Frances I think was worried about his legacy disappearing with DSM-5, because there was a big push to change things in a major way compared to DSM-IV. Ultimately I don't think that really happened; DSM-5 was a change but not the radical change I think the chairs and primary committees wanted it to be.
Frances' flooding of media outlets around that time was sort of strange in certain ways. He seemed to correctly identify potential problems in the mental healthcare system but then had this idea that changing things in the DSM to address some of its issues would make everything worse. It felt as if he was co-opting concerns everyone was having to argue for not changing anything at all, and in the process turned everything on its head.
The DSM is a very political document with a lot of interest groups involved at all levels, which is why it didn't change even more than it did. As a result, you had NIMH circumvent the whole process with RDoC, which then in turn seems to have had a relatively short life (maybe?) associated with changeover in its own administration.
It feels as if everyone has their own schema for thinking about mental illness, and the whole field moves along without any serious consequences. There's probably a lot of reasons for this, including scientific and medical sociology, and the complexity of mental wellness and illness as a domain. But it makes me wonder if some of the distinctions that are argued to be critical are really that critical in the end.
Sure, people are prescribed psychotropic medication for depression. But as more stringent scrutiny has been paid to those, the effect sizes have gone down over time and with more adjustment for publication bias.
There's no shortage of demand for psychotherapy services, and head-to-head they are comparable and both in combination fare best.
There is no blood test for depression, and if there is, no one uses it in practice. Sure, we're seeing this sort of thing with alzheimer's dementia but that's one thing that has never been amenable to psychotherapy, and even then there's a lot of psychotherapy around it in a palliative and coping sense because it's still uncurable.
FWIW, I was involved in the creation of DSM-5 so I'm very familiar with the whole area of mental healthcare.
> Also, psychology is a dying profession. A mental illness is described as a set of symptoms manifested from physical biological systems we don't fully understand yet. But once understood, psychology becomes obsolete.
That's a fundamentally reductionist perspective and assumes everything is biological in its etiology? For example, you could say we don't need a justice system once we have the biology worked out, or arts, or sports. At some level it's a fundamentally authoritarian argument as well: if you have the biology worked out, what's to keep the holders of power from altering people to whatever norm they want? Having the biology completely worked out won't magically reveal natural disorder states.
The biological explication of a behavior doesn't obviate the need to have some norm for intervention decisions. Biology doesn't have norms, psychosocial systems have norms. Non-behavioral medicine is still full of ethics. And that doesn't even get into issues about whether you could ever identify any biological substrate as synonymous with a human experiential state or history.
Frances' flooding of media outlets around that time was sort of strange in certain ways. He seemed to correctly identify potential problems in the mental healthcare system but then had this idea that changing things in the DSM to address some of its issues would make everything worse. It felt as if he was co-opting concerns everyone was having to argue for not changing anything at all, and in the process turned everything on its head.
The DSM is a very political document with a lot of interest groups involved at all levels, which is why it didn't change even more than it did. As a result, you had NIMH circumvent the whole process with RDoC, which then in turn seems to have had a relatively short life (maybe?) associated with changeover in its own administration.
It feels as if everyone has their own schema for thinking about mental illness, and the whole field moves along without any serious consequences. There's probably a lot of reasons for this, including scientific and medical sociology, and the complexity of mental wellness and illness as a domain. But it makes me wonder if some of the distinctions that are argued to be critical are really that critical in the end.