Which encrypts each cache line with a key unknown to the attacker. This means an attacker can't target individual bits. Every change affects at least one AES encrypted block. It's much stronger than any normal defence against row hammer in that regard because flipping a single bit in plaintext changes ~half the bits in the ciphertext. It's similar to how Apple uses always on disk encryption instead of the normal means to limit run length in their NAND flash controllers. If the encryption is "off" it just means the decryption key is stored somewhere in the trusted enclave.
I can get a (used) fanless laptop and a USB GPIO/I2C/SPI/CAN/whatever adapter for that money. Raspberry Pis started at ~$30 for a minimal configuration. They were so cheap that they killed the whole overpriced range of $100 to $200 dev boards by vendors that tried to make money of dev boards for their chips.
They have to be cheap enough that tinkers leave them in their projects.
The court ruled that the AI generated content has an author/editor/publisher: Google. It also ruled that Google can be held liable. Insert pikachu face meme.
This exactly the missing laptop/lowend desktop performance bracket missing in the ARM ecosystem. Make a Mini-ITX compatible board for the SoC, upstream drivers into mainline Linux (and *BSD), and people will buy it as the low power 24/7 board for the home. Is it so fucking hard not shoot yourself in both feet?
About half of them read as "I tried to use C++ as a worse C" e.g. using struct initilisation instead of constructors, using malloc instead of new or new[].
My pet peeve with C++ is that the sequence point operator can be overloaded at which point it stops being a sequence point.
If you want to know how bad it take your time with GCC 4.x before they responded to clang. GCC error messages used to be horrible for anything but the most trival errors. A single C++ template error could span multiple screens and still not tell you the location.