Who Were the Romans, Part V: Saving and Losing an Empire(acoup.blog)
acoup.blog
Who Were the Romans, Part V: Saving and Losing an Empire
https://acoup.blog/2021/07/30/collections-the-queens-latin-or-who-were-the-romans-part-v-saving-and-losing-an-empire/
38 comments
I will quote something another historian, Alessandro Barbero (who is getting quite popular in Italy), often likes to point out when asked about similar "unanswered questions".
For any historian, even just determining what happened in the past requires a lot of work already. Finding primary sources that clearly describe facts, are reliable, and not too biased is hard, and reconciling contradictory sources is even harder.
Explaining why these things happened, or what would have happened if something else happened differently is much harder still, because you must use this incomplete information to establish causality or (even worse) simulate an actual alternate reality.
Just try for a second to ask yourself what would 2021 look like had 9/11 never happened. It's a daunting task, even though we have a massive amount of information about that time period (having literally lived through it). Doing the same with remote history with historical rigour is essentially out of reach.
For any historian, even just determining what happened in the past requires a lot of work already. Finding primary sources that clearly describe facts, are reliable, and not too biased is hard, and reconciling contradictory sources is even harder.
Explaining why these things happened, or what would have happened if something else happened differently is much harder still, because you must use this incomplete information to establish causality or (even worse) simulate an actual alternate reality.
Just try for a second to ask yourself what would 2021 look like had 9/11 never happened. It's a daunting task, even though we have a massive amount of information about that time period (having literally lived through it). Doing the same with remote history with historical rigour is essentially out of reach.
It's hard, sure, but it's also the whole job. Just knowing what happened is meaningless in itself.
I'm in the midst of reading Rome is Burning, Anthony A. Barrett's new book (https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691172316/ro...) about the Great Fire of Rome in 64AD (the one where Nero fiddled). I'm a relative novice to the field of Roman history (studied early modern history in university, never touched ancient history). The key thing to know about the fire is that it is very unclear basic facts like 1) how long did the fire last? Some sources say 6 days, some 9, 2) which buildings burnt down? 3) how far did the fire reach? 4) how many people died? There are lots of ancient references to it but when you get down to the details it's actually quite vague.
> The invasion of the Huns was pretty traumatic for the Western Roman Empire
"Traumatic" is quite the understatement. The huns and the hunnic empire destroyed the roman empire by ending roman primacy in western/northern europe. And the power balance shifted forever from the south to the north. It was the huns victory over the romans that ultimately allowed the northern germanic tribes to move south and westward. Whereas for a thousand years it was the romans who were pushing north and westward. Without the huns, the anglo-saxons wouldn't be able to invade the british isles and we wouldn't have england. No england, no america. No america, no internet. Oh dear.
> and it is possible that if it did not happen, or if the Huns met defeat early, the empire could have limped along for next thousand years, just like the Eastern Empire did.
Or maybe it would have galvanized the romans to expand into northern europe once and for all. And we'd have a roman western/northern europe rather than the germanic western/northern europe.
It's one of those interesting "what ifs" of history.
"Traumatic" is quite the understatement. The huns and the hunnic empire destroyed the roman empire by ending roman primacy in western/northern europe. And the power balance shifted forever from the south to the north. It was the huns victory over the romans that ultimately allowed the northern germanic tribes to move south and westward. Whereas for a thousand years it was the romans who were pushing north and westward. Without the huns, the anglo-saxons wouldn't be able to invade the british isles and we wouldn't have england. No england, no america. No america, no internet. Oh dear.
> and it is possible that if it did not happen, or if the Huns met defeat early, the empire could have limped along for next thousand years, just like the Eastern Empire did.
Or maybe it would have galvanized the romans to expand into northern europe once and for all. And we'd have a roman western/northern europe rather than the germanic western/northern europe.
It's one of those interesting "what ifs" of history.
I think the big issue was not that the foederati were specifically outside the normal Roman political and military world. A German general or nobleman who took over a fragment of the empire would not have caused a major change to the political order and their territory would be easier to re-incorporate into the empire.
What I'm getting at was why were the Franks taking over Gaul different from the Gallic Empire. My impression is that the difference is that there was a German political/military order that replaced the top layer of the Roman political order (although the bottom layers which included the city administrations and the Church continued to function), which included fragmentation of authority after the first few rulers, and that meant that the old administration could not be reincorporated into a renewed Roman Empire in one go. (Of course, this re-incorporation of a German breakaway kingdom did happen in the case of Italy which was briefly reunited with the Byzantines, my explanation doesn't really account for that, it would be interesting to examine how difficult or easy it was for imperial administration to resume (ie, was it treated as a military frontier province or did the old Italian administration get reconstituted))
And I think this is because the foederati system helped preserve a separate German political order even after the tribes were fighting for the empire and living within the empire. The alternative I can think of was if the king of the Germanic tribes settled in the empire was given a formal governor position, or some other position within the Roman hierarchy. My understanding is that that generally did not happen, although I could be wrong.
What I'm getting at was why were the Franks taking over Gaul different from the Gallic Empire. My impression is that the difference is that there was a German political/military order that replaced the top layer of the Roman political order (although the bottom layers which included the city administrations and the Church continued to function), which included fragmentation of authority after the first few rulers, and that meant that the old administration could not be reincorporated into a renewed Roman Empire in one go. (Of course, this re-incorporation of a German breakaway kingdom did happen in the case of Italy which was briefly reunited with the Byzantines, my explanation doesn't really account for that, it would be interesting to examine how difficult or easy it was for imperial administration to resume (ie, was it treated as a military frontier province or did the old Italian administration get reconstituted))
And I think this is because the foederati system helped preserve a separate German political order even after the tribes were fighting for the empire and living within the empire. The alternative I can think of was if the king of the Germanic tribes settled in the empire was given a formal governor position, or some other position within the Roman hierarchy. My understanding is that that generally did not happen, although I could be wrong.
> Austria, and later Austria-Hungary, a hodgepodge of nations of unequal standing, was able to survive for many centuries before disintegrating in 1918 because it lost a major war so thoroughly that the civilian population was struck by long famine.
The national movements were the thing of the late 18 century. They haven't thought about themselves as nations all that much before, they were kingdoms. The unequal standing got bigger and language oppression and such got bigger in that late period.
The national movements were the thing of the late 18 century. They haven't thought about themselves as nations all that much before, they were kingdoms. The unequal standing got bigger and language oppression and such got bigger in that late period.
It is more complicated than that. The German speaking court in Vienna tried to elevate the German language above the others, if only to simplify record keeping and everyday executive functions. This was pretty obvious in the 17th century already, with formerly important Czech language being pushed aside long before any modern national movements. Multiethnic empires generally need a single language for their internal functionality, as few people are able to master languages as different as German, Czech, Polish and Hungarian on an adequate level.
Austria-Hungary in 1914 was a peaceful, growing and sort-of prosperous nation. The nationalist squabbling was incessant, but did not prevent a fairly fast growth of living standards and businesses of the old empire were tighly interconnected all over the map.
The war proved too destructive to handle, though. Even the most prominent nations of the empire (Germans, Hungarians) lost interest in anything but feeding their hungry families at the end of it.
Austria-Hungary in 1914 was a peaceful, growing and sort-of prosperous nation. The nationalist squabbling was incessant, but did not prevent a fairly fast growth of living standards and businesses of the old empire were tighly interconnected all over the map.
The war proved too destructive to handle, though. Even the most prominent nations of the empire (Germans, Hungarians) lost interest in anything but feeding their hungry families at the end of it.
It wasn't really peaceful or prosperous. The Austrians had to cut the Hungarians in on the empire, as otherwise it would have collapsed, and even then it was pretty unpopular and ineffectual. It was a pretty stodgy, autocratic relic of the past.
Austria-Hungary limped along because the varying ethnic minorities were used to the regime and were more worried about who came after the Austrians. But the whole enterprise was running on borrowed time as nationalism was going to dismember the empire at some point.
Austria-Hungary limped along because the varying ethnic minorities were used to the regime and were more worried about who came after the Austrians. But the whole enterprise was running on borrowed time as nationalism was going to dismember the empire at some point.
"It wasn't really peaceful or prosperous."
With the exception of Bosnia, A-H territories haven't seen any fighting or civil war between 1866 and 1914. People utterly forgot what war even meant.
As for prosperity, there were huge differences between individual regions and Cisleithania (Austrian lands) was quite a lot more industrial than Hungarian lands, but the living standards were improving fast, as was literacy, healthcare, public infrastructure etc.
It is not entirely clear what would have happened without war. Nationalisms were strong, but so were innumerable ties holding the country together. For example, Spain is still a country, even though its regional nationalisms are very strong.
For nationalist movements to succeed, they need to convince a lot of individuals that they will be better out than in, which, for any of the smaller nations of the empire, was questionable. Even Hungarians would think twice about secession, given that their part of the monarchy was mostly rural and needed industrial output of the other part.
The Grossdeutschland movement, seeking to unite all German speaking peoples under Berlin, had more of a chance to succeed, because in their case, it would not mean independence but rather transfer of sovereignty to an already powerful nation (imperial Germany). A-H authorities generally considered pan-German nationalists to be the most structurally dangerous element.
With the exception of Bosnia, A-H territories haven't seen any fighting or civil war between 1866 and 1914. People utterly forgot what war even meant.
As for prosperity, there were huge differences between individual regions and Cisleithania (Austrian lands) was quite a lot more industrial than Hungarian lands, but the living standards were improving fast, as was literacy, healthcare, public infrastructure etc.
It is not entirely clear what would have happened without war. Nationalisms were strong, but so were innumerable ties holding the country together. For example, Spain is still a country, even though its regional nationalisms are very strong.
For nationalist movements to succeed, they need to convince a lot of individuals that they will be better out than in, which, for any of the smaller nations of the empire, was questionable. Even Hungarians would think twice about secession, given that their part of the monarchy was mostly rural and needed industrial output of the other part.
The Grossdeutschland movement, seeking to unite all German speaking peoples under Berlin, had more of a chance to succeed, because in their case, it would not mean independence but rather transfer of sovereignty to an already powerful nation (imperial Germany). A-H authorities generally considered pan-German nationalists to be the most structurally dangerous element.
In a previous entry[0], I thought the author was writing against some antagonist. Now I see it was Niall Ferguson (who is almost a professional contrarian).
Well, it's easy to dunk on Ferguson, trivial to show Rome was multi-ethnic, and it's widely accepted the failure to deal with the Germanic tribes was a major factor in the events to follow. I even agree with him regarding Diocletian. But IMHO Devereaux stretches his argument a bit too thin.
The blog entry makes it sound as if foederati arrangement was something entirely new and bad. The term however dates to the Republic, when it often referred to the socii. As he describes it, their arrangement wasn't all that different from the socii arrangement.
Both cases allowed a sovereign mini-state under Roman rule which contributed soldiers (the difference in the 4th century was indeed giving the foederati land to sustain on, but that only made it closer to the socii arrangement). The Romans were building on a successful arrangement. Yet this time the arrangement fell flat. That's a messy story, and I doubt it has a simple answer.
[0] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=27627376
Well, it's easy to dunk on Ferguson, trivial to show Rome was multi-ethnic, and it's widely accepted the failure to deal with the Germanic tribes was a major factor in the events to follow. I even agree with him regarding Diocletian. But IMHO Devereaux stretches his argument a bit too thin.
The blog entry makes it sound as if foederati arrangement was something entirely new and bad. The term however dates to the Republic, when it often referred to the socii. As he describes it, their arrangement wasn't all that different from the socii arrangement.
Both cases allowed a sovereign mini-state under Roman rule which contributed soldiers (the difference in the 4th century was indeed giving the foederati land to sustain on, but that only made it closer to the socii arrangement). The Romans were building on a successful arrangement. Yet this time the arrangement fell flat. That's a messy story, and I doubt it has a simple answer.
[0] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=27627376
> The Romans were building on a successful arrangement. Yet this time the arrangement fell flat.
The socii nearly destroyed Rome, though; the eventual solution was to more or less incorporate them.
Like, it went _worse_ the second time around, but the first incarnation wasn't great, either.
The socii nearly destroyed Rome, though; the eventual solution was to more or less incorporate them.
Like, it went _worse_ the second time around, but the first incarnation wasn't great, either.
There was a long period of very successful socii service beforehand, and even the author mentions the policy's positive outcomes in his previous posts. Here, incorporation had significant problems almost from the get go. Yet it's almost the same policy...
More importantly, the author portrays it as some horrible deal, but late feodrati arguably got a better deal than the socii did: there was a problem when the rewards went mostly to Rome following conquest of Italy while socii still had to serve, but the feodrati got land and tax exemption for service.
The author's story basically lays all the blame on Rome's lack of inclusiveness (and none on the various 'barbarians'), yet I don't see that many evidence for it in the post. The author doesn't show that inclusion was closed off, or all that worse than in any of Rome's earlier period.
Evidently by resettling the 'barbarians' the Roman ruling class intended to integrate them, and the self-ruling status they got was more likely their demand rather than Rome stubbornly refusing to accept them. Plenty of Germans did integrate into Rome and Roman customs, arguably even after the fall of Rome.
More importantly, the author portrays it as some horrible deal, but late feodrati arguably got a better deal than the socii did: there was a problem when the rewards went mostly to Rome following conquest of Italy while socii still had to serve, but the feodrati got land and tax exemption for service.
The author's story basically lays all the blame on Rome's lack of inclusiveness (and none on the various 'barbarians'), yet I don't see that many evidence for it in the post. The author doesn't show that inclusion was closed off, or all that worse than in any of Rome's earlier period.
Evidently by resettling the 'barbarians' the Roman ruling class intended to integrate them, and the self-ruling status they got was more likely their demand rather than Rome stubbornly refusing to accept them. Plenty of Germans did integrate into Rome and Roman customs, arguably even after the fall of Rome.
This is long, but it's addressing the same questions as Gibbon's six-volume famous Decline And Fall Of The Roman Empire in a considerably more readable way.
Not to mention, more historically accurate. Gibbon's work is, of course, a milestone in historical research, but his thesis in a nutshell was "Rome fell because of the spread of Christianity and a general loss of morality". This more or less translates to "immigrants corrupted the core values of classical Roman identity", which is exactly the overall theme that this series of posts tries (successfully, in my opinion) to confute.
TLDR: Rome got big and successful by being pragmatically open and inclusive to outsiders. It treated its allies and conquered people well and gave them a path to citizenship, which made them invested in Rome's continued existence, rather than eager to see it fall (which has made other empires implode rapidly when there was a crisis in the central power).
Rome fell because because beginning in the 4th century, they stopped incorporating allied troops as paid and respected units within the Roman military command structure, and instead had them operate under their own kings, paid with conquered land. Consequently, these "foederati" didn't see themselves as Romans and when the central power waned, saw that as a chance to conquer more territory.
Rome fell because because beginning in the 4th century, they stopped incorporating allied troops as paid and respected units within the Roman military command structure, and instead had them operate under their own kings, paid with conquered land. Consequently, these "foederati" didn't see themselves as Romans and when the central power waned, saw that as a chance to conquer more territory.
Why did that change in policy take place?
Reduced centralized administrative capacity due to consecutive crises of succession in the third century conspired with a large wave of Germanic refugees fleeing the huns that Rome would have traditionally repelled or redistributed throughout the empire in such a manner as to diminish their capacity to coordinate political demands or insurgency.
In the end, they got the worst of both worlds. The Romans failed to properly treat, repel, redistribute, or contain the refugees. They also failed to dismantle the leadership structure of the germanic tribesman before they got into roman territory. As a result, the Germanic tribes became indendent armed political blocs within Roman borders capable of threatening and negotiating with roman authorities for concessions, land, and power.
In the end, they got the worst of both worlds. The Romans failed to properly treat, repel, redistribute, or contain the refugees. They also failed to dismantle the leadership structure of the germanic tribesman before they got into roman territory. As a result, the Germanic tribes became indendent armed political blocs within Roman borders capable of threatening and negotiating with roman authorities for concessions, land, and power.
I think you're mixing up cause and effect.
After the Diocletian reforms, the administration was more centralized and powerful than ever. It would absolutely have been possible to incorporate the Germanic tribes under the old auxilia system, and that would have prevented the formation of such "armed political blocs".
But that would have required paying them more or less like regular legionnaires. And Rome didn't want to spend that kind of money anymore; maybe it didn't have that kind of money, due to the economic troubles caused by the crises of the thrid century that you mention.
After the Diocletian reforms, the administration was more centralized and powerful than ever. It would absolutely have been possible to incorporate the Germanic tribes under the old auxilia system, and that would have prevented the formation of such "armed political blocs".
But that would have required paying them more or less like regular legionnaires. And Rome didn't want to spend that kind of money anymore; maybe it didn't have that kind of money, due to the economic troubles caused by the crises of the thrid century that you mention.
You make a good point, but here's how I understand it - and I'll cop that may be wrong
Diocletian's reforms did a lot to recentralize the empire, but by the the late 300s during this influx, the nation had been wracked by the wars of the tetrarchy, and a cavalcade of small civil wars instigated by would-be usurpers. The iirc military relied more heavilly on conscription, and the better part of it was deployed in service of the emperor's protection, leaving border territories defended by fewer units more dependent on local governing authorities to provide supplemental irregular forces.
The instability at the upper tiers of Roman government from successive administrations executing purges in various states of paranoia, the vacillations between administrations favoring/disfavouring Christians in different quarter of the empire, and the empire's financial troubles had also done a lot to degrade the Roman bureaucracies institutional knowledge, and capacity to plan/execute policy.
As a result, the roman empire was institutionally incapable of managing an uncontrolled mass migration of the scale that was instigated by hunnic expansion in eastern Europe. This wasn't just a matter of being incapable or too miserly to integrate germanic soldiers into the military, it was a matter of integrating entire nations into Roman society at a scale which Rome had never before experienced in a context far more complicated than an occupation of foreign lands.
Irrespective of their pay, Germanic soldiers weren't effectively granted a place in Roman society because Rome had no capacity to give one to them or their families, and at the same time did nothing to prevent them from staying connected to their tribes or their leaders.
Diocletian's reforms did a lot to recentralize the empire, but by the the late 300s during this influx, the nation had been wracked by the wars of the tetrarchy, and a cavalcade of small civil wars instigated by would-be usurpers. The iirc military relied more heavilly on conscription, and the better part of it was deployed in service of the emperor's protection, leaving border territories defended by fewer units more dependent on local governing authorities to provide supplemental irregular forces.
The instability at the upper tiers of Roman government from successive administrations executing purges in various states of paranoia, the vacillations between administrations favoring/disfavouring Christians in different quarter of the empire, and the empire's financial troubles had also done a lot to degrade the Roman bureaucracies institutional knowledge, and capacity to plan/execute policy.
As a result, the roman empire was institutionally incapable of managing an uncontrolled mass migration of the scale that was instigated by hunnic expansion in eastern Europe. This wasn't just a matter of being incapable or too miserly to integrate germanic soldiers into the military, it was a matter of integrating entire nations into Roman society at a scale which Rome had never before experienced in a context far more complicated than an occupation of foreign lands.
Irrespective of their pay, Germanic soldiers weren't effectively granted a place in Roman society because Rome had no capacity to give one to them or their families, and at the same time did nothing to prevent them from staying connected to their tribes or their leaders.
It was cheaper.
It's amazing how historians (of all politics) see the past through their own political views. I would imagine if if you were to ask Bret what he thought the solution to US Immigration is today he would reply similarly to your first paragraph. Probably Andrew Roberts or Niall Ferguson would say the opposite.
I wonder if there are any historians that say "XXX worked then, but I recommend YYY now."
I wonder if there are any historians that say "XXX worked then, but I recommend YYY now."
Basically all historians say that, including Devereaux. He's not presenting late republican Rome as an ideal to aspire to: as he described in detail earlier in the series, they were a violent, militaristic society who succeeded through constant wars of conquest.
The whole point of the entire series is to see the past on its own terms and give very detailed historical evidence why people who say the opposite don't know what they fuck they're talking about. Ferguson specifically is, to use the modern parlance, demolished.
On the other hand, Bret also makes it clear that then is then and now is now, and you can not simply transfer social concepts or policies.
On the other hand, Bret also makes it clear that then is then and now is now, and you can not simply transfer social concepts or policies.
> they stopped incorporating allied troops as paid and respected units within the Roman military command structure, and instead had them operate under their own kings, paid with conquered land.
So in essence... they privatized the military?
So in essence... they privatized the military?
_lz4k(2)
For casual readers unfamiliar, what is happening is typical of what is happening in other corners of university history departments: less factual history and more politicized interpretive dance. Typical young classical historians reject the idea of a "fall" of Rome. That basic long-arc story is now rejected. Rome simply evolved.
Most of us read Gibbon and later popular historians, thus we are familiar with the "fall" story. The clash between academic and popular Roman history makes for a lot of articles about how you, the layman, misunderstand Rome.
In short, you don't misunderstand Rome. For a very good riposte to these arguments, see Bryan Ward-Perkins, The Fall of Rome and the End of Civilization, Oxford University Press 2005.
Most of us read Gibbon and later popular historians, thus we are familiar with the "fall" story. The clash between academic and popular Roman history makes for a lot of articles about how you, the layman, misunderstand Rome.
In short, you don't misunderstand Rome. For a very good riposte to these arguments, see Bryan Ward-Perkins, The Fall of Rome and the End of Civilization, Oxford University Press 2005.
Of course, if you bothered to read the posted article, the author takes the "decline of Rome" perspective and rejects medievalists' "change and continuity" perspective.
Why do you say that's a "medievalist" perspective? The "change and continuity" perspective is endemic to an array of interpretive schools.
If you had read the article, you would have learned that Devereaux contends that the "change and continuity" is promulgated primarily by historians studying the Medieval period, and not those studying Classical Antiquity.
It isn't promulgated primarily by historians studying the Middle Ages. It's promulgated primarily by classicists, and in truth held by the majority of academic historians, and I'm willing to believe widely by medievalists.
The author shouldn't have made such a pat assignation of blame. But, erm, I was supposed to subsume his (in my view flawed) sorting argument into my thinking, and not having done so shows I didn't read the piece? How odd.
The author shouldn't have made such a pat assignation of blame. But, erm, I was supposed to subsume his (in my view flawed) sorting argument into my thinking, and not having done so shows I didn't read the piece? How odd.
[deleted]
[deleted]
Diocletian's reforms were probably forced by necessity and the western part of the empire continued to exist and even thrive a long time after Diocletian was dead. We would not pin the Cold War on Napoleonic reforms either.
The foederati system does not seem as bad as Bret Devereaux puts it. It is not that different from modern NATO and a ton of other, earlier alliances among sovereigns. And a lot of Germanic people actually integrated into late Roman society, including a famous general named Stilicho, who was of Vandal origin.
The invasion of the Huns was pretty traumatic for the Western Roman Empire and it is possible that if it did not happen, or if the Huns met defeat early, the empire could have limped along for next thousand years, just like the Eastern Empire did.
In studying defeats and collapses, we tend to overlook other instances of similar problems that did not end up catastrophically.
Austria, and later Austria-Hungary, a hodgepodge of nations of unequal standing, was able to survive for many centuries before disintegrating in 1918 because it lost a major war so thoroughly that the civilian population was struck by long famine.