The evidence for the big bang is generally not that if you look far enough back in a telescope, the universe looks younger, which is somewhat the layperson's confusion.
Evidence for the big bang is about measuring redshift of galaxies throughout universal history, homgeneity and thermal equilibrium of the universe and CMBR, which could only be explained by it all having been in a compressed location where it could reach thermal equilibrium at some point in the distant past.
None of that is challenged by the Webb observations about very young supermassive black holes.
In fact, the existence of supermassive black holes themselves has basically always been an unsolved problem even before Webb. The only known possible explanation (stellar collapse -> accretion -> supermassive black hole) could be ruled out even before Webb on theoretical and experimental grounds, we just have stronger evidence against it now. (To wit: if supermassive black holes form from stellar black holes by growing, you would expect to see lots of intermediate mass black holes. We see almost none. Furthermore, the process of accretion is extremely energetic, so IMBHs would be the most visible objects in the night sky. The fact we see none is doubly damning)
The mainstream position now will be big bang + some kind of primordial black hole formation during the very early stages of the universe. Work of Hawking/Penrose shows that black holes can form under generic conditions in solutions to the EFE equations. We have a general understanding of how they could come about from certain dense matter layouts in a standard GR cosmological model.
Here's how to appreciate it in terms of the counterfactual:
Suppose kinetic energy was E = m|v| instead, linearly dependent on speed |v|. What does that mean for the universe?
The traditional Lagrangian is L = 1/2 mv^2 - V(x). This kinetic energy gives a different formula:
L = m|v|ln|v|-V(x).
Deriving the corresponding equations of motion, you get:
p = m(1+ln|v|)sgn(v)
ma = |v|F
A few things we can note from these formulas:
1. They are not boost invariant: Galilean relativity is violated. That means there is necessarily a privileged reference frame (i.e. an aether) in which the universe is at rest, and all dynamics must be understood relative to this reference frame.
2. Newton's first law has a pathological interpretation in regards to the above reference frame: If ma = |v|F and |v| = 0 (i.e. you are at rest relative to the aether), then a = 0 no matter what F is. That is, for objects which are stationary with respect to the aether, no motion is possible regardless of what force is applied.
It is still true that objects in motion (relative to the aether) remain in motion unless acted upon by an outside force, and Newton's third law is still true, but such a universe basically makes no sense.
You could essentially argue from the anthropic principle that such a universe would have such pathological dynamics that it could not permit life, and therefore we cannot observe it.
This is the contrapositive of the argument presented on stackexchange. There they say "given Galilean relativity, you get the quadratic scaling law". This argument says "if you don't have the quadratic scaling law, you don't have relativity".
The point of the counterfactual is a bit like Richard Feynman's "why" argument [1]. There is no fundamental reason why this kind of dynamics couldn't exist. We can only ever reduce our explanation to a more fundamental intuition we have about the same universe we live in (i.e. from kinetic energy scaling laws to Galilean relativity). But without a mathematical proof of the incoherence even in principle of the alternative, its perfectly valid to imagine an alternative universe with different dynamics. It's just not our universe.
I would be avoiding npm itself on principle in the JS ecosystem. Use a package manager that has a history of actually caring about these issues in a timely manner.
Willingness to look stupid and intellectual self-confidence are two sides of the same coin.
If you can find internal (rather than external) reasons to trust/believe in your own intelligence and capabilities, it makes it easier to be willing to look foolish. Also, a lack of knowledge/ability in a new area (or even a familiar area) is not a sign of a lack of capability. There's a difference between being a novice and being an idiot. So long as your source of intellectual self-confidence is strong enough (say, you have made great intellectual achievements in some other area of your life unrelated to the thing you're struggling with right now) its irrelevant if other people think you the fool: they're simply mistaken, and that's no skin off your back.
You need to differentiate between special and general relativity when making these statements.
It is absolutely true that someone else would have come up with special relativity very soon after Einstein. All that would be necessary is someone else to have the wherewithal to say "perhaps the aether does not need to exist" for the equations already known at the time by others before Einstein to lead to the general theory.
General relativity is different. Witten contends that it is entirely possible that without Einstein, we may have had to wait for the early string theorists of the 1960s to discover GR as a classical limit of the first string theories in their quest to understand the strong nuclear force.
As opposed to SR, GR is one of the most singular innovative intellectual achievements in human history. It's definitely "out of distribution" in some sense.
> If, then, it is true that the axiomatic basis of theoretical physics cannot be extracted from experience but must be freely invented, can we ever hope to find the right way? Nay, more, has this right way any existence outside our illusions? Can we hope to be guided safely by experience at all when there exist theories (such as classical mechanics) which to a large extent do justice to experience, without getting to the root of the matter? I answer without hesitation that there is, in my opinion, a right way, and that we are capable of finding it. Our experience hitherto justifies us in believing that nature is the realisation of the simplest conceivable mathematical ideas. I am convinced that we can discover by means of purely mathematical constructions the concepts and the laws connecting them with each other, which furnish the key to the understanding of natural phenomena. Experience may suggest the appropriate mathematical concepts, but they most certainly cannot be deduced from it. Experience remains, of course, the sole criterion of the physical utility of a mathematical construction. But the creative principle resides in mathematics. In a certain sense, therefore, I hold it true that pure thought can grasp reality, as the ancients dreamed.
Peter Woit, the Columbia maths department computer systems administrator, makes his bread by googling the word String Theory and then posting what ever latest results come up in a disingenuous way on his blog to stir reactions from his readers.
Something the computer scientists of Hackernews might not realise is that most mathematicians are by nature Platonists, even if they would not try to defend that position when pressed.
Mathematicians begrudgingly retreat to formalism and foundations when pressed because its easier to defend, but the day-to-day of contemporary mathematics is much more an explorative process of a "real" mathematical landscape. They aren't concerned with foundations because it "feels" self-evident that the mathematics they are discovering is true (because their means of discovery, rigour and proof, "guarantee" it to be so).
A lot of the comments here are making false assumptions like "but surely mathematicians all know that their field is ultimately justified as a symbol-pushing game from some axiomatic system right?" in the same way one might say "surely all computer scientists know that every language ultimately compiles down to 1s and 0s processed by a CPU" but that is not at all how most mathematicians think about doing mathematics.
The EMH is a description of how the market behaves when a sufficiently large number of independent actors are looking for alpha. It is not a prescription of how the market should behave.
The conclusion is that with a sufficiently large number of actors in the market all seeking profits by trying to find misevaluation of stock prices, the excess profits of any individual actor will (assuming they all have access to the same information) converge to zero.
Its less a paradox and more a matter of game theory. Every investment firm which gives up trying to look for alpha (believing it is fruitless) means the remaining firms have more opportunities to find stocks with available information not reflected in the price. There's no paradox here: each individual actor is incentivized to participate in order to not miss out on that potential for excess profits, and the net effect is the EMH.
The practical experience of doing mathematics is actually quite close to a natural science, even if the subject is technically a "formal science* according to the conventional meanings of the terms.
Mathematicians actually do the same thing as scientists: hypothesis building by extensive investigation of examples. Looking for examples which catch the boundary of established knowledge and try to break existing assumptions, etc. The difference comes after that in the nature of the concluding argument. A scientist performs experiments to validate or refute the hypothesis, establishing scientific proof (a kind of conditional or statistical truth required only to hold up to certain conditions, those upon which the claim was tested). A mathematician finds and writes a proof or creates a counter example.
The failure of logical positivism and the rise of Popperian philosophy is obviously correct that we can't approach that end process in the natural sciences the way we do for maths, but the practical distinction between the subjects is not so clear.
This is all without mention the much tighter coupling between the two modes of investigation at the boundary between maths and science in subjects like theoretical physics. There the line blurs almost completely and a major tool used by genuine physicists is literally purusiing mathematical consistency in their theories. This has been used to tremendous success (GR, Yang-Mills, the weak force) and with some difficulties (string theory).
————
Einstein understood all this:
> If, then, it is true that the axiomatic basis of theoretical physics cannot be extracted from experience but must be freely invented, can we ever hope to find the right way? Nay, more, has this right way any existence outside our illusions? Can we hope to be guided safely by experience at all when there exist theories (such as classical mechanics) which to a large extent do justice to experience, without getting to the root of the matter? I answer without hesitation that there is, in my opinion, a right way, and that we are capable of finding it. Our experience hitherto justifies us in believing that nature is the realisation of the simplest conceivable mathematical ideas. I am convinced that we can discover by means of purely mathematical constructions the concepts and the laws connecting them with each other, which furnish the key to the understanding of natural phenomena. Experience may suggest the appropriate mathematical concepts, but they most certainly cannot be deduced from it. Experience remains, of course, the sole criterion of the physical utility of a mathematical construction. But the creative principle resides in mathematics. In a certain sense, therefore, I hold it true that pure thought can grasp reality, as the ancients dreamed. - Albert Einstein
>Today, mathematics is regarded as an abstract science.
Pure mathematics is regarded as an abstract science, which it is by definition. Arnol'd argued vehemently and much more convincingly for the viewpoint that all mathematics is (and must be) linked to the natural sciences.
>On forums such as Stack Exchange, trained mathematicians may sneer at newcomers who ask for intuitive explanations of mathematical constructs.
Mathematicians use intuition routinely at all levels of investigation. This is captured for example by Tao's famous stages of rigour (https://terrytao.wordpress.com/career-advice/theres-more-to-...). Mathematicians require that their intuition is useful for mathematics: if intuition disagrees with rigour, the intuition must be discarded or modified so that it becomes a sharper, more useful razor. If intuition leads one to believe and pursue false mathematical statements, then it isn't (mathematical) intuition after all. Most beginners in mathematics do not have the knowledge to discern the difference (because mathematics is very subtle) and many experts lack the patience required to help navigate beginners through building (and appreciating the importance of) that intuition.
The next paragraph about how mathematics was closely coupled to reality for most of history and only recently with our understanding of infinite sets became too abstract is not really at all accurate of the history of mathematics. Euclid's Elements is 2300 years old and is presented in a completely abstract way.
The mainstream view in mathematics is that infinite sets, especially ones as pedestrian as the naturals or the reals, are not particularly weird after all. Once one develops the aforementioned mathematical intuition (that is, once one discards the naive, human-centric notion that our intuition about finite things should be the "correct" lens through which to understand infinite things, and instead allows our rigorous understanding of infinite sets to inform our intuition for what to expect) the confusion fades away like a mirage. That process occurs for all abstract parts of mathematics as one comes to appreciate them (expect, possibly, for things like spectral sequences).
Evidence for the big bang is about measuring redshift of galaxies throughout universal history, homgeneity and thermal equilibrium of the universe and CMBR, which could only be explained by it all having been in a compressed location where it could reach thermal equilibrium at some point in the distant past.
None of that is challenged by the Webb observations about very young supermassive black holes.
In fact, the existence of supermassive black holes themselves has basically always been an unsolved problem even before Webb. The only known possible explanation (stellar collapse -> accretion -> supermassive black hole) could be ruled out even before Webb on theoretical and experimental grounds, we just have stronger evidence against it now. (To wit: if supermassive black holes form from stellar black holes by growing, you would expect to see lots of intermediate mass black holes. We see almost none. Furthermore, the process of accretion is extremely energetic, so IMBHs would be the most visible objects in the night sky. The fact we see none is doubly damning)
The mainstream position now will be big bang + some kind of primordial black hole formation during the very early stages of the universe. Work of Hawking/Penrose shows that black holes can form under generic conditions in solutions to the EFE equations. We have a general understanding of how they could come about from certain dense matter layouts in a standard GR cosmological model.