If the NSA doesn’t have a black box for breaking strong encryption using a shortcut, as portrayed in the movie Sneakers, and if companies like Apple truly aren’t running interference here, is it safe to say that there is a growing collection of encrypted internet traffic probably being stored long term by the government?
Also, how close might the USA or China be to building such a black box? Is it even possible in theory?
Edit: This account has been shadowbanned.
Anyone ever figure out who that guy Kevin was who claimed to be pals with the creep Peter Thiel, who threatened to ruin my career if I talked about what happened on the North Shore? No?
This place is corrupt, too. God damn Silicon Valley. Evil goddamn liberal scumbags. You lack perspective.
It's easier than ever for people to moonlight as a spy and get away with it. You'll probably only get caught if your adversary has the means and motivation to counter.
Most people in civilian/domestic situations are unable to defend themselves. Thus, amateurs get away with spying more easily. They can work alone more easily and have a wider variety of commodity spying tools.
Yes, the futures price settles daily based on the reference rate. Eventually such correlations become more efficient once you have a real market. (As another poster pointed out it's still thin).
It's not technically incorrect to say there is manipulation in the US markets, but comparing bitcoin exchanges to US exchanges is a bit laughable.
The US Federal Reserve has (had) what amount(ed) to a printing press, associated with "working groups" a.k.a. PPT. However, major US exchanges themselves, whether stock, futures, etc., are far more regulated and mature compared to a bitcoin exchange. The manipulation to which you're referring is far more indirect.
Bitcoin topped out as soon as the futures went live. Massive contango on a regulated futures market may have been a factor in "reeling in" price. The spot market is so thin that it didn't seem to take much open interest in the futs to whip the underlying.
It's conceivable that some spot exchanges are or were still from 2017 to now, either malicious and/or incompetent, which would facilitate the continuation of such behavior, likely by more players than one or two.
Nobody else besides me has received a second alert, that I know of, I've posted it like 30 times on twitter under #Hawaii and #MissileAlert etc
Context: I tweeted to someone who was upset about it all, "All your alert are belong to us", then immediately received the second false alarm:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KXGnAMp9Nvk
In the US, one can fill out a police report, but that doesn't mean that the police will opt to press charges. If one contacts the police to report a crime, they still need probable cause to press charges.
As for witch hunts, folks do get burned in the digital age, whether as result of posts on a public twitter feed, or worse yet in some cases, privately via other social media channels or other (digital) communication mechanisms. Publicly outing someone or a group is perhaps a last resort, but necessary in some cases.
Your reasoning has merit, of course. And, that's a sad commentary on the current state of affairs, in which one cannot trust a firewall appliance to do its job.
Perhaps the movement for open source hardware should focus on minimal security appliances.
In the meantime, a high level of technical proficiency is needed to defend against monolithic personal computing environments that are hostile by design.
* Assume personal computing environment is hostile
* Use an external firewall and have a whitelist-only policy
* Use an external NIDS
* Physically disable all hard-connected non-wired interconnectivity
Monitors and keyboards ("I leave message here on service but you do not call") still leak, of course, but this is a good start, and most people need to be concerned with practical attacks that could be carried out over the internet.
New Year's 2018 resolutions: 1) Review backup policy including backup testing procedures 2) Implement personal digital security measures
I've often thought that the current mentality of a "convenient" monolithic personal computing environment (whether an iPhone, laptop, or PC) doesn't properly assess threats.
When broadband internet first became popular in my area growing up, it was acceptable practice (and recommended by ISP's) to simply plug your non-firewall'ed DSL modem ethernet directly into your computer. It truly was unprotected sex in the worst possible way. Perhaps the next evolution will fundamentally reconsider personal computing design from a security-first perspective.
I'd speculate that, after such an age of barbaric experimentation, new and supposedly more innocuous methods that don't require physically detaining/restraining a subject have long since been conceived, implemented, and tried.
