accessvector

Richard StaLLMan?

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Cheers!

accessvector

3 年前議論

I started programming with QBASIC at about 10 years old, too, after randomly coming across a book called “Practise Your BASIC”. It’s a great book and Usborne recently released it for free: https://usborne.com/gb/books/computer-and-coding-books

accessvector

3 年前議論

Right, so this is the crux of the vulnerability. Firstly, note that the `MAX` macro is defined as:

    #define MAX(a, b) ((a) > (b) ? (a) : (b))

This is important because it doesn't cast either arg to any particular type. You can use it with `float`s, or `int`s, or `u_int`s... or a combination.

Referring back to the implementation, the first use of `MAX` (inside the `for` loop) is this:

    ...
    for (i = 0; i < nsyscalls; i++)
        npins = MAX(npins, syscalls[i].sysno);
    ...

`npins` is an `int`, but `sysno` is a `u_int`. C integer promotion rules means that we'll actually be implicitly casting `npins` to a `u_int` here; it's as if we did this:

    ...
     npins = MAX((u_int)npins, syscalls[i].sysno);
    ...

This means that `npins` can end up as any value we like -- even up to `0xffffffff`. But remember that `npins` is _actually_ a signed int, so once it comes out of `MAX`, it'll be signed again. Thus we can use this to make `npins` negative.

Once we're out of the loop, `MAX` is used again here:

    ...
    npins = MAX(npins, SYS_kbind);
    ...

Where `SYS_kbind` is just:

    ...
    #define SYS_kbind       86
    ...

Integer literals in C are signed, so now this use of `MAX` is actually dealing with two signed integers. If we used the loop to make `npins` negative (as described just before) then this line will now take 86 as the maximum of the two values.

With `npins = 86`, an array of 86+1 will be allocated, but the `syscalls[i].sysno` in the next loop could of course easily be greater than 86 -- thus leading to out-of-bounds array access.

accessvector

3 年前議論

Consider this:

    struct pinsyscall entries[] = {
        { .sysno = 1, .offset = 0x1234 },
        { .sysno = 2, .offset = 0x5678 },
        { .sysno = 1, .offset = 0x9abc }
    };

Now `nsyscalls` will be 3 and `pin` will be an array of 3 ints, initialised to `{ 0, 0, 0 }`.

When we loop through, we'll set:

    1. `pin[syscalls[0].sysno] = 0x1234` => `pin[1] = 0x1234`
    2. `pin[syscalls[1].sysno] = 0x5678` => `pin[2] = 0x5678`

Now when we come to 3, we'll find `pin[syscalls[2].sysno] != 0` since `syscalls[2].sysno == syscalls[0].sysno` - so we set `pin[1] = -1` instead of `0x9abc`.

accessvector

3 年前議論

Just to handle the case where the same syscall number is specified twice by the ELF header: in that case, the entry is set to -1 (presumably meaning it’s invalid).

accessvector

3 年前議論

Re-reading this, my analysis is slightly incorrect: the `MAX` at [5] with an unsigned arg means we can make `npins` an arbitrary `int` using the loop at [4].

Choosing to make `npins` negative using that loop means we'll end up allocating an array of 87 (`SYS_kbind + 1`) `int`s at [8] and continue with the OOB accesses described.

You'd set up your `pinsyscall` entries like this:

    struct pinsyscall entries[] = {
        { .sysno = 0x1111, .offset = 0xdeadbeef }, /* first oob write */
        { .sysno = 0x2222, .offset = 0xf000f000 }, /* second oob write */
        { .sysno = 0xffffffff } /* sets npins to 0xffffffff so we under-allocate */
    };

`npins` would be `0xffffffff` after the loop and then the `MAX` at [6] would then return `86`, since `MAX(-1, 86) == 86`.

accessvector

3 年前議論

Out-of-bounds heap write happens in this function:

        int
        elf_read_pintable(struct proc *p, Elf_Phdr *pp, struct vnode *vp,
            Elf_Ehdr *eh, uint **pinp)
        {
         struct pinsyscalls {
          u_int offset;
          u_int sysno;
         } *syscalls = NULL;
         int i, npins = 0, nsyscalls;
         uint *pins = NULL;
        
    [1]  nsyscalls = pp->p_filesz / sizeof(*syscalls);
         if (pp->p_filesz != nsyscalls * sizeof(*syscalls))
          goto bad;
    [2]  syscalls = malloc(pp->p_filesz, M_PINSYSCALL, M_WAITOK);
    [3]  if (elf_read_from(p, vp, pp->p_offset, syscalls,
             pp->p_filesz) != 0) {
          goto bad;
         }
        
    [4]  for (i = 0; i < nsyscalls; i++)
    [5]   npins = MAX(npins, syscalls[i].sysno);
    [6]  npins = MAX(npins, SYS_kbind);  /* XXX see ld.so/loader.c */
    [7]  npins++;
        
    [8]  pins = mallocarray(npins, sizeof(int), M_PINSYSCALL, M_WAITOK|M_ZERO);
         for (i = 0; i < nsyscalls; i++) {
    [9]   if (pins[syscalls[i].sysno])
    [10]   pins[syscalls[i].sysno] = -1; /* duplicated */
          else
    [11]   pins[syscalls[i].sysno] = syscalls[i].offset;
         }
         pins[SYS_kbind] = -1;   /* XXX see ld.so/loader.c */
        
         *pinp = pins;
         pins = NULL;
        bad:
         free(syscalls, M_PINSYSCALL, nsyscalls * sizeof(*syscalls));
         free(pins, M_PINSYSCALL, npins * sizeof(uint));
         return npins;
        }

So first of all we calculate the number of syscalls in the pin section [1], allocate some memory for it [2] and read it in [3].

At [4], we want to figure out how big to make our pin array, so we loop over all of the syscall entries and record the largest we've seen so far [5]. (Note: the use of `MAX` here is fine since `sysno` is unsigned -- see near the top of the function).

With the maximum `sysno` found, we then crucially go on to clamp the value to `SYS_kbind` [6] and +1 at [7].

This clamped maximum value is used for the array allocation at [8].

We now loop through the syscall list again, but now take the unclamped `sysno` as the index into the array to read at [9] and write at [10] and [11]. This is essentially the vulnerability right here.

Through heap grooming, there's a good chance you could arrange for a useful structure to be placed within range of the write at [11] -- and `offset` is essentially an arbitrary value you can write. So it looks like it would be relatively easy to exploit.

accessvector

3 年前議論

Spoiler for anyone else that got excited: nothing new has been published.

accessvector

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