Yes, but I guess you see what I'm getting at. If designing the next ARC-AGI test is impossible for AI without a human in the loop, then AGI becomes unreachable by definition.
Will there be a point in that series of ARC-AGI tests where AI can design the next test, or is designing the next text always going to be a problem that can be solved by humans and not AI?
Having read the paper, I agree that this is an enormous effort, but I didn't see anything that was particularly surprising from a technical point of view - and nothing of Singularity-level significance. The use of AI to train AI - as a source of synthetic data, or as an evaluation tool - is absolutely widespread. You will find similar examples in almost any AI paper dealing with a system of comparable scale.
Stenography is writing in shorthand. What you mean is steganography.
You can also watermark plain text by generating "invisible" patterns.
Of course, in all these cases, the watermarks are trivial to remove: just re-encode the output with an open model. Which is why I hope there will be no federal law that tries to enforce something that is categorically unenforceable.
If La Jetee was just some photos stitched together plus meaningful narration, then of course, you could use AI-generated photos.
But would AI be able to quote Vertigo, like La Jetee does? Doesn't art, at least to some degree, require intent (including all intentional subversions of that intent dogma, of course)?
> In the short term, it's a smart strategy for Israel, but they've likely opened Pandora's box in the process.
Absolutely. From today on, this type of attack will have to be considered part of the arsenal.
While building thousands of explosive communication devices and swapping a large shipment requires substantial resources and intelligence, the actual "sophistication" of today's attack seems to lie in the fact that the perpetrator managed to specifically target a clandestine adversarial organization.
If you don't care about that last part, I don't think it's completely out of reach for a hypothetical "state sponsored terrorist organization" to have a thousand smart phone explosives shipped into a target market, say the European Union or the United States. Such an attack, if successful, would be devastating.
True. But seconds are not the base unit for package compromises coming to light. The appropriate unit for that is almost certainly days.