'Liberalism is increasingly popular among non-elites. Whilst such voters think ideologically, their conceptual understanding is limited and they embrace populist methods, failing to understand the limits of liberal-democratic politics.
Whilst low liberalism reflects traditional liberal concerns and buttresses liberal democracy, low liberals embrace certain authoritarian and radical left positions, such as draconian measures against MPs and extreme anti-Israel stances.
Low liberalism shares the populist tendency to pathologize the views of opponents, dismissing conservatives as stupid and/or greedy. Relatedly, low liberalism can stray into dark territory, embracing the shadowy and conspirational.
Low liberals fail to understand the limits of liberal-democratic politics. They promote the politicization of once apolitical spheres and regard the state as a partisan organ, contrasting with traditional liberalism’s vision of a neutral state.
More broadly, online versions of liberalism and conservatism have developed in reaction to one another, entailing an arms race which disfigures liberal democracy. We should worry about the end point.'
‘Bregret is widespread, much analysis assuming that public opinion is significant. But Britain is locked out of the EU and public opinion will change, potentially favouring the new status quo.
Path dependence is a crucial concept in institutional theory, predicting that constituencies stabilize politico-economic systems. These constituencies may be the SMEs who benefit from post-Brexit deregulation, the fishermen who have better access to British waters and/or the low-skilled workers who enjoy reduced competition with immigrants.
Whilst poor economic performance may characterize this equilibrium, initial reports associating Brexit with lower growth, this might not be as destabilizing as some predict. Given Britain has no plausible medium-term route back into the EU, the country will have to adjust.
There are few obvious comparisons with Britain, yet Turkey is relevant, the blocking of accession in the 2000s frustrating Turkish liberals. Britain may not become as illiberal as Turkey, yet, like Turkey, may be further from EU membership in 20 years.’
After years of lecturing on Brexit, I’ve written a blog which identifies five principles for teaching this divisive topic, with the aim of promoting critical thinking and freedom of speech.
I Adopt a neutral tone. Whilst lecturers can be open about their own positions on Brexit, we should avoid very partisan comments, adopting the most sober tone possible. For much of the time, my model is the BBC presenter who reviews competing claims as calmly as possible.
II But occasionally, you can be open about your own views. We academics take positions in our research, sometimes unambiguous ones, and many of us are open about our opinions of Brexit on social media. In a measured tone, we should be open about these views with students.
III Don’t present false equivalence. The BBC has been accused of presenting false equivalence, e.g. giving equal time to economists from both sides of the Brexit debate, but lecturers should not do this. When evidence favours one side, we should tell students.
IV Don’t pathologize opposing views. Even if we disagree with a position, lecturers should be careful not to pathologize it. This should not apply to views which are hateful or rest on no evidence, but none of the main positions on Brexit fall into this category.
V Encourage those in minorities to speak. Sometimes, Brexit supporters are afraid to express their opinion in class. But students should feel confident expressing legitimate positions, even when they are unpopular. Therefore, I emphasize that support for Brexit is welcome.
Agree that such efforts are important and, in the article, I assert that certain initiatives are worthy. But certain projects go far beyond these; see the efforts in New Zealand, discussed in this thread.
‘Most analyses of the decolonization of university curriculums focus on the role of social justice ideology. Yet decolonization is in the interests of administrators. For years, administrators have sought greater control over curriculums, this being part of university power battles and intensifying as administrations have expanded.
The decolonization agenda enhances the leverage of administrators. Building on fashionable ideas, such initiatives enable supporters to portray opponents as prejudiced, stifling challenges to administrative control.
Administration has no necessary ideology, yet disruption associated with social justice ideology is convenient, entailing an alliance between administrators and those academics who support social justice ideology.
In the medium term, universities will continue with decolonization programmes. Such agendas make political and commercial sense; whether they make liberal-democratic sense is another question.’
‘In recent years, there have been extensive debates about liberal (in)tolerance, involving topics such as the right to hold controversial views and the right of businesses not to serve conservatives. Yet focus on individual cases tends to miss the point.
Whilst individual episodes will involve different rights and wrongs, the large number of cases means that irregularities will even themselves out.
There has been a restructuring of liberal incentives. In Western societies, liberal values of dignity and self-expression have become hegemonic, meaning that liberals have fewer incentives to advocate tolerance.
We may wonder whether liberalism without tolerance is credible, ideologies which are stripped of central elements becoming something else. Indeed, social justice ideology seems to have succeeded liberalism, perhaps spelling the end of liberalism as we know it.’
Why has UK politics become so unstable? Brexit is relevant, yet occurred in a system which was experiencing deeper problems of instability. Two factors, changing patterns of class support and declining partisan identification, underpin recent instability.
Patterns of class support have changed quickly, disrupting complementary relationships between parties and wider institutions. Parties misread the preferences of new supporters and unrepresentative governance practices compound this, the election of Liz Truss being an example.
Partisan identification has declined. Most notably, this has made Conservative polling vulnerable to sudden shocks. If the Conservatives enjoyed historic levels of partisan support, Johnson and Truss would probably have survived crises.
Brexit would probably not have been so destabilizing had these conditions been absent; it may not have happened at all! Yet Brexit has interacted with deeper pressures for instability, making the UK one of the most unstable countries in the West.
'Recently, political tribes have become historically coherent, research showing that voter attitudes are more unidimensional and ideological primes increase conformity with norms. Aside from making contemporary politics more bitter, this bodes ill for the future. If authoritarian politics returns with tightly organized tribes, a condition absent from previous eras, it could be more vicious than ever.'
He's not my ideological ally. Rather, I oppose the libertarian doctrine that firms may act as they like. When a bakery refused to supply a cake with a message promoting same sex marriage, I supported the customer.
On your second point, if this is the case then why did Paypal also ban the Free Speech Union?
This week, Paypal froze the accounts of Toby Young, a British right-wing journalist and bête noire of liberals. Seemingly, Paypal took the decision on political grounds. Surprisingly, many liberals have defended Paypal.
Why can’t liberals recognize the dangers of corporations engaging in censorship? For example, firms have undertaken many of the acts which have eroded Hungarian democracy. Where does this stop? Is it legitimate to deprive Young of electricity and a mobile phone?
When partisans use freedom of speech as a weapon, only demanding it for colleagues, the principle withers, liberal democracy surely following. Whatever one’s opinion of Young, Paypal’s act has undermined liberal democracy. Friends of liberty should oppose it.
‘We may be living in an age in which conservatism is more reasonable. Following a crisis of confidence in the findings of researchers, there are fewer reasons to trust policy interventions. Relatedly, there is growing confidence in the integrity of human institutions. In recent years, cultural evolution theory has demonstrated the role of cultural inheritance in adapting species to social and biological environments.
These developments do not entail a case against all change – in many contexts, policy interventions remain reasonable and necessary – yet shift the basis of calculations. Compared to decades ago, conservatism now appears more reasonable.
One development presents a serious challenge to this argument: the increasing likelihood of exogenous shocks, primarily associated with the climate crisis. These will justify profound reforms, involving the ruptures which conservatives oppose, yet enhance other arguments for conservatism; if there are great changes in some areas, there is a stronger case for minimizing change in other domains.’
'Much political commentary is highly misleading. Though media evaluation of policy agendas and the conduct of politicians tends to be better, analysis of policy effects and the role of parties is very poor, even in the "quality" press. When assessing policy records, commentators tend to mistake noise for the effects of policy interventions, research suggesting that performance metrics are mostly outside the control of politicians.
Why would this be? If societies are to function optimally, should they not use information which conforms tightly with reality? As cultural evolution theory emphasizes, the most efficient societies tend to outcompete alternatives, good information being crucial to this.
In the case of political commentary, better information is available, academic research being more reliable than media analysis. The reasons why this phenomenon occurs are fascinating, demonstrating the limits of rationality. Misleading commentary boosts confidence in liberal democracy; it may be better not to challenge it.'
‘Academia faces a crisis of credibility; following the replication crisis and studies which suggest that datasets have multiple interpretations, we have fewer reasons to trust academic output. People have long identified solutions, such as the preregistration of hypotheses and publication of null hypotheses. Yet intriguingly, the institutional profile of academia may be the biggest barrier to reform. Within academia, there are multiple entrenched interests, precluding solutions to many issues.’
Whilst low liberalism reflects traditional liberal concerns and buttresses liberal democracy, low liberals embrace certain authoritarian and radical left positions, such as draconian measures against MPs and extreme anti-Israel stances.
Low liberalism shares the populist tendency to pathologize the views of opponents, dismissing conservatives as stupid and/or greedy. Relatedly, low liberalism can stray into dark territory, embracing the shadowy and conspirational.
Low liberals fail to understand the limits of liberal-democratic politics. They promote the politicization of once apolitical spheres and regard the state as a partisan organ, contrasting with traditional liberalism’s vision of a neutral state.
More broadly, online versions of liberalism and conservatism have developed in reaction to one another, entailing an arms race which disfigures liberal democracy. We should worry about the end point.'