 as well as 737NG or in fact Boeing as a whole.
According to this newer documentation, many workers of the South Carolina plant would never fly a 787. Because they know how they are being made.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rvkEpstd9os
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rvkEpstd9os
I'm not that surprised that some suppliers could compromise quality under pressure. But I'm very surprised Boeing's supply chain quality and design office could let such a part end up in production.
I have experience in a different large aviation company, and this doesn't match my experience at all in the industry. I've seen parts refused because the label was stamped instead of printed like they used to. To make its way to production, the kind of defect we're talking about would need to be approved by an engineering specialist with FAA delegation. And in my experience these people don't sign their name on anything they remotely don't like, and they have means to escalate to the authorities in case of any issue.
I have experience in a different large aviation company, and this doesn't match my experience at all in the industry. I've seen parts refused because the label was stamped instead of printed like they used to. To make its way to production, the kind of defect we're talking about would need to be approved by an engineering specialist with FAA delegation. And in my experience these people don't sign their name on anything they remotely don't like, and they have means to escalate to the authorities in case of any issue.
As others have noted... Utterly shocking and terrifying documentary. It shows criminal activity and I wonder why those involved aren't in jail.
I'm half-way through this documentary right now, per your request, and it's fascinating. Thanks for the recommendation!
Watched the entire video. A greatly dispiriting example of regulatory capture. Not only does Boeing appear to own the FAA, it's bought off the DoJ as well. Thank you for posting the video link.
That video is from 2010. Did the predicted failures of more 737NG's ever happen?
DISCLAIMER: I haven't seen the full video yet but a quick search brings up recent issues with 737NG [1] [2]
Especially [2] is crazy and I'm quoting "airlines must inspect any Boeing 737NG aircraft that have been parked for more than a week for corrosion of engine bleed air valves"
more than a week ? is this acceptable?
[1] https://eu.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2019/09/29/boeing-...
[2] https://www.flightglobal.com/airframers/corrosion-can-prompt...
more than a week ? is this acceptable?
[1] https://eu.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2019/09/29/boeing-...
[2] https://www.flightglobal.com/airframers/corrosion-can-prompt...
IIRC most aircraft will require a series of inspections on parts if parked for a week. Most aircraft are built to be flown with little to no interruptions (other than for maintenance).
From what I recall, if your aircraft sits on the ground for a month, you need quite a few more intensive inspections to make sure it's still flight ready.
Aircraft will rarely park for a week unattended, the only reason they would be is a refit or major maintenance. Every hour an aircraft isn't in the air costs the airline A LOT of money.
From what I recall, if your aircraft sits on the ground for a month, you need quite a few more intensive inspections to make sure it's still flight ready.
Aircraft will rarely park for a week unattended, the only reason they would be is a refit or major maintenance. Every hour an aircraft isn't in the air costs the airline A LOT of money.
It is alarming, but, in the three examples of plane crashes the planes all overshot the runway. I don't know what the expectations are in those cases. Is it unreasonable to expect nothing to fail?
Just like JIT, the quest for greater efficiency makes systems less robust. Were these failures anticipated due to engineering tradeoffs or due to the manufacturing issues?
Just like JIT, the quest for greater efficiency makes systems less robust. Were these failures anticipated due to engineering tradeoffs or due to the manufacturing issues?
Yes. Planes are designed and tested to not fail in dangerous scenarios, like overshooting the runway, having to abort takeoff at the last moment, an engine exploding, etc. The airplane falling apart is unexpected
Boeing has "culture" problems like a mangy stray dog has a flea problem. The dog and Boeing also have in common that both are blissfully unaware of their problems. However unlike Boeing, the dog does not blame imaginary ghosts of the past for its fleas.
There is a notion that Boeing is (was) a company with an insanely great engineering culture. Their engineers lived in an idyllic culture of building amazing products while always putting public safety first. This great culture suffered under the merger with McDonnell Douglas [1], [2], [3]. This narrative further says that McDonnell had a mercenary profits at all cost management culture which infected the management of the combined entity. However Boeing's engineers tried to preserve their engineering ethos while living under this oppressive regime and continued building great and safe products.
This argument is frequently put forth by ex-Boeing engineers. This is a naked apologia for Boeing's behavior which killed 346 people and endangered the lives of 1000s more and destroyed jobs/wealth around the world.
So strong is the apologists conviction in the purity of Boeing's engineering culture that they ignore the fact that thousands of engineers worked on the 737 Max. Not a single engineer raised issues with the engineering of the aircraft. Not a single engineer wrote a blistering memo calling out its failing or quit in protest. They were all held in thrall, paralyzed and forced to go against their ethics, professionalism, decency by the power of this unholy culture forced upon them by McDonnell Douglas!
Eventually, all stellar organizations, public or private, become complacent (e.g. Israeli Intelligence Failure, 1973, NASA by the 1980s). Boeing made an unstable plane which it then stablized with a dangerous MCAS to get it to market fast. They then topped it off by making the MCAS rely on a single sensor. They then made the dual-sensor an upgrade. An undergraduate engineering student with a basic course on probability can see that this is tailor-made for disaster. Boeing made an essential safety feature an upgrade!! But wait there is more. They then proceeded to hide this monstrosity from every regulator and airline on the planet. They insisted that the plane was no different in every aspect of its flight behavior than its predecessor which was over 30 years old and did not require additional safety training.
Boeing had become so criminally blatant that the head of airline training at Lion Air inquired about extra training for the 737 Max and Boeing's test engineers rebuffed him. After the Lion Air crash, Boeing proceeded to cast aspersion on the safety practices of Lion Air. Lion Air had a spotty safety record in the past. In this case it was Boeing that rebuffed their requests for additional training because it would set a precedent for other airlines in SE Asia. When that lack of training became a factor in the crash during the investigation, Boeing proceeded to blame Lion Air. Chutzpah!
Transcripts of messages released during the investigation show how Boeing employees worked in unison to ensure no extra simulator training was required. Folks, this is not a great engineering culture obsessed with safety but rather an organization trying to get away with as much as it can and then indulging in a coverup.
We need to start accepting that whatever stellar engineering culture existed at Boeing is dead. We as a society need to stop scapegoating imaginary forces in the past and giving Boeing engineers a pass.
Strong regulation is necessary to ensure the safety of Boeing Products.
[1] https://qz.com/1776080/how-the-mcdonnell-douglas-boeing-merg...
[2] https://fortune.com/longform/boeing-737-max-crisis-sharehold...
[3] https://www.perell.com/blog/boeing-737-max
There is a notion that Boeing is (was) a company with an insanely great engineering culture. Their engineers lived in an idyllic culture of building amazing products while always putting public safety first. This great culture suffered under the merger with McDonnell Douglas [1], [2], [3]. This narrative further says that McDonnell had a mercenary profits at all cost management culture which infected the management of the combined entity. However Boeing's engineers tried to preserve their engineering ethos while living under this oppressive regime and continued building great and safe products.
This argument is frequently put forth by ex-Boeing engineers. This is a naked apologia for Boeing's behavior which killed 346 people and endangered the lives of 1000s more and destroyed jobs/wealth around the world.
So strong is the apologists conviction in the purity of Boeing's engineering culture that they ignore the fact that thousands of engineers worked on the 737 Max. Not a single engineer raised issues with the engineering of the aircraft. Not a single engineer wrote a blistering memo calling out its failing or quit in protest. They were all held in thrall, paralyzed and forced to go against their ethics, professionalism, decency by the power of this unholy culture forced upon them by McDonnell Douglas!
Eventually, all stellar organizations, public or private, become complacent (e.g. Israeli Intelligence Failure, 1973, NASA by the 1980s). Boeing made an unstable plane which it then stablized with a dangerous MCAS to get it to market fast. They then topped it off by making the MCAS rely on a single sensor. They then made the dual-sensor an upgrade. An undergraduate engineering student with a basic course on probability can see that this is tailor-made for disaster. Boeing made an essential safety feature an upgrade!! But wait there is more. They then proceeded to hide this monstrosity from every regulator and airline on the planet. They insisted that the plane was no different in every aspect of its flight behavior than its predecessor which was over 30 years old and did not require additional safety training.
Boeing had become so criminally blatant that the head of airline training at Lion Air inquired about extra training for the 737 Max and Boeing's test engineers rebuffed him. After the Lion Air crash, Boeing proceeded to cast aspersion on the safety practices of Lion Air. Lion Air had a spotty safety record in the past. In this case it was Boeing that rebuffed their requests for additional training because it would set a precedent for other airlines in SE Asia. When that lack of training became a factor in the crash during the investigation, Boeing proceeded to blame Lion Air. Chutzpah!
Transcripts of messages released during the investigation show how Boeing employees worked in unison to ensure no extra simulator training was required. Folks, this is not a great engineering culture obsessed with safety but rather an organization trying to get away with as much as it can and then indulging in a coverup.
We need to start accepting that whatever stellar engineering culture existed at Boeing is dead. We as a society need to stop scapegoating imaginary forces in the past and giving Boeing engineers a pass.
Strong regulation is necessary to ensure the safety of Boeing Products.
[1] https://qz.com/1776080/how-the-mcdonnell-douglas-boeing-merg...
[2] https://fortune.com/longform/boeing-737-max-crisis-sharehold...
[3] https://www.perell.com/blog/boeing-737-max
I may have misunderstood you but your post seems to be saying "People say Boeing had a great engineering culture until the McDonnell Douglas merge but Boeing built the 737 Max and look how bad that is ?".
The McDonnell Douglas merger occurred in 1997, the 737 Max programme wasn't started until 2011. So if people say that the merger caused a decline in engineering standards that would seem to be consistent with 737 Max being badly executed ?
The McDonnell Douglas merger occurred in 1997, the 737 Max programme wasn't started until 2011. So if people say that the merger caused a decline in engineering standards that would seem to be consistent with 737 Max being badly executed ?
Do you see the problem with that argument that "the McDonnell merger was the root of all evil in the current Boeing"?
- First there is no way to falsify that assertion. It is completely unfalsifiable and unscientific.
- Second, there is no one from McDonnell here to defend them. This assertion is at best innuendo and at worst defamatory and tars McDonnell unfairly.
- Let's say that the merger was the cause of all the evil. So what? Really, so what. The shareholders and employees of the combined entity have reaped the benefit of the merger for two decades.
I don't care if they merged with McDonnell or McDonald or McSorely's. The current Boeing inflicted this disaster on us. Lets hold them accountable and dispense with the fantastical stories of some company they merged with 20 years ago which did them in.
- First there is no way to falsify that assertion. It is completely unfalsifiable and unscientific.
- Second, there is no one from McDonnell here to defend them. This assertion is at best innuendo and at worst defamatory and tars McDonnell unfairly.
- Let's say that the merger was the cause of all the evil. So what? Really, so what. The shareholders and employees of the combined entity have reaped the benefit of the merger for two decades.
I don't care if they merged with McDonnell or McDonald or McSorely's. The current Boeing inflicted this disaster on us. Lets hold them accountable and dispense with the fantastical stories of some company they merged with 20 years ago which did them in.
The former McDonnell Douglas and Boeing CEO couldn't have been any more clear when he stated, "When people say I changed the culture of Boeing, that was the intent, so that it's run like a business rather than a great engineering firm." https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/11/how-boeing...
I don't think there's any serious dispute (now or then) that McDonnell Douglas was a financial engineering company first and foremost, not an engineering company. Likewise, leading into the merger Boeing's reputation as an engineering-first company was widely accepted. But as I mention elsethread, claims that McDonnell Douglas corrupted Boeing are problematic. Top Boeing leadership had already made their choice to transform the culture before the merger; the merger was the execution.
I don't think there's any serious dispute (now or then) that McDonnell Douglas was a financial engineering company first and foremost, not an engineering company. Likewise, leading into the merger Boeing's reputation as an engineering-first company was widely accepted. But as I mention elsethread, claims that McDonnell Douglas corrupted Boeing are problematic. Top Boeing leadership had already made their choice to transform the culture before the merger; the merger was the execution.
Valid point. Root cause attribution is still problematic.
My problem with the narrative is two fold:
[1] Assigning the "cause" of the 737Max fiasco to culture instead of plain hubris, complacency, etc.
[2] Even if [1] is true, attributing the culture shift to the McDoug merger. There is simply no way to test/falsify it. It becomes purely a narrative.
Even if McDoug was a financial engineering company first and foremost where is the counterfactual that Boeing would not have arrived here anyways?
Are there other great engineering organizations that have arrived in a dysfunctional place without an infusion of alien culture. Look at NASA, what was the financial engineering culture that enforced a launch at any cost mindset?
McDoug culture as the culprit in the 737Max disaster is a fanciful narrative, an adult version of the tooth fairy and santa claus.
Fanciful narratives are fine but here they are being used to exonerate Boeing by blame shifting.
My problem with the narrative is two fold:
[1] Assigning the "cause" of the 737Max fiasco to culture instead of plain hubris, complacency, etc.
[2] Even if [1] is true, attributing the culture shift to the McDoug merger. There is simply no way to test/falsify it. It becomes purely a narrative.
Even if McDoug was a financial engineering company first and foremost where is the counterfactual that Boeing would not have arrived here anyways?
Are there other great engineering organizations that have arrived in a dysfunctional place without an infusion of alien culture. Look at NASA, what was the financial engineering culture that enforced a launch at any cost mindset?
McDoug culture as the culprit in the 737Max disaster is a fanciful narrative, an adult version of the tooth fairy and santa claus.
Fanciful narratives are fine but here they are being used to exonerate Boeing by blame shifting.
> First there is no way to falsify that assertion. It is completely unfalsifiable and unscientific.
Sure there is. If all the management at Boeing stayed in charge, there would be no MD executives and management to have tarnished Boeing's culture. But that's not what happened. MD DID take over management and DID change the culture.
>Second, there is no one from McDonnell here to defend them. This assertion is at best innuendo and at worst defamatory and tars McDonnell unfairly.
Really? It was pretty widely known throughout the industry what MD's culture and management was like. There's nobody to "defend them" because they considered the behavior perfectly acceptable.
>Let's say that the merger was the cause of all the evil. So what? Really, so what. The shareholders and employees of the combined entity have reaped the benefit of the merger for two decades.
So... I would hope we as a species realize there are limits to profit at all cost and learn from it??
As for proof, all you need to do look back to the mid-90s. I remember what a mess MD was, it's not hard to research.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/1995/12/17/c...
Highlights include:
>All aerospace firms are cutting costs to match declining orders, but McDonnell Douglas does it with an unmatched aggression. It has shed 52 percent of its work force over the past seven years, dropping to 63,000 employees.
>Stonecipher defines one of his key roles as "making sure we employ not one person more than we absolutely need." He insists that company managers cut costs yearly, with "zero allowance for inflation."
Cutting costs to absolute 0 doesn't allow for a culture of quality and craftsmanship, period. Taking time and doing things right has excess spend by definition.
Sure there is. If all the management at Boeing stayed in charge, there would be no MD executives and management to have tarnished Boeing's culture. But that's not what happened. MD DID take over management and DID change the culture.
>Second, there is no one from McDonnell here to defend them. This assertion is at best innuendo and at worst defamatory and tars McDonnell unfairly.
Really? It was pretty widely known throughout the industry what MD's culture and management was like. There's nobody to "defend them" because they considered the behavior perfectly acceptable.
>Let's say that the merger was the cause of all the evil. So what? Really, so what. The shareholders and employees of the combined entity have reaped the benefit of the merger for two decades.
So... I would hope we as a species realize there are limits to profit at all cost and learn from it??
As for proof, all you need to do look back to the mid-90s. I remember what a mess MD was, it's not hard to research.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/1995/12/17/c...
Highlights include:
>All aerospace firms are cutting costs to match declining orders, but McDonnell Douglas does it with an unmatched aggression. It has shed 52 percent of its work force over the past seven years, dropping to 63,000 employees.
>Stonecipher defines one of his key roles as "making sure we employ not one person more than we absolutely need." He insists that company managers cut costs yearly, with "zero allowance for inflation."
Cutting costs to absolute 0 doesn't allow for a culture of quality and craftsmanship, period. Taking time and doing things right has excess spend by definition.
> Sure there is. If all the management at Boeing stayed in charge, there would be no MD executives and management to have tarnished Boeing's culture. But that's not what happened. MD DID take over management and DID change the culture.
The problem with this narrative is that Boeing CEO/President/Chairman Philip Condit knew precisely what he was doing when he sought the merger. The board had elevated him precisely to make a strategic move like that--in fact, to make that particular move. And most importantly the board knowingly chose the financial pitches of the McDonnell Douglas executives over the protests of the more risk-averse Boeing CFO Givans and his faction. Givans was pushed out shortly after the merger by Condit and the board, including original Boeing board members. (See https://archive.seattletimes.com/archive/?date=19980715&slug... Unfortunately I can't find some of the more informative contemporaneous accounts that explain it better.)
All of which is to say, Boeing's engineering-first culture was already on the way out before the merger. Yes, McDonnell Douglas executives ended up winning the power struggles, but that was Condit's and the board's plan from the get go. McDonnell Douglas was the vehicle, not the instigator. But top Boeing leadership didn't want too much spectacle because they needed to keep stringing along a handful of board members and major investors who were wary of the strategic and cultural shifts.
The problem with this narrative is that Boeing CEO/President/Chairman Philip Condit knew precisely what he was doing when he sought the merger. The board had elevated him precisely to make a strategic move like that--in fact, to make that particular move. And most importantly the board knowingly chose the financial pitches of the McDonnell Douglas executives over the protests of the more risk-averse Boeing CFO Givans and his faction. Givans was pushed out shortly after the merger by Condit and the board, including original Boeing board members. (See https://archive.seattletimes.com/archive/?date=19980715&slug... Unfortunately I can't find some of the more informative contemporaneous accounts that explain it better.)
All of which is to say, Boeing's engineering-first culture was already on the way out before the merger. Yes, McDonnell Douglas executives ended up winning the power struggles, but that was Condit's and the board's plan from the get go. McDonnell Douglas was the vehicle, not the instigator. But top Boeing leadership didn't want too much spectacle because they needed to keep stringing along a handful of board members and major investors who were wary of the strategic and cultural shifts.
>"the McDonnell merger was the root of all evil in the current Boeing"...and more arguments on its irrelevance
The problem with doing as you say is ypu're cutting out the factors that led to the problem. Companies do not fail in a day except in the most spectacular circumstances. Culture death is a death of many cuts, just as a successful corporate culture is the outcome of concerted, consistent effort.
People in the presence of a good corporate culture don't generally make downright negligent, dangerous decisions. You need a dysfunctional culture to elevate those dangerous decisions to the "new, desirable status quo". Just look at investment banking or finance for examples of those by the boatload.
Quality culture requires Quality upkeep. If you set the incentives wrong, everything quickly goes downhill from there. I see it everywhere I go. Maintaining a quality first mindset is not natural at all. It is Hard. It requires accountability, it requires everyone chipping in and doing at times their own job, plus someone elses enough to cover those bad days. It requires vigilance, egolessness, and a drive to stop the whole bloody show rather than deliver a sub-par, unworkable product. It requires as close as you'll ever get to unity and clarity of purpose from top to bottom. Throw out any of that, and effort invested to desirable output ratio just balloons from there.
You had a Boeing competitor with a clear history of decision making that caused issues like MAX (DC-10, MD-11).
You had an unprecedented period of aerospace consolidation. You saw a turning over of the guard in a shining star of the space where the very people who worked there and still had family there calling out that the culture had changed for the worse.
>The relentless message: Shareholders would henceforth come first at Boeing. The important thing was not to get “overly focused on the box,” Hopkins said in a 2000 interview with Bloomberg. “The box”—the plane itself—“is obviously important, but customers are assuming the box is of great quality.” This was heresy to engineers, to whom the box was everything. The strike that year was formally over wages and benefits, but workers described it as a referendum on management.[1]
The engineering powerhouse, famous for building "the box" stopped caring about the building "the box". They pivoted to growth and financial performance at all costs.
>12a. Remove barriers that rob the hourly worker of his right to pride of workmanship. The responsibility of supervisors must be changed from sheer numbers to quality.[2]
>12b. Remove barriers that rob people in management and in engineering of their right to pride of workmanship. This means, inter alia, abolishment of the annual or merit rating and of management by objective.[2]
They did everything they could to union bust, damping the spirits and pride that workers brought to the job.
>End the practice of awarding business on the basis of price tag. Instead, minimize total cost. Move toward a single supplier for any one item, on a long-term relationship of loyalty and trust.[2]
They outsourced without regard for Quality of product or building loyalty and trust with suppliers.
>Boeing began putting more junior employees into the roles, and some employees believed that was because they’d be more willing to listen to managers and less likely to dig in their heels, Dickson says. “How long do you want to keep polishing that apple?” was a phrase managers often used with engineers who wanted to keep testing, he says.[1]
They skimped on training, and did everything possible to wring leniency out of their regulator. They penalized anyone who pointed out a Quality problem. These are not the hallmarks of a company that people point to as an example of quality culture, and the tipping point and timeframe from shift of incentives to long-term production of lackluster results is just about right.
These are not unscientific observations. They are clear as day. You had means, management swapout/changing of incentives, culture degradation; opportunity (merger); and motive (hello stock options)! You don't do any of the aforementioned and come out smelling like roses, let alone all at the same time. The finance first school of corporate management, is not, in fact, the same culture that blazed the path for ever safer skies. Even once an Engineer (Mullenberg) got bumped up to CEO eventually, he inherited a dysfunctional organization, stripped of it's safeguards by the severity of the cultural transformation that had already taken place, and that he was a part and parcel of. To be honest, I feel bad for the guy. If anything went wrong, it was that he didn't disrupt the place enough on turn over to see where the mold had started to grow.
[1] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2019-05-09/former-bo...
[2]https://deming.org/explore/fourteen-points/
It isn't about blaming ghosts. It's about acknowledging that as human beings, the institutions we establish are as much in a transient state of being, development, and growth as we ourselves are. The are the being, to which we were the cells and organelles.
Therefore, you have to take into account the devil in the details to ensure the same degradation or slipping is recognized for what it is and remediated the moment it rears its ugly head. To do anything else; to blind oneself to the way change propagates through human systems, is to doom the lot of us to making the same mistakes again.
You do you. However, as someone who dug into every detail of those investigations I could get my hands on at the time, down to running the math, looking up regulations, designs, blueprints, etc.? I saw enough of the warning signs to recognize the processes at work. Culture went down the tubes. It doesn't exonerate anyone involved necessarily, and yeah, more people should have spoke out. Maybe they'd have risked it if there was more competition in the sector? Maybe not. But we at least know a pattern to look for.
The problem with doing as you say is ypu're cutting out the factors that led to the problem. Companies do not fail in a day except in the most spectacular circumstances. Culture death is a death of many cuts, just as a successful corporate culture is the outcome of concerted, consistent effort.
People in the presence of a good corporate culture don't generally make downright negligent, dangerous decisions. You need a dysfunctional culture to elevate those dangerous decisions to the "new, desirable status quo". Just look at investment banking or finance for examples of those by the boatload.
Quality culture requires Quality upkeep. If you set the incentives wrong, everything quickly goes downhill from there. I see it everywhere I go. Maintaining a quality first mindset is not natural at all. It is Hard. It requires accountability, it requires everyone chipping in and doing at times their own job, plus someone elses enough to cover those bad days. It requires vigilance, egolessness, and a drive to stop the whole bloody show rather than deliver a sub-par, unworkable product. It requires as close as you'll ever get to unity and clarity of purpose from top to bottom. Throw out any of that, and effort invested to desirable output ratio just balloons from there.
You had a Boeing competitor with a clear history of decision making that caused issues like MAX (DC-10, MD-11).
You had an unprecedented period of aerospace consolidation. You saw a turning over of the guard in a shining star of the space where the very people who worked there and still had family there calling out that the culture had changed for the worse.
>The relentless message: Shareholders would henceforth come first at Boeing. The important thing was not to get “overly focused on the box,” Hopkins said in a 2000 interview with Bloomberg. “The box”—the plane itself—“is obviously important, but customers are assuming the box is of great quality.” This was heresy to engineers, to whom the box was everything. The strike that year was formally over wages and benefits, but workers described it as a referendum on management.[1]
The engineering powerhouse, famous for building "the box" stopped caring about the building "the box". They pivoted to growth and financial performance at all costs.
>12a. Remove barriers that rob the hourly worker of his right to pride of workmanship. The responsibility of supervisors must be changed from sheer numbers to quality.[2]
>12b. Remove barriers that rob people in management and in engineering of their right to pride of workmanship. This means, inter alia, abolishment of the annual or merit rating and of management by objective.[2]
They did everything they could to union bust, damping the spirits and pride that workers brought to the job.
>End the practice of awarding business on the basis of price tag. Instead, minimize total cost. Move toward a single supplier for any one item, on a long-term relationship of loyalty and trust.[2]
They outsourced without regard for Quality of product or building loyalty and trust with suppliers.
>Boeing began putting more junior employees into the roles, and some employees believed that was because they’d be more willing to listen to managers and less likely to dig in their heels, Dickson says. “How long do you want to keep polishing that apple?” was a phrase managers often used with engineers who wanted to keep testing, he says.[1]
They skimped on training, and did everything possible to wring leniency out of their regulator. They penalized anyone who pointed out a Quality problem. These are not the hallmarks of a company that people point to as an example of quality culture, and the tipping point and timeframe from shift of incentives to long-term production of lackluster results is just about right.
These are not unscientific observations. They are clear as day. You had means, management swapout/changing of incentives, culture degradation; opportunity (merger); and motive (hello stock options)! You don't do any of the aforementioned and come out smelling like roses, let alone all at the same time. The finance first school of corporate management, is not, in fact, the same culture that blazed the path for ever safer skies. Even once an Engineer (Mullenberg) got bumped up to CEO eventually, he inherited a dysfunctional organization, stripped of it's safeguards by the severity of the cultural transformation that had already taken place, and that he was a part and parcel of. To be honest, I feel bad for the guy. If anything went wrong, it was that he didn't disrupt the place enough on turn over to see where the mold had started to grow.
[1] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2019-05-09/former-bo...
[2]https://deming.org/explore/fourteen-points/
It isn't about blaming ghosts. It's about acknowledging that as human beings, the institutions we establish are as much in a transient state of being, development, and growth as we ourselves are. The are the being, to which we were the cells and organelles.
Therefore, you have to take into account the devil in the details to ensure the same degradation or slipping is recognized for what it is and remediated the moment it rears its ugly head. To do anything else; to blind oneself to the way change propagates through human systems, is to doom the lot of us to making the same mistakes again.
You do you. However, as someone who dug into every detail of those investigations I could get my hands on at the time, down to running the math, looking up regulations, designs, blueprints, etc.? I saw enough of the warning signs to recognize the processes at work. Culture went down the tubes. It doesn't exonerate anyone involved necessarily, and yeah, more people should have spoke out. Maybe they'd have risked it if there was more competition in the sector? Maybe not. But we at least know a pattern to look for.
I had to reply to you on investment banks. "Look at IBs for examples by the boatloads".
I hope you dont imply banks in general have a culture problem, more than aviation or bakeries ?
Cutting corners is a result of a cultural dysfunction that happens everywhere. The reason why you feel you care about IB is because salaries are high and it was easier to blame them for 2008 than blame the culprits (easy loan policies, millions of voting adults jump on speculative loops in real estate, specialized lenders lying on loan application, US gov exporting securitized debt to Germany, etc... IBs just were a middle man taken by surprise in an ocean of shit everyone was swimming in happily)
I hope you dont imply banks in general have a culture problem, more than aviation or bakeries ?
Cutting corners is a result of a cultural dysfunction that happens everywhere. The reason why you feel you care about IB is because salaries are high and it was easier to blame them for 2008 than blame the culprits (easy loan policies, millions of voting adults jump on speculative loops in real estate, specialized lenders lying on loan application, US gov exporting securitized debt to Germany, etc... IBs just were a middle man taken by surprise in an ocean of shit everyone was swimming in happily)
IBs were just a middle man taken by surprise in an ocean of shit? Boy oh boy, IBs were pumping that shit into the ocean, knowing fully well it was shit. They just didn't know that their drinking pipes were drawn from the same ocean.
Worrying about who to blame is a job for lawyers, managers and people with emotional ties to the company.
It distracts from the more important question of, what to do about the fact that Boeing is a dangerously broken "too big to fail" (code for a national firm in Americanese) money pit?
My vote would be to remove the bullshit capitalist figleaf and just nationalize it. This has the advantage of aligning expectations for Americans, who are convinced government can't function competently.
More seriously, left to their own devices, Boeing will continue to shove enormous gobs of money into executive pockets. Make them GS-scale and most of them will leave, clearing the way for an attempt at hiring some competence.
It distracts from the more important question of, what to do about the fact that Boeing is a dangerously broken "too big to fail" (code for a national firm in Americanese) money pit?
My vote would be to remove the bullshit capitalist figleaf and just nationalize it. This has the advantage of aligning expectations for Americans, who are convinced government can't function competently.
More seriously, left to their own devices, Boeing will continue to shove enormous gobs of money into executive pockets. Make them GS-scale and most of them will leave, clearing the way for an attempt at hiring some competence.
The problem is, that empires have planned economy parts, and those destroy the market. Join the us-protective empire, you buy military hardware and other product-groups to pay for the protection against hostile neighbours. If these products are worth the money is near irrelevance.
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/12/04/world/middlee...
They could make these planes from paper and they still would sell. The moment the systemic thread of the soviet union was considered no longer imminent (70s-80s) the slide into abysmal quality began. So to join the "I don't want to pay for my own military and still be relatively safe" club, you buy those planes.
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/12/04/world/middlee...
They could make these planes from paper and they still would sell. The moment the systemic thread of the soviet union was considered no longer imminent (70s-80s) the slide into abysmal quality began. So to join the "I don't want to pay for my own military and still be relatively safe" club, you buy those planes.
Yes, I agree. Being the world's uncontested hegemonic power hasn't economically benefited the United States at all. /s
Capability-rot is very real.And the cultural cost, aka destruction of the middle-class and its fallout might even cost billionaires dearly in the end.
The 737 Max is aerodynamically stable without MCAS. The purpose of MCAS is to manage stick pressure progression in certain situations, in order to match the performance of the original 737 and thereby avoid the need for additional certification.
I think your analysis of the culture problem is insightful; even the most broken corporate cultures believe internally that they are not broken, and that problems are someone else’s fault. In fact this belief is probably an essential clue to a broken culture as it breaks the feedback-improvement loop and erodes accountability.
I think your analysis of the culture problem is insightful; even the most broken corporate cultures believe internally that they are not broken, and that problems are someone else’s fault. In fact this belief is probably an essential clue to a broken culture as it breaks the feedback-improvement loop and erodes accountability.
> thousands of engineers worked on the 737 Max. Not a single engineer raised issues with the engineering of the aircraft.
It's entirely realistic that most engineers by far were not aware of it.
I work (not at Boeing) on an aircraft system. On the aircraft I work on, I have no idea if the flight controls architecture is fully safe, I don't know nearly enough about it to judge. I don't know how many sensor they use and how. That's not the system I work on.
> Boeing made an unstable plane which it then stablized with a dangerous MCAS to get it to market fast. They then topped it off by making the MCAS rely on a single sensor. They then made the dual-sensor an upgrade. An undergraduate engineering student with a basic course on probability can see that this is tailor-made for disaster.
It's really not that straightforward. Again, without knowing a lot of details about the implementation of the MCAS you couldn't say it was so obviously dangerous.
For instance, I understand that the use of a single sensor was justified by the fact that the MCAS was supposed to be possible to activate only once, which wouldn't give it enough authority to reach a catastrophic condition. This literally gives you the justification to use a single sensor. However the implementation of the MCAS software combined with the flight crew procedures ended up activating it several times.
The point is, you need to know an awful lot about a system to judge whether it's dangerous or not. And there are lots of systems. It's not something that any engineer not working on that particular part could do, and it's certainly not in the reach of any external undergraduate student.
> Strong regulation is necessary to ensure the safety of Boeing Products.
Right, and the only thing any engineer on the program could have been concerned about is the apparent lack of oversight from the authorities, although I don't know enough about how it went in practice to say if it was really apparent to lower level engineers.
It's entirely realistic that most engineers by far were not aware of it.
I work (not at Boeing) on an aircraft system. On the aircraft I work on, I have no idea if the flight controls architecture is fully safe, I don't know nearly enough about it to judge. I don't know how many sensor they use and how. That's not the system I work on.
> Boeing made an unstable plane which it then stablized with a dangerous MCAS to get it to market fast. They then topped it off by making the MCAS rely on a single sensor. They then made the dual-sensor an upgrade. An undergraduate engineering student with a basic course on probability can see that this is tailor-made for disaster.
It's really not that straightforward. Again, without knowing a lot of details about the implementation of the MCAS you couldn't say it was so obviously dangerous.
For instance, I understand that the use of a single sensor was justified by the fact that the MCAS was supposed to be possible to activate only once, which wouldn't give it enough authority to reach a catastrophic condition. This literally gives you the justification to use a single sensor. However the implementation of the MCAS software combined with the flight crew procedures ended up activating it several times.
The point is, you need to know an awful lot about a system to judge whether it's dangerous or not. And there are lots of systems. It's not something that any engineer not working on that particular part could do, and it's certainly not in the reach of any external undergraduate student.
> Strong regulation is necessary to ensure the safety of Boeing Products.
Right, and the only thing any engineer on the program could have been concerned about is the apparent lack of oversight from the authorities, although I don't know enough about how it went in practice to say if it was really apparent to lower level engineers.
Just wait until the 787 "issues" with the composite fuselages start happening en masse.
I don't understand why such mergers are allowed. This is where capitalism falls apart as it is when it crosses the line between creating products to satisfy customers and chasing profit above all. These resulting giant companies become too big to fail, they lose accountability and they detach from their customers and mission. Then when these companies start having problems, they use money to buy themselves laws, exemptions and corrupt whatever and whoever they need to in order to stay afloat. I think they way to fix capitalism is to order companies going above certain threshold to split and never allow any mergers.
The economic orthodoxy believes that consolidation > efficiency > reduced prices > consumer benefit > societal benefit
No amount of empirical evidence to the contrary will disuade them because you don't understand the _science_
No amount of empirical evidence to the contrary will disuade them because you don't understand the _science_
Actually that is not really economic orthodoxy unless you learn economics from CNBC or something. Real economists understand that monopoly, oligopoly often produces a suboptimal outcome. In order for capitalism to work competition has to exist. For Boeing the only competition is Airbus. We have been building jetliners from over half a century. Things like airframes failing after 8 years shouldn't be a thing...
This is more symptomatic of American Capitalism and its managerial class. Kill hundreds of people, get tens or hundreds of millions in parachute payments and stock and exit the company extraordinarily rich. Changing the leadership at the top of Boeing isn't going to change anything because the new leaders will be a product of the same society.
Boeing is a prime example of the hazards of regulatory capture and "too big to fail." The way capitalism is supposed to work is if you mess up in a competitive market you are punished by the market. Further if you deviate from the industry standard of care, in a functioning legal system, you are sued by your customers / injured parties. Instead, in America, for at least the last 20 years there is no real penalty for messing up. The bigger the company the lighter the penalty. This will be the downfall of America. In the case of Boeing, it needs to be broken up. It needs to fail. There is no reason why America can not have 3 or even half a dozen competing jetliner manufacturers. That is how capitalism is supposed to work. In the case of online retail same story with Amazon. Marketing and shipping goods is something that is almost as old as trade itself. There is no reason we need to buy diapers from the same store that we buy an HD TV from. Healthy capitalism is supposed to be about competition and diversity of options where the best quality option rules out. It is not supposed to be about Wall Street or Fed fueled monopolies.
> There is no reason why America can not have 3 or even half a dozen competing jetliner manufacturers
There is - it's an incredibly capital and know-how heavy business, with loooong lead times and huge risk. Just ask Bombardier - a company with plenty of aeronautical experience nearly went bankrupt developing the C-series ( which is a short haul airliner, so not even the most expensive), had to sell off everything they do, and the pandemic will probably finish them off.
There is - it's an incredibly capital and know-how heavy business, with loooong lead times and huge risk. Just ask Bombardier - a company with plenty of aeronautical experience nearly went bankrupt developing the C-series ( which is a short haul airliner, so not even the most expensive), had to sell off everything they do, and the pandemic will probably finish them off.