China's Age of Malaise (2023)(newyorker.com)
newyorker.com
China's Age of Malaise (2023)
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2023/10/30/chinas-age-of-malaise
27 comments
This is a very "outside" take on what all these countries are doing.
It's measuring their velocity on a linear path towards integration into a US-dominated global economy with a specific (classically) liberal, individualist, humanist vestigially-Christian culture and then characterizing deviations as mistakes or compromises or fallbacks.
The "inside" reality is that many of these countries and their people are skeptical or hostile towards that economy and culture for legitimate historical or cultural reasons of their own. These are largely countries with accomplished, strong histories in the modern era and they are taking informed, principled bets on a different future than the West is pursuing. They have their own development and continuity objectives that sometimes compete with or are otherwise incompatible with docile integration into the Western hegemony.
I don't even dispute that it all amounts to the same thing on the surface of effects: China is at a crossroads as their chapter of rapid industrialization comes to a close, some countries that do have lagging economies, military conflict and aggressiveness is ripe, etc -- but I think it's worth giving credit to the people of these countries for making their own informed decisions that are different than what we might make, instead of writing them all off as simply mismanaged or whatever.
It's measuring their velocity on a linear path towards integration into a US-dominated global economy with a specific (classically) liberal, individualist, humanist vestigially-Christian culture and then characterizing deviations as mistakes or compromises or fallbacks.
The "inside" reality is that many of these countries and their people are skeptical or hostile towards that economy and culture for legitimate historical or cultural reasons of their own. These are largely countries with accomplished, strong histories in the modern era and they are taking informed, principled bets on a different future than the West is pursuing. They have their own development and continuity objectives that sometimes compete with or are otherwise incompatible with docile integration into the Western hegemony.
I don't even dispute that it all amounts to the same thing on the surface of effects: China is at a crossroads as their chapter of rapid industrialization comes to a close, some countries that do have lagging economies, military conflict and aggressiveness is ripe, etc -- but I think it's worth giving credit to the people of these countries for making their own informed decisions that are different than what we might make, instead of writing them all off as simply mismanaged or whatever.
people of these countries for making their own informed decisions
thank you for a balanced take on this
I'm not sure why the article give so many of it to Xi. I doubt things will go much different if you swap Xi with someone else.
Mao and Deng are IMO different. For Mao, he is the starter of this saga. For Deng, he's a visionary, and the decision he made was largely against the common trend in the party.
But for Xi, he is just a continuation of the tradition, it's how the ancient civilization views governing, which can be summed up with the traditional Chinese family relationship: the parents are always right, and the children must obey. In this arrogant and dangerously outdated analogy, the leaders are the "parents" (for example, as in "父母官", or "Official like a dad or mom"), and people are the children. Parents always wants the best for their childs, right? (And how can parent be abusive to their child?)
You would probably understand a lot of what China did based on that analogy. If you view yourself as a parent, then many of your people's demand suddenly look like pointless tamper tantrum.
> In the darker scenario, China faces “Japanification”
China is an autocracy. Unlike in a democracy (Japan) where it's leaders are expected to leave the office to someone else, an autocrat can and usually do use all the means necessary to protect their power. That includes just become a sellout for a foreign nation, or worse. If the current trend of decoupling from the wealthy nations continued and China's systems remained unupgraded, "Japanification" could as well be the ceiling of the whole spectrum of possibilities.
That's why I think China's leadership will face some serious real tests in the future years much more critical than just simple stagnation.
Mao and Deng are IMO different. For Mao, he is the starter of this saga. For Deng, he's a visionary, and the decision he made was largely against the common trend in the party.
But for Xi, he is just a continuation of the tradition, it's how the ancient civilization views governing, which can be summed up with the traditional Chinese family relationship: the parents are always right, and the children must obey. In this arrogant and dangerously outdated analogy, the leaders are the "parents" (for example, as in "父母官", or "Official like a dad or mom"), and people are the children. Parents always wants the best for their childs, right? (And how can parent be abusive to their child?)
You would probably understand a lot of what China did based on that analogy. If you view yourself as a parent, then many of your people's demand suddenly look like pointless tamper tantrum.
> In the darker scenario, China faces “Japanification”
China is an autocracy. Unlike in a democracy (Japan) where it's leaders are expected to leave the office to someone else, an autocrat can and usually do use all the means necessary to protect their power. That includes just become a sellout for a foreign nation, or worse. If the current trend of decoupling from the wealthy nations continued and China's systems remained unupgraded, "Japanification" could as well be the ceiling of the whole spectrum of possibilities.
That's why I think China's leadership will face some serious real tests in the future years much more critical than just simple stagnation.
I don't know why you wouldn't ascribe the last decade of China's fist-tightening to Xi, unless you think that all autocrats must inevitably behave so.
Xi could have left the country quasi-free, but he didn't. If you're talking about China's slump, talking about Xi is unavoidable.
Xi could have left the country quasi-free, but he didn't. If you're talking about China's slump, talking about Xi is unavoidable.
> Xi could have left the country quasi-free
With what method? Before Xi's rising, China wasn't exactly a nice place to begin with. The corruption was rampant, and the gangs were effecting the lives of common people. All the communist shit mixed in with capitalist shit. The only thing kept China going is people's wishes to improve their lives, not some gov policy.
Given the track record on how the Communist Party's China solve it's problems (likely doing patches rather than finding long-lasting systematic solutions), it's quite reasonable to assume that a quasi-free China will have other type of issues going on that are equality bad as fist-tightening.
With what method? Before Xi's rising, China wasn't exactly a nice place to begin with. The corruption was rampant, and the gangs were effecting the lives of common people. All the communist shit mixed in with capitalist shit. The only thing kept China going is people's wishes to improve their lives, not some gov policy.
Given the track record on how the Communist Party's China solve it's problems (likely doing patches rather than finding long-lasting systematic solutions), it's quite reasonable to assume that a quasi-free China will have other type of issues going on that are equality bad as fist-tightening.
> With what method
There has been a systemic decrease in freedoms and grey areas in China under Xi over the past few years.
Criticism and protests have always been fairly common in China, but the level to which they have been cracked down and prosecuted under Xi is stark compared to the late 2000s and early 2010s.
Furthermore, the CCP always had the ability to choose to harden the Great Firewall, but never chose to until the 2nd Xi Administration.
Furthermore, Xi dismantled a number of the checks and balances the CCP developed after Mao's death in order to prevent a Mao 2.0 from arising. The Premiership and State Council has been hollowed out, and regulations such as term limits and federalism have been thrown on the wayside.
Finally, under the guise of anti-corruption reforms, the Xi Administration has increasingly cut off average Chinese from the rest of the world by severely limiting cash and asset outflow (which is needed if you want to study abroad because being an international student isn't cheap).
China was never a Disneyland, but the level of authoritarianism in China today was unseen since the death of Mao.
> wasn't exactly a nice place to begin with
I agree with that, but the issue is selective enforcement.
People like Bo Xilai and Jack Ma absolutely deserve to be prosecuted for corrupt business practices and criminality, yet similar enforcement doesn't extend to business and party leaders close to Xi, and in some cases Xi himself (such as his tenure in Fujian).
There is a way to walk a middle ground between full blown authoritarianism and managed authoritarianism. Russia pre-2016 is a good example of how managed autocracy could work (it sucks but it's still more free than China today)
> continuation of the tradition
This statement reeks of Orientalism.
Taiwan, HK, and Singapore are children of the same traditions, yet are significantly less authoritarian than Mainland China today.
Ascribing cultural reasons takes the onus of responsibility away from the individuals who systemically undermined institutions within China.
> Unlike in a democracy (Japan) where it's leaders are expected to leave the office to someone else
This was China before 2018. After Deng Xiaoping's reforms, the Politburo made 2 term rule a requirement, and formalized the 2nd term Secretariat to Party Secretary pathway
There has been a systemic decrease in freedoms and grey areas in China under Xi over the past few years.
Criticism and protests have always been fairly common in China, but the level to which they have been cracked down and prosecuted under Xi is stark compared to the late 2000s and early 2010s.
Furthermore, the CCP always had the ability to choose to harden the Great Firewall, but never chose to until the 2nd Xi Administration.
Furthermore, Xi dismantled a number of the checks and balances the CCP developed after Mao's death in order to prevent a Mao 2.0 from arising. The Premiership and State Council has been hollowed out, and regulations such as term limits and federalism have been thrown on the wayside.
Finally, under the guise of anti-corruption reforms, the Xi Administration has increasingly cut off average Chinese from the rest of the world by severely limiting cash and asset outflow (which is needed if you want to study abroad because being an international student isn't cheap).
China was never a Disneyland, but the level of authoritarianism in China today was unseen since the death of Mao.
> wasn't exactly a nice place to begin with
I agree with that, but the issue is selective enforcement.
People like Bo Xilai and Jack Ma absolutely deserve to be prosecuted for corrupt business practices and criminality, yet similar enforcement doesn't extend to business and party leaders close to Xi, and in some cases Xi himself (such as his tenure in Fujian).
There is a way to walk a middle ground between full blown authoritarianism and managed authoritarianism. Russia pre-2016 is a good example of how managed autocracy could work (it sucks but it's still more free than China today)
> continuation of the tradition
This statement reeks of Orientalism.
Taiwan, HK, and Singapore are children of the same traditions, yet are significantly less authoritarian than Mainland China today.
Ascribing cultural reasons takes the onus of responsibility away from the individuals who systemically undermined institutions within China.
> Unlike in a democracy (Japan) where it's leaders are expected to leave the office to someone else
This was China before 2018. After Deng Xiaoping's reforms, the Politburo made 2 term rule a requirement, and formalized the 2nd term Secretariat to Party Secretary pathway
> In August, a man rode a Jet Ski, loaded with extra fuel, nearly two hundred miles to South Korea. According to rights activists, he had served time in prison for wearing a T-shirt that called China’s leader “Xitler.”
Badass. I hope he makes it to the US.
Badass. I hope he makes it to the US.
Articles like these makes me want to read English translations of writings where Chinese authors and journalists have described the USA in the same style. I wonder what details and observations they would compose their story of.
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"America Against America" - Wang Huning
The article is very interesting, but I have been reading about the impending fall of China for at least the last two decades. So far it hasn't happened.
I suppose at some point it will be true, as in Peter and the Wolf, but color me skeptical.
I suppose at some point it will be true, as in Peter and the Wolf, but color me skeptical.
Where have you been reading about China's "fall", apart from maybe Peter Zeihan? (who is a sensationalist on everything)
I have been reading about China's structural problems which might in the long term lead to slower growth / stagnation, and that seems to fit reality well.
I have been reading about China's structural problems which might in the long term lead to slower growth / stagnation, and that seems to fit reality well.
5% growth when you're expecting 8% is a problem, but it's a problem a lot of countries would like to have. And 5% growth during a time of population decline is even more impressive since it means per capita growth is even larger.
China's population declined by about 0.2% compared to its peak, pretty irrelevant for GDP so far.
It's more significant when compared to Western countries that experience population growth. For example, in 2023 the US's top line GDP growth was about 25% higher than its per capita GDP growth.
Anyone who's calling a "fall" is being disingenuous.
There absolutely is a massive economic slowdown in China. That said, it will NOT lead to a Soviet style collapse.
That said, a persistent long term slowdown will absolutely lead to overcompensation on the foreign policy side, as past experiences with Russia and Turkey have shown.
There absolutely is a massive economic slowdown in China. That said, it will NOT lead to a Soviet style collapse.
That said, a persistent long term slowdown will absolutely lead to overcompensation on the foreign policy side, as past experiences with Russia and Turkey have shown.
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Id imagine its going to be a global phenomenon, global warming, dwindling resources leading to more wars. Not sure how we can infinite growth our way out of this
The problem of global warming is one of too much resources, not dwindling resources. There's too much accessible fossil fuel.
>The problem of global warming is one of too much resources
No. One can be sober while having unlimited alcohol at hand. Being responsible requires to consume with moderation. The problem is not resources but what we do with them.
No. One can be sober while having unlimited alcohol at hand. Being responsible requires to consume with moderation. The problem is not resources but what we do with them.
What about water for the 4 billion people living in places with low water security?
That's an effect, not a cause.
I dont understand, why did you think the original post said there's a relationship between global warming and resource shortages?
I read the original message as saying global warming and resource shortages were independent causes of problems.
In general, we don't have global shortage of resources.
In general, we don't have global shortage of resources.
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The Eastern Bloc in the 1980s-1990s; Thailand, South Korea, Mexico, and Malaysia in the 1990s-2000s; and Turkey, Brazil, Venezuela, and Russia in the 2010s all hit a similar hurdle when low hanging fruit reforms were done, and systemic reforms were needed.
Some, like South Korea and Poland, did those reforms and reshaped their entire economies.
Others like Malaysia, Hungary, and Turkey did some piecemeal reform but never any systemic ones.
And others like Mexico, Russia, and Brazil basically stood still and lagged behind.
China's trajectory for the rest of the 21st century will be decided by the choices policymakers in China will make this decade.
Also, people should NOT feel schadenfreude about the current slowdown of the Chinese economy - similar slowdowns in Russia, Turkey, etc lead to a much more aggressive foreign stance adding fuel to conflicts in the Caucasus, Ukraine, Syria, South Asia, Sahel, and the Maghreb.