Australian Police and spies gain powers to access encrypted messages(smh.com.au)
smh.com.au
Australian Police and spies gain powers to access encrypted messages
https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/police-spies-gain-powers-to-access-encrypted-messages-after-political-deal-struck-20181204-p50k74.html
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clipper_chip
Also note that Telegram and WhatsApp are insecure and horrible. I would use Signal, OTR and maybe iMessage if you trust the Apple bean-counter-turned-CEO.
Also note that Telegram and WhatsApp are insecure and horrible. I would use Signal, OTR and maybe iMessage if you trust the Apple bean-counter-turned-CEO.
That was interesting. That page took me to the paper, "Keys Under Doormats: Mandating insecurity by requiring government access to all data and communications" (2015) - http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/97690
From the conclusion:
> This report’s analysis of law enforcement demands for exceptional access to private communications and data shows that such access will open doors through which criminals and malicious nation-states can attack the very individuals law enforcement seeks to defend. The costs would be substantial, the damage to innovation severe, and the consequences to economic growth difficult to predict. The costs to developed countries’ soft power and to our moral authority would also be considerable.
<snip>
> If law enforcement wishes to prioritize exceptional access, we suggest that they need to provide evidence to document their requirements and then develop genuine, detailed specifications for what they expect exceptional access mechanisms to do. As computer scientists and security experts, we are committed to remaining engaged in the dialogue with all parts of our governments, to help discern the best path through these complex questions.
This is a paper by experts in the field. The Australian government would do well to listen to them and not fantasize that they can legislate away reality.
From the conclusion:
> This report’s analysis of law enforcement demands for exceptional access to private communications and data shows that such access will open doors through which criminals and malicious nation-states can attack the very individuals law enforcement seeks to defend. The costs would be substantial, the damage to innovation severe, and the consequences to economic growth difficult to predict. The costs to developed countries’ soft power and to our moral authority would also be considerable.
<snip>
> If law enforcement wishes to prioritize exceptional access, we suggest that they need to provide evidence to document their requirements and then develop genuine, detailed specifications for what they expect exceptional access mechanisms to do. As computer scientists and security experts, we are committed to remaining engaged in the dialogue with all parts of our governments, to help discern the best path through these complex questions.
This is a paper by experts in the field. The Australian government would do well to listen to them and not fantasize that they can legislate away reality.
And they're going to do it in three weeks. Amazing!
"Spy agencies and police have said that the Christmas and New Year period poses a heightened risk of terrorist attacks."
It'd be comical if there weren't serious risks of them damaging internet security in the process.
"Spy agencies and police have said that the Christmas and New Year period poses a heightened risk of terrorist attacks."
It'd be comical if there weren't serious risks of them damaging internet security in the process.
Get your Clipper chips! Steaming hot Clipper chips! Chocked full of vitamins, backdoors and laughably lazy intelligence agency bungling!
>In one of the most significant compromises, the bill will define what constitutes a "systemic weakness".
I'm eagerly awaiting the explanation of how they intend to break encryption without introducing systemic weakness.