Indigenous Myth and Science: From Egypt to New Zealand(lawrencekrauss.substack.com)
lawrencekrauss.substack.com
Indigenous Myth and Science: From Egypt to New Zealand
https://lawrencekrauss.substack.com/p/indigenous-myth-and-science-from
59 comments
I think it's important to distinguish between empirical knowledge and other mental states or impressions, because they differ fundamentally in their reliability.
This addresses a real problem that exists: people treating the work of credentialed scholars in the areas of philosophy or social commentary as disclosing "facts" similar to the work of scientists.
> A few examples of knowledge that isn't empirical: Using your shared humanity to intuit what somebody else is feeling, in order to have compassion for them. Creating art that you know is aesthetically pleasing, without first performing any empirical analysis of what that even means.
Knowledge based on experience and trial-and-error is still empirical--i.e. based on "sense experience." Artists paint stuff and then observe how people react to it. Farmers learn from inherited experience and their own experience with harvest cycles.
That said, it's less rigorous than knowledge based on controlled experiments and theoretical closed-form analysis, so I would call it more "skill" or "experience" than "knowledge."
> Knowing that all humans deserve human rights.
This is the opposite of knowledge, it's a non-falsifiable belief or moral assertion.
This addresses a real problem that exists: people treating the work of credentialed scholars in the areas of philosophy or social commentary as disclosing "facts" similar to the work of scientists.
> A few examples of knowledge that isn't empirical: Using your shared humanity to intuit what somebody else is feeling, in order to have compassion for them. Creating art that you know is aesthetically pleasing, without first performing any empirical analysis of what that even means.
Knowledge based on experience and trial-and-error is still empirical--i.e. based on "sense experience." Artists paint stuff and then observe how people react to it. Farmers learn from inherited experience and their own experience with harvest cycles.
That said, it's less rigorous than knowledge based on controlled experiments and theoretical closed-form analysis, so I would call it more "skill" or "experience" than "knowledge."
> Knowing that all humans deserve human rights.
This is the opposite of knowledge, it's a non-falsifiable belief or moral assertion.
> Knowledge based on experience and trial-and-error is still empirical--i.e. based on "sense experience." [...] Artists paint stuff and then observe how people react to it.
Artists do this, that is true. But they don't exclusively do this. Artists may also develop their skill in private through introspective means. Furthermore this analysis is almost always qualitative in nature; artists or their audience assessing distinctly qualitative properties of the work.
Artists do this, that is true. But they don't exclusively do this. Artists may also develop their skill in private through introspective means. Furthermore this analysis is almost always qualitative in nature; artists or their audience assessing distinctly qualitative properties of the work.
I strongly disagree with you. He qualified "about the real world." Yes, there are other types of knowledge, even something like math might be an example, but certainly cultural, fictions, and so on. That's not what he's talking about though, nor is he saying that in the absence of empirical knowledge you shouldn't use other less rigorous information to make decisions.
Also, in your example about human rights, this to me is a choice we make. It's not any sort of physical law of the universe, and as such science doesn't say anything about it.
Also, in your example about human rights, this to me is a choice we make. It's not any sort of physical law of the universe, and as such science doesn't say anything about it.
All of human interaction and artistic expression exists in the 'real world', I think using that term to exclude everything other than simple physical phenomena is misguided at best.
> nor is he saying that in the absence of empirical knowledge you shouldn't use other less rigorous information to make decisions.
As I read it, he's saying that only empirical knowledge exists [at least in the context of "real world" or physical phenomena], rendering the term 'empirical knowledge' essentially redundant. How could you use non-emperical knowledge if such a thing doesn't even exist?
Limiting the scope of consideration to simple physical phenomena: What about your innate intuition about the way physical objects behave? Is there no use for that? Nobody gets out a pencil and solves kinematic equations every time they try to catch a baseball. There's a great deal of utility to be found in the intuitive knowledge of how the physical world works.
> nor is he saying that in the absence of empirical knowledge you shouldn't use other less rigorous information to make decisions.
As I read it, he's saying that only empirical knowledge exists [at least in the context of "real world" or physical phenomena], rendering the term 'empirical knowledge' essentially redundant. How could you use non-emperical knowledge if such a thing doesn't even exist?
Limiting the scope of consideration to simple physical phenomena: What about your innate intuition about the way physical objects behave? Is there no use for that? Nobody gets out a pencil and solves kinematic equations every time they try to catch a baseball. There's a great deal of utility to be found in the intuitive knowledge of how the physical world works.
He is using the dictionary definition of science: https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/science
Specifically 1. The use of the scientific method, which is concerned with the physical world and its phenomena.
I'm not going to debate your incorrect assumption about his statement. To anyone who practices science it's abundantly clear what he was saying, and it is in no way saying that "intuition" or anything else somehow doesn't exist, only that these are not valid ways to knowledge about the physical world. I agree with that.
Again, these other things can be useful, but they should not be confused with knowledge of the world as learned through science.
Specifically 1. The use of the scientific method, which is concerned with the physical world and its phenomena.
I'm not going to debate your incorrect assumption about his statement. To anyone who practices science it's abundantly clear what he was saying, and it is in no way saying that "intuition" or anything else somehow doesn't exist, only that these are not valid ways to knowledge about the physical world. I agree with that.
Again, these other things can be useful, but they should not be confused with knowledge of the world as learned through science.
Indeed, the "rights of a (living) being" is something we decide upon as a species. Most of the rest of the known universe and its phenomena don't seem to observe moral rights any more than a mudslide about to swallow everything in its path.
We decide that some things are moral, others immoral or ethical and unethical.
We decide that some things are moral, others immoral or ethical and unethical.
I think your three examples are all subjective statements, and not objective knowledge. You can't know that something is intrinsically aesthetically pleasing. You can say that a painting is aesthetically pleasing to someone (or many people) but without opinionated viewers, it cannot be described as such. Gravity, on the other hand, works even if nobody is present.
> I think your three examples are all subjective statements, and not objective knowledge.
They aren't empirical knowledge, which is the point. They are nevertheless knowledge in the sense that is relative to humans.
Another example: I accidentally rear-end somebody at a traffic light. He jumps out of his car hopping mad and storms towards me. I know he is angry, but how do I know that? I know that because of my qualitative assessments of the situational context and his body language. There is no objective empirical analysis going on in this situation, but nevertheless I know what's going on.
They aren't empirical knowledge, which is the point. They are nevertheless knowledge in the sense that is relative to humans.
Another example: I accidentally rear-end somebody at a traffic light. He jumps out of his car hopping mad and storms towards me. I know he is angry, but how do I know that? I know that because of my qualitative assessments of the situational context and his body language. There is no objective empirical analysis going on in this situation, but nevertheless I know what's going on.
How did you acquire that knowledge? Are you saying we are born with that knowledge? That certainly requires emperical evidence to confirm, hence the only way we can confirm this knowledge is emperical.
> Are you saying we are born with that knowledge?
Some of it, yes. Some of it seems to be encoded in our genes. It may also be culturally acquired. Furthermore, there exists a priori knowledge, without which you can throw away most of mathematics. Given a set of mathematical axioms, you can derive truths through deduction and pure reason, independent of experience.
> That certainly requires empirical evidence to confirm
Most people do not require such confirmations; they go about their lives without it.
Some of it, yes. Some of it seems to be encoded in our genes. It may also be culturally acquired. Furthermore, there exists a priori knowledge, without which you can throw away most of mathematics. Given a set of mathematical axioms, you can derive truths through deduction and pure reason, independent of experience.
> That certainly requires empirical evidence to confirm
Most people do not require such confirmations; they go about their lives without it.
> > Are you saying we are born with that knowledge?
> Some of it, yes. Some of it seems to be encoded in our genes.
How do you arrive at that conclusion?
> It may also be culturally acquired. Furthermore, there exists a priori knowledge, without which you can throw away most of mathematics. Given a set of mathematical axioms, you can derive truths through deduction and pure reason, independent of experience.
Yes and mathematics is not science. You can build all sort of logical constructs that have absolutely no relation to the real world.
> > That certainly requires empirical evidence to confirm
> Most people do not require such confirmations; they go about their lives without it.
I thought we talk about acquiring knowledge? Sure lots of people do not question anything they do, but I don't think we should use that as a standard.
> Some of it, yes. Some of it seems to be encoded in our genes.
How do you arrive at that conclusion?
> It may also be culturally acquired. Furthermore, there exists a priori knowledge, without which you can throw away most of mathematics. Given a set of mathematical axioms, you can derive truths through deduction and pure reason, independent of experience.
Yes and mathematics is not science. You can build all sort of logical constructs that have absolutely no relation to the real world.
> > That certainly requires empirical evidence to confirm
> Most people do not require such confirmations; they go about their lives without it.
I thought we talk about acquiring knowledge? Sure lots of people do not question anything they do, but I don't think we should use that as a standard.
> > Some of it, yes. Some of it seems to be encoded in our genes.
> How do you arrive at that conclusion?
Instinctual behaviors are simple to empirically observe. It's easy to demonstrate an instinctual fear of snakes in people or animals that never saw a real snake before and have no empirical knowledge of snakes. This shows there is knowledge about the danger of snakes encoded in the genes of vertebrates.
That we can study these instincts through empirical means does not mean the individual's instincts are empirically informed. The individual gets this knowledge not through observations of the world, so that well-founded fear of snakes isn't empirical knowledge.
> How do you arrive at that conclusion?
Instinctual behaviors are simple to empirically observe. It's easy to demonstrate an instinctual fear of snakes in people or animals that never saw a real snake before and have no empirical knowledge of snakes. This shows there is knowledge about the danger of snakes encoded in the genes of vertebrates.
That we can study these instincts through empirical means does not mean the individual's instincts are empirically informed. The individual gets this knowledge not through observations of the world, so that well-founded fear of snakes isn't empirical knowledge.
Not just the Vietnam war, but a lot of political questions aren't really scientific. We can of course use science as (often good) argumentation, but fundamentally many political topics aren't scientific questions.
A simple example would be to say that extra policing of certain ethnic groups would reduce crime rates. Purely empirically this might be correct, but there is a broad consensus that this is also morally wrong.
A simple example would be to say that extra policing of certain ethnic groups would reduce crime rates. Purely empirically this might be correct, but there is a broad consensus that this is also morally wrong.
Not only are such questions not scientific, but they use the same words with different meanings. This is why it is important to be clear when communicating.
Morally wrong is to be opposed to what is good and virtuous. Scientifically wrong is to be demonstrably false.
To your last point, it gets more interesting when the topic is "Increased police presence is necessary in geographic areas experiencing high crime rates"
What does necessary mean here? What does" right" or "wrong" mean in the context of this situation? Does right or wrong change with the nature of the crimes being committed, or the nature of the people committing the crimes, or the nature of the victims? Is it right to not increasing police presence because the perpetrators are predominantly of one race, even if the victims are also of that race, as are the police themselves?
How do you achieve consensus- empirically or otherwise- on such a simple statement when no two people may be using the same words the same way?
Morally wrong is to be opposed to what is good and virtuous. Scientifically wrong is to be demonstrably false.
To your last point, it gets more interesting when the topic is "Increased police presence is necessary in geographic areas experiencing high crime rates"
What does necessary mean here? What does" right" or "wrong" mean in the context of this situation? Does right or wrong change with the nature of the crimes being committed, or the nature of the people committing the crimes, or the nature of the victims? Is it right to not increasing police presence because the perpetrators are predominantly of one race, even if the victims are also of that race, as are the police themselves?
How do you achieve consensus- empirically or otherwise- on such a simple statement when no two people may be using the same words the same way?
> A simple example would be to say that extra policing of certain ethnic groups would reduce crime rates. Purely empirically this might be correct, but there is a broad consensus that this is also morally wrong.
Historically, the solution to that conundrum would be for each ethnic group to be responsible for policing their own. We still see traces of this in the modern notion that due process requires a trial by "a jury of one's peers". Someone's "peers" back then would've been not just any fellow citizens, but people actually sharing the same general background as the accused. Disputes between groups would've been solved peaceably, through monetary restitution and the paying of damages; but punishment was strictly an internal matter.
Historically, the solution to that conundrum would be for each ethnic group to be responsible for policing their own. We still see traces of this in the modern notion that due process requires a trial by "a jury of one's peers". Someone's "peers" back then would've been not just any fellow citizens, but people actually sharing the same general background as the accused. Disputes between groups would've been solved peaceably, through monetary restitution and the paying of damages; but punishment was strictly an internal matter.
> However he unfortunately he later states "I would argue that there is only one kind of knowledge, at least about the real world, and that is empirical knowledge."
You ignored the important qualifier which is "about the real world" and by real I assert he means physical world. Your examples do not in fact contradict his statement because they are not about knowledge about the real (physical) world. I also don't understand your segway to Mcnamara. The above statement certainly does not state that data by itself is knowledge, and certainly any (naturally limited) set of data is not necessarily sufficient to predict the future. However this fact does not contradict the statement that we can only confirm how the world works (i.e. acquire knowledge about the physical world) through empirical means.
You ignored the important qualifier which is "about the real world" and by real I assert he means physical world. Your examples do not in fact contradict his statement because they are not about knowledge about the real (physical) world. I also don't understand your segway to Mcnamara. The above statement certainly does not state that data by itself is knowledge, and certainly any (naturally limited) set of data is not necessarily sufficient to predict the future. However this fact does not contradict the statement that we can only confirm how the world works (i.e. acquire knowledge about the physical world) through empirical means.
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The problem is that scientists don't just do science, they're people. They have ideological biases of their own, and they're often not corrected because they're systemic and entrenched. And because of these biases they often don't listen to evidence or voices that doesn't fit pre-existing concerns. Especially in "softer" or social sciences like archaeology / anthropology.
Example: "Clovis first" settlement of the North America vigorously drowned out other voices, sometimes with aggressive nasty personal politics (read about how how Tom Dillehay was treated personally about his discoveries at Monte Verde sometime, got pretty nasty). All the while indigenous Americans were insisting in various capacities that they had been much longer. And lo and behold, archaeology is finally starting to 'discover' these facts, but in reality much of the evidence has been here all along (though a lot of it is probably underwater), it just required looking for it and not immediately discounting its possibility.
And yes, this doesn't mean that "science" is wrong or the scientific method intrinsically flawed. And usually these things shake out eventually. But I don't think there's anything wrong with shaking people a bit and asking them to open their eyes and ears and accept that what they think they're doing as a pure empirical method needs to be scrutinized carefully and part of that is accepting that there are stories and knowledge out there that have all too easily been discounted with the same kind of attitude the author of this article is presenting.
Example: "Clovis first" settlement of the North America vigorously drowned out other voices, sometimes with aggressive nasty personal politics (read about how how Tom Dillehay was treated personally about his discoveries at Monte Verde sometime, got pretty nasty). All the while indigenous Americans were insisting in various capacities that they had been much longer. And lo and behold, archaeology is finally starting to 'discover' these facts, but in reality much of the evidence has been here all along (though a lot of it is probably underwater), it just required looking for it and not immediately discounting its possibility.
And yes, this doesn't mean that "science" is wrong or the scientific method intrinsically flawed. And usually these things shake out eventually. But I don't think there's anything wrong with shaking people a bit and asking them to open their eyes and ears and accept that what they think they're doing as a pure empirical method needs to be scrutinized carefully and part of that is accepting that there are stories and knowledge out there that have all too easily been discounted with the same kind of attitude the author of this article is presenting.
I believe the author explicitly did the opposite of what you accuse him of doing. He even criticized the original letter from the seven because of its sweeping dismissal of Maori knowledge, and the likelihood that some of it is scientific in nature. His point is that science is a process, and one shouldn’t confuse traditional myth with this process. I think he’s right, even if in some cases the process, and its flawed instantiation, leads to incorrect conclusions in cases where the traditional story is correct.
He only seems to defend Maori knowledge insofar as that knowledge was derived from informal scientific experiments.
> I do take issue with one sentence in original letter by the seven scientists: “Indigenous knowledge may indeed help advance scientific knowledge in some ways, but it is not science.” As a blanket statement this is not strictly correct. Some indigenous knowledge is scientific in nature. Surely indigenous people’s survival depended on empirical examination and trial and error testing associated with a variety of natural phenomena, including: which plants were beneficial or harmful to eat, which might provide useful medicines; how the detailed migratory behavior of animals that might serve as prey would impact on hunting success, tidal variations and annual weather cycles, to name just a few.
> I do take issue with one sentence in original letter by the seven scientists: “Indigenous knowledge may indeed help advance scientific knowledge in some ways, but it is not science.” As a blanket statement this is not strictly correct. Some indigenous knowledge is scientific in nature. Surely indigenous people’s survival depended on empirical examination and trial and error testing associated with a variety of natural phenomena, including: which plants were beneficial or harmful to eat, which might provide useful medicines; how the detailed migratory behavior of animals that might serve as prey would impact on hunting success, tidal variations and annual weather cycles, to name just a few.
"Clovis first" suppressing contrary evidence was people abusing academic processes against science.
We speak in the past tense, but there are plenty of other such abuses, ongoing.
Lawrence Krauss is calling out just such an abuse. It is not the only one. Each has to be fought, in detail, on its own ground; this one, on this ground.
We speak in the past tense, but there are plenty of other such abuses, ongoing.
Lawrence Krauss is calling out just such an abuse. It is not the only one. Each has to be fought, in detail, on its own ground; this one, on this ground.
Sure but part of the way that the faults in said academic processes were rectified has been through bringing indigenous voices into the process. So I get a bristly when I see the tone used here.
Throughout the author keeps dodging the relationship between science and scientists, insisting on the purity of science itself. But that's precisely the point. It's an ideal. Not a bad ideal, but a process to get to. And it means scientific organizations and science as an academic and so on have to take responsibility for the history and their roles in it.
Throughout the author keeps dodging the relationship between science and scientists, insisting on the purity of science itself. But that's precisely the point. It's an ideal. Not a bad ideal, but a process to get to. And it means scientific organizations and science as an academic and so on have to take responsibility for the history and their roles in it.
If the indigenous voices happened to be correct in this case, it was coincidence. Fifteen thousand years is much too long a time span for oral traditions to carry any factual historical information.
Oral history of Mount Mazama in Oregon recounts an eruption that happened 7700 years ago. Don't be so quick to discount oral history.
That has not been demonstrated. We know of oral traditions carrying facts over seven thousand years.
What has been demonstrated is that these particular oral traditions do not carry factual information about geology. Treating them as factual information about geology would be abuse.
They are legitimate facts about Pacific anthropology.
What has been demonstrated is that these particular oral traditions do not carry factual information about geology. Treating them as factual information about geology would be abuse.
They are legitimate facts about Pacific anthropology.
BTW, the oldest tradition I'm familiar with says that the world is not more than 6000 years old. So there might be something fishy about these claims either way.
Sometimes attempts at rectifying abuses create other abuses. Science is about verifiable facts, and how to verify them. Science can't defend itself against abuses. That is on each of us.
The whole point is that saying mythsticism is equivalent to science is attacking the process not the people.
I always get bristly when this sort of idealisation of indigenous knowledge/systems/religion etc is used. The consequences of religion/mythsticism were/are almost always worse than science. In case of the Maori, they were used to justify genocide (the first thing tribes from the north island did when they acquired guns was to go south and wipe out other tribes for some perceived offence from the far past).
I always get bristly when this sort of idealisation of indigenous knowledge/systems/religion etc is used. The consequences of religion/mythsticism were/are almost always worse than science. In case of the Maori, they were used to justify genocide (the first thing tribes from the north island did when they acquired guns was to go south and wipe out other tribes for some perceived offence from the far past).
Only two weeks after Maori first heard from the British there were people on Chatham Island, 600 mi to the east, they sailed out and exterminated them.
It seems likely the same thing happened to the Marquesans who first discovered Hawai'i, once people from Fiji or Samoa or someplace arrived. The latter's descendants still talk about "menehunes", small people who come out only at night.
Brits, not long after, hunted Tasmanians for sport.
It seems likely the same thing happened to the Marquesans who first discovered Hawai'i, once people from Fiji or Samoa or someplace arrived. The latter's descendants still talk about "menehunes", small people who come out only at night.
Brits, not long after, hunted Tasmanians for sport.
Maybe this is me being a 90s kid, but the interregnum between when you couldn’t say factual things because it could upset non-falsifiable Christian beliefs and when you can’t say factual things because it upsets non-falsifiable beliefs of other sorts was weirdly short.
I hope this comes to pass to become but a pox on history.
This incarnation, pun intended, has greater sway amongst the elites and those in the position of promulgating and legitimizing these positions. It’s a bit concerning that these aren’t your traditional uneducated proles espousing these views but rather highly educated elites. This is what we call ideology. It's not out of "provincial ignorance," for example.
This incarnation, pun intended, has greater sway amongst the elites and those in the position of promulgating and legitimizing these positions. It’s a bit concerning that these aren’t your traditional uneducated proles espousing these views but rather highly educated elites. This is what we call ideology. It's not out of "provincial ignorance," for example.
This is the critical distinction. I can process most of the anti-vax stuff going on, etc., by thinking about how people in my dad's village in Bangladesh would react to things. At the end of the day, folks in rural Georgia who think the government wants to tag you with an Obama chip have a lot less power than the professors at Ivy League universities that mint almost all of our economic and political elites.
Just wow. I'm embarrassed for New Zealand. An American analogy would be if the National Academy of Science were taken over by Christian creationists, and the teaching of evolution were condemned as "hurtful" etc.
It seems to be the other way around though. Modern scientists getting upset for schools teaching creation myths. To be honest I think it's a bit arrogant to say there's no value in these myth and dismiss them as nothing but fairy tales. Because they tend to delve deep into philosophy, raise questions of what we are, and what it means to be here, and there's definitely value in studying these kind of things.
Obviously evolution should be taught as well, but it's a narrow mindset to assume we actually have it all figured out, can proclaim an objective truth about our existence, and everything else is just non-sense.
Because you have to admit, there are so many things we don't really know, and we can't be pretentious, like nothing ever could possibly challenge the paradigm of our current understanding. Like for example the picture of the pyramids in the blog post, how did those exactly came to be? Well nobody knows. Another thing that nobody knows, is how exactly atoms and particles work, and it really demonstrate the fragile legs on which we're standing here. It means we don't actually have working model of our reality. Which is pretty big deal if you want to proclaim things as true.
Not to come across as too wacky, but some of these old spiritual texts are really interesting, they don't have to be taken at face value, but there's some buried wisdom there that makes them worth mentioning in schools I think.
Obviously evolution should be taught as well, but it's a narrow mindset to assume we actually have it all figured out, can proclaim an objective truth about our existence, and everything else is just non-sense.
Because you have to admit, there are so many things we don't really know, and we can't be pretentious, like nothing ever could possibly challenge the paradigm of our current understanding. Like for example the picture of the pyramids in the blog post, how did those exactly came to be? Well nobody knows. Another thing that nobody knows, is how exactly atoms and particles work, and it really demonstrate the fragile legs on which we're standing here. It means we don't actually have working model of our reality. Which is pretty big deal if you want to proclaim things as true.
Not to come across as too wacky, but some of these old spiritual texts are really interesting, they don't have to be taken at face value, but there's some buried wisdom there that makes them worth mentioning in schools I think.
Sure we can talk about mythicism and religion in religion class or maybe philosophy class, but keep them out of science classes, because they certainly are not science. And it is not arrogance to say that religion is not an equivalent system for explaining the world.
I agree about the spiritual part. Many people get wisdom, inspiration, etc. from the Bible. But people who use the Genesis timeline to calculate the age, composition, and shape of the earth, or the emergence of living species, are considered fringe in the U.S. In New Zealand, similar traditions coming from the Maori are considered unassailable dogma, and skeptics are regarded as heretics to be condemned.
> An American analogy would be if the National Academy of Science were taken over by Christian creationists, and the teaching of evolution were condemned as "hurtful" etc.
The subset of people in the US who would be willing to push that agenda are neither insubstantial nor marginalized from political power (in recent memory they've been within an unhealthy septuagenarian's heartbeat of the presidency).
The subset of people in the US who would be willing to push that agenda are neither insubstantial nor marginalized from political power (in recent memory they've been within an unhealthy septuagenarian's heartbeat of the presidency).
Maybe they are not marginalized from political power in the civic realm, but they are certainly considered outliers in the academic world (aside from a few evangelical colleges).
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The author gives quite a few examples what science supposedly is not, however doesn't really say what science is. From the declaration of totalizing aspiration, "I would argue that there is only one kind of knowledge, at least about the real world, and that is empirical knowledge," it seems that he would get into trouble trying to differentiate an account of Maori crafts and effective field theories. Thing is, Maoris were perfectly capable of building functional boats, and if that is science, then it is not clear why it shouldn't be taught in a science class. On the other hand, if science is the way to some upper case Truth, then effective field theory, which is probably the most mainstream understanding of the standard model, does quite explicitly not make such claims. It just claims to be a low energy approximation. So, in that case the question is what should be taught in a science class.
> But the more worrisome assertion is that the group of seven’s letter had “caused "considerable hurt and dismay" among staff and students”, as if that matters.
Now, this transforms Krauss from someone who is merely wrong to someone who is an idiot.
> But the more worrisome assertion is that the group of seven’s letter had “caused "considerable hurt and dismay" among staff and students”, as if that matters.
Now, this transforms Krauss from someone who is merely wrong to someone who is an idiot.
The question is, does science contradict how maories build boats? The question is not if Maori had incredible seafaring skills and knowledge about navigation. The question is Maori mythsticism an equally valid system for explaning the world? If you believe in this relativism, than the only conclusion is that the fundamental Christian genesis is also equally as valid and we should also teach creation in science classes. I strongly reject this view.
Science classes should be reserved for teaching scientific things. I think you, I and Krauss would all agree on that much. I wish it were uncontroversial, but evidently it isn't.
However Krauss seems to goes further. If knowledge is asserted to only come from scientific means, and if the purpose of schooling is to impart knowledge, that seems to leave little room for classes which don't purport to be science classes in the first place.
You could presumably make room for these classes through twisted logic along the lines of "Actually English Literature is science because we're making empirical observations about the words written on this paper...", but I don't think there is much real utility in this line of reasoning. It's much simpler to simply accept there are some subjects that have value yet aren't science.
However Krauss seems to goes further. If knowledge is asserted to only come from scientific means, and if the purpose of schooling is to impart knowledge, that seems to leave little room for classes which don't purport to be science classes in the first place.
You could presumably make room for these classes through twisted logic along the lines of "Actually English Literature is science because we're making empirical observations about the words written on this paper...", but I don't think there is much real utility in this line of reasoning. It's much simpler to simply accept there are some subjects that have value yet aren't science.
I think you are taking a very narrow interpretation of what Krauss is saying. Nowhere in his essay does he talk about that we should not be teaching religion, art, music, literature and that they don't have value.
Remember that he is replying to an initiative to bring Maori perspectives (mysticism) into science classes as an equally valid system to explain the physical world, to which he answers the only valid way of explaining the physical world is the scientific process.
Remember that he is replying to an initiative to bring Maori perspectives (mysticism) into science classes as an equally valid system to explain the physical world, to which he answers the only valid way of explaining the physical world is the scientific process.
As I said, I agree with most of what Krauss said. I object mainly to his assertion that empirical knowledge is the only kind of knowledge. Whether you restrict the scope of consideration to physical phenomena or not, he's going too far with that assertion.
> The question is, does science contradict how maories build boats?
as you claim in your next sentence
> The question is not if Maori had incredible seafaring skills and knowledge about navigation.
so no, they work therefore they don't contradict science. And the thing is, that science class is anyhow highly simplified, so you may as well teach them in a Maori context.
as you claim in your next sentence
> The question is not if Maori had incredible seafaring skills and knowledge about navigation.
so no, they work therefore they don't contradict science. And the thing is, that science class is anyhow highly simplified, so you may as well teach them in a Maori context.
Building boats would be academically comprised under naval architecture, which is not "science".
> The suggestion in the report that science has been used to promote the dominance of Eurocentric views is a particularly egregious example of this misunderstanding.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scientific_racism#Ideological_...
> There is just Science: a process that allows us to understanding how the world works by careful empirical investigation supplemented by rigorous theoretical analysis and predictions that are then subject to additional empirical testing.
I take issue with this definition. It uses a lot of words which seem meaningful, but are just arbitrary thresholds: "careful", "rigorous", "testing".
How do I know if I'm doing "careful empirical investigation" or just "empirical investigation"? Am I being rigourous enough to be "Science"? How do I tell if my "testing" is valid?
Is it "Science" if I think parachutes work? There's evidence, but it could simply be a placebo.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scientific_racism#Ideological_...
> There is just Science: a process that allows us to understanding how the world works by careful empirical investigation supplemented by rigorous theoretical analysis and predictions that are then subject to additional empirical testing.
I take issue with this definition. It uses a lot of words which seem meaningful, but are just arbitrary thresholds: "careful", "rigorous", "testing".
How do I know if I'm doing "careful empirical investigation" or just "empirical investigation"? Am I being rigourous enough to be "Science"? How do I tell if my "testing" is valid?
Is it "Science" if I think parachutes work? There's evidence, but it could simply be a placebo.
The whole thing seems rather overblown. In terms of natural observations of the world around them and the use of a rational process to measure time, Maoris appear to have done the same kind of things all other cultures have done - made measurements and used astronomical observations to measure time.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M%C4%81tauranga_M%C4%81ori#Dis...
Other aspects of the issue seem more like social choice - i.e. 'free-market economic theory' as practiced today is no more 'scientific' or 'mathematically sound' than Maori Matauranga social notions about how best to organize societies and 'pursue happiness' - perhaps they have different notions of what happiness means, is all.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M%C4%81tauranga_M%C4%81ori#Dis...
Other aspects of the issue seem more like social choice - i.e. 'free-market economic theory' as practiced today is no more 'scientific' or 'mathematically sound' than Maori Matauranga social notions about how best to organize societies and 'pursue happiness' - perhaps they have different notions of what happiness means, is all.
Sure. But things like evolution, the big bang theory, and the formation of the solar system is a bit more sound than Rangi and Papa creating the world. Maori culture absolutely should be taught - in social studies classes, just like how we teach about Zeus and Osiris but draw a distinction between that and science.
I really liked how Feynman discussed Mayan astronomy - they had a higly accurate calendar based on detailed astronomical observations, which made pretty accurate predictions - but they didn't have a very good model, i.e. the notions of planets in space orbiting the sun had nothing to do with their system. Now, was the Mayan calendar a scientific system or not? It had observations and predictions, after all.
It's entirely possible the some of the scientific models we now use are similar in nature to the Mayan calendar, even though they're based on accurate observations and make good predictions. It's an interesting concept, in any case.
It's entirely possible the some of the scientific models we now use are similar in nature to the Mayan calendar, even though they're based on accurate observations and make good predictions. It's an interesting concept, in any case.
Right, plenty of early calendar systems formed the basis of early astronomy. It's fair to call that science.
But calling mythological creation stories science is not. Rangi and Papa are no more scientific than Cronus and Gaia. It's literally teaching creationism, just a different creation story than the Judeo-Christian one.
But calling mythological creation stories science is not. Rangi and Papa are no more scientific than Cronus and Gaia. It's literally teaching creationism, just a different creation story than the Judeo-Christian one.
Early astronomy was indistinguishable from astrology. Is that "science" too?
The astronomical parts of that, yes. Say some historical scholar plotted the movements of the planets and concluded that people born under a certain constellation share a characteristic because of a supernatural aspect of the planet. The former - the tracking of celestial objects - is science, the latter part rooted in superstition is not.
> There is no such thing as Western Science, Eastern Science, Chinese Science, or Indigenous Science. There is just Science ...
Of course we all understand that. But isn't the reality that Science is skewed towards Science That Gets Funding? Empirical data is empirical data, but Western Science is a _particular_ selection of the empirical facts that reflects the politically-influenced institutions of science in the West right?
Of course we all understand that. But isn't the reality that Science is skewed towards Science That Gets Funding? Empirical data is empirical data, but Western Science is a _particular_ selection of the empirical facts that reflects the politically-influenced institutions of science in the West right?
Exactly. There's "science" and then there's "Science(tm)". Nothing wrong with the scientific method. But there's lots wrong with plenty of scientists. In the long run it might work out, but it requires vigorous critique and engagement to shake out some of the biases. And so attitude is important here.
Science is neither data nor a collection of facts. As Krauss points out, it’s a process for accumulating reliable knowledge.
This is exactly the kind of stupidity which gives fuel to the rightwing. Who gained anything from this persecution of scientists? Qui prodest? Did the Maori gain anything? Or just some "pure champions" got the opportunity to hammer their chests to impress their mates, the hell with the rest of the world?
However he unfortunately he later states "I would argue that there is only one kind of knowledge, at least about the real world, and that is empirical knowledge." This goes entirely too far, it seems to reject not just the existence of a priori knowledge, but also intuition derived from the shared experience of being human, knowledge derived from informal experience, etc. He's strayed into scientism; the belief that all truth is exclusively discovered through science. This is a common belief system for 'engineery-types', but it often leads people astray when they ignore and eschew qualitative analysis and focus exclusively on empirical quantitative data. This was McNamara's fallacy; he thought he could win a war by collecting enough quantitative data and crunching numbers, ignoring any consideration that didn't lend itself to numerical analysis as unscientific. He was subsequently blindsided by public sentiment in Vietnam and America, and lost the war.
A few examples of knowledge that isn't empirical: Using your shared humanity to intuit what somebody else is feeling, in order to have compassion for them. Creating art that you know is aesthetically pleasing, without first performing any empirical analysis of what that even means. Knowing that all humans deserve human rights.