Airbus Shatters Record for Jet Orders as Demand Soars(wsj.com)
wsj.com
Airbus Shatters Record for Jet Orders as Demand Soars
https://www.wsj.com/business/airlines/airbus-shatters-record-for-jet-orders-as-demand-soars-a9f75750
241 comments
Airlines with Airbus fleets are dealing with lengthy periods of unavailability due to issues with the Pratt & Whitney engines that power ~60% of A320neos and all A220s[1]. My understanding is that the airlines have agreements where P&W will eventually compensate them for this, but Airbus fleets haven't been without headaches.
[1] https://crankyflier.com/2023/09/26/the-problem-with-pratt-wh...
[1] https://crankyflier.com/2023/09/26/the-problem-with-pratt-wh...
A company I use often, Wizz Air, had/has to regularly ground these planes. It’s always a safe bet to book seats at the front of the plane to be sure that your seat doesn’t magically disappear when you are at the gate (happened last Easter when they sold seats for a 180 seats plane but had to ground it and sent a smaller one last minute). The only silver lining here is that they caught the problems before any plane actually crashed because of them
>It’s always a safe bet to book seats at the front of the plane to be sure that your seat doesn’t magically disappear when you are at the gate
Why? Do they bump the rear seats first?
Why? Do they bump the rear seats first?
his 2nd one says they send a smaller plane. it'd make sense a simple algorithm would map 1a1b1c1d1e to 1a1b1c1d2a2b etc. the rear most seats get bumped.
I assume people who pay less and/or are less costly to compensate (adults, people without babies, etc) get bumped first.
The relatively new “basic economy” class instead of “economy”.
The relatively new “basic economy” class instead of “economy”.
A lot of times they are narrower too, guess you want seats with a low letter too (17A vs 17G).
yeah that's why I mapped seats in the first row into the second :) maybe they just truncate the extra seats instead of move them back. i don't know
All WizzAir planes have 3-3 seatings.
According to the fleet data here (and assuming it is up to date)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wizz_Air#Fleet
a scheduled 180 seat plane would not have been a A321neo and hence not been affected by the mentioned Pratt & Whitney engine problems.
But since the A320-200 is the smallest aircraft in their fleet, maybe the flight was scheduled with a A321neo but got replaced with a A320-200?
But since the A320-200 is the smallest aircraft in their fleet, maybe the flight was scheduled with a A321neo but got replaced with a A320-200?
So the main issue they have is the biggest piece of American technology they use.
Oy. As an American it's rough to see the state of U.S. aviation.
Oy. As an American it's rough to see the state of U.S. aviation.
Pratt & Whitney is a business unit of United Technologies Corporation. UTC merged with Raytheon a couple years ago. Raytheon was already a dysfunctional corporate culture, and what I hear is that the UTC management that took over is somehow even more risk averse than the old Raytheon leadership, which is hard to imagine.
Risk aversion is probably a good thing if you want an engine that will work reliably. But it's not going to produce the next big thing or massively scale output on short timelines.
Risk aversion is probably a good thing if you want an engine that will work reliably. But it's not going to produce the next big thing or massively scale output on short timelines.
I'd like to see some SpaceX veterans spin up a jet engine company. SX500 FTW
At least their planes don't fall out of the sky, because some morons cheaped out on the software and they don't have to get special inspections every other week because Boeing forgot to put a bolt in the Rudder, Door etc...
This airline went bankrupt: https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/engine-di...
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Civil aviation is beer money to Boeing. They make the brunt of the money in military. That’s also where the margins are.
The US government will never let Boeing go bankrupt, the impact on their supply chain (specifically nuclear) would be too big. And Boeing know it.
The US government will never let Boeing go bankrupt, the impact on their supply chain (specifically nuclear) would be too big. And Boeing know it.
> Civil aviation is beer money to Boeing. They make the brunt of the money in military. That’s also where the margins are
You haven't been keeping track I presume. Boeing is bleeding money on recent military contracts like the Air Force One Replacement or the KC-46, because they're on a fixed price structure and Boeing drastically underestimated the costs involved.
So much so that for the replacement of the NEACP ("Doomsday Planes") Boeing withdrew from bidding because they refuse to get into another fixed price military programme, knowing they can't predict costs for shit and will lose a lot of money. They're only interested in costs+ contracts, which nobody seems to be willing to give them.
You haven't been keeping track I presume. Boeing is bleeding money on recent military contracts like the Air Force One Replacement or the KC-46, because they're on a fixed price structure and Boeing drastically underestimated the costs involved.
So much so that for the replacement of the NEACP ("Doomsday Planes") Boeing withdrew from bidding because they refuse to get into another fixed price military programme, knowing they can't predict costs for shit and will lose a lot of money. They're only interested in costs+ contracts, which nobody seems to be willing to give them.
That contract was first awarded to Airbus' A330-MRTT tanker aircraft (which is currently in service with other air forces). Boeing was so upset by losing a Pentagon contract that they lobbied the US government hard into voiding the original contract award and re-opening the tender. Subsequently, Boeing placed an unreasonably low bid and Airbus walked away saying they can't make it happen at that price.
So, this was an entirely predictable own goal by Boeing.
So, this was an entirely predictable own goal by Boeing.
Not to mention the embarrassment that is the Starliner program. Now SpaceX has almost finished the 6 launches the original contract included and is moving into a second contract. Boeing has yet to do its first launch "active" launch.
Boeing had tried to get the snakes in Congress to cancel SpaceX's contract at the start because Boeing was clearly the reliable option, we see how that's turned out.
Boeing had tried to get the snakes in Congress to cancel SpaceX's contract at the start because Boeing was clearly the reliable option, we see how that's turned out.
I wonder why lol. Although I will say that some of the issues that Lockheed Martin has had with the JSF and Littoral Combat Ships is that the military is asking them to build something far too complex. The whole module thing never worked out and that seems obvious. I think instead they should have tried for a couple of specific designs that served specific roles instead of building a single ship or plane that could do lots of things poorly while bleeding too much money.
Disclaimer: I'm just guessing at all of this. I'm no expert. Not even an armchair.
Disclaimer: I'm just guessing at all of this. I'm no expert. Not even an armchair.
That's a "fighter mafia" opinion that's not really grounded in reality (the language of "specific designs for specific roles" is from them).
The JSF on a per unit basis is now cheaper then some 4th gen non-stealth fighters, and the idea that it does things "poorly" is not supported by reality.
The JSF on a per unit basis is now cheaper then some 4th gen non-stealth fighters, and the idea that it does things "poorly" is not supported by reality.
"Specific designs for specific roles" is a general engineering thing. Any engineer knows that it's easier to get good performance (in whatever dimension you're measuring performance) if you're designing for only one use case than if you're trying to be everything to everyone. Designs that try to do everything end up being overconstrained and then having to make (often irrational from the POV of any one user) compromises to fit reality.
Software monopolies face this on a daily basis. Much of what we see as "enshittification" from a consumer standpoint comes from single products that need to serve the needs of 3B consumers. The idea of "unbundling" that was en vogue in startup circles from ~2013-2016 is just that startups which serve one use case for one customer base are able to eek out efficiencies that consumer tech giants cannot.
I'm not in aerospace or military so I can't comment on whether the JSF itself performs poorly. How would that even be defined, though? It doesn't have a whole lot of competition to measure against. (Seems like a common thread in these discussions...)
Software monopolies face this on a daily basis. Much of what we see as "enshittification" from a consumer standpoint comes from single products that need to serve the needs of 3B consumers. The idea of "unbundling" that was en vogue in startup circles from ~2013-2016 is just that startups which serve one use case for one customer base are able to eek out efficiencies that consumer tech giants cannot.
I'm not in aerospace or military so I can't comment on whether the JSF itself performs poorly. How would that even be defined, though? It doesn't have a whole lot of competition to measure against. (Seems like a common thread in these discussions...)
Yeah that was basically my thought that perhaps they need a dogfighter, a long range bomber, some kind of thing like an A-10 or C-130 gunship.
Not sure if Ukraine is showing us that some of those are now useless or not.
It must be difficult to design something like the JSF that has to have a vertical takeoff version and all this other junk to make 4 branches of the military happy. Part of me thinks that having two different planes would have made more sense and lifted a lot of design constraints.
Not sure if Ukraine is showing us that some of those are now useless or not.
It must be difficult to design something like the JSF that has to have a vertical takeoff version and all this other junk to make 4 branches of the military happy. Part of me thinks that having two different planes would have made more sense and lifted a lot of design constraints.
>and the idea that it does things "poorly" is not supported by reality.
That remains to be seen. Ukraine has completely upended military doctrine of the last 30 years. Dog fights are happening regularly, and air defense has proven to be far more effective than we could have imagined. The F-35 has never been proven in combat, and it's an open question as to whether its' known weaknesses will matter in a high intensity near-peer conflict.
That remains to be seen. Ukraine has completely upended military doctrine of the last 30 years. Dog fights are happening regularly, and air defense has proven to be far more effective than we could have imagined. The F-35 has never been proven in combat, and it's an open question as to whether its' known weaknesses will matter in a high intensity near-peer conflict.
Dogfights are not happening regularly in Ukraine. They might have been a few in the first ~month, but not at all since then. Air defense being more effective is even more support for stealth, which directly reduces air defense's effectiveness.
>Dogfights are not happening regularly in Ukraine.
They are happening far more regularly than US Air Force doctrine calls for, which is never. Posessing total air superiority is baked into nearly every decision.
They are happening far more regularly than US Air Force doctrine calls for, which is never. Posessing total air superiority is baked into nearly every decision.
So let's ship some to Ukraine and get them battle tested!
They're too expensive to hand out I would guess (also Russia might start threatening nuclear war again) and it would be a disaster to have one get blown up easily.
They're probably also still not fully combat ready.
They're probably also still not fully combat ready.
One of the issues was wiring harnesses being too close together. The USAF has higher requirements in for redundancy and fault-tolerance in aircraft that may be shot at than civilian airliners do, go figure. Either way, it's not something that should be new for a company like Boeing that's done several generations of airliner to tanker conversions.
The LCS's mission modules were based on the Danish Stanflex system, which seems to be working pretty well. Since the modular mission packages have gone away, the remaining ones are going to be installed more permanently, making the LCS into more of a purpose built ship. This won't really help the LCS though because it was already purpose built to operate in the littorals, which was a role that never really made sense
I wonder what went wrong woth the combat module concept. The Dutch who inspired this in the LCS are using similar modules just fine apparently on their ships.
They were probably used to having unlimited funding in the past and now that military purchasers finally woke up and decided to limit spending on projects with fixed cost caps. Boeing doesn't know how to bud with the actual cost. Can't nid low and then go ask for addtional budgets.
When I read up recently on the KC-46 bidding, I found a quote from an Airbus exec at the time saying Airbus won't bid in the second round, because Boeing's offer was too aggressive. I guess being burned once, with the A400M, was a lesson Airbus didn't forget.
> They're only interested in costs+ contracts, which nobody seems to be willing to give them.
"What do you mean we have to deliver planes that don't fall out of the sky? That's an outrageous requirement!"
"What do you mean we have to deliver planes that don't fall out of the sky? That's an outrageous requirement!"
Interesting. Also, do you think their civil and military depts are isolated ? or do blunders in one can appear in the other ? this would surely cause the US to have cold feet in asking them for more planes.
The rot at Boeing came from the McDonnell-Douglas acquisition and its military-contractor culture of corruption. Harry Stonecipher used to joke McDonnell-Douglas bought Boeing with Boeing's own money.
> Civil aviation is beer money to Boeing
This is completely false. For 2022 fiscal year revenue in commercial was $25B vs $23B for defense and losses in commercial were $2.3B vs $3.5B for defense.
https://www.boeing.com/resources/boeingdotcom/company/annual... (Page 58)
This is completely false. For 2022 fiscal year revenue in commercial was $25B vs $23B for defense and losses in commercial were $2.3B vs $3.5B for defense.
https://www.boeing.com/resources/boeingdotcom/company/annual... (Page 58)
That's less true than it used to be, due to the unofficial end of cost plus. And Boeing is getting to be a bit of a red flag in procurement circles.
More or less all capital-B Boeing programs in the DoD side are - at best - unwell, but "terminally ill" is also making a showing. KC46, SLS, CST-100. There was also the AH-64D/E fictional upgrade kit and bad/counterfeit parts, something repeated on the CH-47 retrofits[1] . . honestly, peel back the skin on a successful Boeing program and odds are you'll see a non-Boeing organization or its remnants (or Phantom Works, or some other little island of competence that's somehow avoided the All Seeing Eye). And this is just the surface stuff.
BDS never recovered from the end of cost plus' Glory Days of the GWoT. Fixed price broke a lot of BDS, because no one really has any idea what anything costs, or even how long it takes to do a thing. Sometimes I wonder just how much is left in the core of the org.
My first memory of working with Boeing was from 2010, when a government encryption requirement led me down a long and tortured road that ended with me training an entire Boeing team on what PGP was (we still ended up handling virtually all of that in-house, at cost to Boeing, because it took eight months to get an answer to virtually any question, as both call and response filtered through two dozen levels of management emails). More recently the USAF tossed Boeing a softball project to glue wings and a GPS kit to Mk82 iron bombs, but Boeing couldn't figure it out - they had to subcon the job to Kratos (this was in the news, but was also confirmed anecdotally). Similar thing with "avionics updates" for <redacted> - the "update" was just a request that an accurate pinout diagram be sent with the documentation. Again, core Boeing just couldn't manage that without subconning it out; they literally did not know the pin #s on a standard ARINC connector that they were themselves using. Pretty close to an aerospace company needing a subcontractor to explain what the Bernoulli Principle is.
I do hope I am wrong about B. It's quite possible I've just had really bad luck when it comes to the division I deal with. But sometimes . . sometimes you wonder, "What . . what if the whole org is like that?"
[1] That's a huge theme across multiple BDS divisions and programs, from UAS to F-15 and Super Hornet. I suspect it's also why BGS appears to be made of money.
More or less all capital-B Boeing programs in the DoD side are - at best - unwell, but "terminally ill" is also making a showing. KC46, SLS, CST-100. There was also the AH-64D/E fictional upgrade kit and bad/counterfeit parts, something repeated on the CH-47 retrofits[1] . . honestly, peel back the skin on a successful Boeing program and odds are you'll see a non-Boeing organization or its remnants (or Phantom Works, or some other little island of competence that's somehow avoided the All Seeing Eye). And this is just the surface stuff.
BDS never recovered from the end of cost plus' Glory Days of the GWoT. Fixed price broke a lot of BDS, because no one really has any idea what anything costs, or even how long it takes to do a thing. Sometimes I wonder just how much is left in the core of the org.
My first memory of working with Boeing was from 2010, when a government encryption requirement led me down a long and tortured road that ended with me training an entire Boeing team on what PGP was (we still ended up handling virtually all of that in-house, at cost to Boeing, because it took eight months to get an answer to virtually any question, as both call and response filtered through two dozen levels of management emails). More recently the USAF tossed Boeing a softball project to glue wings and a GPS kit to Mk82 iron bombs, but Boeing couldn't figure it out - they had to subcon the job to Kratos (this was in the news, but was also confirmed anecdotally). Similar thing with "avionics updates" for <redacted> - the "update" was just a request that an accurate pinout diagram be sent with the documentation. Again, core Boeing just couldn't manage that without subconning it out; they literally did not know the pin #s on a standard ARINC connector that they were themselves using. Pretty close to an aerospace company needing a subcontractor to explain what the Bernoulli Principle is.
I do hope I am wrong about B. It's quite possible I've just had really bad luck when it comes to the division I deal with. But sometimes . . sometimes you wonder, "What . . what if the whole org is like that?"
[1] That's a huge theme across multiple BDS divisions and programs, from UAS to F-15 and Super Hornet. I suspect it's also why BGS appears to be made of money.
With that in mind, would there be any negative effects to slowly giving Boeing the cold shoulder?
For suppliers, it's a valid question, and it gets more valid every year as the cost of doing business with big B spirals. Thing is, it's just so much damn money up front, that the guys up in Mahogany Row don't really care about follow-on costs, like having to support Boeing staff who don't know what a scroll wheel on a mouse does. Now, though, with (another!) active investigation, possibly one where Boeing loses their in-house DERs . . whew, who knows.
From the DoD perspective? It's not really possible for DoD to offload Boeing. The old airframes - F-15, F-18, 7X7 derivatives of all flavors - are the workhorses of US jet aviation . . or they are perceived to be the workhorses, in any case.
Ah, "perceived" . . there's a huge, ginormous other subject here, and that is the subject of a peacetime military. Specifically, whether the metrics we optimize for in peacetime have any bearing whatsoever when it comes to a hot war with a peer. History says, "nope!". Tech and metrics optimized in peacetime buildups almost never have decisive roles in major conflicts, for somewhat obvious reasons: the enemy sees it coming. Everyone's got countermeasures ready to go before shooting starts.
The victor - the technological victor, which doesn't necessarily correlate with the winner - is the one that adjusts fastest to combat experience. That industrial agility is really the thing that needs to be optimized. Trade offs of course are aplenty here; if you adjust hardware too fast, you damage your production capacity and your logistics. Case in point: the US in WW2 were probably one of the slowest-adjusting of the Powers, technologically speaking, but none of that mattered a good god damn when US industrial capacity was greater than the rest of the planet combined. Combining capacity/readiness with agility is the magic bullet. When historians say the T-34 was the most effective armored fighting vehicle of WW2, that's what they're talking about. It obviously wasn't the best, or even a good fighting platform, but it matched Soviet industrial capability to a T while effectively countering the enemy. It was the best design for the system it was part of. Internet people get in terrible screaming matches about this, not realizing that mil historians evaluate systems, not hunks of iron.
Anyway, I'm rambling now. Short answer, yes. Tons.
From the DoD perspective? It's not really possible for DoD to offload Boeing. The old airframes - F-15, F-18, 7X7 derivatives of all flavors - are the workhorses of US jet aviation . . or they are perceived to be the workhorses, in any case.
Ah, "perceived" . . there's a huge, ginormous other subject here, and that is the subject of a peacetime military. Specifically, whether the metrics we optimize for in peacetime have any bearing whatsoever when it comes to a hot war with a peer. History says, "nope!". Tech and metrics optimized in peacetime buildups almost never have decisive roles in major conflicts, for somewhat obvious reasons: the enemy sees it coming. Everyone's got countermeasures ready to go before shooting starts.
The victor - the technological victor, which doesn't necessarily correlate with the winner - is the one that adjusts fastest to combat experience. That industrial agility is really the thing that needs to be optimized. Trade offs of course are aplenty here; if you adjust hardware too fast, you damage your production capacity and your logistics. Case in point: the US in WW2 were probably one of the slowest-adjusting of the Powers, technologically speaking, but none of that mattered a good god damn when US industrial capacity was greater than the rest of the planet combined. Combining capacity/readiness with agility is the magic bullet. When historians say the T-34 was the most effective armored fighting vehicle of WW2, that's what they're talking about. It obviously wasn't the best, or even a good fighting platform, but it matched Soviet industrial capability to a T while effectively countering the enemy. It was the best design for the system it was part of. Internet people get in terrible screaming matches about this, not realizing that mil historians evaluate systems, not hunks of iron.
Anyway, I'm rambling now. Short answer, yes. Tons.
They are roughly 40% military, 30% civilian planes and 30% services (maintenance), revenue-wise
Is 50% of services for the military?
Probably less. A lot of US military groups have dedicated personal for maintaining operational hardware including planes that are cross-trained at these large companies.
I think you’d be surprised how many civilians work on jets and how many parts the military goes through.
Those dedicated personnel interact with contractors and don’t make their own parts.
They were...
I'm gonna guess that civilian plane starts tapering off with a reputation for expensive groundings (bad for airlines), and for crashes (means the public is gonna be buying tickets on an airbus given the chance).
I'm gonna guess that civilian plane starts tapering off with a reputation for expensive groundings (bad for airlines), and for crashes (means the public is gonna be buying tickets on an airbus given the chance).
Boeing bonanza leaves rival Airbus in the dust at 2023 Dubai Air Show with three times more aircraft orders
https://www.cnbc.com/2023/11/16/dubai-airshow-2023-boeing-or...
https://www.cnbc.com/2023/11/16/dubai-airshow-2023-boeing-or...
The commands during air shows are mostly performative. Boeing probably wanted to cater middle east/asian investors in 2023. When Airbus launched the 320neo, they did the same, waiting months before announcing the commands to 'beat' Boeing during the Bourget, even though Boeing had more commands the 5+ following years.
Too big to fail implies the government should probably break them up then.
I don't get it. If civil aviation is beer money why build the 747, the most iconic passenger plane to be every built, only surpassed perhaps by the Concorde. Something has changed at Boeing in the last couple of decades, that has changed the trajectory of Boeing leadership leading to quality issues.
Yes. The merger with McDonnell-Douglas, which resulted in McDonnell-Douglas's leadership getting control of Boeing despite the fact that they had already run McDonnell-Douglas into the ground.
And they've been shook real bad in the aerospace market with ULA. So bad, it's pretty much a given that Boeing is getting out of the market and selling to Amazon.
If Boeing’s civilian jets are falling from the skies, I wonder what will happen to its military ones in the coming conflict with China.
And if anything nuclear is manufactured to the same quality standards as the 737 Max, then… woe is us…
Boeing is toast, both in civil aviation and in the military. They gutted the engineering expertise that would have been needed to be successful. And now they just can't fix it.
The US gov might force/convince them to split in two then.
If Boeing concedes the civilian market, the likes of SpaceX could just spin out an aircraft or jet engine business and compete quite well.
How about some engines made with those fancy alloys they've got? Or just a willingness to do an awesome design without all the baggage or need for short term profit.
How about some engines made with those fancy alloys they've got? Or just a willingness to do an awesome design without all the baggage or need for short term profit.
The overlap between space rockets and aircraft engines and airliners either zero so.
Also, Boeing isn't buildong aircraft engines.
Also, Boeing isn't buildong aircraft engines.
Do you know if they use Rolls Royce engines?
Rolls Royce is big in big engines. Not so much in smaller single aisle aircraft. Boeing 777 and 787 have Rolls Royce engine options. The Rolls Royce Trent engine family is advanced in having three spools compared to the usual two by competitors.
Short search turned up at least one:
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rolls-Royce_BR700
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rolls-Royce_BR700
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombardier_Aviation
>On 28 April 2016, Bombardier Aerospace, a division of Bombardier Inc., recorded a firm order from Delta Air Lines for 75 CSeries CS100s plus 50 options. On 27 April 2017, The Boeing Company filed a petition for dumping them at $19.6m each, below their $33.2m production cost.
>On 26 September, after lobbying by Boeing, the US Department of Commerce (DoC) alleged subsidies of 220% and intended to collect deposits accordingly, plus a preliminary 80% anti-dumping duty, resulting in a duty of 300%. The DoC announced its final ruling, a total duty of 292%, on 20 December, hailing it as an affirmation of the "America First" policy.
>In October 2017, as a direct result of the tariffs and mounting financial issues, Bombardier was forced by the American government into an agreement to relinquish 50.01% of its stake in the CSeries program to Airbus for a token CAD$1, and would produce CSeries aircraft in the United States.
>In 2020, amid mounting debts, Bombardier sold its remaining A220 stake to Airbus and exited the commercial plane business.
Boeing will be fine.
>On 28 April 2016, Bombardier Aerospace, a division of Bombardier Inc., recorded a firm order from Delta Air Lines for 75 CSeries CS100s plus 50 options. On 27 April 2017, The Boeing Company filed a petition for dumping them at $19.6m each, below their $33.2m production cost.
>On 26 September, after lobbying by Boeing, the US Department of Commerce (DoC) alleged subsidies of 220% and intended to collect deposits accordingly, plus a preliminary 80% anti-dumping duty, resulting in a duty of 300%. The DoC announced its final ruling, a total duty of 292%, on 20 December, hailing it as an affirmation of the "America First" policy.
>In October 2017, as a direct result of the tariffs and mounting financial issues, Bombardier was forced by the American government into an agreement to relinquish 50.01% of its stake in the CSeries program to Airbus for a token CAD$1, and would produce CSeries aircraft in the United States.
>In 2020, amid mounting debts, Bombardier sold its remaining A220 stake to Airbus and exited the commercial plane business.
Boeing will be fine.
I think Boeing miscalculated that one, because in the end Airbus ended up with the A220 program which is great for them.
> The only thing keeping Boeing in the game right now is likely the fact that Airbus is sold out for over a decade
Depends on the model, A220, A330 and A350 can be ordered for within 5 years.
Update: Delta just ordered A350-1000s, and deliveries will start in 2026, so merely 2 years out.
Depends on the model, A220, A330 and A350 can be ordered for within 5 years.
Update: Delta just ordered A350-1000s, and deliveries will start in 2026, so merely 2 years out.
Delivery slot allocation is bit more complex than deviding order book by monthly deliveries. Also, custumers cancel orders, freeing up delivery slots for other airlines.
The A320 order book is approaching ten years so, and wont decrease with sales exceeding deliveries.
The A320 order book is approaching ten years so, and wont decrease with sales exceeding deliveries.
It figures Airbus wouldn't add a new production line for an aircraft first introduced in 1988 and for which a replacement could arrive in 2024 or 2025.
> for which a replacement could arrive in 2024 or 2025
That's unlikely. They're in the process of testing out various moonshots (hydrogen powered aircraft in multiple configurations, flying wings, open fan engines), and it's practically impossible to have enough data to engage in a new design so quickly. Especially when the neo A320 family is quite new, selling very well, and has new models coming out soon (A321LR and XLR), and they already have the A220 that can use new engines and a stretch.
That's unlikely. They're in the process of testing out various moonshots (hydrogen powered aircraft in multiple configurations, flying wings, open fan engines), and it's practically impossible to have enough data to engage in a new design so quickly. Especially when the neo A320 family is quite new, selling very well, and has new models coming out soon (A321LR and XLR), and they already have the A220 that can use new engines and a stretch.
For a replacement to arrive in the next 2 years, planes would have to be already in flight testing.
Moonshots are good, aren't they? Difference between Airbus and the various Start-Up moonshoots: the former is financed by their existing business activities, while the latter is financed by VC money.
Moonshots are good, aren't they? Difference between Airbus and the various Start-Up moonshoots: the former is financed by their existing business activities, while the latter is financed by VC money.
That and switching costs. I'm no expert but I've noticed airlines tend to keep their fleets to as few variants of plane as possible. Makes sense thinking about maintenance etc. Have to imagine introducing an entire new manufacturer would add significant complication.
Emirates with the B777 and A380 models only. Landing in Dubai and seeing that uniform line of B777's was something else.
I remember the first time I came face to face with 777. When you show up to the gate expecting a 737, that 777 is incredible sitting there instead. Normally, you are pretty much looking down at the 737 from the gate, but you’re underneath the 777 and can’t even see the cockpit. It was really surprising since this was not a long haul flight.
I was and still am impressed by the size of the engines of those things. Last time I flew one I was looking down on one thinking it looked more like a small house than a jet tube.
(see https://www.reddit.com/r/aviation/comments/x7jges/777_engine...)
(see https://www.reddit.com/r/aviation/comments/x7jges/777_engine...)
reddit comments can be fun:
"If I was a billionaire, I would buy a 737 and upgrade the engines to GE9X's "
Boeing refers to that as 737MAX+
"If I was a billionaire, I would buy a 737 and upgrade the engines to GE9X's "
Boeing refers to that as 737MAX+
The 777 is a great aircraft. Pilots love them. Maybe the last one Boeing built.
Sucks to fly on though, compared to the A350/A380/787, all of which are noticeably more comfortable.
any airline can turn any plane into a hell for the customers with how they squeeze as many seats in as nearly impossible to do
Maybe. In my experience over the last few years of doing a lot of long haul flying in economy, there's not much difference in seat layout between airlines though, it's mostly about the plane you're on. A380s have nice big seats, the rest are pretty similar. The pressurisation and quality of air conditioning on the other hand makes a big difference to my quality of life personally, and that's noticeably worse on 777s.
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And vendor lock-in. Airlines have invested in education for their pilots and maintenance employees, and in Boeing specific maintenance equipment.
This is the whole reason for the 737 Max debacle. They tried to keep the controls the same so pilots wouldn’t need retraining, even though the plane was very different. They tried to paper over the differences in software. And hundreds died.
I'd assume a contributing factor is all the defense contracts Boeing has. Not sure how the percentages work out, but guaranteed orders of military equipment have to have high margin.
Or for airlines like Southwest that have an exclusive contract with Boeing and would require an enormous cost and effort to introduce any other manufacturer.
Not only does Southwest exclusively fly Boeing aircraft, they exclusively fly 737s, which enables their unusual routing style. Essentially every pilot and crew at Southwest can fly any aircraft the company has for them.
Presumably this gives Boeing a strong incentive to keep making new 737s that push the engineering envelope, instead of making a new narrowbody aircraft.
That strategy makes some sense in the short to medium term, but I always wonder what the end game is supposed to be. Convincing Boeing to just keep making 737 variants forever so Southwest can keep flying a single aircraft type seems like it will lock the two in a death spiral where they slowly become less and less competitive due to forced reliance on an increasingly aging airframe. The MAX is an obvious example of the types of compromises that need to be made to try to keep pace, but it sees unlikely it will be the last. At some point both Boeing and Southwest need a path to replace the 737 entirely.
Other airlines have switched from exclusively Boeing to exclusively Airbus - eg Easyjet did in the early 2000s, and operated a mixed fleet for about a decade.
https://simpleflying.com/easyjet-boeing-to-airbus/
Obviously it's more of a challenge, but it's not insurmountable.
https://simpleflying.com/easyjet-boeing-to-airbus/
Obviously it's more of a challenge, but it's not insurmountable.
You're right that switching airplane models certainly seems possible, even for airlines that operate one model exclusively. I wonder if Southwest being such a huge airline by fleet size (much larger than EasyJet for example) would make that harder or easier.
Either way I was thinking less about Southwest jumping ship to Airbus and more switching to an entirely new model from either manufacturer. I wouldn't see Southwest going through the trouble of switching to the A320 for example, but maybe to an A320 or 737 replacement. The A320 may be a newer platform than the 737, but it still dates to the 80s (admittedly better than dating to the 60s). I doubt Southwest would want to go through the hassle of changing models just to end up on a 40 year old airframe that they might have to transition away from again in the not-too-distant future.
Either way I was thinking less about Southwest jumping ship to Airbus and more switching to an entirely new model from either manufacturer. I wouldn't see Southwest going through the trouble of switching to the A320 for example, but maybe to an A320 or 737 replacement. The A320 may be a newer platform than the 737, but it still dates to the 80s (admittedly better than dating to the 60s). I doubt Southwest would want to go through the hassle of changing models just to end up on a 40 year old airframe that they might have to transition away from again in the not-too-distant future.
If Southwest will have to make One Big Decision on its next generation, Airbus could have a reasonable shot at it eh.
I imagine Airbus does have a chance, although like I said in a sibling comment, I think they'll need a new plane to do it. The A320 might be newer than the 737, but it's not really that new. I don't see a company like Southwest planning a generational shift to an airframe that itself is nearly a generation old. Whichever company comes out with the next generation single aisle might end up with the business though.
That and the US government trying to keep them afloat for national security reasons.
Its funny, back when I want to college I had a CS professor who referred to himself as "an otherwise reputable computer scientist who sometimes gets on Airbus airplanes".
That was in reference to the difference in philosophy between Boeing and Airbus about whether the pilot or the plane's computer should get the final say in emergency situations, with Boeing letting the pilot override the plane and Airbus having some protections that won't allow the pilot to do something dangerous (I'm sure I'm oversimplifying or misconstruing details, I'm not a pilot or aviation engineer and it's been a couple of decades since I heard this particular rant).
With the last few years of Boeing's misadventures I wonder what he'd call himself today, "an otherwise reputable computer scientist who sometimes gets on modern jetliners"?
That was in reference to the difference in philosophy between Boeing and Airbus about whether the pilot or the plane's computer should get the final say in emergency situations, with Boeing letting the pilot override the plane and Airbus having some protections that won't allow the pilot to do something dangerous (I'm sure I'm oversimplifying or misconstruing details, I'm not a pilot or aviation engineer and it's been a couple of decades since I heard this particular rant).
With the last few years of Boeing's misadventures I wonder what he'd call himself today, "an otherwise reputable computer scientist who sometimes gets on modern jetliners"?
Airbus has 3 flight computers (1 PRIM and two SECs) for fly by wire - they run same software with voting deciding outcomes of commands that comes from the pilot to the flight surfaces.
The unit not matching the others are marked as suspect and removed from flight operations-the switch out is not done by software but hard cutover system using relays.
Good design.
The unit not matching the others are marked as suspect and removed from flight operations-the switch out is not done by software but hard cutover system using relays.
Good design.
I think they’re talking about the pilot being able to apply inputs that might otherwise be considered dangerous by the flight control computers.
So in an emergency a Boeing may allow the pilots to make an input that may overstress the airframe but save the lives of the passengers. Whereas the Airbus computer would override the pilot’s decision and not allow it.
IANAP so I have no idea if that’s true or not.
So in an emergency a Boeing may allow the pilots to make an input that may overstress the airframe but save the lives of the passengers. Whereas the Airbus computer would override the pilot’s decision and not allow it.
IANAP so I have no idea if that’s true or not.
You can dump an A3xx to "direct law" if you turn off the right switches and get direct controls.
ECAM memo: "DIRECT LAW (PROT LOST)"
https://apstraining.com/wp-content/uploads/FCS-Airbus-Quick-...
ECAM memo: "DIRECT LAW (PROT LOST)"
https://apstraining.com/wp-content/uploads/FCS-Airbus-Quick-...
[deleted]
Isn't the MCAS situation the exact opposite? Boeing pilots tried hard to override it, but it wouldn't let them.
Yes, it's one of the most notable aspects of MCAS, that it departs from previous Boeing design philosophy.
Yes but MCAS is relatively recent, the controversy in GP happened when fly by wire was a new concept.
More or less that - the rationale being that pilots could overreact in stressful emergency situations and thus the flight control system would prevent unintentional damage that would only make the situation worse.
> Airbus has 3 flight computers (1 PRIM and two SECs) for fly by wire - they run same software with voting deciding outcomes of commands that comes from the pilot to the flight surfaces.
So a software bug could doom the plane?
IIRC, some other flight-control voting system have 3 computers, but one runs software developed independently from the others.
So a software bug could doom the plane?
IIRC, some other flight-control voting system have 3 computers, but one runs software developed independently from the others.
Boeing 787 is also fly-by-wire.
Yes, software is life-critical. Therefore it is developed to a very high standard. Ada is often used.
Yes, software is life-critical. Therefore it is developed to a very high standard. Ada is often used.
I heard the military relaxed restrictions that required Ada. So the F-22 Raptor was mostly Ada, but the newer JSF is mostly C++. No idea if true, but that is what I remember.
> I heard the military relaxed restrictions that required Ada. So the F-22 Raptor was mostly Ada, but the newer JSF is mostly C++. No idea if true, but that is what I remember.
I think that's correct. IIRC, the JSF C++ coding standard document is floating around.
I think that's correct. IIRC, the JSF C++ coding standard document is floating around.
I would certainly hope that it's the MISRA variant.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MISRA_C
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MISRA_C
> I would certainly hope that it's the MISRA variant.
I think this is it: https://www.stroustrup.com/JSF-AV-rules.pdf, and it appears you're right:
> The MISRA Guidelines were written specifically for use in systems that contain a safety aspect to them. The guidelines address potentially unsafe C language features, and provide programming rules to avoid those pitfalls. The Vehicle Systems Safety Critical Coding Standards for C, which are based on the MISRA C subset, provide a more comprehensive set of language restrictions that are applied uniformly across Vehicle Systems safety critical applications. The AV Coding Standards build on the relevant portions of the previous two documents with an additional set of rules specific to the appropriate use C++ language features (e.g. inheritance, templates, namespaces, etc.) in safety-critical environments.
I think this is it: https://www.stroustrup.com/JSF-AV-rules.pdf, and it appears you're right:
> The MISRA Guidelines were written specifically for use in systems that contain a safety aspect to them. The guidelines address potentially unsafe C language features, and provide programming rules to avoid those pitfalls. The Vehicle Systems Safety Critical Coding Standards for C, which are based on the MISRA C subset, provide a more comprehensive set of language restrictions that are applied uniformly across Vehicle Systems safety critical applications. The AV Coding Standards build on the relevant portions of the previous two documents with an additional set of rules specific to the appropriate use C++ language features (e.g. inheritance, templates, namespaces, etc.) in safety-critical environments.
> Boeing letting the pilot override the plane and Airbus ... won't allow
I still think it is basically true (MCAS notwithstanding).
For Boeing:
The design philosophy is: "to inform the pilot that the command being given would put the aircraft outside of its normal operating envelope, but the ability to do so is not precluded."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flight_control_modes
I thought there was some situation where an airbus plane though it was landing and cut back on the throttle causing a crash. Can't find it now.
I still think it is basically true (MCAS notwithstanding).
For Boeing:
The design philosophy is: "to inform the pilot that the command being given would put the aircraft outside of its normal operating envelope, but the ability to do so is not precluded."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flight_control_modes
I thought there was some situation where an airbus plane though it was landing and cut back on the throttle causing a crash. Can't find it now.
What you have in mind for the Airbus crash is what the captain claimed, but it was not true. The engines responded normally and started to spool up to maximum power, but that takes time for older jet engines coming from idle.
The crew then pulled as far back as the stick would go, and the computer put the aircraft at it's maximum possible pitch-up. Unfortunately that wasn't enough to clear the trees they were flying into. More details here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_296Q
A 737 in the same situation would have similar engine challenges. But the crew would have stalled it instead of the Airbus computer avoiding the stall. That would have most likely been a more severe crash than what happened here.
The crew then pulled as far back as the stick would go, and the computer put the aircraft at it's maximum possible pitch-up. Unfortunately that wasn't enough to clear the trees they were flying into. More details here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_296Q
A 737 in the same situation would have similar engine challenges. But the crew would have stalled it instead of the Airbus computer avoiding the stall. That would have most likely been a more severe crash than what happened here.
This article shows how pilots could also get confused by the 3 tier autopilot system.
https://admiralcloudberg.medium.com/the-long-way-down-the-cr...
https://admiralcloudberg.medium.com/the-long-way-down-the-cr...
I had a prof too (formal methods?) who opened with "Ladies and gentlemen, if you follow my lecture series, you will never fly model x of brand y aircraft again.
[deleted]
The way it works for the Airbus is that the pilot controls the plane, but there are safety parameters that determine what the controls do.
Consider it like a modern car with engine management software. If you floor the accelerator all at once from a low rpm in a very old car, the engine will stumble, if you do it in a modern car the engine management software will inject the maximum amount of fuel that can be burned and not too much, getting you maximum acceleration.
The same applies for the way Airbus controls work. Let's say you want the maximum climb (for example due to wind shear on landing), in the Airbus you push the throttles all the way forward, and pull the stick all the way back. The computer will figure out not to pitch you up further than the plan can handle.
The same manoeuvre in a Boeing means you press the TO/GA switch twice for maximum power (because the engines are computer controlled here as well) but then you pull back on the yoke up to stick shaker activation (stall warning) and manually try to pitch just below the maximum. There is no safeguard stopping you from pulling too far and stalling the airplane. Every pilot can do that, small training aircraft that everyone learns this in don't have any protections either. But the accuracy won't be as good as what the Airbus computers can do and it requires paying more attention.
Now in an emergency, systems failures, the Airbus will downgrade to how the Boeing works. Full back stick will be an unlimited pitch-up and the pilots need to manually figure out what the maximum is.
Consider it like a modern car with engine management software. If you floor the accelerator all at once from a low rpm in a very old car, the engine will stumble, if you do it in a modern car the engine management software will inject the maximum amount of fuel that can be burned and not too much, getting you maximum acceleration.
The same applies for the way Airbus controls work. Let's say you want the maximum climb (for example due to wind shear on landing), in the Airbus you push the throttles all the way forward, and pull the stick all the way back. The computer will figure out not to pitch you up further than the plan can handle.
The same manoeuvre in a Boeing means you press the TO/GA switch twice for maximum power (because the engines are computer controlled here as well) but then you pull back on the yoke up to stick shaker activation (stall warning) and manually try to pitch just below the maximum. There is no safeguard stopping you from pulling too far and stalling the airplane. Every pilot can do that, small training aircraft that everyone learns this in don't have any protections either. But the accuracy won't be as good as what the Airbus computers can do and it requires paying more attention.
Now in an emergency, systems failures, the Airbus will downgrade to how the Boeing works. Full back stick will be an unlimited pitch-up and the pilots need to manually figure out what the maximum is.
>Now in an emergency, systems failures, the Airbus will downgrade to how the Boeing works. Full back stick will be an unlimited pitch-up and the pilots need to manually figure out what the maximum is.
You're referring to Alternate Law and the more extreme version, Direct Law. One note is that it's not always an emergency that can cause this. If important sensors like AOA or airspeed disagree (for example, due to a temporarily-frozen pitot tube), that will also reduce to alternate or direct depending on the situation.
Unfortunately this can bite pilots badly if they either don't notice or don't understand the new situation quickly enough. There have been one or two crashes attributed to this over the years. [See Air France 447]
You're referring to Alternate Law and the more extreme version, Direct Law. One note is that it's not always an emergency that can cause this. If important sensors like AOA or airspeed disagree (for example, due to a temporarily-frozen pitot tube), that will also reduce to alternate or direct depending on the situation.
Unfortunately this can bite pilots badly if they either don't notice or don't understand the new situation quickly enough. There have been one or two crashes attributed to this over the years. [See Air France 447]
I went down a youtube rabbit hole about aircraft investigations once. One think I am still surprised by is the (in my opinion) bad UX of some errors. For example: It can be really easy to not notice a change from normal to alternate or direct law, if there are multiple problems going on at once.
There's a bigger difference, as I understand it, which is where airbus generally considers the pilot as managing a complex machine with a lot of automation (even without autopilots), and the inputs and controls reflect that, being a bit more abstract. Boeing basically tries to make every plane they make fly like a cessna, using the same basic controls but always adapting the interface to the same thing, even if that abstraction is leaky. There's upsides and downsides to it, but MCAS is one example of boeing's philosophy going wrong (in part exacerbated by trying to conserve the type rating and avoiding pilot retraining).
The very first A320 demonstration flight _and_ one of the first A330 flights both crashed and killed multiple people due to issues with the autopilot programming. The whole “if it’s not Boeing, I’m not going” thing was because of distrust around the fly-by-wire system that Airbus used.
I guess all big companies eventually succumb to this fate. It sucks.
I guess all big companies eventually succumb to this fate. It sucks.
AF296 crashed because the pilot selected TOGA too late for the engines to spool up in time, and was completely unprepared. There was no issue with the FCS, nor the autopilot which was disengaged.
For Airbus Industrie 129, it seems that the FCS was not the root cause of the issue, but I don't know a lot about this flight.
For Airbus Industrie 129, it seems that the FCS was not the root cause of the issue, but I don't know a lot about this flight.
The pilot of AF296 claims the crash happened because the fly-by-wire system preventing him from being able to select TOGA and from pulling up. The official investigation still found the pilot at fault, but there were also claims and later investigation that Airbus interfered with the official investigation, leading to general distrust of Airbus and the fly-by-wire system.
Asseline can claim what he wants, but, unfortunately for him, the FDR and reconstitutions (performed in a simulator and in a real plane) do not back him up. And the only “proof” of FDR tampering comes from someone who did not understand what he was looking at.
Now, I don't want to be too harsh on him. AF set him up to fail (acknowledged by the BEA report), then threw him under the bus. I can understand why he chose the support of the SNPL, even if it meant going at war against the plane.
Now, I don't want to be too harsh on him. AF set him up to fail (acknowledged by the BEA report), then threw him under the bus. I can understand why he chose the support of the SNPL, even if it meant going at war against the plane.
Yeah older pilots distrusted the Airbus design and joystick controls. They preferred Boeing's direct cable-and-pully design. But many of them are retired now, younger pilots probably don't have such strong opinions. They also like airplanes where the doors don't blow out in flight.
Well they switched that philosophy with the MAX and look what happened...
Airbus selling point: The side doesn't fall out
I don't disagree with that but Airbus planes have also had their fair shares of issues: from frozen sensors sending planes into both the Atlantic and the Mediterannean see to a repeated behavior of apparently loving to land with the front gear's wheel rotated 90 degrees (why oh why!? At this point I think they'll have to reinforce the arm holding the wheel so that it can better deal with landing at 90 degrees).
Are Boeing planes really that much more dangerous than Airbus ones?
Are Boeing planes really that much more dangerous than Airbus ones?
Here is an interesting article by Airbus regarding the 90 degree nose wheel landings: https://safetyfirst.airbus.com/landing-with-nosewheels-at-90...
> The investigations identified the root causes, which were different for each event. Mitigating actions were developed and deployed accordingly.
This is a nice document. Analogies in software operations world!
This is a nice document. Analogies in software operations world!
Reading that, I see more references to inappropriate resets than seems reasonable. It seems to be that Airbus could benefit from a more systematic way to manage what happens when a system is reset and to address the factors that give the crew incentives to reset systems when not authorized by the instructions from Airbus.
This sounds complex, but possibly quite worthwhile.
This sounds complex, but possibly quite worthwhile.
> Are Boeing planes really that much more dangerous than Airbus ones?
You don’t need to speculate about what could happen, you have statistics about what did happen. Yes, they are. Not by much in absolute terms (thank goodness) but in relative terms, significantly.
You don’t need to speculate about what could happen, you have statistics about what did happen. Yes, they are. Not by much in absolute terms (thank goodness) but in relative terms, significantly.
> significantly
You must be comparing two specific airframes.
You must be comparing two specific airframes.
> Are Boeing planes really that much more dangerous than Airbus ones?
The 737NG is the safest airliner ever produced. Boeing is having a rough patch, but anyone counting them out is foolish. They've had rough patches before.
The 737NG is the safest airliner ever produced. Boeing is having a rough patch, but anyone counting them out is foolish. They've had rough patches before.
Technically, yes[0].
And aviation, especially in the U.S., is very much tied to politics, which cares not as much about what might happen, but what did.
— [0]: https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10130490
And aviation, especially in the U.S., is very much tied to politics, which cares not as much about what might happen, but what did.
— [0]: https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10130490
> Are Boeing planes really that much more dangerous than Airbus ones?
With the attention span of last few weeks it is indeed the case.
Besides the serious one you recounted. I find this [1] funny:
https://www.businessinsider.com/airbus-changing-a350-aircraf...
With the attention span of last few weeks it is indeed the case.
Besides the serious one you recounted. I find this [1] funny:
https://www.businessinsider.com/airbus-changing-a350-aircraf...
For the airlines it's not about safety it's about reliable flight hours. Boeing right now have to ground their planes way more haphazardly than Airbus.
The issues mentioned here about Airbus are manageable, they're not unforeseen parts falling off the plane suddenly.
The issues mentioned here about Airbus are manageable, they're not unforeseen parts falling off the plane suddenly.
The other problem with Boeing and FAA in USA is that we seen how they cover their mistakes, how they try to patch over flaws etc.
FAA should today randomly pick new Beoings and do a full inspection and not wait for incidents to happen in USA and posted on internet before pretending to care.
FAA should today randomly pick new Beoings and do a full inspection and not wait for incidents to happen in USA and posted on internet before pretending to care.
Isn’t that what they just did? Only instead of picking a random new plane, they forced 100% of the newest plane to be inspected.
They checked only the door plug thing, they should check everything in a few random planes.
Yeah, with the loose bolts discovered in several planes after the door plug incident, and the recent Boeing advisory about possible loose bolts in the rudder control system, I imagine airline maintenance staff will start wondering what other screws may be loose in their planes...
> from frozen sensors sending planes into both the Atlantic and the Mediterannean
It wasn't the sensors doing that, it was pilots misunderstanding what the frozen sensors are telling them, and what the plane is telling them. That's why the UX has been improved on that, and there's even an estimated airspeed via GPS now to give some indication to the pilots with the best available information.
Overall, I think this is a false equivalence and bad form of whataboutism. Boeing are caught, again, with shoddy manufacturing and design practices, and people harp on "But Airbus aren't better!". Even if they weren't, and they are better, why does it matter? Boeing have issues, those need to be fixed. If Airbus had issues, those have to be fixed too. And Airbus have been working on theirs (like the A350 paint problems or the UX that could be improved when sensors are out) which are, again, much less critical than Boeing's planes flying themselves into the ground or with parts flying off.
It wasn't the sensors doing that, it was pilots misunderstanding what the frozen sensors are telling them, and what the plane is telling them. That's why the UX has been improved on that, and there's even an estimated airspeed via GPS now to give some indication to the pilots with the best available information.
Overall, I think this is a false equivalence and bad form of whataboutism. Boeing are caught, again, with shoddy manufacturing and design practices, and people harp on "But Airbus aren't better!". Even if they weren't, and they are better, why does it matter? Boeing have issues, those need to be fixed. If Airbus had issues, those have to be fixed too. And Airbus have been working on theirs (like the A350 paint problems or the UX that could be improved when sensors are out) which are, again, much less critical than Boeing's planes flying themselves into the ground or with parts flying off.
Anyone have flight numbers for these incidents?
Air France 447 is a famous one.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_447
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_447
Is that very typical?
Well, there are a lot of these 737s going around the world all the time, and very seldom does anything like this happen… I just don’t want people thinking that Boeing airplanes aren’t safe.
Well for the past few years Boeing has basically been in the news multiple times a year over something going wrong so you can’t blame people for thinking they aren’t safe
This is misleading as not all of those 737s are MAX version of them.
(My comment was a reference to this: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3m5qxZm_JqM )
Also government subsidies that make the airplanes ~20-30% cheaper.
Which to be fair Boeing almost has as well, but for Boeing it's mostly military contracts that subsidize the development of new airplanes that then get reused as civilian aircraft.
Which to be fair Boeing almost has as well, but for Boeing it's mostly military contracts that subsidize the development of new airplanes that then get reused as civilian aircraft.
Except Boeing's flawed execution turned their normal 'safe' government contracts into a disaster. They claim to have lost $7B on that KC-46 refueler contract already. So they managed to fumble that into a negative subsidy. Boeing looks like a grossly mismanaged company now.
What recent Boeing planes were originally developed for the military and reused as civilian aircraft? It seems like recent designs (eg the 787) are developed entirely from the needs of airlines.
[deleted]
I suspect this a reference to this video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3m5qxZm_JqM&t=4s
Yes!
I have a feeling this will soon enough lead to some protectionist measures and new sanctions based on some suddenly discovered anti-competitive behavior.
They certainly did a wonderful hatchet job to Bombardier. Effectively forced them out of the market to the point they had to sell the entire line to Airbus as the A220.
I'm still crying about this. Bombardier could have become a third large airframe producer.
On the other hand, the Quebec government made the boneheaded decision to give incentives specifically to the C-Series. If they had given those incentives to the whole company, Boeing couldn't have complained.
On the other hand, the Quebec government made the boneheaded decision to give incentives specifically to the C-Series. If they had given those incentives to the whole company, Boeing couldn't have complained.
There's Embraer of Brazil and Comac of China.
Yeah but those companies aren’t able to make larger airframes. Boeing and Airbus are the only two companies making the truly big planes. Bombardier legitimately wanted to enter that market if the C-Series worked well.
For those who want to read about this
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CSeries_dumping_petition_by_Bo...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CSeries_dumping_petition_by_Bo...
They're going to have a real tough time doing that when the alternative is grounded planes. Boeing has put both themselves and the government between a rock and a hard place.
Airbus A320 and Airbus A320neo family final assembly for all North American airlines happens in Mobile, Alabama.
[deleted]
> I have a feeling this will soon enough lead to some protectionist measures and new sanctions based on some suddenly discovered anti-competitive behavior.
American competitiveness and freedom act.
American competitiveness and freedom act.
It is interesting to note that just 5 companies dominated the order book: (1223 total)
* 500 to Indigo (India)
* 250 to Air India.
* 220 to Turkish Airlines
* 153 to EasyJet
* 100 to Avolon.
* 500 to Indigo (India)
* 250 to Air India.
* 220 to Turkish Airlines
* 153 to EasyJet
* 100 to Avolon.
India is going through an economic boom period of which not that many people talk about. The cheap energy inputs as a result of Western sanctions on Russia also help with that, of course.
Cheap inputs are temporary.
What is happening is that for decades, Indian govts have not focussed much on infra development. Current govt, which is in power for past 9 years, has put infra development on a rocket sled, with special focus on highways, railway stations, freight and airports.
Also, air travel is just within the reach of middle-middle class and above. Cirporate bookings are also on the rise.
On the whole, a huge boom is in the works. But dampners include eventual high prices and inefficiencies of logistics and poor management.
Indian are cheap travellers, and cutting 5 USD on a ticket that has no snacks means people will throng to it.
Market is astronomically competitive and consumers are very high price sensitive.
What is happening is that for decades, Indian govts have not focussed much on infra development. Current govt, which is in power for past 9 years, has put infra development on a rocket sled, with special focus on highways, railway stations, freight and airports.
Also, air travel is just within the reach of middle-middle class and above. Cirporate bookings are also on the rise.
On the whole, a huge boom is in the works. But dampners include eventual high prices and inefficiencies of logistics and poor management.
Indian are cheap travellers, and cutting 5 USD on a ticket that has no snacks means people will throng to it.
Market is astronomically competitive and consumers are very high price sensitive.
I don't understand why you got downvoted, but you are raising an interesting point
Apple made sure to migrate some of their factories to India is another evidence
As well as US companies lobbying the Indian government to weaken the labor laws
https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2023/03/apple-foxconn-convin...
Apple made sure to migrate some of their factories to India is another evidence
As well as US companies lobbying the Indian government to weaken the labor laws
https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2023/03/apple-foxconn-convin...
India's economy in general is strong but the recent expansion in air travel has been epic.
I'd also point out that US airlines are notorious for holding on to old planes. Delta in particular has an ancient fleet but they are excellent in maintenance so it's OK, it's not like the 737 has done anything to improve the passenger experience in the past 30 years.
I'd also point out that US airlines are notorious for holding on to old planes. Delta in particular has an ancient fleet but they are excellent in maintenance so it's OK, it's not like the 737 has done anything to improve the passenger experience in the past 30 years.
Newer planes have made massive strides in fuel-efficiency, though.
Well old planes I travelled in India were more spacious. And new planes from US to India were so congested to the point of being claustrophobic. There is no way one can put meal tray on to that tiny front seat pullout.
Needless to say I am just a cattle class passenger. Upper classes would have better experience. Sure, old planes will last forever and everything in next decades will be replaced by same tight seating planes.
Needless to say I am just a cattle class passenger. Upper classes would have better experience. Sure, old planes will last forever and everything in next decades will be replaced by same tight seating planes.
Seat configuration is up to the airline to decide to some degree. Some newer 737s have the ability for airlines to pack them dense if they decide to. A lot of airlines use 737s for short haul flights that do not have meal service, so not being able to fit a meal is not a concern for these customers. What they care about more is being able to split the costs between more passengers and offer cheaper tickets.
Packing in more people definitely improves the economics of the plane and gets the ticket price down and makes it available to more people. In the US we stopped giving out free meals on flights about 10 years ago, at best you can buy a $20 yucky cardboard lunch box, so the problem of the front pullout never comes up.
I think the most luxurious experience in US domestic travel I had was circa 2013 on a 767 widebody from NYC to LA but there were times circa 1990 when it was common to get on a 737 from Philadelphia or Pittsburgh to Albuquerque that was 1/3 full which feels spacious but that couldn't have been economic.
The industry here is competitive on price but not competitive on quality. New entrants in the industry have focused on price, but I can certainly imagine a start-up airline that builds a fleet of entirely A220 or E2-Jets around a hub in, say, Texas, could serve almost all of North America and advertise a futurist plane you'll like much better.
I think the most luxurious experience in US domestic travel I had was circa 2013 on a 767 widebody from NYC to LA but there were times circa 1990 when it was common to get on a 737 from Philadelphia or Pittsburgh to Albuquerque that was 1/3 full which feels spacious but that couldn't have been economic.
The industry here is competitive on price but not competitive on quality. New entrants in the industry have focused on price, but I can certainly imagine a start-up airline that builds a fleet of entirely A220 or E2-Jets around a hub in, say, Texas, could serve almost all of North America and advertise a futurist plane you'll like much better.
I'd be interested to know how many are former Boeing customers. The implication is that people are switching from Boeing to Airbus but it's quite possible a lot of these airlines have always been Airbus customers.
IngiGo are all Airbus and ATR: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IndiGo#Fleet
Air India are about 60% Airbus: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_India_fleet
Turkish Airlines are about 50/50: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkish_Airlines_fleet#Current...
EasyJet are all Airbus: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EasyJet#Fleet
Avalon doesn't have fleet information on Wikipedia (I'm not in the industry and have no idea what a reputable place to go to get this information would be)
Air India are about 60% Airbus: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_India_fleet
Turkish Airlines are about 50/50: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkish_Airlines_fleet#Current...
EasyJet are all Airbus: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EasyJet#Fleet
Avalon doesn't have fleet information on Wikipedia (I'm not in the industry and have no idea what a reputable place to go to get this information would be)
Avolon looks majority Airbus: https://www.avolon.aero/our-fleet
Avolon buys what it calculates it can lease out to airlines, it doesn't have a 'preference' itself.
So basically this Airbus order surge probably has little to do with recent Boeing news and the headline is misleading clickbait
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I'm trying to decide how pleased I should be if Airbus is winning customers from Boeing.
I have an overall impression that Boeing had excessively chooses profit over safety. E.g., the various 737 MAX problems, maybe other ways as well?
If they have, then I'd hope that losing orders gets them to mend their ways.
But maybe my view is overly simplistic.
I have an overall impression that Boeing had excessively chooses profit over safety. E.g., the various 737 MAX problems, maybe other ways as well?
If they have, then I'd hope that losing orders gets them to mend their ways.
But maybe my view is overly simplistic.
There’s undoubtedly great engineers at Boeing but the management sound like most software organisations I’ve worked making random decisions to obtain bonuses or favours with bosses. In software this can just get 900 postmasters jailed, in planes this manages to be considerably worse!
> In software this can just get 900 postmasters jailed
Today I learned. For context: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_Post_Office_scandal
Today I learned. For context: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_Post_Office_scandal
Postmasters jailed? LOL. What does that mean?
It's just sad how much of this idiocy is driven by the idea that "we don't want to have to get re-certified". It's 100% short-term thinking because if they'd just bite the bullet and get re-certified they'd likely be setup for another 30+ years on the new airframe. Of course, that would also mean airlines would have a reason to look at the alternatives, so I guess they're also admitting they don't think they can produce a new airframe that's attractive enough to win on merit.
> It's just sad how much of this idiocy is driven by the idea that "we don't want to have to get re-certified".
It's be nice to know how much of this is Boeing and how much is Boeing's customers. 95/5? 80/20? 50/50?
It's hard to believe that Boeing doesn't want to build a brand-new 737-sized aircraft.
It's be nice to know how much of this is Boeing and how much is Boeing's customers. 95/5? 80/20? 50/50?
It's hard to believe that Boeing doesn't want to build a brand-new 737-sized aircraft.
Why is that hard to believe? At my work they choose quick cheap and easy over long expensive and hard any day.
It would make sense they’d try to optimize the bottom line for the short term. That’s what most companies do.
It would make sense they’d try to optimize the bottom line for the short term. That’s what most companies do.
> I'm trying to decide how pleased I should be if Airbus is winning customers from Boeing.
Well, you have time to decide because that's not what TFA is about.
Well, you have time to decide because that's not what TFA is about.
It's not just safety, it's that the 737 is the symbol of an industry which is not keeping up with the times. The 737 is a 1967 aircraft that is still flying. You don't see a 1967 car being sold in car dealerships. You can't buy a 1967 computer.
You see the headline "Airliners can't take off in Arizona because it's too hot" but the truth is "737s can't take off in Arizona because it's too hot" (737 struggles to take off under good conditions, it takes more runway to take off than planes with 2x the PAX) People say "flying sucks", but it's more like "flying sucks in a 737" (the reason why your neck locks up just thinking about sitting in a window seat on a 737 is because the 737 has a circular cross section that doesn't fit the human body; a plane smaller than a 737 with a more appropriate cross section feels like riding in a 747)
The Embraer E2-Jet is a smaller aircraft that has a bigger engine with better fuel economy because it's not an obsolete design that can't fit a bigger engine. Then there's the A220, bought by Airbus, that Boeing has no answer to and has chosen to have no answer to. For some reason they got possessed to develop several widebody airliners in a row but when it comes to overhauling the narrowbody planes that are most of the units, most of the flights and most of the social and economic impact of aviation, management has been on strike for decades.
The industry has been trying hard to keep you from riding in a modern narrowbody or regional jet because if they did, you'd be demanding it. Once you try the A220 there is no way you'd ride the same route on a 737 if you had a choice. And the thing is the A220 has lower operating costs... But remember, capitalists pay capital costs but they can make you pay operating costs. So long as everybody is flying inferior aircraft they can refuse to invest and pass higher operating costs on to you.
You see the headline "Airliners can't take off in Arizona because it's too hot" but the truth is "737s can't take off in Arizona because it's too hot" (737 struggles to take off under good conditions, it takes more runway to take off than planes with 2x the PAX) People say "flying sucks", but it's more like "flying sucks in a 737" (the reason why your neck locks up just thinking about sitting in a window seat on a 737 is because the 737 has a circular cross section that doesn't fit the human body; a plane smaller than a 737 with a more appropriate cross section feels like riding in a 747)
The Embraer E2-Jet is a smaller aircraft that has a bigger engine with better fuel economy because it's not an obsolete design that can't fit a bigger engine. Then there's the A220, bought by Airbus, that Boeing has no answer to and has chosen to have no answer to. For some reason they got possessed to develop several widebody airliners in a row but when it comes to overhauling the narrowbody planes that are most of the units, most of the flights and most of the social and economic impact of aviation, management has been on strike for decades.
The industry has been trying hard to keep you from riding in a modern narrowbody or regional jet because if they did, you'd be demanding it. Once you try the A220 there is no way you'd ride the same route on a 737 if you had a choice. And the thing is the A220 has lower operating costs... But remember, capitalists pay capital costs but they can make you pay operating costs. So long as everybody is flying inferior aircraft they can refuse to invest and pass higher operating costs on to you.
It seems like the federal government could help everyone get out of this mess by subsidizing the certification and training costs associated with switching out the 737 for a new Boeing airframe. But the federal government doesn't generally think like that. In fact they still fly a ton of 737s themselves.
Why should the federal government subsidise airlines if they want to be cheapskates risking safety & long term viability for a few bucks? I’d rather the government enforce the switch by regulation (if appropriate) and have the airlines + Boeing eat the cost, as punishment for bad decision making.
Unless you are suggesting the federal government subsidise airlines worldwide, your idea would have little impact.
Isn't the A320 the better comparison?
I find it more comfortable as it's a bit wider, the cabin wall is straighter, and the windows are higher up. Possibly it's also quieter.
I find it more comfortable as it's a bit wider, the cabin wall is straighter, and the windows are higher up. Possibly it's also quieter.
Airbus can outsource to US firms as well as Boeing can. Boeing and its shareholders deserve to lose business and market share.
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Someone with integrity needs to inspect all Boeing and their contractors stuff, they clearly started to cut corners.
Boeing supply chain is 500 miles long. Multiple suppliers for every part, and practically none of them are made by Boeing. I started my career in aerospace manufacturing. The whole supply chain is designed to track and shift liability down into the smaller suppliers, who can be easily replaced. That panel blew off your plane? Well who made it?!?! Where are the certs?!?! That vendor must've done something wrong! It surely wasn't us not tightening the bolts all the way.
Airbus isn't in an advantage there. They also employ a bunch of suppliers, outside the original companies that formed Airbus. However, they might be in an advantage because that's the way they grown from the start. Different countries, different continents, different languages, final assembly plants, all sorts of aircraft...
I met a guy from EADS once, while it was still called EADS, and I was far too young to understand the complexity of what he was talking about. But from what I understood they really do put a lot into managing their supply chain management (very meta), a team he was in. It was a behemoth of an organisation back then and this is just one guy, but I had a feeling they were very open minded.
I met a guy from EADS once, while it was still called EADS, and I was far too young to understand the complexity of what he was talking about. But from what I understood they really do put a lot into managing their supply chain management (very meta), a team he was in. It was a behemoth of an organisation back then and this is just one guy, but I had a feeling they were very open minded.
The design problems that led to the first grounding of the 737 Max weren't particularly cost saving.
The overall approach, where they wanted pilot certification to carry over is certainly a business decision, but I'd bet that pilots and airlines and so on liked it.
Similar thing with this door issue. It's likely enough to be sloppy process, and is going to cost them a mint, not save them money. Sure, you can say that compromising quality is motivated by profit, but that cedes an awful lot of the discussion of the consequences of the poor quality to the people that are pushing to save a bit up front.
The overall approach, where they wanted pilot certification to carry over is certainly a business decision, but I'd bet that pilots and airlines and so on liked it.
Similar thing with this door issue. It's likely enough to be sloppy process, and is going to cost them a mint, not save them money. Sure, you can say that compromising quality is motivated by profit, but that cedes an awful lot of the discussion of the consequences of the poor quality to the people that are pushing to save a bit up front.
> weren't particularly cost saving
Not "cost saving" per se, but definitely about money. MBAs are taught that airlines should use one kind of plane. FAA makes it expensive to certify a new kind of plane. So you get this "737 of Theseus" concept where they virtualized the 737 as a "guest", implemented on a different plane "host", leading to the crashes.
Not "cost saving" per se, but definitely about money. MBAs are taught that airlines should use one kind of plane. FAA makes it expensive to certify a new kind of plane. So you get this "737 of Theseus" concept where they virtualized the 737 as a "guest", implemented on a different plane "host", leading to the crashes.
There was and is immense pressure to retain type ratings. For example, both Ryanair and Southwest fly exclusively 737s and have enormous fleets. If type rating compatibility is lost, it's very plausible they could jump to Airbus.
I don't understand why you would quote that sentence and ignore my next paragraph.
They are currently flying them with the adjusted system and a few hours of additional training, pointing to the implementation rather than the approach.
They are currently flying them with the adjusted system and a few hours of additional training, pointing to the implementation rather than the approach.
A key to understanding this is "type rating". Pilots are generally certified to fly 1-2 types of aircraft at a time. Budget airlines, in the US in particular, will try to maintain a single type rating across their entire fleet. This means planes are largely interchangeable with some exceptions (eg a given plane has to be certified to fly over open water on routes like Hawaii and to Europe). So any pilot can fly any plane in the fleet. That's great for keeping costs low and scheduling. As soon as you add a new type rating, you've created a second pool of planes and pilots that you need to manage.
Airbus surprised Boeing when it introduced the A320neo as this was very attractive to budget airlines who were loyal customers to the 737 over decades. There were multiple iterations of 737 up to the 737NG (to that point). Beoing had a choice: develop a new aircraft. This would take longer and wouldn't keep the same type rating so they'd lose their type rating lock-in with the likes of Southwest, who is a huge Boeing customer.
The compromise was the 737Max. It was faster to develop and deliberately designed to maintain the 737 type rating. But it had larger engines and they were moved forward on the plane. This could make stalls easier so Boeing (mostly) silently added a system to "handle" that. That was the infamous MCAS. Lack of knowledge about this and training was what caused the 2 crashes that grounded the Max fleet last time. This was exacerbated by the sensor having a single point of failure. Interestingly, there was an optional upgrade package to have 3 sensors instead of 1, which is more the industry norm for critical systems. 2 of the 3 sensors have to agree.
So Being solved a short term problem but created a long term problem as that 737 lock in was both a blessing and a curse. Existing customers liked the 737 but it was an aging plane that didn't fit changing standards with plane controls, engine design and so forth.
Also, to keep costs low, Boeing has increasingly over the last two decades relied on various layers of outsourcing.
Airbus simply isn't shackled with 50 year old designs like Boeing is. They've made mistakes too, most notably the A380 but between the A319/320/321 (neo and not), A330 and A350, Airbus has a really solid product line. Boeing's 777 was a workhorse for long range wide body aircraft in the same market as the A350. The 787 fits here too but it seems like it's not as popular as the 777 or A350. I could be wrong.
Lastly, Boeing's 747 was a massive cash cow for decades. This is what let them own the airplane market. But 4 engine planes no longer make economic sense. The same applies to the A380. So we have the 777/787/A350 instead.
Airbus surprised Boeing when it introduced the A320neo as this was very attractive to budget airlines who were loyal customers to the 737 over decades. There were multiple iterations of 737 up to the 737NG (to that point). Beoing had a choice: develop a new aircraft. This would take longer and wouldn't keep the same type rating so they'd lose their type rating lock-in with the likes of Southwest, who is a huge Boeing customer.
The compromise was the 737Max. It was faster to develop and deliberately designed to maintain the 737 type rating. But it had larger engines and they were moved forward on the plane. This could make stalls easier so Boeing (mostly) silently added a system to "handle" that. That was the infamous MCAS. Lack of knowledge about this and training was what caused the 2 crashes that grounded the Max fleet last time. This was exacerbated by the sensor having a single point of failure. Interestingly, there was an optional upgrade package to have 3 sensors instead of 1, which is more the industry norm for critical systems. 2 of the 3 sensors have to agree.
So Being solved a short term problem but created a long term problem as that 737 lock in was both a blessing and a curse. Existing customers liked the 737 but it was an aging plane that didn't fit changing standards with plane controls, engine design and so forth.
Also, to keep costs low, Boeing has increasingly over the last two decades relied on various layers of outsourcing.
Airbus simply isn't shackled with 50 year old designs like Boeing is. They've made mistakes too, most notably the A380 but between the A319/320/321 (neo and not), A330 and A350, Airbus has a really solid product line. Boeing's 777 was a workhorse for long range wide body aircraft in the same market as the A350. The 787 fits here too but it seems like it's not as popular as the 777 or A350. I could be wrong.
Lastly, Boeing's 747 was a massive cash cow for decades. This is what let them own the airplane market. But 4 engine planes no longer make economic sense. The same applies to the A380. So we have the 777/787/A350 instead.
The A380 might have been a market mistake, but that's very different from a safety failure. I've never heard anyone say the A380 was an unsafe plane, just uneconomical.
Their highest sales in a single year.
I cannot believe how many jets and flights there are every second of the day. Looking at those flight maps over the country is insane.
Where is everyone going, all the time.. I need to travel more.
I cannot believe how many jets and flights there are every second of the day. Looking at those flight maps over the country is insane.
Where is everyone going, all the time.. I need to travel more.
Archived: https://archive.ph/lTc0o
I get the sense that Boeing has been zombified by finance suits. Is there any truth to this?
The documentary "Downfall" [0] touches on this.
[0] https://www.netflix.com/title/81272421
[0] https://www.netflix.com/title/81272421
Boeing merged with McDonnell Douglas in 1997.
McD-D had for a couple of decades prioritized military/defense/space contracts over civil aviation and had turned into a finely tuned machine for milking government cost-plus contracts. They also had a bad case of Jack Welch management disease.
Over the years after the merger, Boeing's traditional management was largely replaced by the imported profits-over-everything culture of McDonnell-Douglas. This is, to put it mildly, not your grandparents' Boeing any more.
Because the design life of an airliner is on the order of 30 years, it took years to decades for the cultural change to become visible on the outside, but the 737 MAX MCAS debacle is symptomatic of the change in priorities to focus on hitting sales targets over engineering and QA, with lethal results.
(The simple fact that they had to add MCAS to compensate for changed handling characteristics in the 737 MAX isn't damning on its own, although it was a marketing-driven decision: really, at 50+ years old, it's past time Boeing designed a clean-sheet 737 replacement to compete with the A320 family. But then Boeing didn't see fit to mention MCAS in the pilots' handbook. An MCAS failure can cause a 737 MAX to become unflyable if it fails and the pilots don't understand what's going on, and that has led to two fatal crashes. And the 737 MAX MCAS is controlled by a single sensor, introducing a single point of failure. A dual sensor option is available to customers, but at extra cost -- and this is unforgivable. And now we learn that new-Boeing's institutional response is to demand exemption from FAA oversight? It's not looking good!)
McD-D had for a couple of decades prioritized military/defense/space contracts over civil aviation and had turned into a finely tuned machine for milking government cost-plus contracts. They also had a bad case of Jack Welch management disease.
Over the years after the merger, Boeing's traditional management was largely replaced by the imported profits-over-everything culture of McDonnell-Douglas. This is, to put it mildly, not your grandparents' Boeing any more.
Because the design life of an airliner is on the order of 30 years, it took years to decades for the cultural change to become visible on the outside, but the 737 MAX MCAS debacle is symptomatic of the change in priorities to focus on hitting sales targets over engineering and QA, with lethal results.
(The simple fact that they had to add MCAS to compensate for changed handling characteristics in the 737 MAX isn't damning on its own, although it was a marketing-driven decision: really, at 50+ years old, it's past time Boeing designed a clean-sheet 737 replacement to compete with the A320 family. But then Boeing didn't see fit to mention MCAS in the pilots' handbook. An MCAS failure can cause a 737 MAX to become unflyable if it fails and the pilots don't understand what's going on, and that has led to two fatal crashes. And the 737 MAX MCAS is controlled by a single sensor, introducing a single point of failure. A dual sensor option is available to customers, but at extra cost -- and this is unforgivable. And now we learn that new-Boeing's institutional response is to demand exemption from FAA oversight? It's not looking good!)
The thing is all the other major airliners today (even made in Brazil!) have fly-by-wire and a "flight envelope protection" system which is like MCAS but more comprehensive, better thought through, documented, etc. That is, pilots are trained in the system and a huge amount of effort went into thinking through how the system should behave when it is in a degraded condition and some parts of the system (like those sensors) aren't functioning properly.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flight_envelope_protection
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flight_envelope_protection
Well yes, the problems of MCAS are not that it exists (although its implementation was definitely debatable, notably the use of a single AoA sensor, and AoA sensor warnings being optional), having FBW and flight envelope correction is not an issue in and of itself.
The issues of MCAS was that it was added specifically to hide type behavioural differences with previous 737s with the specific goal of keeping the type, and thus the entire purpose of MCAS precluded training pilots on its behaviour and edge cases.
The issues of MCAS was that it was added specifically to hide type behavioural differences with previous 737s with the specific goal of keeping the type, and thus the entire purpose of MCAS precluded training pilots on its behaviour and edge cases.
Basically it was to maintain a lie. The illusion that it was the same plane as older models. They needed it in order to pretend there was no change, but that also meant they couldn't teach pilots about this new system interfering with the plane's flight behaviour.
> I get the sense that Boeing has been zombified by finance suits. Is there any truth to this?
This is the arc of all American companies that prioritize financials above longevity.
This is the arc of all American companies that prioritize financials above longevity.
I recently had five hour a first class flight (lucky upgrade) on a brand-new Delta 321Neo, it was easily the best flight I've ever had. The 321Neo is just a brilliant plane that outclasses any 737 in my experience.
To any Boeing execs reading this thread:
How is the clean sheet redesign of the 737 going?
J/K, everyone knows you wake up in the morning and think about how much stock to buy back and not much else. Do you even remember what Boeing used to do? Do you play parlor games where you try to guess? "Did we used to make books? Did we used to make soup?" "Ha ha! Who cares, I've got a meeting with analysts to discuss our buyback schedule" I bet it's an SNL skit every single day there.
Another question:
Why did you move HQ to Chicago? Was it really just to get far away from those pesky engineers that don't know a thing about hyperfinancialization?
How is the clean sheet redesign of the 737 going?
J/K, everyone knows you wake up in the morning and think about how much stock to buy back and not much else. Do you even remember what Boeing used to do? Do you play parlor games where you try to guess? "Did we used to make books? Did we used to make soup?" "Ha ha! Who cares, I've got a meeting with analysts to discuss our buyback schedule" I bet it's an SNL skit every single day there.
Another question:
Why did you move HQ to Chicago? Was it really just to get far away from those pesky engineers that don't know a thing about hyperfinancialization?
Neat seeing this alongside all the mass layoff threads.
A record for jet order should provide some job safety over the next few years (and possibly hiring if they increase their output instead of just adding to a longer backlog) for people working on the manufacturing side of Airbus.
But on the development side, the situation is less clear. There is no major development project anymore since A350 is in operation. And there are no signs yet of an upcoming major program based on their research activities for hydrogen-powered of more electric airliners.
So there could still be layoffs or downsizing due to hiring less engineers than the ones that go to retirement.
But on the development side, the situation is less clear. There is no major development project anymore since A350 is in operation. And there are no signs yet of an upcoming major program based on their research activities for hydrogen-powered of more electric airliners.
So there could still be layoffs or downsizing due to hiring less engineers than the ones that go to retirement.
It can provide job safety only to folks at the assembly line.
Even with record profits and huge backlog companies nowadays can do layoffs to please shareholders. Like Microsoft did.
There is no such thing as job security anymore. Successful companies can do layoffs anytime. Why not to layoff people if they can hire in cheaper locations?
Even with record profits and huge backlog companies nowadays can do layoffs to please shareholders. Like Microsoft did.
There is no such thing as job security anymore. Successful companies can do layoffs anytime. Why not to layoff people if they can hire in cheaper locations?
>Successful companies can do layoffs anytime.
Depends. Airbus probably has a strong union in France so mass layoffs especailly during pofitable times seem as likely as contact with aliens.
Depends. Airbus probably has a strong union in France so mass layoffs especailly during pofitable times seem as likely as contact with aliens.
Strong union in France would be pleased if Airbus decides to layoff folks at their plant in Mobile, Alabama.
The Mobile plant is working heavily to serve the US market with A320s and A220s (on which production is starting to ramp up), so no, there is no place for layoffs while demand far outstrips supply.
Why would they though? Having a presence on US soild is a vital strategical and political baragaining chip for Airbus. They wouldn't jeopardize that.
Roughly 25% of Airbus SE stock is owned by Germany, France and Spain.
> There is no major development project anymore since A350 is in operation.
Well, not having a complete new aircraft doesn't mean there is no activities. A320neo is leaps and bounds ahead on the market. While Boeing seriously needs a new aircraft in that segment, Airbus can happily modernise the A320 some more. As for new developments, they likely need to integrate the A220 into their lineup, streamline the issues they had with it, and many think that the A320 successor will likely be based on the A220, making the A220 much more important to Airbus than it seems. There are rumours about a A220-500 which will have different engines than the smaller ones. In the meantime, it's known that Boeing doesn't plan to release anything anytime soon until a new generation of much more efficient engines comes in, even though it's an uncertainty when will it be.
Also, it seems that A350-1000 and A330neo sales are somewhat underwhelming, they cannot compete against the 777X or 787. By some reports, the RR engine in the A350-1000 needs too much maintenance in the hot climates of the Middle East, where a lot of wide bodies are sold.
All in all, they have their work cut on multiple fronts.
Well, not having a complete new aircraft doesn't mean there is no activities. A320neo is leaps and bounds ahead on the market. While Boeing seriously needs a new aircraft in that segment, Airbus can happily modernise the A320 some more. As for new developments, they likely need to integrate the A220 into their lineup, streamline the issues they had with it, and many think that the A320 successor will likely be based on the A220, making the A220 much more important to Airbus than it seems. There are rumours about a A220-500 which will have different engines than the smaller ones. In the meantime, it's known that Boeing doesn't plan to release anything anytime soon until a new generation of much more efficient engines comes in, even though it's an uncertainty when will it be.
Also, it seems that A350-1000 and A330neo sales are somewhat underwhelming, they cannot compete against the 777X or 787. By some reports, the RR engine in the A350-1000 needs too much maintenance in the hot climates of the Middle East, where a lot of wide bodies are sold.
All in all, they have their work cut on multiple fronts.
One of the big issues wrt "major development projects" is that engine manufacturers are working on pretty interesting concepts but it's not clear if they'll pan out, and that means if you lock in a program too early you might completely miss out on this new generation of engines and end up with a plane missing the market.
I don't think Airbus wants a repeat of the A380.
Plus last I'd checked Boeing declared they're not working on a new frame for at least a decade, and Airbus is competitive right now, so the incentive is limited: Comac is up and coming, but it's still a way away (and is missing the entire support network).
I don't think Airbus wants a repeat of the A380.
Plus last I'd checked Boeing declared they're not working on a new frame for at least a decade, and Airbus is competitive right now, so the incentive is limited: Comac is up and coming, but it's still a way away (and is missing the entire support network).
Following recent news from Boeing, it’s not really surprising, I by far prefer to be on an airbus than a Boeing these days, since 747 days really
Perfect opportunity for Embraer or the like to start designing bigger twin jet aircraft. We can’t be strangled by two manufacturers, one with a quality problem, the other with a back order problem.
You have to be back ordered in boom times like these. You cannot build for peak throughput in such an industry, because otherwise you collapse under the weight of your pipeline when the orders decrease, as will happen at some point.
I know, I just really want to see more variety. Embraer, Bombardier, both are capable with the right incentives. You’re right though and thus the capitalist free market will make it a championship match between two juggernauts.
I’m not sure if these are connected but I wouldn’t be surprised if they are. Airlines are losing millions of dollars due to grounding their fleet and the fact that it’s happened again cannot help.
The only thing keeping Boeing in the game right now is likely the fact that Airbus is sold out for over a decade.