As a user, I like wayland. X11 was a security disaster. Wayland is much better about tearing.
What scares me though are all the responsibilities passed to compositors, because what ends up happening is that each compositor may reimplement what should be common functionality in annoying ways. This is especially true for input things, like key remapping. This ultimately fragments linux desktop experiences even harder than it was before.
I'd really like to get more clarification on offline mode and privacy. The github issues related to privacy did not leave a good feeling, despite being initially excited. Is offline mode a thing yet? I want to use this, but I don't want my code to leave my device.
You can sometimes find the serial lines if you are careful. Otherwise you can use the flashrom to store the output, and read it back out after each failure. It is much easier to just poke around and find the serial if you can, either from schematics (it seems the author has these) or by hand with a lot of patience or board scrying.
Possibly. Usually this is handled by the embedded controller, and not sure if that was reversed or not. You may be able to tristate the GPIO line that tells the CPU that a pin means PROCHOT, which would allow you to ignore the ECs attempts to do this.
In a signature context, you probably want someone else to know that "you" signed it (I can think of other cases, but that's the usual one). The way to do that requires them to know that the key which signed the data belongs to you. My only point is that this is actually the hard part, which any "replacement" crypto system needs to solve for, and that solving that is hard (none of the methods are particularly good).
Yes, not saying that web of trust ever worked. "Pre-established channel" are the other mechanisms I mentioned, like a central authority (https) or TOFU (just trust the first key you get). All of these have some issues, that any alternative must also solve for.
> I certainly want to get rid of gpg from my life if I can
I see this sentiment a lot, but you later hint at the problem. Any "replacement" needs to solve for secure key distribution. Signing isn't hard, you can use a lot of different things other than gpg to sign something with a key securely. If that part of gpg is broken, it's a bug, it can/should be fixed.
The real challenge is distributing the key so someone else can verify the signature, and almost every way to do that is fundamentally flawed, introduces a risk of operational errors or is annoying (web of trust, trust on first use, central authority, in-person, etc). I'm not convinced the right answer here is "invent a new one and the ecosystem around it".
Right, I think those were the closest we got to the CHRP standard, as they moved the platform toward PC-style floppies, PS/2, ATX PSU and even more generic "platform" stuff than most clones. I'm fairly sure I had an ISA slot, I do remember trying to get a bargain bin NE2K card working in mine under linux (it didn't work). Definitely did nothing under OS 8/9.
The powercity models were interesting, because they came out after Apple revoked Motorola's clone license. A German company, ComJet, bought up the boards and sold unlicensed clones cheap. Case was slightly different, but otherwise they corresponded to StarMax models (fairly certain they were identical but may have been last revision boards).
StarMax series (and the 4400) seemed to be about as close to CHRP as we got. My off-brand StarMax clone (PowerCity) had a PS/2 and an ISA port. Ran BeOS well, and had a quirk that I could hear a tight loop on the speaker.
What scares me though are all the responsibilities passed to compositors, because what ends up happening is that each compositor may reimplement what should be common functionality in annoying ways. This is especially true for input things, like key remapping. This ultimately fragments linux desktop experiences even harder than it was before.