AIM and MAC seem like a very interesting system for enforcing security guarantees, and they partially solved the malicious dependencies problem as well.
> I am loyal to doing competent work. If our goals align, then we will get on.
100% agreed here, but I've also noticed I've had a fair few managers who didn't know what to do with someone like this. Sure, promotions are nice and what not, but if I'm not producing interesting work (or managing a team of people producing interesting work), it's pretty difficult to care about said job, and I'll move on quickly.
> I suspect these export restrictions are less black-and-white than you imagine.
They definitely are, but things like Golden Sentry and Blue Lantern (amongst other Dual Use Monitoring regimes) can also still look for these sorts of uses. But yes, there's lots of examples of "Country X can't do Y, so we go to country Z and work with them to do Y" sorts of bypasses. Still increases the amount of work required if they want something NATSEC related to work on.
[0]: https://neugierig.org/software/blog/2026/04/theseus.html