> I don't like it because it suggests that freedom and security are somehow at odds with each other, which is already an authoritarian framing of the situation, and really just nonsense.
Agreed. I think part of the issue stems from how people define freedom, seemingly thinking that freedom means "no rules".
For example: If having rules is intrinsically against freedom, then why would anyone who desires freedom play sports, where rules define the game. If you eliminate the rules, you eliminate the game and your freedom to actually be able to play it.
> It just takes a very, very long time, but there have been dogma updates and clarifications throughout the centuries, and even admissions of being in the wrong.
Clarifications, yes. Changes in dogma, no. Catholic doctrine has not changed since the death of the last apostle, John. It has developed, in the sense of being expounded upon for an increase in understanding (clarification), but it hasn't changed. Clarification often occurs in response to attempts at changing doctrine or promoting something which is contrary to doctrine.
You agree with the following claim: The specific observation of water boiling at 125°C in 1 atm falsifies the claim "water only boils at 150°C+ in 1 atm".
Since being falsifiable is your requirement for making warranted claims about reality, then, in order to be warranted, you'd need to have a specific observation that would falsify the claim "The specific observation of water boiling at 125°C in 1 atm falsifies the claim 'water only boils at 150°C+ in 1 atm'". But now the claim, that whatever observation you may describe would falsify the aforementioned, would also need to have an observation that would falsify it.
Any claim that some claim is falsified by some observation will also have to have a observation that falsifies that claim. Thus leading to an infinite regression (have fun showing your position is warranted when you have to detail an unending list of observations), circular regression (we both agree circular reasoning is not reasonable), or a first claim that is not falsifiable.
More nails for your argument's proverbial coffin... ;)
===
> Seriously? You are seriously contesting that a defining characteristic of religion is that it makes non-falsifiable claims?
"Yes, DUH!", hence the question. What indicates to you that making non-falsifiable claims is a defining characteristic of religion?
> The fact that I am measuring the falsifiability of your position does not mean that you are establishing my position.
So you are not relying on me to describe to you a very specific observation that I would "accept as falsification of the claim of the existence of the god that [I] believe in", in order to answer my question "How has it been shown that the claim "God exists" is not a falsifiable claim"?
> Would you prefer if I argued against a randomly selected religious position of other people that you probably don't agree with, and will you accept me demonstrating that that position is not falsifiable as demonstration that your position is not falsifiable?
We already selected the position "God exists". You've yet to demonstrate that it is not falsifiable. You are merely dodging the question with "It just is!"/"Because I said so!" like responses.
> A container with liquid water in it that is measured to be at a pressure of 1 atm and at a temperature of 149.9999 °C, and the temperature of the water vapor coming off of it measuring as 150 °C (or in short: water boiling only at 150 °C). That observation would falsify the claim that water does not boil only at 150 °C.
Measuring the temperature of the water vapor at 150 °C coming off of liquid water at 149.9999 °C doesn't falsify that claim if you haven't checked lower temperatures. If you haven't checked every temperature from -273.15 °C to 150 °C at every possible precision, then you may have missed some other temperature at which it boils. More over, if the claim was "water does not boil only at 150 °C in 1 atm" vs "150 °C+ in 1 atm", then you'd also have to check every temperature at every possible precision above 150 °C to falsify that claim.
> You are confusing "formal truths" and "real truths".
Is it possible to make a tautological claim about reality?
> I have a hard time figuring out what that second sentence means ...
If you can always potentially falsify claim A which is the falsification of claim B, then claim B always has the potential of having not actually been falsified. If a claim always has the potential of having not actually been falsified, then it is not actually falsifiable, because if it were actually falsified then there would no longer be any potential for it to be not actually falsified. For a claim to not actually be falsifiable, when it is said to be falsifiable, is a contradiction.
In other words:
If you can always have the potential to show that claim A is false, which is a claim that states claim B is false, then claim B always has the potential of having not actually been shown to be false. If a claim always has the potential of having not actually been shown to be false, then it cannot actually be shown to be false, because if it were actually shown to be false then there would no longer be any potential for it to have not actually been shown to be false. For a claim to not have the potential to actually be show as false, when it is said to have the potential to be show as false, is a contradiction.
> That's, again, only a problem resulting from your demand for certainty. ...
No, it is a problem resulting from your use of the word "is".
> I mean, you are aware that there are delusional people, right? Like, people who have an almost completely wrong idea about their identity? Are these people justified in being certain that they exist?
In what context could some existing person be certain that they exist and be wrong?
===
Since being falsifiable is your requirement for making warranted claims about reality:
What specific observation can you describe that would falsify the first premise of your argument?
What specific observation can you describe that would falsify the second premise of your argument?
What specific observation can you describe that would falsify the conclusion of your argument?
What specific observation can you describe that would falsify the claim "making non-falsifiable claims is a defining characteristic of religion"?
What specific observation can you describe that would falsify the claim "the claim 'water only boils at 100 °C+ in 1 atm' is falsifiable"?
What specific observation can you describe that would falsify the claim "'formal truths' are not about reality"?
What specific observation can you describe that would falsify the claim "claims about reality must be falsifiable to be warranted"?
What specific observation can you describe that would falsify the claim "there is no way to verify that perception matches up with any sort of 'ultimate reality'"?
> There is no contradiction with my own position, and there is no certainty involved, nor is certainty needed.
How do you know there is no certainty involved? How do you know certainty is not needed? If you are not certain, why not say "is likely" instead of "is"? ("There is likely no contradiction with my own position", "there is likely no certainty involved", "Religion is likely incompatible with science", etc.)
> You are simply refusing to agree that logic works unless I agree to making the assumption that I am certain of some other claims, even though you otherwise would agree that logic does work.
Logic works, your's doesn't, particularly because you are framing your conclusion using terms of certainty while also refusing to think that anything can be known with certainty.
Do you have a reason for not assuming something, even your own existence, can be known with certainty? What I've gathered from your previous replies would indicate that your main reason could be phrased as "there is no way to verify that my perception matches up with any sort of 'ultimate reality'".
> Like, even if you were justified in being absolutely certain on some claim, I don't see how that is of any use whatsoever for a conversation.
Then what was the purpose of your demanding, "I won't answer any further questions about whether I am certain about something until you show that there is anything anyone could possibly be certain about", if being certain about some claim is of no use, even if it could be justified?
===
To set things in order:
You claim that "Religion is incompatible with science" because, as you've claimed, they contradict in stating what is or is not warranted regarding the assertion of falsifiable claims.
Your argument fails on the grounds that it has not established that religion makes non-falsifiable claims. Moreover, when I pushed you on this regarding a specific claim you provided, asking "Assuming your saying "It is not warranted" because the claim "God exists" is not falsifiable, how has it been shown that the claim "God exists" is not a falsifiable claim?", you asked: "What would you accept as falsification of the claim of the existence of the god that you believe in?", leaving it to me to establish your position.
The issues with that aside, if I where to answer that question similar to the way you answered one of mine...
"
s> "After falsifying the claim "water only boils at 150°C+ at 1 atm", is the claim "it is not the case that water only boils at 150°C+ at 1 atm" falsifiable, and if so how might it be falsified?"
z> By demonstrating water that boils only at 150°C+ at 1 atm?!
"
... then I could say, "By demonstrating that God doesn't exist?!", and I could apply the same format to all questions asking how I might falsify some religions claim, which is absurd.
Your argument also fails on the grounds of not having a coherent use of the term "falsifiable":
You've stated that making non-falsifiable claims is unwarranted, and have also stated "it's a logical contradiction to show that a tautological claim is false". Either tautological statements contradict your claim that non-falsifiable claims are unwarranted to make or you'll need to establish that they are indistinguishable from shit just made up (this distinguishing presumably being the reason you think making non-falsifiable claims is unwarranted).
By your own words, every claim asserting the falsification of a falsifiable claim is falsifiable, which defeats the purpose of calling claims falsifiable to begin with. By your words, you can't falsify a claim without any doubt that the falsification can't be falsified, effectively making all falsifiable claims non-falsifiable, a contradiction.
Regarding Certainty: Without certainty, you can't potentially show that a claim is false, only that it is likely to be false, thus another collapse of your notion of "falsifiable". If there is no potential to show that a claim is false, then it is not falsifiable.
===
You have less basis for your claim "Religion is incompatible with science" than you have of the the claim "Some claims can be known with certainty".
Are you uncertain of your own existence? Maybe uncertain in mode, but that you exist in any way at all? Do you think that the certainty of ones existence is an unwarranted assumption? To think as such is self defeating.
It is certain that you can't be certain of the claim "there is no thing anyone could possibly be certain about". You can't be certain "there is no thing anyone could possibly be certain about" without contradicting that claim, thus it is not possible to truthfully assert that claim in any way. Where there are no other possibilities, you have certainty.
> Also, just asserting certainty doesn't give you any more basis, only actually having justified certainty does.
Agreed. If you lack certainty about that though, then you think that there is a chance, however small, that just asserting certainty does give you more basis.
> The fact that you might prefer absolute certainty for the basis of (some of) your beliefs does not mean it's something you can actually have.
It ought to be sought out where possible, because it can actually be had. Also, if you lack certainty about that, then you think that there is a chance, however small, that the fact one might prefer absolute certainty for the basis of (some of) their beliefs does mean it's something they can actually have.
> How would you distinguish logical conclusions or methods of logical reasoning that you are certain are correct from those that you currently are mistakenly convinced are correct?
By distinguishing what possibilities have/haven't been ruled out.
> How is that relevant to our conversation?
Not knowing of any reason to think anything could be known with certainty is a non-starter for most conversation. Resisting all reasons to think anything could be known with certainty is a non-starter for any conversation.
> I don't see how, could you explain?
Your statement "There is nothing in reality, as far as I am aware, that guarantees that you can be certain about anything", expresses a lack of certainty in all claims, which includes tautological claims and claims of awareness, "awareness" being comparable to "senses".
If you lack certainty regarding tautological claims, then you think there is a chance, however small, that tautological claims could be shown to be false. You are open to the idea, however unlikely you take it to be, of logical contradictions being true, and thus are open, even if only a little, to asserting the illogical.
If you lack certainty regarding your awareness, then you think that there is a chance, however small, that there are things in reality, as far as you are aware, that guarantees that one can be certain about something.
> Just to avoid that confusion: "certain" is not the same as "so incredibly sure that it would be world-shattering to discover otherwise", even though the former often is used colloquially to mean the latter. I'm pretty sure that that is some equivocation that's going on here.
I don't mean "so incredibly sure that it would be world-shattering to discover otherwise" when I say certain. I mean "Known for sure; established beyond doubt".
> So, you are saying that there is a claim that you are absolutely certain about?
Yes. I've already said so. Consider re-reading my previous comment in light of my response "to avoid that confusion".
> There is nothing in not being absolutely certain about anything that prevents you from still coming to conclusions and acting on them, and in many cases at least locally successfully so.
Agreed. Those conclusions have less basis, but our knowledge can wind up aligned with the truth without us being certain.
> There is nothing in reality, as far as I am aware, that guarantees that you can be certain about anything.
Then we are done with our conversation. If you can't be certain of anything, then all of logic is suspect.
This flies in the face of a comment you've made previously in two ways, both regarding logic and your awareness: "Which you can't [with your senses, demonstrate that the claim "our senses have at least one way in which they are reliable" is false] because it's a logical contradiction to show that a tautological claim is false."
> I won't answer any further questions about whether I am certain about something until you show that there is anything anyone could possibly be certain about.
So apparently you are uncertain that you've just stated "I won't answer any further questions about whether I am certain about something until you show that there is anything anyone could possibly be certain about"... lol, wow.
Haha, are you certain you won't answer any further questions about whether you are certain about something until I show that there is anything anyone could possibly be certain about? If not, are you certain that you are not certain? If so, well then now you know there is something you can possibly be certain about. If not, are you certain?
> Demanding a burden of proof that you don't apply to anything else is simply destructive behaviour, not something that could possibly lead to any insight.
Smh, tsk tsk. I do apply it to other things. At the moment, however, we are dealing with your "uncertain" claims, a burden which is evermore appearing to be too much for you, especially now, given that you have now revealed that you've not intended to say anything with certainty. Perhaps, for all future claims you make, it would serve us well if you included wording that indicates your uncertainty.
> Just remove "certainly".
If you're going to remove certainty from all of your claims, then we have reached the end of our discussion. I'm content with you not being certain of the claim "Religion is incompatible with science". You may feel that one can't be certain of anything, but it is certain that you can't be certain of that.
> The point is: I haven't seen any, I doubt you have seen any, I doubt anyone has seen any.
Well according to you, you are not certain that you doubt it. In addition, by your own expectations of uncertainty, you are not certain that (you are not certain that you doubt it), and, to continue, you are not certain that (you are not certain that (you are not certain that you doubt it)), and you are not certain that (you are not certain that (you are not certain that (you are not certain that you doubt it))), and so on...
Oh, and if you want to replace all certainty with likelihood, as in stating that "It is likely that religion is incompatible with science" to highlight your uncertainty of the claim "Religion is compatible with science", then the claim "It is likely that religion is incompatible with science" would also be uncertain. This would result in the same infinite hierarchically regressive death spiral as above. So... have fun with that.
And by asking a question, you have no answer for mine? You seem to think that claims aren't true or false if we don't know whether they are true or false. What your doing is equivocating the likelihood of the method to produce true claims with whether a stated claim is likely to be true.
> I didn't claim I had a certain basis.
So you are not certain if religion is incompatible with science?
> By demonstrating water that boils only at 150°C+ at 1 atm?!
So, by your words, every falsifiable claim is not falsifiable with certainty, because any claim X that states the falsification of some falsifiable claim Y can be falsified.
> As far as we know, everything we perceive could be illusion/simulation/whatever WRT "ultimate reality", so making that claim in the sense that our senses are in any way reliable for detecting "ultimate reality" (i.e., "the programmer that wrote the simulation") is unwarranted, and there certainly is no evidence supporting such a claim.
How do you know this with certainty?
As far as you know everything you perceive could be illusion/simulation/whatever WRT "ultimate reality", so making that claim in the sense that our senses are not in any way reliable for detecting "ultimate reality" (i.e., "the programmer that wrote the simulation") is unwarranted, and there certainly is no evidence supporting such a claim.