How Scientists Got Climate Change So Wrong(nytimes.com)
nytimes.com
How Scientists Got Climate Change So Wrong
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/08/opinion/sunday/science-climate-change.html
54 comments
Bear in mind the actuality has tended to come far faster than the IPCC predictions. The IPCC, being a UN body of government appointed scientists, economists etc, consistently take an overly conservative view. There's been criticism of this over the years.
From seven years ago: https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-the-ipcc-unde...
IPCC includes representatives from the oil and coal states, and those reports require unanimity. What gets published tends to the blandest interpretation possible so that the oil states, coal exporters and the couple of countries pretending it isn't happening can agree too.
Saudi has tried to significantly tone down reports to protect their oil interests to name but one. It's far from the sole incident:
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/earth-insight/2014/m...
From seven years ago: https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-the-ipcc-unde...
IPCC includes representatives from the oil and coal states, and those reports require unanimity. What gets published tends to the blandest interpretation possible so that the oil states, coal exporters and the couple of countries pretending it isn't happening can agree too.
Saudi has tried to significantly tone down reports to protect their oil interests to name but one. It's far from the sole incident:
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/earth-insight/2014/m...
The IPCC, being a UN body of government appointed scientists, economists etc, consistently take an overly conservative view
No, IPCC predictions have been wrong/over-aggressive in the past. Their 1990 long range predictions can be compared against the present now and are 40% out:
http://joannenova.com.au/2012/05/the-ipcc-1990-far-predictio...
People have a tendency to cherry pick predictions that worked out or which assert a requirement for even more panic, whilst ignoring predictions that didn't work out (of which there are many).
Your argument is basically unfalsifiable: scientists must be listened to because they all agree (itself a dubious or false claim), but the internationally agreed consensus must not be listened to because it's "bland" and influenced by people who might disagree (but who in the end endorsed the report anyway).
It appears that evidence is only accepted as legitimate if it's more alarming than past evidence: how could this argument ever ramp itself down? And how can the argument both be argument by authority whilst simultaneously attacking the credibility of those authorities?
No, IPCC predictions have been wrong/over-aggressive in the past. Their 1990 long range predictions can be compared against the present now and are 40% out:
http://joannenova.com.au/2012/05/the-ipcc-1990-far-predictio...
People have a tendency to cherry pick predictions that worked out or which assert a requirement for even more panic, whilst ignoring predictions that didn't work out (of which there are many).
Your argument is basically unfalsifiable: scientists must be listened to because they all agree (itself a dubious or false claim), but the internationally agreed consensus must not be listened to because it's "bland" and influenced by people who might disagree (but who in the end endorsed the report anyway).
It appears that evidence is only accepted as legitimate if it's more alarming than past evidence: how could this argument ever ramp itself down? And how can the argument both be argument by authority whilst simultaneously attacking the credibility of those authorities?
That seems to be exactly what you are doing -- one cherry picked alleged mistake at your link as against 8 instances of under-estimate in that old Scientific American article, and the instances picked up by this NYT piece. A link I might add that is a highly dubious source[1] who is already demonstrably wrong on extent of current warming, and has written for the Heartland Institute[1][2], a bunch of extremist idiots -- notably with no scientific credentials -- who think CATO too moderate. All you need to know is revealed by their continued denial, even today, of the link between tobacco and health[3].
Her about page quotes proudly Matt Ridley and James Delingpole - two outright and consistent liars on climate and multiple other topics over decades. Both well known UK climate deniers who you absolutely don't want to be lauded by if you want a shred of credibility. Ridley, the man who brought down a bank (Northern Rock) in 08, then claimed the answer would have been less regulation and he was in no way to blame - the inquiries found him to blame and specifically criticised him for bringing Britain and British banking into disrepute.
So at the very least I would want independent confirmation from a reputable source that her outlying view of climate sensitivity and the IPCC's alleged error is even accurate. She can't even quote SkepticalScience accurately or honestly, but cherry picks part of what they wrote to try and paint them incorrectly as fools.
I'm not suggesting we do not listen to the IPCC either, just that they have on past performance been found to be consistently conservative in their estimates. That's borne out by their structure, their errors of omission, and that they give little to no consideration to tipping points and non-linear impacts -- which is understandable given that some are unknown and none are amenable to modelling. Both issues highlighted in that Scientific American piece. Put another way IPCC reports are the least impact we can probably expect, which the data is bearing out as years pass.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joanne_Nova
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Heartland_Institute
[3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Heartland_Institute#Tobacc...
Her about page quotes proudly Matt Ridley and James Delingpole - two outright and consistent liars on climate and multiple other topics over decades. Both well known UK climate deniers who you absolutely don't want to be lauded by if you want a shred of credibility. Ridley, the man who brought down a bank (Northern Rock) in 08, then claimed the answer would have been less regulation and he was in no way to blame - the inquiries found him to blame and specifically criticised him for bringing Britain and British banking into disrepute.
So at the very least I would want independent confirmation from a reputable source that her outlying view of climate sensitivity and the IPCC's alleged error is even accurate. She can't even quote SkepticalScience accurately or honestly, but cherry picks part of what they wrote to try and paint them incorrectly as fools.
I'm not suggesting we do not listen to the IPCC either, just that they have on past performance been found to be consistently conservative in their estimates. That's borne out by their structure, their errors of omission, and that they give little to no consideration to tipping points and non-linear impacts -- which is understandable given that some are unknown and none are amenable to modelling. Both issues highlighted in that Scientific American piece. Put another way IPCC reports are the least impact we can probably expect, which the data is bearing out as years pass.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joanne_Nova
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Heartland_Institute
[3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Heartland_Institute#Tobacc...
Without getting into who is a crank and who isn’t, I think the following point from the post you’re replying to really gets to the heart of my consternation:
> And how can the argument both be argument by authority whilst simultaneously attacking the credibility of those authorities?
If people are supposed to believe the IPCC because it’s a consensus statement, how can you then ask them to then assume the IPCC is wrong? Who is the scientific authority we’re supposed to trust more than the IPCC?
Your assertion that the IPCC “gives too little consideration to tipping points” highlights the issue. The IPCC seems to have considered runaway greenhouse gas effects and rejected them as “unlikely.” Why should we disregard those conclusions?
> And how can the argument both be argument by authority whilst simultaneously attacking the credibility of those authorities?
If people are supposed to believe the IPCC because it’s a consensus statement, how can you then ask them to then assume the IPCC is wrong? Who is the scientific authority we’re supposed to trust more than the IPCC?
Your assertion that the IPCC “gives too little consideration to tipping points” highlights the issue. The IPCC seems to have considered runaway greenhouse gas effects and rejected them as “unlikely.” Why should we disregard those conclusions?
I'm not suggesting to assume the IPCC is wrong - but that the reports have a conservative outlook. In some respects that's a good thing in that outlying and unclear studies and predictions will be omitted, yet some of those outliers may turn out to be accurate and the middle of the road view wrong. That's fine and expected, if frustrating at times.
In other respects, notably the structure of having a political approval stage for reports has, if that Guardian Saudi piece is to be believed, subsequently toned down those consensus views -- under pressure from home for political or economic reasons. There's also an awful lot of "he said, she said", meaning it's impossible to reach certainty from those reports. Without criticising any nation's scientific and economic representatives involved in the preparation phase, there are multiple representatives criticising that final political approval phase... Draw your own conclusions.
The upshot for those of us trying to make sense of it is IPCC tends to a very diligent presentation of the least contentious, which subsequent measurements have shown to have underestimated it on multiple occasions. Which leaves me thinking IPCC reports a best-case scenario: I believe them, it's the best consensus we have, but am not surprised if something crops up that turns out to be worse or more significant than projected. I still find that far better than had they been over-estimating impacts consistently. YMMV. :)
Specifically on tipping points, they're likely to always be something of an unknown before they actually tip. Once a threshold has been passed and an ice sheet thought safe for decades collapses, or permafrost tips into catastrophic melting it's clear the threshold was passed, and we know from hindsight. Predicting and modelling on the other hand will probably remain near impossible - we only really know after it's switched. Which is, of course, after it's too late and tipping them back effectively impossible.
That said, that old Scientific American article mentioned they would be including some consideration to threats from tipping points and non-linear effects from 2014.
In other respects, notably the structure of having a political approval stage for reports has, if that Guardian Saudi piece is to be believed, subsequently toned down those consensus views -- under pressure from home for political or economic reasons. There's also an awful lot of "he said, she said", meaning it's impossible to reach certainty from those reports. Without criticising any nation's scientific and economic representatives involved in the preparation phase, there are multiple representatives criticising that final political approval phase... Draw your own conclusions.
The upshot for those of us trying to make sense of it is IPCC tends to a very diligent presentation of the least contentious, which subsequent measurements have shown to have underestimated it on multiple occasions. Which leaves me thinking IPCC reports a best-case scenario: I believe them, it's the best consensus we have, but am not surprised if something crops up that turns out to be worse or more significant than projected. I still find that far better than had they been over-estimating impacts consistently. YMMV. :)
Specifically on tipping points, they're likely to always be something of an unknown before they actually tip. Once a threshold has been passed and an ice sheet thought safe for decades collapses, or permafrost tips into catastrophic melting it's clear the threshold was passed, and we know from hindsight. Predicting and modelling on the other hand will probably remain near impossible - we only really know after it's switched. Which is, of course, after it's too late and tipping them back effectively impossible.
That said, that old Scientific American article mentioned they would be including some consideration to threats from tipping points and non-linear effects from 2014.
The IPCC isn't written in a vacuum. They are well aware of the political realities, and there are always fights between the draft stage and the final report. As a result, the projects are skewed the the most conservative end range of possible outcomes, as no matter what is said there will be pushback and it is easier to defend the less aggressive projections than the median or aggressive projections.
Part of the problem is that the IPCC in most of the more conservative scenarios were assuming humanity acted on climate change and limited CO2e emissions or that their growth at least tapered off (they did for a while after the 2008 crises).
I can predict that if you save $1 every year that you'll have $10 in 10 years, but if you don't save that $1 then the prediction isn't wrong even though it doesn't reflect reality.
I can predict that if you save $1 every year that you'll have $10 in 10 years, but if you don't save that $1 then the prediction isn't wrong even though it doesn't reflect reality.
Speaking of consensus, someone happened to post https://stephenschneider.stanford.edu/Publications/PDF_Paper... (2003) today, in which it is argued that consensus science is not science at all.
It seems pretty fool-hardy to me to think that we shouldn't act on climate change on the chance that we can simply spend a few dozen trillion a few decades down the road to try to mop up the problem.
Perhaps we should find a report that also analyzes how much human suffering and ecological damage would occur with a 3 degree C increase versus a 1.5 increase?
One point that isn't stressed enough is how much humanity depends on rich ecosystems for so much of our technology, medicine, and science. Life would be much harder for us on an ecologically devastated Earth.
Perhaps we should find a report that also analyzes how much human suffering and ecological damage would occur with a 3 degree C increase versus a 1.5 increase?
One point that isn't stressed enough is how much humanity depends on rich ecosystems for so much of our technology, medicine, and science. Life would be much harder for us on an ecologically devastated Earth.
The more important cutoffs are, as usual, based on water availability for agriculture and consumption.
Really bad negative impact at near 2 C. Problems in Mediterranean area, most China and India, and southern USA. On the other hand, floods in Scandinavia.
Ecological damage is not even funny at 1 C which is about where we are now, with accelerated desertification and serious water availability problems in Africa and Middle East. (Also no more evaporative cooling due to lack of water.)
Every 1 C averaged is about 5% sharper water cycle. That's not counting the potential for runaway heating due to activation of putative hydrocarbon sources in permafrost or under glaciers.
Really bad negative impact at near 2 C. Problems in Mediterranean area, most China and India, and southern USA. On the other hand, floods in Scandinavia.
Ecological damage is not even funny at 1 C which is about where we are now, with accelerated desertification and serious water availability problems in Africa and Middle East. (Also no more evaporative cooling due to lack of water.)
Every 1 C averaged is about 5% sharper water cycle. That's not counting the potential for runaway heating due to activation of putative hydrocarbon sources in permafrost or under glaciers.
> It seems pretty fool-hardy to me to think that we shouldn't act on climate change on the chance that we can simply spend a few dozen trillion a few decades down the road to try to mop up the problem.
That’s not what the UN report means. What they’re saying is that GDP will be that much lower from the effects of climate change (extreme weather events, loss of farm land, rising water, etc.)
If we’re really looking at a 10-15% reduction in GDP, that suggests we shouldn’t take drastic steps in response to climate change. Massive restructuring of the economy like the Green New Deal could easily cost us more than 10-15% in GDP. And most likely it won’t work, so we’ll suffer the double whammy of reduced growth plus the effects of climate change.
That’s not what the UN report means. What they’re saying is that GDP will be that much lower from the effects of climate change (extreme weather events, loss of farm land, rising water, etc.)
If we’re really looking at a 10-15% reduction in GDP, that suggests we shouldn’t take drastic steps in response to climate change. Massive restructuring of the economy like the Green New Deal could easily cost us more than 10-15% in GDP. And most likely it won’t work, so we’ll suffer the double whammy of reduced growth plus the effects of climate change.
I suspect that the problem will end up being something quite 'simple.' Our time didn't have the horsepower nor know how to accurately compute feedback loops in our environment. We didn't understand the numerous and unforeseeable tipping points that we tipped. We didn't understand the dance of nature and how disparate events tied into the pattern of our actions.
The deliberations, however, are over and the verdict is in. We have done fucked up. There's no point in lamenting our failure. We've made the mess and now we need to fix it. The only real question facing us is how.
Whether it's carbon sinks in the form of olivine and 20 million trees, new methods to suck carbon out of the air, or some desperate act of geoengineering. Humanity needs to come to grips with the situation and act quickly and decisively. Like we did with nuclear weapons and space races. An Earth Race (so that we don't regress), if you will.
The deliberations, however, are over and the verdict is in. We have done fucked up. There's no point in lamenting our failure. We've made the mess and now we need to fix it. The only real question facing us is how.
Whether it's carbon sinks in the form of olivine and 20 million trees, new methods to suck carbon out of the air, or some desperate act of geoengineering. Humanity needs to come to grips with the situation and act quickly and decisively. Like we did with nuclear weapons and space races. An Earth Race (so that we don't regress), if you will.
What does "quickly and decisively" mean in term of timeframe?
The IPCC's 2014 AR5 WG3 report is the latest to provide a detailed mitigations response. That would be the concensus view. There are a wide range of others.
I've only just now looked it up, so while I can't answer your question directly, it's all but certainly the most comrepensive concensus answer you'll find.
https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg3/
For the Paris accords: net negative emissions by 2050, now 30 years away.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_warming#/media/File%3AM...
I've only just now looked it up, so while I can't answer your question directly, it's all but certainly the most comrepensive concensus answer you'll find.
https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg3/
For the Paris accords: net negative emissions by 2050, now 30 years away.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_warming#/media/File%3AM...
When people riot in the streets and demand their luxuries back, what will you do to stop it? Authoritarian repression? Massacres?
Yellow vest protests in France were caused by a modest increase in fuel taxes. Serious belt-tightening to stop global warming is going to be far worse in most countries - heck, France already generates most of their energy from nuclear and renewables so they are way ahead of the US and others.
Yellow vest protests in France were caused by a modest increase in fuel taxes. Serious belt-tightening to stop global warming is going to be far worse in most countries - heck, France already generates most of their energy from nuclear and renewables so they are way ahead of the US and others.
Meanwhile in the UK, nearly half of Conservative voters and a majority of the country think we should be aiming to decarbonise far faster[1]. Namely by 2030 and not kicked off into the long grass of 2050 as the government committed to. Committed to purely because they don't have to _do_ anything. Apparently even their voters aren't properly signed up to the denial hymn sheet.
Yellow vest protests were far more about inequality than a modest increase in fuel taxes. If government makes an equitable policy that spares the poorest in society the disproportionate impact that would naturally fall on them, there need be no riots - especially if they had a warm, well insulated house for the first time. The middle classes don't, generally speaking, riot.
So what luxuries are you expecting to be taken? Decarbonising doesn't mean deindustrialising. It means winding back some of the excesses of capitalism and consumerism. Done properly we should expect better made, longer lasting but sustainable products. Which I suppose should have the multinationals rioting if we take away planned obsolescence... :)
[1] https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/nov/07/majority...
Yellow vest protests were far more about inequality than a modest increase in fuel taxes. If government makes an equitable policy that spares the poorest in society the disproportionate impact that would naturally fall on them, there need be no riots - especially if they had a warm, well insulated house for the first time. The middle classes don't, generally speaking, riot.
So what luxuries are you expecting to be taken? Decarbonising doesn't mean deindustrialising. It means winding back some of the excesses of capitalism and consumerism. Done properly we should expect better made, longer lasting but sustainable products. Which I suppose should have the multinationals rioting if we take away planned obsolescence... :)
[1] https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/nov/07/majority...
In terms of luxuries being taken away, I’d point to electricity and transportation as the #1. For those calling for immediate decarbonization, that would mean shutting down all our coal, gas, and oil burning power plants and scrapping our gas burning cars. Electric heating costs more than gas heating, electric cars cost more than gas cars, and so on. All of these costs hit ordinary people directly in the pocketbook.
Economists estimate a carbon tax high enough to force fossil fuel plants offline in a couple decades would need to be quite high. Meanwhile, in democratic societies like the USA it’s very difficult to even raise the gas tax a few cents to fund needed repairs to bridges and other infrastructure. To get people out of their SUV’s and into Teslas, for instance, you’d need to put multi-dollar taxes on gas to make it make sense (e.g. Norway where Tesla is doing well because they put a 100% tax on normal gas cars). Democratic elections often result in the rejection of such taxes because voters value their immediate standard of living over that of future decades (e.g. WA state initiatives for carbon taxes, which were soundly rejected at the ballot box in 2016 and 2018).
And to do all this without affecting the standard of living of the poor and middle classes, and without slowing down the growth of developing countries and China - I think it’s a bit of a dream. There’s a reason market-based societies selected to use fossil fuel technology and it’s because it’s cheaper than other energy generation tech. Transitioning off of it is now a massive capital investment and will hurt.
You say the yellow vest protest were about inequality - but the result of them was that the fuel tax was put on hold and the speed limit was kept high.
Economists estimate a carbon tax high enough to force fossil fuel plants offline in a couple decades would need to be quite high. Meanwhile, in democratic societies like the USA it’s very difficult to even raise the gas tax a few cents to fund needed repairs to bridges and other infrastructure. To get people out of their SUV’s and into Teslas, for instance, you’d need to put multi-dollar taxes on gas to make it make sense (e.g. Norway where Tesla is doing well because they put a 100% tax on normal gas cars). Democratic elections often result in the rejection of such taxes because voters value their immediate standard of living over that of future decades (e.g. WA state initiatives for carbon taxes, which were soundly rejected at the ballot box in 2016 and 2018).
And to do all this without affecting the standard of living of the poor and middle classes, and without slowing down the growth of developing countries and China - I think it’s a bit of a dream. There’s a reason market-based societies selected to use fossil fuel technology and it’s because it’s cheaper than other energy generation tech. Transitioning off of it is now a massive capital investment and will hurt.
You say the yellow vest protest were about inequality - but the result of them was that the fuel tax was put on hold and the speed limit was kept high.
That doesn't make sense though. If you're outside the USA, ending coal is coming. It might just take a little longer in the US and Poland. The UK has, I think, five remaining coal plants - all spending 90% of their time idling as source of last resort. They'll all be gone before 2025. Offshore wind is already competitive with gas, and the expectation is it will be cheaper than existing gas in the next round of auctions, i.e. electricity will cost less from closing and demolishing gas plants and building new offshore wind.
There we do get to a slight issue - UK doesn't currently have enough pumped hydro or other storage to underpin 100% renewables, so gas will probably survive a while as the fill in source, in lieu of batteries and pumped storage.
That has been done with a low carbon tax - $25 per ton[1][2]. Brought in under the Conservative coalition government - not one you'd expect to tax excessively. Democratic societies in Europe manage to tax petrol and diesel enough to bring it to double or more the US price.
You're conflating far too much though. Elections come with hundreds of promises and policies - there are multiple issues, and multiple often conflicting policies that get or lose a vote. It is exceptionally rare for a single point to swing a vote one way or another. Thus despite winning politicians of every nation trying to claim 100% support of every controversial policy, nothing could be further from the truth.
As far as being equitable is concerned, it's perfectly feasible to bring a carbon tax that spends the take subsidising the poorest to enable them to insulate their home, get solar panels, or replace their car with an EV. Maybe with a policy to build out or subsidise more public transport. Car taxes based on a combination of weight and emissions should help push the rest toward EVs. If voters consistently claim they want more action, and far faster, then it's reasonable to suppose that at least most realise that will come with a cost, whether in increased state borrowing or adjusted taxes. The magic money tree only gets brought out for illegal military adventures in Iraq.
Without going into growth as an unwise Ponzi scheme, there's no reason to suppose huge spending on modern sustainable infrastructure would hurt economies - it would boost a new and growing sector in place of an incumbent. Growth would probably surge due to the additional government funded activity. The New Deal was an attempt to boost the economy though didn't spend enough - ultimately it was spending on WW2 rearming that brought the necessary effect. Little wonder some transition policies have been labelled Green New Deal - attempting to achieve similar during a transition to sustainability. The logic is sound, though I don't know enough detail to know if the numbers add up.
Fossil simply isn't the cheapest fuel any more, far from it. Which is why the transition is happening anyway, even without policies to encourage or require it.
[1] https://arstechnica.com/science/2019/10/uk-renewables-out-ge...
[2] https://www.carbonbrief.org/analysis-uk-renewables-generate-...
There we do get to a slight issue - UK doesn't currently have enough pumped hydro or other storage to underpin 100% renewables, so gas will probably survive a while as the fill in source, in lieu of batteries and pumped storage.
That has been done with a low carbon tax - $25 per ton[1][2]. Brought in under the Conservative coalition government - not one you'd expect to tax excessively. Democratic societies in Europe manage to tax petrol and diesel enough to bring it to double or more the US price.
You're conflating far too much though. Elections come with hundreds of promises and policies - there are multiple issues, and multiple often conflicting policies that get or lose a vote. It is exceptionally rare for a single point to swing a vote one way or another. Thus despite winning politicians of every nation trying to claim 100% support of every controversial policy, nothing could be further from the truth.
As far as being equitable is concerned, it's perfectly feasible to bring a carbon tax that spends the take subsidising the poorest to enable them to insulate their home, get solar panels, or replace their car with an EV. Maybe with a policy to build out or subsidise more public transport. Car taxes based on a combination of weight and emissions should help push the rest toward EVs. If voters consistently claim they want more action, and far faster, then it's reasonable to suppose that at least most realise that will come with a cost, whether in increased state borrowing or adjusted taxes. The magic money tree only gets brought out for illegal military adventures in Iraq.
Without going into growth as an unwise Ponzi scheme, there's no reason to suppose huge spending on modern sustainable infrastructure would hurt economies - it would boost a new and growing sector in place of an incumbent. Growth would probably surge due to the additional government funded activity. The New Deal was an attempt to boost the economy though didn't spend enough - ultimately it was spending on WW2 rearming that brought the necessary effect. Little wonder some transition policies have been labelled Green New Deal - attempting to achieve similar during a transition to sustainability. The logic is sound, though I don't know enough detail to know if the numbers add up.
Fossil simply isn't the cheapest fuel any more, far from it. Which is why the transition is happening anyway, even without policies to encourage or require it.
[1] https://arstechnica.com/science/2019/10/uk-renewables-out-ge...
[2] https://www.carbonbrief.org/analysis-uk-renewables-generate-...
The transition is happening, but we’re nowhere near on pace for negative carbon by 2050. Here in the US, most of our emissions reduction has been switching from coal to gas, while energy consumption continues to rise and politicians block offshore wind farms for aesthetic reasons (e.g. Cape wind in MA).
Once the coal->gas transition completes, the easy gains on emissions reduction are gone - now it’s cheap, already built gas plants with cheap fracked gas that need to be out competed by renewables + as yet to be invented cost-effective storage technologies.
GND policies don’t add up as far as I can tell, in fact they are probably counter productive since they promise voters that they can have carbon friendly policies and everything else they want too.
I’d be happy to see a tax on carbon and more subsidies for green cars and so on (right now, a gas car is still a better deal despite the tax subsidy on electric, especially with our low US gas prices). But I’m skeptical that we’re anywhere near on track to convincing voters to get behind it.
[1] https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogerpielke/2019/11/10/the-surp...
Once the coal->gas transition completes, the easy gains on emissions reduction are gone - now it’s cheap, already built gas plants with cheap fracked gas that need to be out competed by renewables + as yet to be invented cost-effective storage technologies.
GND policies don’t add up as far as I can tell, in fact they are probably counter productive since they promise voters that they can have carbon friendly policies and everything else they want too.
I’d be happy to see a tax on carbon and more subsidies for green cars and so on (right now, a gas car is still a better deal despite the tax subsidy on electric, especially with our low US gas prices). But I’m skeptical that we’re anywhere near on track to convincing voters to get behind it.
[1] https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogerpielke/2019/11/10/the-surp...
Now there I agree, but that appears down to the unique success anti-science lobbying is having in the US right now. The US has long had a political structure that is not amenable to regulation -- so it comes particularly slowly, and often later than elsewhere.
Forbes piece is correct that much coal has been replaced by gas, but it is not (necessarily) as bad as it tries to make out. That mirrors the UK experience 10 or so years ago, when we had a dash for gas. Already those gas plants are becoming uneconomic -- so much for their expected 50+ year life. We've already had a couple of closures, and one of the gas generators are busy trying to pivot to renewables. This under a Conservative government that has outlawed cheaper onshore wind and backed fracking, two decisions even their own membership disagree with.
So it may well be gas starts dropping out of US generation in a decade, not ideal, but potentially OK on course for 2050 neutrality. US gas prices and love of the car may prove more intractable, but I haven't quite lost hope yet.
Forbes piece is correct that much coal has been replaced by gas, but it is not (necessarily) as bad as it tries to make out. That mirrors the UK experience 10 or so years ago, when we had a dash for gas. Already those gas plants are becoming uneconomic -- so much for their expected 50+ year life. We've already had a couple of closures, and one of the gas generators are busy trying to pivot to renewables. This under a Conservative government that has outlawed cheaper onshore wind and backed fracking, two decisions even their own membership disagree with.
So it may well be gas starts dropping out of US generation in a decade, not ideal, but potentially OK on course for 2050 neutrality. US gas prices and love of the car may prove more intractable, but I haven't quite lost hope yet.
> Yellow vest protests in France were caused by a modest increase in fuel taxes.
Ans: Stop with the neoliberal rubber hose type solutions to problems.
Ans: Stop with the neoliberal rubber hose type solutions to problems.
If you'd like to read a comprehensive if rather depressing look at the question of how politics responds to the challenges of limits and scarcity, I'd strongly recommend William Ophuls, particularly his original Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity:
https://www.worldcat.org/title/ecology-and-the-politics-of-s...
(That's the 1992 revised edition, original was published in 1977: https://www.worldcat.org/title/ecology-and-the-politics-of-s...)
That book was just the start of a life's work addressing precisely your question. The answer, as much as there is one, is rather much a comprehensive full-court offensive. Addressing inequality and past wrongs is absolutely a part of the problem, and one that's been with us since the start.
Other notable authors addressing this question and problem include Robert Wright, notable for his 2004 Massey Lecture series (Canada) "A Short History of Progress":
https://www.cbc.ca/radio/ideas/the-2004-cbc-massey-lectures-...
Also Joseph Tainter, The Collapse of Complex Societies (https://www.worldcat.org/title/collapse-of-complex-societies...)
And Jared Diamond, Collapse: How societies choose to fail or succeed (https://www.worldcat.org/title/collapse-how-societies-choose...)
All are intelligent, dilligent authors with extensive bibliographies for further reading, including both supporting evidence and counterarguments.
It's reading many of the so-called rebuttals or dismissals of such viewpoints which I've found particularly compelling support for the general arguments of collapse.
I'm not entirely sure who his current equivalents are, though Thomas Homer-Dixon is probably on that list:
https://www.worldcat.org/search?q=au%3Athomas+homer-dixon&qt...
https://homerdixon.com
https://www.worldcat.org/title/ecology-and-the-politics-of-s...
(That's the 1992 revised edition, original was published in 1977: https://www.worldcat.org/title/ecology-and-the-politics-of-s...)
That book was just the start of a life's work addressing precisely your question. The answer, as much as there is one, is rather much a comprehensive full-court offensive. Addressing inequality and past wrongs is absolutely a part of the problem, and one that's been with us since the start.
Other notable authors addressing this question and problem include Robert Wright, notable for his 2004 Massey Lecture series (Canada) "A Short History of Progress":
https://www.cbc.ca/radio/ideas/the-2004-cbc-massey-lectures-...
Also Joseph Tainter, The Collapse of Complex Societies (https://www.worldcat.org/title/collapse-of-complex-societies...)
And Jared Diamond, Collapse: How societies choose to fail or succeed (https://www.worldcat.org/title/collapse-how-societies-choose...)
All are intelligent, dilligent authors with extensive bibliographies for further reading, including both supporting evidence and counterarguments.
It's reading many of the so-called rebuttals or dismissals of such viewpoints which I've found particularly compelling support for the general arguments of collapse.
I'm not entirely sure who his current equivalents are, though Thomas Homer-Dixon is probably on that list:
https://www.worldcat.org/search?q=au%3Athomas+homer-dixon&qt...
https://homerdixon.com
I suggest dropping Jared Diamond, since, while he is apparently a decent ornithologist, his works on history are largely rubbish.
Which specifically?
"Guns, Germs, and Steel" tries to explain a timeline of world history that doesn't exist. In particular, he begins with the idea that western Europe had more "cargo" from the beginning and stayed ahead, which is blatantly false when you look back past the Dutch cornering the triangle trade in the east and the Spanish looting the Americas. He also pretends to invent the idea of geographical determination of history, ignoring over a century of literature on the subject where the initial enthusiasm for the idea was steadily tempered until it was taken as one factor among many.
"Collapse" uses case studies, such as that of Rapa Nui, that are just plain wrong. If you start from wrong data, you can't expect to get much of anywhere.
I stopped bothering with him at that point. He goes over the exact same ground that anthropologists and historians have long before and makes many of the mistakes again.
He's an excellent writer. I wish his content weren't so inaccurate.
"Collapse" uses case studies, such as that of Rapa Nui, that are just plain wrong. If you start from wrong data, you can't expect to get much of anywhere.
I stopped bothering with him at that point. He goes over the exact same ground that anthropologists and historians have long before and makes many of the mistakes again.
He's an excellent writer. I wish his content weren't so inaccurate.
Nowhere does Diamond claim to have invented geographic determinism. He does suggest a model for a specific mechanism, largely urbanisation (accounting for much of the terms), technology, and a wide range of domesticated animals, including multiple heavy draft animals. Not all of these are specific to Western Europe, and several decidedly did not originate there.
Going beyond the Age of Discovery to why it was the West that industrialised ~1800, rather than other places and times, has occupied a great many writers. Karl Polnyi's The Great Transformation, a whole set of economic history texts edited by Joel Mokyr (the Princeton Economic History of the World), notably Pomeranz, The Great Divergence, Clark's A Farewell to Alms, and Mokyr's on (not part of the series) Gifts of Athena, A Culture of Growth, The British Industrial Revolution, and Lever of Riches. The question of "why Europe and not China?" is literally The Needham Question, which occupied British sinologist Joseph Needham for his entire life (and beyond -- his Science and Civilisation in China is still being written, approaching 70 years since it began, and two decades after Needham's own death.
Much of the criticism of Diamond's work smells far more to me of academic jealousy over not respecting borders. Several of the broad-brush elements you describe simply aren't valid. Others are details of larger theory which may require revisiting, but don't invalidate the whole.
Again: I'd asked for specific criticisms, preferably references to the best specific critiques available. Most I've seen are, as yours, vague, broad, and themselves grossly flawed.
Or for another view, Barbara King at NPR:
https://www.npr.org/sections/13.7/2013/01/14/169374400/why-d...
Going beyond the Age of Discovery to why it was the West that industrialised ~1800, rather than other places and times, has occupied a great many writers. Karl Polnyi's The Great Transformation, a whole set of economic history texts edited by Joel Mokyr (the Princeton Economic History of the World), notably Pomeranz, The Great Divergence, Clark's A Farewell to Alms, and Mokyr's on (not part of the series) Gifts of Athena, A Culture of Growth, The British Industrial Revolution, and Lever of Riches. The question of "why Europe and not China?" is literally The Needham Question, which occupied British sinologist Joseph Needham for his entire life (and beyond -- his Science and Civilisation in China is still being written, approaching 70 years since it began, and two decades after Needham's own death.
Much of the criticism of Diamond's work smells far more to me of academic jealousy over not respecting borders. Several of the broad-brush elements you describe simply aren't valid. Others are details of larger theory which may require revisiting, but don't invalidate the whole.
Again: I'd asked for specific criticisms, preferably references to the best specific critiques available. Most I've seen are, as yours, vague, broad, and themselves grossly flawed.
Or for another view, Barbara King at NPR:
https://www.npr.org/sections/13.7/2013/01/14/169374400/why-d...
> Nowhere does Diamond claim to have invented geographic determinism.
He claims exactly that in the introduction to his book, alongside the explicit thesis that the west had more "cargo" to start and continued to.
> Much of the criticism of Diamond's work smells far more to me of academic jealousy over not respecting borders.
What would it look like if it were historians dismissing poor work?
> Most I've seen are, as yours, vague, broad, and themselves grossly flawed.
Broad, yes. Vague, no. One of the central methodological problems in history is the selection of facts and material from which to construct an account. Diamond selects facts and material which support his theory, which is not a defensible choice. This is a broad critique, and it invalidates the whole work whether or not his particulars are correct.
He claims exactly that in the introduction to his book, alongside the explicit thesis that the west had more "cargo" to start and continued to.
> Much of the criticism of Diamond's work smells far more to me of academic jealousy over not respecting borders.
What would it look like if it were historians dismissing poor work?
> Most I've seen are, as yours, vague, broad, and themselves grossly flawed.
Broad, yes. Vague, no. One of the central methodological problems in history is the selection of facts and material from which to construct an account. Diamond selects facts and material which support his theory, which is not a defensible choice. This is a broad critique, and it invalidates the whole work whether or not his particulars are correct.
Now. Work on solutions now. There are lots of them and we should all be doing our part.
Along those lines, but more than that:
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=21511026
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=21511026
I really hate this headline and I don’t think it should be rewarded with clicks. NYT knows that a certain population is going to read that headline, and nothing else, and then take away that “they were right all along and climate change isn’t real”. It does absolutely nothing to help move things in the right direction and just further fuels the fire of false “debate” over the issue.
I hate clickbait as much as the next person but in this case... aren't the people you're talking about the people you want to read the article?
Most people don’t actually read the articles. They just scan the headlines and take away whatever they want from that. This would have been much better if the headline was more like: Scientists grossly underestimated the impact of climate change. That would have been sensationalistic while also conveying the main point of the article to those people.
I guess the fear is they will not read the article at all. Just twitter the title along. Which is probably a reasonable assumption.
My understanding is that many climate scientists want to avoid a kind of paralyzing alarmism/catastrophic fatalism, and that this might be where the conservative consensus comes from.
Just as a thought experiment, suppose the best prediction that could be made right now would see the earth's carrying capacity drop to under a billion people in the next 50 years. What would you expect to see different, in media, in papers in top journals, in public discourse, than we see right now? I think the world might look just as we see it today.
There is no going back, our entire way of living is unsustainable, climate change is going to happen. Good news is, planet Earth will be fine, give it a few thousand years, it has survived far worse.
It is sustainable, barely, with major reinvestment into nuclear, renewable and electric battery storage, for about 300 years. (Taking into consideration countries catching up on development and increased demands for air conditioning and water purification. This is a conservative time estimate, there are more nuclear fuel sources.)
That's not too long of a time, but maybe enough to solve these problems in any number of available ways, from biotechnology through cybernetics, nanotechnology, new advanced energy sources (some of which are being developed right now), even perhaps space travel or mega structures.
That's not too long of a time, but maybe enough to solve these problems in any number of available ways, from biotechnology through cybernetics, nanotechnology, new advanced energy sources (some of which are being developed right now), even perhaps space travel or mega structures.
An element of this story and challenge is the nature of technology. I've spent a few years on the problem of what technology is, or more specifically, what technolgical mechanisms are. There several obvious ones: new fuel sources, materials, better understandings of processes, and information flows -- acquisition, processing, storage and retrieval, transmission, and controls. I've come up with a list of eight.
It wasn't until some time that I hit on a ninth element, what I've called "hygiene factors", in that the address the overall health of a system or the human technosphere and environent. They're based on unintended consequences, a term introduced in 1936 by the sociologist Robert K. Merckton, which he describes (I'm just realising) using the same term I'd landed on: manifest and latent functions and dysfunctions.[1][2][3]
Hygiene factors tend to be saturation of sinks, exhaustion of sources, or disruptions of endogenous or exogenous systems on which we rely -- say, urban filth and public health (endogenous) or ecosystem disruption affecting resources, food supply, or disease reservoirs (external).
A specific technology might be thought of as some cluster of effects, both positive (or intended) and negative (or unintended), both manifest and latent. A specific technology -- a device, technique, management method, practice, convention -- approaches some theoretical physical limit of efficiency, also introducing unintended consequences.
We're pretty good at choosing technologies which have manifest positive effects, and at rejecting those with manifest negative effects. We're less good about adopting technologies with latent positive effects or rejecting those with latent negative effects.[4]
We can think of an entire technosphere as the set of interactions between all technologies and the environment.
As both our technology and role within the environment extend, we find ourselves running up against inherent limits. That is, the capacities of either fixed-capacity or rate-based sinks to absorb effluents, of fixed-stock or flow-based sources to provide resources, or disruptions of either our own endogenous or exogenous systems on which healthy function rely.
The problem is that as we start hitting one set of limits, we tend to spill over to others. In agricultural science, there's the notion of Leibig's Law of the Minimum: "growth is dictated not by total resources available, but by the scarcest resource (limiting factor)." It seems that this should have some reciprocal principle, that health is dictated not by the total sinks available, but of the most currently binding one. As the first contraint(s) are lifted -- low-hanging fruit -- subsequent constraints of greater effect, or more difficult mitigation or management, emerge. (I'm not aware of any named principle matching this, though I strongly suspect it exists.)
We also end up with interactions between the consequences -- one system interacts with another, producing their own sets of effects.
It's the latent negative consequences which catch up with you. Since they're not apparent, they're not evident and available for planning or modeling when looking at future direction. As systems generally become more optimised, the odds of any further change tends to fall -- you've exhausted most of the good interactions, the remaining ones are bad.
And the worst of all is a set of compounding, latent, negative 2nd and higher-order interactions. These are conceptually, and probably statistically, inevitable. We can't point to them specifically, as we don't know what they are. There's a tremendous tendency in human nature to dismiss and minimise future and latent risks (though yes, also benefits), especially where personal or private interests are served by optimism bias.
The result then would be that increasingly complex circumstances in which the tolerances of multiple systems are stressed to their limits, an apparent zone of stability is actually an illusion as still-fermenting latent negative interactions are developing, beyond the realm of detection.
Which seems to be exemplified in the global warming case.
I struggle with whether this is tremendously insightful or blindingly obvious, or possibly a case of overfitting to available information. Responses have been rather all over the map, though the "blindingly obvious" criticisms frequently seem to come from those afflicted with blindness to latent benefits and risks.
But I'm fearful.
________________________________
Notes:
1. Bio: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_K._Merton
2. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manifest_and_latent_functions_...
3. I'd been working with the notion of "manifestation", though I'd not settled on a good term for its opposite. "Covert", "emergent", and "latent" were optons. And this is a reason why I research and footnote my HN (and other) comments and posts. I'm learning.
4. For concreteness, some possible examples:
- Manifest positive: Movable type, water wheel, medical anaesthesia.
- Manifest negative: Hydrochloric acid skin treatment. Taunting lions.
- Latent positive: Medical hygiene, handwashing. Seismic building standards. Limiting building to above the Tsunami line.
- Latent negative: Lead plumbing, asbestos insulation, CFC refrigerants and aerosol propellants, residential laundry chutes.
5. See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liebig%27s_law_of_the_minimum
It wasn't until some time that I hit on a ninth element, what I've called "hygiene factors", in that the address the overall health of a system or the human technosphere and environent. They're based on unintended consequences, a term introduced in 1936 by the sociologist Robert K. Merckton, which he describes (I'm just realising) using the same term I'd landed on: manifest and latent functions and dysfunctions.[1][2][3]
Hygiene factors tend to be saturation of sinks, exhaustion of sources, or disruptions of endogenous or exogenous systems on which we rely -- say, urban filth and public health (endogenous) or ecosystem disruption affecting resources, food supply, or disease reservoirs (external).
A specific technology might be thought of as some cluster of effects, both positive (or intended) and negative (or unintended), both manifest and latent. A specific technology -- a device, technique, management method, practice, convention -- approaches some theoretical physical limit of efficiency, also introducing unintended consequences.
We're pretty good at choosing technologies which have manifest positive effects, and at rejecting those with manifest negative effects. We're less good about adopting technologies with latent positive effects or rejecting those with latent negative effects.[4]
We can think of an entire technosphere as the set of interactions between all technologies and the environment.
As both our technology and role within the environment extend, we find ourselves running up against inherent limits. That is, the capacities of either fixed-capacity or rate-based sinks to absorb effluents, of fixed-stock or flow-based sources to provide resources, or disruptions of either our own endogenous or exogenous systems on which healthy function rely.
The problem is that as we start hitting one set of limits, we tend to spill over to others. In agricultural science, there's the notion of Leibig's Law of the Minimum: "growth is dictated not by total resources available, but by the scarcest resource (limiting factor)." It seems that this should have some reciprocal principle, that health is dictated not by the total sinks available, but of the most currently binding one. As the first contraint(s) are lifted -- low-hanging fruit -- subsequent constraints of greater effect, or more difficult mitigation or management, emerge. (I'm not aware of any named principle matching this, though I strongly suspect it exists.)
We also end up with interactions between the consequences -- one system interacts with another, producing their own sets of effects.
It's the latent negative consequences which catch up with you. Since they're not apparent, they're not evident and available for planning or modeling when looking at future direction. As systems generally become more optimised, the odds of any further change tends to fall -- you've exhausted most of the good interactions, the remaining ones are bad.
And the worst of all is a set of compounding, latent, negative 2nd and higher-order interactions. These are conceptually, and probably statistically, inevitable. We can't point to them specifically, as we don't know what they are. There's a tremendous tendency in human nature to dismiss and minimise future and latent risks (though yes, also benefits), especially where personal or private interests are served by optimism bias.
The result then would be that increasingly complex circumstances in which the tolerances of multiple systems are stressed to their limits, an apparent zone of stability is actually an illusion as still-fermenting latent negative interactions are developing, beyond the realm of detection.
Which seems to be exemplified in the global warming case.
I struggle with whether this is tremendously insightful or blindingly obvious, or possibly a case of overfitting to available information. Responses have been rather all over the map, though the "blindingly obvious" criticisms frequently seem to come from those afflicted with blindness to latent benefits and risks.
But I'm fearful.
________________________________
Notes:
1. Bio: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_K._Merton
2. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manifest_and_latent_functions_...
3. I'd been working with the notion of "manifestation", though I'd not settled on a good term for its opposite. "Covert", "emergent", and "latent" were optons. And this is a reason why I research and footnote my HN (and other) comments and posts. I'm learning.
4. For concreteness, some possible examples:
- Manifest positive: Movable type, water wheel, medical anaesthesia.
- Manifest negative: Hydrochloric acid skin treatment. Taunting lions.
- Latent positive: Medical hygiene, handwashing. Seismic building standards. Limiting building to above the Tsunami line.
- Latent negative: Lead plumbing, asbestos insulation, CFC refrigerants and aerosol propellants, residential laundry chutes.
5. See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liebig%27s_law_of_the_minimum
I dont think anyone really cares what the scientists predict. Its the tragedy of the commons, no one will really change their behaviour anyway, even when it becomes unbearable to live in many parts of the world.
You're talking in generalities. Even if it's not the majority of people, some people will change their lifestyles, or at least parts of it (buying eco friendly cars, using less AC, eating less meat, etc.) But in general, you're right, most people won't do enough. That's why there need to be institutional changes, like investments into green energy/tech and incentives for companies to pollute less.
It is worse than that, the incumbent politicians don't want to be seen as 'lefties', and there is a lot of people with money with a vested interest in burning more oil and coal. I think individuals changing behaviour is hopeless, but taxes that make doing the wrong thing expensive (and vice versa) is probably the only way, but politicians don't want to do that.
Meta: Why are paywalled articles doing so well on HN lately? I know about the "web" link, but it never works for me. It's frustrating to want to participate in the comments on a subject, but not have access to the specific content that everyone seems to be discussing (and no, I am not paying for an NYT subscription).
The NYT has 4 million digital subscribers, and they’re probably concentrated in the type of demographics that read HN. (I don’t know the WSJ numbers, but since it’s included in apple news that’s probably another one where a lot of HN readers have the subscription)
I suspect HN users are likely to be either a) willing to pay or b) able to circumnavigate paywalls by using private windows, blocking cookies, disabling javascript, or whatever else works.
I wonder how long before paywalls aren't so easy to get around.
I wonder how long before paywalls aren't so easy to get around.
Reader view on iPhone gets past New York Times paywall for now
Or use the uMatrix browser add-on to block cookies and JavaScript on NY Times domains.
I’m on an iPhone and can not get past :-(
smitty1e(1)
> More likely, a separate United Nations report concluded, we are headed for warming of at least 5.4 degrees Fahrenheit. That will come with almost unimaginable damage to economies and ecosystems. Unfortunately, this dose of reality arrives more than 30 years after human-caused climate change became a mainstream issue.
5.4F is 3C. The cost of 3C change is projected to be up to 13% of GDP relative to keeping to 1.5C. See: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/may/23/hitting-.... Over the 30 year time horizon of the calculation, world GDP will grow by 140%. (Climate change will cost just 1/10 of total growth by that time. )