Meanwhile in Germany I see, quite literally, 12 traffic signs on a 100m stretch of road. I'm pretty sure that looking at all those signs adds up to a few seconds at least.
In dbus, it seems the feature is intended for two processes to know they can access the same shmem and other system resources. I'm struggling to understand in which circumstances would that be useful.
If signals were based on low impedance current loops as opposed to voltage-based like they are today, interference could be much reduced. This would break phantom power, so power to preamps would have to be send through another set of conductors, which would make the design of the electronics easier as well as safer.
How is this supposed to be zero-click? All attack scenarios require either the attacker to modify configuration files, or the user to click on a malicious shortcut.
I found, in my rather recent experience with Go, that using anything other than zero for invalid, default or "sentinel" values is a source of potential problems due to the lack of real constructors.
Thinking how a secure setup for uploading packages from a CI would look like: the package must be signed by the devs, and for that they must build it independently on their machines (this requires a reproducible build).
100% of those cases would be favorable to cops. Defamation laws are quite restrictive in Europe, much more so when it involves public officials (take a look at the Strafgesetzbuch)
Such a concise way of saying what I've been thinking for a long time.