I couldn't find this by googling - if A is an n by n matrix, can you get A^k strictly faster than you can get a product of k arbitrary n by n matrices?
You're thinking of CDS, not CDO. CDS stands for credit default swap(s) and CDO stands for collateralized debt obligation. You're right that a CDO would be really big if you printed out a formal specification, but that's because a CDO is special trust where the trustee buys and sells different securitized products and tranches out the payments to shareholders in the trust.
Also - AIG could have made the same mistake with conventional home insurance. Say they only keep 100 dollars of cash around and they decide to insure a million houses, each with a value of one dollar. If one ten thousandth of the houses burn down, AIG goes bankrupt. So it's not true that selling a dollar notional of home insurance is less risky than selling a dollar notional of CDS, because it could easily be the case that the expected payout on the CDS is higher. CDS are just harder to price. There are very robust statistics about houses burning down - the statistics on whether homeowners would default were a lot trickier to deal with.
You're right, of course, but my point (and maybe I didn't make it very effectively) was that to acquire a similarly thorough understanding of macros would require way more information - I wasn't trying to make the point that a complete description of CDS could be given in a couple of paragraphs.
But if you believe that the exchange rate is going to move in favor of the dollar, the sensible thing to do is still to switch almost all of your euros into dollars and convert back gradually as you need to actually use them to buy things.
I think this tendency to mythologize certain financial derivatives is weird. The concept of a macro is way more complex than the concept of a credit default swap. To demonstrate, here is (in my opinion) an explanation of credit default swaps that a person with no financial background should be able to understand.
A bond is a contract created and sold by an "issuer". The issuer can be a government or a company. Ownership of the bond entitles you to payments from the issuer. The specific number and size of payments varies from bond to bond. Once the issuer sells the bond to someone, that person can sell the bond to anyone else they want.
A credit default swap is a contract between two parties (neither of which is necessarily the aforementioned issuer) that are usually called the protection buyer and the protection seller. This contract is made in reference to someone called the reference entity. The protection buyer agrees to make a series of payments to the protection seller in exchange for the protection seller's promise that, in the case of a "credit event", they will give the protection buyer either some specified amount of money or some specified amount of bonds. The nature of the payments and the meaning of "credit event" vary from contract to contract, but generally a "credit event" is understood to have occurred if the reference entity (which is always an issuer) fails to make payments on some of the bonds it has sold. Either party in the contract is free to find someone else to take up their side of the trade at whatever price they can negotiate.
The only thing you needed to know to understand that was what a contract was, but if you want to understand macros, you really need to know what an interpreter is.
I think that in this case the reporter doesn't understand what's going on behind the abstraction.
One thing that might happen is that some country's equivalent of our treasury dept will realize that they're not going to be able to make the next set of payments on their bonds.
Not that I have a solution to this problem, but who does the filtering once you remove the job offer as a prerequisite? I can't conceive of a situation where the people that get put in charge of that process are actually qualified.
What Taleb is saying is still true. If I have a 400k market salary and I give up 200k of it for the right to 1% of the profits I generate, then I still maximize the expected value of my compensation that year by maximizing the size of my bets. I could bet a billion dollars on a coin flip, get 9.8 million (after recouping foregone salary) on heads and lose 200k on tails. Moreover, there is a well established history of traders that lost large amounts of money finding gainful employment regardless. See Boaz Weinstein, for example.
And even then it's tricky, because a non-regulated entity can make a bet with a regulated one and end up getting bail-out money by virtue of that bet. That seems undesirable, but you also can't really stiff the non-regulated entity, because then nobody will ever want to bet with the regulated one again, thereby destroying its ability to hedge.
That would work if we wanted to stop banks from transferring losses to shareholders - the real problem is that they transfer losses to taxpayers. Pre-IPO Goldman Sachs was probably considered "systemically important" enough for their losses to have been covered in the event of a large trading loss.
3 would necessarily raise the bid/ask. If you charge everyone 10 cents to transact, then nobody will act as a market maker at a bid/ask narrower than 20 cents.
We shouldn't practice financial regulation like it's holistic medicine. Metaphors about cleaning the pipes and taking the pain should be weighed against the evidence we have about what happens when you let banks fail, and that didn't go very well when we did it with Lehman Brothers.