Where do you draw the line on how good human-machine interfaces should be? I'm sure this model could be a convenience for many, and while it may be social for some, I am not sure it would substitute existing human interaction for those users.
Besides, I do not think there is anything inherently immoral with not being social, or not having the ability to be. Consider for example people who do not naturally have the social network to interact with people they want to (e.g. some gifted children).
I am not convinced this model has enough empathy to satisfy most users on an emotional level. A bond is not merely an exchange of words, but prolonged and deep contemplation of the other being. We cannot introspect into these machines, and they certainly cannot yet do the same to us.
I often refrain from commenting about meta-issues on HN, but I'm particularly annoyed by the downvotes on this question of mine. What is this forum for, if not for this exchange between makers? I've noticed downvotes on questions are an oft occuring pattern. I think the comments on HN should house more than self-contained absolute statements.
Would Rust have made this issue impossible by construction? I know Linus has spoken about Rust's promises about memory safety not being equivalently applicable in the kernel domain, so I would be curious to hear any kernel developer's perspectives.
The vast majority (72%) of European citizens are opposed to Chat control. Regardless, the proposal has been brought up and rejected relentlessly, mostly by action of politicians (commissioners) who are not directly elected to begin with. We have more than enough reasons to be furious.
Klara and the Sun is such a great book. Kazuo Ishiguro captured the intersection of technology and society in a way which can appeal to both to humanists and technologists. It was especially interesting to read his interpretation of partial sentience, learning and understanding the world from the lens of the artificial friends.
I don't understand why a photosensing pixel is meaningfully worse for privacy than the devices we already have. I mean, sure, you might not as easily be able to cover up your camera with tape, but even then a better solution which should be implemented anyway is a physical decoupling.
And as I stated above, I doubt this is meaningful for spying capabilities. Micro cameras are likely more suitable, for better or worse.
Phone screens without notches, laptops which can have larger cameras for better video calls, VR gear with better eye tracking, digital mirrors and more. I'm sure there are less obvious applications.
Is this really as detrimental to privacy as other comments claim? There are already very small cameras which can be used for adversarial purposes. This technology could be useful for many utilitarian purposes.
I think that was Citra emulator. Protect Dolphin at all costs!
Nintendo (among other creative corporations) do not seem to realise that invite to play creates an attachment to the product that is deeper than a license agreement, which is our shared cultural filament.
Does anybody have an understanding of when realistically there will be supply again? I've heard some positive sentiment about new developments in China, but that's not a market I am familiar with, and I haven't witnessed any effects of it thus far.
Do you search the name of the photographer every time you download a creative commons image? The vast majority of people simply do not care about copyright.
I would assume it also has to do with if not fundamentally manifesting from Steam being an organisation of technologists. They don't want to put out a project which has a worse operating system than their workstations.
Besides, I do not think there is anything inherently immoral with not being social, or not having the ability to be. Consider for example people who do not naturally have the social network to interact with people they want to (e.g. some gifted children).
I am not convinced this model has enough empathy to satisfy most users on an emotional level. A bond is not merely an exchange of words, but prolonged and deep contemplation of the other being. We cannot introspect into these machines, and they certainly cannot yet do the same to us.