Why Chrome 53 Is Rejecting Chase Bank's Symantec Certificate(sslmate.com)
sslmate.com
Why Chrome 53 Is Rejecting Chase Bank's Symantec Certificate
https://sslmate.com/blog/post/ct_redaction_in_chrome_53
94 comments
The Chrome team was able to fix this within 24 hours by remotely disabling CT enforcement in Chrome. (When Chrome starts up, it fetches a list of feature flags from a Chrome server using a system called Finch which is independent of the normal upgrade system.)
After reading the blogpost, it seems like it was working as intended. Why "fix" it?
After reading the blogpost, it seems like it was working as intended. Why "fix" it?
The expiration was designed back when Certificate Transparency was only required to make Extended Validation certificates display a green bar. The intention was never to make certificates fail entirely when a Chrome build was more than 10 weeks old. Now that CT is being used for more than just a green bar, the log list expiration is being revisited.
Update: Finch is always disabled in Chromium builds. Disabling it was not a decision by distro maintainers.
Supposedly, the following command line options will enable it, but it seems like just upgrading is a better option:
--variations-server-url=https://clients4.google.com/chrome-variations/seed --fake-variations-channel=stable
Supposedly, the following command line options will enable it, but it seems like just upgrading is a better option:
--variations-server-url=https://clients4.google.com/chrome-variations/seed --fake-variations-channel=stable
» When Chrome starts up, it fetches a list of feature flags from a Chrome server using a system called Finch which is independent of the normal upgrade system.
I'm not a Chrome user. But that sounds awful at first. What is the idea behind this service? Is there any documentation about the 'features' these flags can enable/disable?
I understand that I'm paranoid at times AND I really dislike Google, but why would you have an extra channel to influence deployments, other than offering a global update file?
I'm not a Chrome user. But that sounds awful at first. What is the idea behind this service? Is there any documentation about the 'features' these flags can enable/disable?
I understand that I'm paranoid at times AND I really dislike Google, but why would you have an extra channel to influence deployments, other than offering a global update file?
I fail to see this as any more harmful than the auto updating feature. I understand the concern of multiple avenues to phone home as being worse than one, but it's negligible considering it's the same company. Coupled with all of their other services for security incidents, prediction, auto correct, spelling, usage stats, dangerous page warnings, etc, I think it's just another log on the fire and not worth being concerned about specifically.
It actually is almost nothing like the auto updating feature.
Finch is mainly used for A/B testing. It doesn't push actual updates, all it does it turn existing features (flags) on and off. It's used for quickly A/B testing or incremental rolling new features and is designed to be more agile.
Finch is mainly used for A/B testing. It doesn't push actual updates, all it does it turn existing features (flags) on and off. It's used for quickly A/B testing or incremental rolling new features and is designed to be more agile.
That means it uniquely identified you to Google every day then, right?
> using a Google browser
> not wanting to be tracked
here's a hint: ad impression for unknown user is 0.01$ and for logged in user 2$. guess why Google has a browser now...
> not wanting to be tracked
here's a hint: ad impression for unknown user is 0.01$ and for logged in user 2$. guess why Google has a browser now...
Does it? Does the request actually provide enough to uniquely identify you?
The biggest difference I see is the speed. You're right, it doesn't make a difference from a technical point of view but it illustrates again just how much power they have over chrome - and thereby over the web: They can push a policy update to the bigger part of Chrome's userbase in 24 hours.
It should be entertaining when car makers use the same strategy: "Oh yeah, we have this system where everytime you turn the ignition, your car polls us and updates its assistant, motor, steering and airbag settings. Don't worry though, we mostly just use it for randomized tests and field trials."
It should be entertaining when car makers use the same strategy: "Oh yeah, we have this system where everytime you turn the ignition, your car polls us and updates its assistant, motor, steering and airbag settings. Don't worry though, we mostly just use it for randomized tests and field trials."
Update actually changes the binary/code of chrome. It pushes new features and content to you.
Finch only turns certain features on/off. It's used for A/B testing and incremental rollouts.
You can see a list of flags in chrome://flags
Mostly experimental stuff that will become full features soon, but until then they are behind a flag.
The two systems fulfill very different roles.
Finch only turns certain features on/off. It's used for A/B testing and incremental rollouts.
You can see a list of flags in chrome://flags
Mostly experimental stuff that will become full features soon, but until then they are behind a flag.
The two systems fulfill very different roles.
For one:
https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src.git/+/master/...
Also look for base::FieldTrialList in Chromium source. In this case, it seems to be: https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/net/+/master/...
Also look for base::FieldTrialList in Chromium source. In this case, it seems to be: https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/net/+/master/...
because Google don't know bugs on your (their) browser affecting their revenue.
interesting, if you're a victim of mitm attacks, i wonder if attackers can abuse that to disable some certificate check features to make spoofing ssl sites easier.
interesting, if you're a victim of mitm attacks, i wonder if attackers can abuse that to disable some certificate check features to make spoofing ssl sites easier.
I think they use TLS and they use cert pinning for Google domains.
If you "really" dislike Google, then why are you using Chrome?
I'm not the GP, and even though I personally really dislike Google too, I'm forced to use Chrome because Firefox fucking sucks.
> by remotely disabling CT enforcement in Chrome
A) why is this possible, and B) isn't the whole point of the expiring list to provide a stick? Why remove the stick at the last moment?
A) why is this possible, and B) isn't the whole point of the expiring list to provide a stick? Why remove the stick at the last moment?
Is there any reason, in 2016, to use Symantec over LetsEncrypt?
I use LetsEncrypt on a (personal) site or two and on a couple for work.
We've got customers that mostly run Windows, however, and it's a helluva lot easier to, for example, just get a three-year certificate from <vendor>, install it, and then forget about it for the next three years.
Fortunately, I don't (usually) have to deal with the Windows boxes (i.e. actually installing and/or configuring the certificates) but I'm often the one acquiring the certificates.
We've got customers that mostly run Windows, however, and it's a helluva lot easier to, for example, just get a three-year certificate from <vendor>, install it, and then forget about it for the next three years.
Fortunately, I don't (usually) have to deal with the Windows boxes (i.e. actually installing and/or configuring the certificates) but I'm often the one acquiring the certificates.
extended validation (mandatory for bigcos) and support contracts (important for corporates, not sure how useful "in real life").
Also, inventory management, which is helpful when you have hundreds or thousands of certs.
Also, inventory management, which is helpful when you have hundreds or thousands of certs.
There are lots of EV issuers who haven't been caught doing shady shit like Symantec...
cough Hey there!
CertSimple only does EV, and we do it completely differently from every other company: we check as much of your company's details before you pay, matching your order to a registered/active entity, flagging up things before asking for your credit card number, and helping you resolve any missing identification steps based on your company, order and the domain names involved.
I've been on HN for a decade and was at YC in Mountain View last week for the 10-min final interview last week (we didn't make it, which I blame on me being a jetlagged mess). OTOH the AirBnB we stayed in used a customer as their ISP.
We're used by a bunch of companies HN folks might know, including Travis, Tito, and Monzo.
https://certsimple.com/about
CertSimple only does EV, and we do it completely differently from every other company: we check as much of your company's details before you pay, matching your order to a registered/active entity, flagging up things before asking for your credit card number, and helping you resolve any missing identification steps based on your company, order and the domain names involved.
I've been on HN for a decade and was at YC in Mountain View last week for the 10-min final interview last week (we didn't make it, which I blame on me being a jetlagged mess). OTOH the AirBnB we stayed in used a customer as their ISP.
We're used by a bunch of companies HN folks might know, including Travis, Tito, and Monzo.
https://certsimple.com/about
The Symantec "this website is ssl protected by"-badge has high customer recognition and will raise conversion rates a tenth of a percent or two.
If I hadn't seen it repeatedly with my own eyes - most trust images will get you a small bump, for some reason Symantec performs the best. It's understandable and yet very frustrating!
If I hadn't seen it repeatedly with my own eyes - most trust images will get you a small bump, for some reason Symantec performs the best. It's understandable and yet very frustrating!
It's not "Symantec", it's not "Norton", it's the "VeriSign checkmark". That's why they also bought the checkmark from VeriSign (which was also their corporate logo) when they acquired the CA business, and VeriSign went on and adopted a new corporate logo.
The checkmark been around since at least 1997, and in it existence it has been associated with the most trustworthy institutions. It has become a synonym of trust. That checkmark is one of Symantec's most valuable assets.
The checkmark been around since at least 1997, and in it existence it has been associated with the most trustworthy institutions. It has become a synonym of trust. That checkmark is one of Symantec's most valuable assets.
For small startups, probably not. Large organisations have far more stringent processes around certificates. Auditing, validation, testing, regulatory requirements, EV, support contracts and SLAs, etc.
yet all that don't add absolute any value to the company nor security to their data. since they're still paying a vendor full of problems.
incompetence promoting incompetence. the staple of big corporations.
incompetence promoting incompetence. the staple of big corporations.
Apart from the reasons posted earlier, "legacy" also comes into play.
Symantec acquired the CA business from the old VeriSign in 2010, which back then was the largest CA and had a large corporate client portfolio accustomed to paying $$$$ per certificate per year. Corporations can become very reluctant to change, even if it benefits them, and there are some who just pay up every year without researching alternatives or even being aware of any.
You will find that there are a lot of similarities with the domain name industry where there is also a company operating with a VeriSign heritage: Network Solutions. Network Solutions also charge premium prices, because their legacy customers expect those. And although market share is slowly eroding over the years and cheap (and even free) competitors rise, more than enough legacy customers stay on board to remain very profitable for many years to come. What definitely helps is that most of the processes in the domain registration and CA industries can be automated and don't need a lot of maintenance.
Symantec acquired the CA business from the old VeriSign in 2010, which back then was the largest CA and had a large corporate client portfolio accustomed to paying $$$$ per certificate per year. Corporations can become very reluctant to change, even if it benefits them, and there are some who just pay up every year without researching alternatives or even being aware of any.
You will find that there are a lot of similarities with the domain name industry where there is also a company operating with a VeriSign heritage: Network Solutions. Network Solutions also charge premium prices, because their legacy customers expect those. And although market share is slowly eroding over the years and cheap (and even free) competitors rise, more than enough legacy customers stay on board to remain very profitable for many years to come. What definitely helps is that most of the processes in the domain registration and CA industries can be automated and don't need a lot of maintenance.
And they tends to need legacy stuff such as SHA-1 certificates more often.
When it comes to Certificate Transparency, LE doesn't bed SCTs in the issued certificates, which is mildly annoying.
Practically speaking, this has no impact until browsers start requiring CT (which is in about a year for Chrome).
Wildcards.
We use wildcard certs for a number of domains to support affiliate subdomains. So affiliate.example.com and affiliate2.example.com are all served by the same servers and thus all need to validate with one cert.
You can use SAN certificates to avoid wildcards while still validating for a number of domains.
They don't even need to be subdomains.
They don't even need to be subdomains.
There's a limit to how many SAN's you can fit in one cert. There is apparently no defined upper bound, but dependent on the client's implementation. 25 - 100 names seems to be the common limit supported by most registrars.
In the parent poster's case, it sounds like a good use case for a wildcard cert. They may have thousands of affiliates, and may not know all of the affiliates ahead of time, so with a SAN cert, would need to reissue the certificate each time a new affiliate signs up.
https://community.letsencrypt.org/t/subjectaltname-certifica...
In the parent poster's case, it sounds like a good use case for a wildcard cert. They may have thousands of affiliates, and may not know all of the affiliates ahead of time, so with a SAN cert, would need to reissue the certificate each time a new affiliate signs up.
https://community.letsencrypt.org/t/subjectaltname-certifica...
Oh, I completely agree—I maintain a SAN and it's a royal pain in the ass.
But there are options, and a SAN has lower risk if your key is leaked (only the enumerated domains will validate).
But there are options, and a SAN has lower risk if your key is leaked (only the enumerated domains will validate).
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I can't speak for Symantec, but folks use SSLMate (which resells Comodo) because of the customer support, the wildcard certificates, the lack of rate limits, and the central management of certificates (which integrates with Cert Spotter, our Certificate Transparency monitor). Also, some of our customers have special requirements and unfortunately can't automate certificate issuance. These customers want year long certificates with email validation, but still prefer using SSLMate's command line workflow over the clunky web interfaces of most CAs.
I'm using Chromium on Ubuntu 16, and I've been trying to visit
https://www.nist.gov/
but I don't even get an option to 'browse insecurely' under the 'Advanced' link.
In my experience that past couple days, I get the warning on about 10-25% of major web sites.
https://www.nist.gov/
but I don't even get an option to 'browse insecurely' under the 'Advanced' link.
In my experience that past couple days, I get the warning on about 10-25% of major web sites.
Ugh that's the worst. I work on servers where the GUI can only be accessed using HTTPS, but its all internal so many clients don't bother. And I don't know why browsers sometimes don't let me say "continue anyway" but it's super frustrating.
Using HSTS on a website will generally prevent your browser from allowing you to continue, which is fair: the website owner has explicitly indicated the website should only ever be used over a encrypted connection, and that is not the case..
I understand who owns the website.
Who owns my browser?
Who owns my browser?
To be RFC compliant, it MUST NOT allow the user to ignore the errors.
12.1. No User Recourse
Failing secure connection establishment on any warnings or errors
(per Section 8.4 ("Errors in Secure Transport Establishment")) should
be done with "no user recourse". This means that the user should not
be presented with a dialog giving her the option to proceed. Rather,
it should be treated similarly to a server error where there is
nothing further the user can do with respect to interacting with the
target web application, other than wait and retry.
Essentially, "any warnings or errors" means anything that would cause
the UA implementation to announce to the user that something is not
entirely correct with the connection establishment.
Not doing this, i.e., allowing user recourse such as "clicking
through warning/error dialogs", is a recipe for a man-in-the-middle
attack. If a web application issues an HSTS Policy, then it is
implicitly opting into the "no user recourse" approach, whereby all
certificate errors or warnings cause a connection termination, with
no chance to "fool" users into making the wrong decision and
compromising themselves.
Well I suppose curl/wget will never be RFC compliant user agents (curl -k, wget --no-check-certificate).
But somehow I think they'll still be used...
But somehow I think they'll still be used...
wget writes a ~/.wget-hsts file with the HSTS information for any URI you have accessed that served an HSTS header.
Making it ignore --no-check-certificate if the file has an entry for the hostname you are visiting should be trivial, if it hasn't been done already.
Making it ignore --no-check-certificate if the file has an entry for the hostname you are visiting should be trivial, if it hasn't been done already.
Exactly.
[deleted]
You can configure most major browsers to forget HSTS entries they already know about, so to the question of who owns your browser wrt honoring HSTS, I'd say it's the user.
http://classically.me/blogs/how-clear-hsts-settings-major-br...
Though now I'm curious if Chrome can be configured to forget HSTS for Google sites.
http://classically.me/blogs/how-clear-hsts-settings-major-br...
Though now I'm curious if Chrome can be configured to forget HSTS for Google sites.
I'm not 100% certain, but is that to just delete the HSTS Header that is saved into the browser?
The manufacturer.
try typing 'badidea' on that page and report back if it works. :)
Can you explain that trick?
I Googled it and found this:
https://www.reddit.com/r/sysadmin/comments/42xd4i/chrome_dan...
https://www.reddit.com/r/sysadmin/comments/42xd4i/chrome_dan...
Well there's a nice little easter egg, I could have really done with that a week ago while doing a load of provision testing with LE staging certs!
I love how discoverable GUIs are.
[deleted]
Very nice :) Thanks.
actually works
I get the error on the NIST web site [0] as well. I do have the "Proceed to ..." option, though, as you can see in my screenshot [1].
The same thing happens on the Chase Bank URL [2] mentioned in the article. Clicking "Proceed to ..." then redirects me to another URL [3] which throws up the same error. If I click "Proceed to ..." on that URL, I then get an ironic login page [4].
[0]: https://www.nist.gov/
[1]: http://i.imgur.com/QbgBxyB.png
[2]: https://choosemyreward.chase.com/
[3]: https://chaseonline.chase.com/Logon.aspx
[4]: http://i.imgur.com/KFqiwNG.png
The same thing happens on the Chase Bank URL [2] mentioned in the article. Clicking "Proceed to ..." then redirects me to another URL [3] which throws up the same error. If I click "Proceed to ..." on that URL, I then get an ironic login page [4].
$ lsb_release -d
Description: Ubuntu 16.04.1 LTS
$ apt show chromium-browser | grep ^Version
Version: 53.0.2785.143-0ubuntu0.16.04.1.1254
$ chromium-browser --version
Chromium 53.0.2785.143 Built on Ubuntu , running on Ubuntu 16.04
[0]: https://www.nist.gov/
[1]: http://i.imgur.com/QbgBxyB.png
[2]: https://choosemyreward.chase.com/
[3]: https://chaseonline.chase.com/Logon.aspx
[4]: http://i.imgur.com/KFqiwNG.png
I do get the "proceed to www.xxx (unsafe)" under Advanced. Version 53.0.2785.143 Built on Ubuntu , running on Ubuntu 16.04 (64-bit)
> In my experience that past couple days, I get the warning on about 10-25% of major web sites.
I'm finding about the same, including major sites like Mint.com and Amazon (or part of Amazon's CDN for images, anyway). I'm running a slightly older Ubuntu and as of now, Chromium 53 is the latest in the repos...
I'm finding about the same, including major sites like Mint.com and Amazon (or part of Amazon's CDN for images, anyway). I'm running a slightly older Ubuntu and as of now, Chromium 53 is the latest in the repos...
"Too many websites have chosen redaction incorrectly"
I purchased a Symantec cert from ssls.com for one of my sites. I wasn't given the option of redacting anything.. yet I'm seeing this error with Chrome 53 in Linux. (I also have Chrome 54 on another computer, and it's working fine).
There are clearly other ways of ending up with a certificate that triggers this.
I purchased a Symantec cert from ssls.com for one of my sites. I wasn't given the option of redacting anything.. yet I'm seeing this error with Chrome 53 in Linux. (I also have Chrome 54 on another computer, and it's working fine).
There are clearly other ways of ending up with a certificate that triggers this.
Did you find your cert in the public log? What does the host name look like? Is it redacted? Maybe they did it without confirming with you, first :/
Checked, and it's not redacted.
> There are clearly other ways of ending up with a certificate that triggers this.
The update at the top of the blog post should explain why this error message is triggered even with an unredacted certificate.
The update at the top of the blog post should explain why this error message is triggered even with an unredacted certificate.
Yes, thanks. The cert isn't redacted. I read the update, then read the article, and forgot all about it. That probably explains it.
Would you mind sharing the domain?
The wider bug affects all versions of Ubuntu using Chromium from the universe repo, which is a 10 week old build of Chrome 53.
Launchpad bug: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/chromium-browser/+...
Launchpad bug: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/chromium-browser/+...
tl;dr: Symantec have tried to implement a broken version of Certificate Transparency on their Certs when IETF have not finished the spec.
As such new Symantec certificates don't work in newer versions of Chrome.
Crazy but true.
Kudos to the site owner - clear and simple and authoritative explanation
(Although I see the hand of politics behind this. "Hey we really fucked up the Google.com certificates. The board insists we do what Google wants and implement full certificate transparency by June 30. And it took two hours to explain it to the board so I am not going back to explain that it's all changed - Just implement the most recent IETF draft. Then I can tell the board it's done. What's the worst that can happen!"
Oh ....)
As such new Symantec certificates don't work in newer versions of Chrome.
Crazy but true.
Kudos to the site owner - clear and simple and authoritative explanation
(Although I see the hand of politics behind this. "Hey we really fucked up the Google.com certificates. The board insists we do what Google wants and implement full certificate transparency by June 30. And it took two hours to explain it to the board so I am not going back to explain that it's all changed - Just implement the most recent IETF draft. Then I can tell the board it's done. What's the worst that can happen!"
Oh ....)
I am in China, when I open baidu.com, zhihu.com, Chromium will throw the private error.
There is an interesting solution, on the page of private error, input "badidea", the browser will automaticly redirect to the targeted website. But it may be a "bad idea".
Now I use Firefox to open these sites.
Chrome had a different bypass password until recently. They've shown that when a password catches on among the wrong folks they will change it.
This bit me on both the NYT and WSJ websites this past week using Chrome 53; CDNs they were using both broke with this error. Upgrading to Chrome 54 seemed to solved the problem for me (I'm using arch linux, fwiw).
me too, i saw it on amazon broken. i updated my chromium and all good.
This has been wreaking havoc for matrix.org and riot.im all day - we blogged about it earlier: https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/14/ssl-issues-with-chromium. Tempted to move off RapidSSL wildcard certs to a bajillion LetsEncrypts...
Watch out for the rate limits: https://letsencrypt.org/docs/rate-limits/
Upgrade to fixed chromium from staging ppa on Ubuntu:
sudo add-apt-repository ppa:canonical-chromium-builds/stage sudo apt-get update sudo apt-get install chromium-browser
sudo add-apt-repository ppa:canonical-chromium-builds/stage sudo apt-get update sudo apt-get install chromium-browser
Was wondering why a bunch of websites were giving me ssl errors, but working in firefox.
Forgive my ignorance, but if you're issuing certificates for internal hostnames that you want to keep private, why would you need a public cert? Wouldn't an internal CA be better?
This is affecting Australia's Suncorp internet banking too. We reported the certificate error to them yesterday, and I've just updated that with a link to this article.
Happening with BofA too.
Interesting enough, just got this error trying to buy something on ebay for pay.ebay.com requiring transparency now.
[deleted]
No problem in Version 54.0.2840.100 (64-bit)
Somewhat off-topic but what a horrible bank they are.
A friend of mine's father almost got a heart attack by trying to refinance their underwater house. Despite of being a US veteran and government willing to sponsor their whole mortage through some special aid program, Chase chosen not to accept check from said agency. If that would be check from him they would gladly take it.. but not from gov. Government, of course will not want to write a check for him, so its a catch 22.
They currently file a lawsuit that Chase gladly accepted (thank God my friend has a good lawyer who took it pro-bono), but it just shows you to what extent they will go just to make an extra buck.
A friend of mine's father almost got a heart attack by trying to refinance their underwater house. Despite of being a US veteran and government willing to sponsor their whole mortage through some special aid program, Chase chosen not to accept check from said agency. If that would be check from him they would gladly take it.. but not from gov. Government, of course will not want to write a check for him, so its a catch 22.
They currently file a lawsuit that Chase gladly accepted (thank God my friend has a good lawyer who took it pro-bono), but it just shows you to what extent they will go just to make an extra buck.
1. In September, Chrome 53 was released, which enabled mandatory Certificate Transparency for Symantec certificates due to Symantec's history of incompetence. Some website operators, such as Chase, asked Symantec to submit their certificates to Certificate Transparency logs in such a way that the certificate wouldn't be trusted by Chrome, triggering the ERR_CERTIFICATE_TRANSPARENCY_REQUIRED error. This is when I wrote this blog post.
2. Last week, an internal timebomb expired in older versions of Chrome causing this error message for any website using a Symantec certificate issued since June. Basically, Chrome contains a list of Certificate Transparency logs that it trusts, and this list has a 10 week expiration date. So if Chrome was built more than 10 weeks ago, there would be no trusted Certificate Transparency logs, and therefore any certificate that was supposed to be logged (such as new Symantec certs) would be untrusted and display this error message. The Chrome team was able to fix this within 24 hours by remotely disabling CT enforcement in Chrome. (When Chrome starts up, it fetches a list of feature flags from a Chrome server using a system called Finch which is independent of the normal upgrade system.)
3. Today, the Chromium packages in several Linux distros, including Ubuntu, became 10 weeks old. For some reason, they have not picked up the Finch update, and so they are displaying this error message for all Symantec certificates issued since June. This is not confirmed yet, but the current hypothesis is that the distros have disabled Finch for privacy reasons. It will probably require a distro package upgrade to fix.