I'm not trying to be rude, and I'm not choosing random quotes. I chose Eisenhower since I was surprised to learn his opinion on the subject, and actually read the quote out of a paper copy of his autobiography. So while I can't be 100% sure that he wrote that, it seems extremely likely that he did.
Until a few years ago, I believed what I had learned in school - that the bombs were necessary to end the war more quickly, and that they actually saved both American and Japanese lives by hastening the surrender. If invading the home islands was the only way, and if there was a fight to the last person, then that would be a reasonable conclusion.
A few counterarguments I heard over time were not easy to dismiss:
1. Why did the surrender come on August 15th? Since no more bombs arrived after August 9th, what changed? In particular, if the US had more nuclear weapons to use, where was the August 12th bomb, since there was apparently a 3 day cycle. From the perspective of the Japanese military leadership, one explanation would be there were no more ready, so the urgency to surrender before further bombs would be lessened.
2. Why did Operation Meetinghouse (March 10th, 1945) which caused a similar amount of destruction with only conventional weapons not precipitate a surrender?
3. How important were the other reasons to use the weapons, such as:
a. Testing out their effectiveness against a real enemy target. Conducting such a test initially seemed hard to believe, but in context of the firebombing of cities in Japan (e.g. Tokyo) and Germany (e.g. Dresden) may have made this test plausible to Allied military leaders. The fact that two different types of bomb were used bolsters the argument that this was in part a test.
b. Deterring the Soviet armies from continuing to take territory because they had the conventional means to doing so. In other words, this was not just to end WW2, but to set the stage for the post-war environment that was coming soon.
c. Making sure that the huge expense of developing the weapons wasn't "wasted" by not using them against an enemy.
I've read Paul Fussell's "Thank God for the Atom Bomb" (which I just re-read now) since it's the most concise yet persuasive argument I've encountered in favor of using atomic weapons to save lives. If I knew of a similar writing making the opposite case, I would share it here. If you know of such a thing, please let me know.
My current understanding of the situation is that the accumulation of damage inflicted against Japan helped cause the leadership to surrender. The proximate tipping point was the Soviet invasion of Manchuria. That meant the end of their peace treaty with the Soviets, the foreclosing of the possibility of the Soviets facilitating peace negotiations with the Allies, and increased the likelihood of an invasion of the home islands by the Red Army before an American invasion could happen. This is the event that finally brought the Japanese government to their senses.
Dwight Eisenhower had a different view (from The White House Years: Mandate for Change: 1953-1956: A Personal Account (New York: Doubleday, 1963), pp. 312-313):
The incident took place in 1945 when Secretary of War Stimson, visiting my headquarters in Germany, informed me that our government was preparing to drop an atomic bomb on Japan. I was one of those who felt that there were a number of cogent reasons to question the wisdom of such an act. The Secretary, upon giving me the news of the successful bomb test in New Mexico, and of the plan for using it, asked for my reaction, apparently expecting a vigorous assent.
During his recitation of the relevant facts, I had been conscious of a feeling of depression and so I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives. It was my belief that Japan was, at that very moment, seeking some way to surrender with a minimum loss of “face.” The Secretary was deeply perturbed by my attitude, almost angrily refuting the reasons I gave for my quick conclusions.
I'm not trying to be rude, and I'm not choosing random quotes. I chose Eisenhower since I was surprised to learn his opinion on the subject, and actually read the quote out of a paper copy of his autobiography. So while I can't be 100% sure that he wrote that, it seems extremely likely that he did.
Until a few years ago, I believed what I had learned in school - that the bombs were necessary to end the war more quickly, and that they actually saved both American and Japanese lives by hastening the surrender. If invading the home islands was the only way, and if there was a fight to the last person, then that would be a reasonable conclusion.
A few counterarguments I heard over time were not easy to dismiss:
1. Why did the surrender come on August 15th? Since no more bombs arrived after August 9th, what changed? In particular, if the US had more nuclear weapons to use, where was the August 12th bomb, since there was apparently a 3 day cycle. From the perspective of the Japanese military leadership, one explanation would be there were no more ready, so the urgency to surrender before further bombs would be lessened.
2. Why did Operation Meetinghouse (March 10th, 1945) which caused a similar amount of destruction with only conventional weapons not precipitate a surrender?
3. How important were the other reasons to use the weapons, such as: a. Testing out their effectiveness against a real enemy target. Conducting such a test initially seemed hard to believe, but in context of the firebombing of cities in Japan (e.g. Tokyo) and Germany (e.g. Dresden) may have made this test plausible to Allied military leaders. The fact that two different types of bomb were used bolsters the argument that this was in part a test. b. Deterring the Soviet armies from continuing to take territory because they had the conventional means to doing so. In other words, this was not just to end WW2, but to set the stage for the post-war environment that was coming soon. c. Making sure that the huge expense of developing the weapons wasn't "wasted" by not using them against an enemy.
I've read Paul Fussell's "Thank God for the Atom Bomb" (which I just re-read now) since it's the most concise yet persuasive argument I've encountered in favor of using atomic weapons to save lives. If I knew of a similar writing making the opposite case, I would share it here. If you know of such a thing, please let me know.
My current understanding of the situation is that the accumulation of damage inflicted against Japan helped cause the leadership to surrender. The proximate tipping point was the Soviet invasion of Manchuria. That meant the end of their peace treaty with the Soviets, the foreclosing of the possibility of the Soviets facilitating peace negotiations with the Allies, and increased the likelihood of an invasion of the home islands by the Red Army before an American invasion could happen. This is the event that finally brought the Japanese government to their senses.