This article is scratching the surface of the concept of desynchronization from the theory of social acceleration and the sociology of speed. Any technology that is supposed to create idle time, once it reaches mass adoptions has the opposite effect of speeding up everything else.
We have been on this track for a long time: cars were supposed to save time in transit, but people started living farther from city centres (c.f. Marchetti's constant). E-Mail and instant messaging were supposed to eliminate wait time from postal services, but we now send orders of magnitude more messages and social norms have shifted such that faster replies are expected.
"AI" backed productivity increases are only impressive relative to non-AI users. The idilliac dream of working one or two days a week with agents in the background "doing the rest" is delusional. Like all previous technologies once it reaches mass adoption everyone will be working at a faster pace, because our society is obsessed with speed.
> Sometimes models that seem nonlinear turns linear if those nonlinearities are pushed into the basis functions, so one can still hope.
That idea was pushed to its limit by the Koopman operator theory. The argument sounds quite good at first, but unfortunately it can’t really work for all cases in its current formulation [1].
From the abstract and skimming a few sections of the first paper, imho it is not really the same. The paper is moving the loss gradient to the tangent dual space where weights reside for better performance in gradient descent, but as far as I understand neither the loss function nor the neural net are analyzed in a new way.
The Fourier and Wavelet transforms are different as they are self-adjoint operators (=> form an orthogonal basis) on the space of functions (and not on a finite dimensional vector space of weights that parametrize a net) that simplify some usually hard operators such as derivatives and integrals, by reducing them to multiplications and divisions or to a sparse algebra.
So in a certain sense these methods are looking at projections, which are unhelpful when thinking about NN weights since they are all mixed with each other in a very non-linear way.
Since as you say this utilitarian view is rather common, perhaps it would good to show _why_ this is problematic by presenting a counterargument.
The basic premise under GP's statements is that although not perfect, we should use the technology in such a way that it maximizes the well being of the largest number of people, even if comes at the expense of a few.
But therein lies a problem: we cannot really measure well being (or utility). This becomes obvious if you look at individuals instead of the aggregate: imagine LLM therapy becomes widespread and a famous high profile person and your (not famous) daughter end up in "the few" for which LLM therapy goes terribly wrong and commit suicide. The loss of the famous person will cause thousands (perhaps millions) people to be a bit sad, and the loss of your daughter will cause you unimaginable pain. Which one is greater? Can they even be be compared? And how many people with a successful LLM therapy are enough to compensate for either one?
Unmeasurable well-being then makes these moral calculations at best inexact and at worst completely meaningless. And if they are truly meaningless, how can they inform your LLM therapy policy decisions?
Suppose for the sake of the argument we accept the above, and there is a way to measure well being. Then would it be just? Justice is a fuzzy concept, but imagine we reverse the example above: many people lose their lives because of bad LLM therapy, but one very famous person in the entertainment industry is saved by LLM therapy. Let's suppose then that this famous persons' well being plus the millions of spectators' improved well-being (through their entertainment) is worth enough to compensate the people who died.
This means saving a famous funny person justifies the death of many. This does not feel just, does it?
There is a vast amount of literature on this topic (criticisms of utilitarianism).
I don't think this is the reason. Since Apple stopped making new interesting product lines they are very attentive about not having one line cannibalize the sales of the other(s) as it happened with the iPod and iPhone. This is also the reason why iPads will never run macOS and vice-versa.
> It's breaking news about a topic that came out of the blue for everyone.
After having read the two rather strongly opinionated pieces "Amusing ourselves to death" [1] and "Avoid news" [2] they have mostly convinced me that "breaking news" is rarely of value in our everyday life, and I would rather have less of it.
If I understand correctly the fees are only for an overleaf-type web collaborative editing experience. The typst program itself, the one you install on your computer, is free to use and open-source.
We have been on this track for a long time: cars were supposed to save time in transit, but people started living farther from city centres (c.f. Marchetti's constant). E-Mail and instant messaging were supposed to eliminate wait time from postal services, but we now send orders of magnitude more messages and social norms have shifted such that faster replies are expected.
"AI" backed productivity increases are only impressive relative to non-AI users. The idilliac dream of working one or two days a week with agents in the background "doing the rest" is delusional. Like all previous technologies once it reaches mass adoption everyone will be working at a faster pace, because our society is obsessed with speed.