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l1k

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l1k
·mese scorso·discuss
This is using Thunderbolt networking as transport, which incurs a bit of overhead.

But starting with the upcoming Linux v7.2, there's a new feature called USB4STREAM to use raw Thunderbolt packets as transport with minimum overhead and a super simple user interface:

https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260511102744.1867485-1-mika.west...

Release of v7.2-rc1 is predicted for Jul 5, that's when this will first be available as a tarball. Until then you have to clone from thunderbolt.git/next:

https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/westeri/thun...

Or alternatively linux-next:

https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/next/linux-n...

Press coverage:

https://www.phoronix.com/news/Intel-Linux-USB4STREAM
l1k
·2 mesi fa·discuss
Fun fact (or not so fun if you're a subscriber):

Somebody is spamming kernel mailing lists under the name Marian Corcodel with a 26 MByte message multiple times per day containing a collection of nonsensical patches. Looks AI-generated, perhaps with the intention to poison LLMs. This has been going on for a few days now.

https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAGg4U=GNtCObd_Nbm_1Rr5FEvPb69Yz...
l1k
·2 mesi fa·discuss
As Eric has correctly stated above, we believe iwd (Intel Wireless Daemon), or rather the ell library it relies on (Embedded Linux Library) is the only relatively widespread user space application relying on it.
l1k
·2 mesi fa·discuss
> the kernel's implementation of RSA isn't hardened against timing attacks

Cloudflare is using custom BoringSSL-based crypto code in the kernel:

https://lore.kernel.org/all/CALrw=nEyTeP=6QcdEvaeMLZEq_pYB9W...
l1k
·2 mesi fa·discuss
It does enable address space separation of secret keys from user space, which some people love:

https://blog.cloudflare.com/the-linux-kernel-key-retention-s...

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7djRRjxaCKk

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lvZaDE578yc

So it's not as simple as "should not exist". I agree though that there doesn't seem to be a valid need to expose authencesn to user space.

Disclosure: I'm co-maintaining crypto/asymmetric_keys/ in the kernel and the author/presenter in the first two links is another co-maintainer.