Is Consciousness an Illusion?(nybooks.com)
nybooks.com
Is Consciousness an Illusion?
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2017/03/09/is-consciousness-an-illusion-dennett-evolution/
131 comments
Isn't that past the point where something stops being an illusion and starts being real?
I find this question, like whether we have 'free will' in a deterministic universe, to be meaningless. You are simply stretching a naive interpretation of the concept until it's breaking point, and then claiming reality doesn't fit with that concept. One should at the very least consider if the original definition used was perhaps too naive.
I find this question, like whether we have 'free will' in a deterministic universe, to be meaningless. You are simply stretching a naive interpretation of the concept until it's breaking point, and then claiming reality doesn't fit with that concept. One should at the very least consider if the original definition used was perhaps too naive.
Real for who?
Free will is obviously an extremely important subject since its the assumption behind most of our moral and legal system. You can of course ignore it and just assume, however I am unconvinced that does anything good to our understanding of other people.
Free will is obviously an extremely important subject since its the assumption behind most of our moral and legal system. You can of course ignore it and just assume, however I am unconvinced that does anything good to our understanding of other people.
> Free will is obviously an extremely important subject since its the assumption behind most of our moral and legal system.
This statement can be argued. It seems sufficient to rationalize the current state of the legal system using principles that do not require free will. For example, we may consider it a systematic form of distribution to satisfy an instinctive need for vengeance and retribution, or for deterrence from acts that deprive us from our instinctive need to feel happy and safe.
From this perspective, it seems like the legal system is perfectly tailored for a rational agent maximizing for these instinctive needs. On the contrary, it seems like a person having Schoenpauerian free will would do poorly by such a system, since a person with such free will wouldn't really care about satisfying their own need for vengeance or retribution, and should they find themselves on the wrong side of the law, would probably welcome their suffering as a demonstration of their freedom of will.
This statement can be argued. It seems sufficient to rationalize the current state of the legal system using principles that do not require free will. For example, we may consider it a systematic form of distribution to satisfy an instinctive need for vengeance and retribution, or for deterrence from acts that deprive us from our instinctive need to feel happy and safe.
From this perspective, it seems like the legal system is perfectly tailored for a rational agent maximizing for these instinctive needs. On the contrary, it seems like a person having Schoenpauerian free will would do poorly by such a system, since a person with such free will wouldn't really care about satisfying their own need for vengeance or retribution, and should they find themselves on the wrong side of the law, would probably welcome their suffering as a demonstration of their freedom of will.
I think such contortions are unneccasary. Surely it is much easier to say that if a person is committing what we call crimes because they have no free will and are pre-determined to do so, then we punish them for it because we have no free will and are pre-determined to do so.
Just because we don't have free will does not mean we don't have some will.
Putting the death sentence on someone for a thing they arent in control based on the assumption that they were just as an example of the issue IMO.
For the moral and legal system, 'Free will' is important because it means people are responsible for their actions.
In that sense, a world where someone could have made a different choice is a world with less free will. After all, the choice they made was random, it wasn't inherent in their character. What matters here is agency. Did you act of your own volition, with your own agency? Or did someone else use their agency to manipulate you (threats, etc.).
In this perspective, free will means that your choice depend on who you are (i.e. in the causal chain that lead to your decisions, your 'character' was of very large influence). In a materialist view, your character would be a property of your body. There is a gray area, as alluded to in the aricle, for those properties of your body you are not aware of, that play a large role in the decision process. (e.g. being cranky because of some indigestion)
In that sense, a world where someone could have made a different choice is a world with less free will. After all, the choice they made was random, it wasn't inherent in their character. What matters here is agency. Did you act of your own volition, with your own agency? Or did someone else use their agency to manipulate you (threats, etc.).
In this perspective, free will means that your choice depend on who you are (i.e. in the causal chain that lead to your decisions, your 'character' was of very large influence). In a materialist view, your character would be a property of your body. There is a gray area, as alluded to in the aricle, for those properties of your body you are not aware of, that play a large role in the decision process. (e.g. being cranky because of some indigestion)
Not sure what you mean with it being random. It's not. The choices they made are based on previous choices they made. In that respect it's more akin to an evolutionary way of looking at our choices.
You don't need to be manipulated by anyone else it might just be that you simply don't make the choices you think you do but that they are spread out over a much longer timeline.
You don't need to be manipulated by anyone else it might just be that you simply don't make the choices you think you do but that they are spread out over a much longer timeline.
I was arguing for the existence of some conception of free will in a deterministic world (i.e. compatiablism).
Specifically, I was arguing against the definition of free will where someone has a choice in the sense of 'they could have done something else'. This gets into a harry discussion about what 'could' means.
Specifically, I was arguing against the definition of free will where someone has a choice in the sense of 'they could have done something else'. This gets into a harry discussion about what 'could' means.
Ahh yeah.
The way I look at it is basically and to oversimplify:
We learn from our past never our present.
As long as we survive the present that information gets used to update our reaction in the future.
Sometimes large updates (once scorned, twice shy) other times incremental improvement (practice).
Perhaps one could say that we dont have free will but things are not 10% deterministic either it's just not our consciousness who is running the show but the entire system.
The way I look at it is basically and to oversimplify:
We learn from our past never our present.
As long as we survive the present that information gets used to update our reaction in the future.
Sometimes large updates (once scorned, twice shy) other times incremental improvement (practice).
Perhaps one could say that we dont have free will but things are not 10% deterministic either it's just not our consciousness who is running the show but the entire system.
I agree that our subjective experience is an "illusion" (or more accurately, a construct) rather than an accurate representation of our environment. Furthermore, this is fairly easy to prove.
On the other hand, if consciousness is the property of having a subjective experience of existence, it is silly to call consciousness an illusion. An illusion is something that appears to exist, but actually does not. The very fact that we are able to perceive the "illusion" contradicts the implication of the statement.
On the other hand, if consciousness is the property of having a subjective experience of existence, it is silly to call consciousness an illusion. An illusion is something that appears to exist, but actually does not. The very fact that we are able to perceive the "illusion" contradicts the implication of the statement.
The illusory aspects are ideas that consciousness is "atomic", constantly present, persistent, flows continuously and we are fully in control of it.
Modern neurology proves otherwise.
No because the point of calling it an illusion is to say that we are more in the passenger seat looking at our lifes as if we were the one driving the car.
Then it would be more correct to say that free will is an illusion, which is also debatable but at least not absurd.
Not at all. Free will is just one of the "victims" another one is our perception of things being what we experience them as (qualia) or that there is only one way to simulate reality.
This then comes back to things like AI where you could ask yourself if there are other forms of feedback loops which could be "conscious" in some form or another.
This then comes back to things like AI where you could ask yourself if there are other forms of feedback loops which could be "conscious" in some form or another.
> We are pattern recognizing feedback loops (with memory) who simulate a reality not the reality.
This could also hold for a philosophical zombie, so this doesn't say anything about consciousness. Or perhaps we're talking about different kinds of consciousness here (unfortunately, good standard terminology seems missing).
This could also hold for a philosophical zombie, so this doesn't say anything about consciousness. Or perhaps we're talking about different kinds of consciousness here (unfortunately, good standard terminology seems missing).
If I have understood the article correctly, the main idea is that philosophical zombies don't exist. Or rather, that we all are. The "thing" that would separate us from them, subjective consciousness, would be just an illusion - another feature in the zombie/human brain, like memory or perception.
> [...] the main idea is that philosophical zombies don't exist. Or rather, that we all are.
Not sure if I can follow. Isn't that a contradiction?
Not sure if I can follow. Isn't that a contradiction?
There were two groups ("really conscious" vs philosophical zombies). If you accept what the article talks about, the thing which separates bith groups doesn't exist. So there is only one group. You could say that one doesn't exist (as the zombies, so far at least, are hypothetical, I'm inclined to choose them there), or you could say that they are both the same group. It's a lingüistic choice, not a contradiction.
yes thats the zombie part (all organisms are this)
What makes us different is that we seem to be able to reflect on this loop, not in the driver seat but as a passenger making notes about future drives.
What makes us different is that we seem to be able to reflect on this loop, not in the driver seat but as a passenger making notes about future drives.
What is the reality?
Not OP, but of course physics. Not that this is necessarily the ultimate answer, there may as well be yet another layer, a layer explaining why physics is the way it is. But strictly speaking that would probably still be physics. This is of course also pretty dangerous, one easily ends up with an infinity of layers, each trying to explain the layer above.
It ultimately comes down to questions like why is there anything at all. But those seem way out of reach at the moment and maybe they will remain forever. Being part of what you are trying to study may obstruct your view in an unsurmountable way.
It ultimately comes down to questions like why is there anything at all. But those seem way out of reach at the moment and maybe they will remain forever. Being part of what you are trying to study may obstruct your view in an unsurmountable way.
Mr brain literally hurts when I attempt to imagine the final answer behind the universe. I get to a point where my brain quivers and pushes me back like I'm not meant to be lurking there. Off limits, out of bounds.
It's so annoying not knowing. Where did all this matter come from, and if it's always been here, then how the hell has it always been here, and why is it like it is. What caused the nature of nature?
I bet God doesn't have the answers either. Why would God know the source of God? It wouldn't.
This is why I kind of like that recent movie called "Arrival" or the proper name "Story of your life". A new language delivered from Aliens would be great to tackle the big questions.
It's so annoying not knowing. Where did all this matter come from, and if it's always been here, then how the hell has it always been here, and why is it like it is. What caused the nature of nature?
I bet God doesn't have the answers either. Why would God know the source of God? It wouldn't.
This is why I kind of like that recent movie called "Arrival" or the proper name "Story of your life". A new language delivered from Aliens would be great to tackle the big questions.
Form is emptiness and emptiness is form.
You could just as easily say that consciousness is all that exists and the physical universe is the illusion. There is no objective reality.
That changes just what reality is, what thing you are trying to understand. It is no longer something outside and independent of your mind but your mind itself and the things within it. Your mind would become the objectively real thing and you could still study the structure of your consciousness, of your experiences, what causes the regularities in them we call the laws of physics and so on.
We essentially just decided to ignore most of such possibilities most of the time, from solipsism as you mentioned over Last Thursdayism [1] to living in a simulation or the Matrix. They may seem interesting to ponder about at times but in the end they just prevent you from learning anything at all. You can always come up with a strange scenario in which anything you might believe turns out to be falls.
That certainly sounds kind of arbitrary and unscientific, but without some founding assumptions about reality you get nowhere and that is of course not helpful at all. We should certainly keep an eye on those assumption and we do, living in a simulation for example pops up quite frequently, but for the moment our success seems to justify our assumptions.
[1] The world came into existence last Thursday in precisely the state of last Thursday with all the memories and evidence of the time before last Thursday just to fool us.
We essentially just decided to ignore most of such possibilities most of the time, from solipsism as you mentioned over Last Thursdayism [1] to living in a simulation or the Matrix. They may seem interesting to ponder about at times but in the end they just prevent you from learning anything at all. You can always come up with a strange scenario in which anything you might believe turns out to be falls.
That certainly sounds kind of arbitrary and unscientific, but without some founding assumptions about reality you get nowhere and that is of course not helpful at all. We should certainly keep an eye on those assumption and we do, living in a simulation for example pops up quite frequently, but for the moment our success seems to justify our assumptions.
[1] The world came into existence last Thursday in precisely the state of last Thursday with all the memories and evidence of the time before last Thursday just to fool us.
You can say there is a reality it's just not objective and can't be for reasons I would be happy to expand on if necessary.
what is physics without 'topics such as quantity, structure, space, and change.'(o)?
(o) https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathematics
(o) https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathematics
See my response to btmorex. [1]
[1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13792713
[1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13792713
i saw it.. that's a response to me?.. but your response seems hindered by the logical fallacy of proof by assertion (o)
i explain why i feel that way: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13792787
(o) https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proof_by_assertion
i explain why i feel that way: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13792787
(o) https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proof_by_assertion
My bad, did not notice both comments were by you.
Mathematics.
You might make the case for a stochastic simulation, but given how easy it is to produce analytically intractable equations, and the fundamental limits of logical systems demonstrated by Godel's incompleteness theorems, I highly doubt math is anything more than a clever method for approximating the universe.
> stochastic simulation .. approximating the universe
your education is showing.. perhaps you have a different definition of mathematics
among many definitions you can define mathematics as an abstract science or as what those abstractions are studying
but holding the first definition is insufficient evidence for the inexistence of the second
i'm unclear what you think intractable equations.. whether easy or difficult to form and what the definitions of easy and hard are or why they are of consequence.. say of mathematics
a computer is a system literally built as an electrical manifestation of mathematics, albeit a subset, and in its case suffers limitations of intractability but the mathematics underlying its structure still remain
can you defend the position that the limitations of a nand gate somehow disproves quantity(o)?
also, I think Godel would be distressed to have heard the incompleteness theorems being used to deny the existence of mathematics
incompleteness is intended to show mathematics exists beyond the scope of proof
for me incompleteness does go beyond its intentions but as proof of paradox such as the existence mathematics
(o) https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantity
your education is showing.. perhaps you have a different definition of mathematics
among many definitions you can define mathematics as an abstract science or as what those abstractions are studying
but holding the first definition is insufficient evidence for the inexistence of the second
i'm unclear what you think intractable equations.. whether easy or difficult to form and what the definitions of easy and hard are or why they are of consequence.. say of mathematics
a computer is a system literally built as an electrical manifestation of mathematics, albeit a subset, and in its case suffers limitations of intractability but the mathematics underlying its structure still remain
can you defend the position that the limitations of a nand gate somehow disproves quantity(o)?
also, I think Godel would be distressed to have heard the incompleteness theorems being used to deny the existence of mathematics
incompleteness is intended to show mathematics exists beyond the scope of proof
for me incompleteness does go beyond its intentions but as proof of paradox such as the existence mathematics
(o) https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantity
If you want to be so general, then anything can be considered mathematics, at which point it kind of loses its meaning. For me, mathematics is any system of symbolic manipulation built on top of axiomatic set theory, ideally having some algebraic structure. Given that the universe is comprised of things and not symbolic representations (unless you want to get really general about what a symbol is) that seems to disqualify it right there. Can we approximately describe the universe using mathematics? At the gross level, with the inclusion of fuzzy sets/probability theory, sure. At the fine level, I'm not so sure we can accurately represent the universe using less information than the universe itself contains - thus you aren't abstracting anything.
I mentioned the incompleteness theorems because they suggest a universe that was a consistent logical system would be arbitrarily constrained from valid portions of its state space - a testable hypothesis with no evidence. Of course, if you toss out consistency then all bets are off.
I mentioned the incompleteness theorems because they suggest a universe that was a consistent logical system would be arbitrarily constrained from valid portions of its state space - a testable hypothesis with no evidence. Of course, if you toss out consistency then all bets are off.
> If you want to be so general, then anything can be considered mathematics
that was where this whole conversation started, 'what is reality[anything]?'
you are working from an incomplete definition of the full scale of, even recognised, mathematics which is clear in that you define it as being 'built on top of axiomatic set theory' when godel used mathematics to show axioms are limited in scope
but you, stead Godel, consider that all of mathematics, and now I'm repeating myself
that was where this whole conversation started, 'what is reality[anything]?'
you are working from an incomplete definition of the full scale of, even recognised, mathematics which is clear in that you define it as being 'built on top of axiomatic set theory' when godel used mathematics to show axioms are limited in scope
but you, stead Godel, consider that all of mathematics, and now I'm repeating myself
> Given that the universe is comprised of things and not symbolic representations
In my original comment I was referring to the theory that the universe is entirely mathematics. I'm not talking about modeling with mathematics, rather that the universe is mathematics. There are no things.
In my original comment I was referring to the theory that the universe is entirely mathematics. I'm not talking about modeling with mathematics, rather that the universe is mathematics. There are no things.
That is at least a contentious point of view. It would probably require some form of Platonism to be true and that seems pretty hard to defend.
this is a 'third realm' strawman, the parent simply said mathematics.. you incited platonism
still, i hold it would be more 'hard to defend' abstract concepts fail to exist.. regardless of 'where'
beyond the scope of humanity or human curiosity, look at chemistry
the universe is rather predicated on relations to the abstract concept of quantity
and those distinguishing identities exist within a hadron and in far flung galaxies
still, i hold it would be more 'hard to defend' abstract concepts fail to exist.. regardless of 'where'
beyond the scope of humanity or human curiosity, look at chemistry
the universe is rather predicated on relations to the abstract concept of quantity
and those distinguishing identities exist within a hadron and in far flung galaxies
I said Platonism because that is the point of view that mathematical objects are real. As far as I can tell no other point of view asserts the fundamental reality of mathematical objects. And just because I am not absolutely sure I said »a form of Platonism« which I would admittedly better have worded as »something like Platonism«.
To you point about quantity. There are grains of sand. Does that mean that there are also numbers? I obviously argue no. You have to take some of the grains and set them aside to count them. You have to split your pile into two and recombine the two piles to add them. You have to line the grains up in order to number them.
By itself there are only grains of sand, mathematics only emerges when you impose additional structure on them and perform operations with them. There is no addition in a thousand grains of sand, it is the act of separating and combining them. Or at least imagining to do so.
You can build a huge part of mathematics on top of set theory but that does not mean that all of mathematics is already contained in every large enough set of things, at least not in any meaningful way. Only when you decide what to with the things in the set, what kind of manipulations you are willing to consider, that the structures mathematics describes emerge.
And while physics looks very mathematically, I see no problem with this. The most simple rules can give rise to staggering complex math. I find it much more reasonable to think - gross oversimplification ahead - that photons travel in straight lines in a three-dimensional space and therefore the electric field follows an inverse-square law instead of assuming that the universe already contained the mathematics needed to deal with electric fields.
There are just photons moving around, only after deciding how to measure distances and to look at spherical shells around charges we find a particularly simple way to describe electrical fields. But we could have made a lot of different choices leading to wildly different descriptions.
To you point about quantity. There are grains of sand. Does that mean that there are also numbers? I obviously argue no. You have to take some of the grains and set them aside to count them. You have to split your pile into two and recombine the two piles to add them. You have to line the grains up in order to number them.
By itself there are only grains of sand, mathematics only emerges when you impose additional structure on them and perform operations with them. There is no addition in a thousand grains of sand, it is the act of separating and combining them. Or at least imagining to do so.
You can build a huge part of mathematics on top of set theory but that does not mean that all of mathematics is already contained in every large enough set of things, at least not in any meaningful way. Only when you decide what to with the things in the set, what kind of manipulations you are willing to consider, that the structures mathematics describes emerge.
And while physics looks very mathematically, I see no problem with this. The most simple rules can give rise to staggering complex math. I find it much more reasonable to think - gross oversimplification ahead - that photons travel in straight lines in a three-dimensional space and therefore the electric field follows an inverse-square law instead of assuming that the universe already contained the mathematics needed to deal with electric fields.
There are just photons moving around, only after deciding how to measure distances and to look at spherical shells around charges we find a particularly simple way to describe electrical fields. But we could have made a lot of different choices leading to wildly different descriptions.
> To you point about quantity. There are grains of sand. Does that mean that there are also numbers? I obviously argue no. You have to take some of the grains and set them aside to count them. You have to split your pile into two and recombine the two piles to add them. You have to line the grains up in order to number them.
numbers exist without sand, sand needs numbers to exist
you can count apples instead of sand
yet physical phenomena, such as the formation of sand or apples, depends on quantity
chemistry shows that how many particles in what structure determine how it interacts physically with its environment
a hadron with three quarks is a baryon, a hadron with a different number is fundamentally different
numbers exist without sand, sand needs numbers to exist
you can count apples instead of sand
yet physical phenomena, such as the formation of sand or apples, depends on quantity
chemistry shows that how many particles in what structure determine how it interacts physically with its environment
a hadron with three quarks is a baryon, a hadron with a different number is fundamentally different
numbers exist without sand, sand needs numbers to exist
Why would sand need numbers to exist? I can pile up sand without ever knowing how many grains of sand are in the piles. I can not see how combining several things requires numbers, it only requires several things, i.e. you have to define what the different things are, where the boundaries between them are.
you can count apples instead of sand
Obviously, that was just an example. You need several objects.
yet physical phenomena, such as the formation of sand or apples, depends on quantity
It does only insofar as you need several distinct objects, it does not depend on numbers. Also note that you have to arbitrarily decide to count apples or grains of sand. Why apples or grains, why not atoms or quarks? There is a bunch of stuff and you have to divide into several distinct objects before you can even start to count them. The fact that you decide to divide all the quarks and electrons into things you call apples is an arbitrary decision and imposes a structure on top of the things that are there by itself. Only with this imposed structure and your [imagined] action of dividing and combining subsets of the things does something like counting, and numbers and addition emerge.
a hadron with three quarks is a baryon, a hadron with a different number is fundamentally different
Arbitrary definition. There are quarks, calling collections of them baryons or mesons or tetraquarks is an arbitrary definition made by humans, albeit a useful one.
Why would sand need numbers to exist? I can pile up sand without ever knowing how many grains of sand are in the piles. I can not see how combining several things requires numbers, it only requires several things, i.e. you have to define what the different things are, where the boundaries between them are.
you can count apples instead of sand
Obviously, that was just an example. You need several objects.
yet physical phenomena, such as the formation of sand or apples, depends on quantity
It does only insofar as you need several distinct objects, it does not depend on numbers. Also note that you have to arbitrarily decide to count apples or grains of sand. Why apples or grains, why not atoms or quarks? There is a bunch of stuff and you have to divide into several distinct objects before you can even start to count them. The fact that you decide to divide all the quarks and electrons into things you call apples is an arbitrary decision and imposes a structure on top of the things that are there by itself. Only with this imposed structure and your [imagined] action of dividing and combining subsets of the things does something like counting, and numbers and addition emerge.
a hadron with three quarks is a baryon, a hadron with a different number is fundamentally different
Arbitrary definition. There are quarks, calling collections of them baryons or mesons or tetraquarks is an arbitrary definition made by humans, albeit a useful one.
> Why would sand need numbers to exist? I can pile up sand without ever knowing how many grains of sand are in the piles.
But those grains of sand you are piling already exist ;P
In a universe where quarks only collect in groups of four sand would fail to exist
it needs baryons.. or whatever name you want to ascribe, yes it is scientifically known and recognised that naming conventions are arbitrary and often localised but naming stems from consistent behaviour
In a universe without baryons to claim sand exists would be making up a new substance that uses 3 quarked particles
Or if you add a fourth quark to one proton in a grain of sand it would cease to be sand
So the number of quarks that collect and how they structure determines the existence of sand
Similar to how a beach is formed based on the number of grains of sand
anyway the root of the issue is confounding to me.. how often has physics been disproven and replaced by implementing mathematics?
for me physics is behavior, mathematics is existence
But those grains of sand you are piling already exist ;P
In a universe where quarks only collect in groups of four sand would fail to exist
it needs baryons.. or whatever name you want to ascribe, yes it is scientifically known and recognised that naming conventions are arbitrary and often localised but naming stems from consistent behaviour
In a universe without baryons to claim sand exists would be making up a new substance that uses 3 quarked particles
Or if you add a fourth quark to one proton in a grain of sand it would cease to be sand
So the number of quarks that collect and how they structure determines the existence of sand
Similar to how a beach is formed based on the number of grains of sand
anyway the root of the issue is confounding to me.. how often has physics been disproven and replaced by implementing mathematics?
for me physics is behavior, mathematics is existence
Okay, let me try it from an different angle. Imagine a completely empty universe. What would be the meaning of seven?
if you are attempting to draw out salinger's orange peels(o), i would argue the tree makes a sound
if you are sincerely asking.. i suppose i'd answer: well the same as the state of the universe: empty; now what would be the meaning of the concept that the term, or symbol, seven refers to? well, still 7, but such a universe would lack the necessary representations to express it
my mathematical research begins in an 'empty universe' and questions the most base of assumptions necessary to get to a representation of, for instance, 7
an empty universe actually contains enough information to express all information utilising mathematics: the current empty 0, and the potential any state replacing the empty state 1; if time.. when emptiness begins and ends.. is allowed to be considered
(o) http://materlakes.enschool.org/ourpages/auto/2013/2/25/50973...
> "Someone just dumped a whole garbage can of orange peels out the window." ... "They float very nicely," he said without turning around. "That's interesting." ... "I don't mean it's interesting that they float," Teddy said. "It's interesting that I know about them being there. If I hadn't seen them, then I wouldn't know they were there, and if I didn't know they were there, I wouldn't be able to say that they even exist. That's a very nice, perfect example of the way--"
if you are sincerely asking.. i suppose i'd answer: well the same as the state of the universe: empty; now what would be the meaning of the concept that the term, or symbol, seven refers to? well, still 7, but such a universe would lack the necessary representations to express it
my mathematical research begins in an 'empty universe' and questions the most base of assumptions necessary to get to a representation of, for instance, 7
an empty universe actually contains enough information to express all information utilising mathematics: the current empty 0, and the potential any state replacing the empty state 1; if time.. when emptiness begins and ends.. is allowed to be considered
(o) http://materlakes.enschool.org/ourpages/auto/2013/2/25/50973...
> "Someone just dumped a whole garbage can of orange peels out the window." ... "They float very nicely," he said without turning around. "That's interesting." ... "I don't mean it's interesting that they float," Teddy said. "It's interesting that I know about them being there. If I hadn't seen them, then I wouldn't know they were there, and if I didn't know they were there, I wouldn't be able to say that they even exist. That's a very nice, perfect example of the way--"
Let me try to be more precise, I probably did a pretty bad job explaining what I really want to argue for.
I want to argue that whenever you think that there is some math already contained in the universe, it is actually you accidentally introducing it without noticing it. Look, trees! One, two, three, ... See? There are numbers in the universe. And look, I can add the number of trees in this wood and that wood.
It is of course tempting to conclude that the math was already there. But I argue that it was not, that it is you inventing it. It is your concept of object identity that defines what a tree is and when two trees are the same or different trees, you divide the world into different objects. It is your concept of grouping objects into sets. It is your concept of pairing the elements of two different sets to compare their cardinalities. It is your concept of including one more element in a set that defines what counting means. It is your concept of combining two sets that defines what addition is.
That are all things you can do with objects in the universe, but nothing of that is inherent. If you look carefully enough, all the things that look like math already exists in the universe actually require you making use of a lot of abstract man-made concepts. Many of them, like object identity and counting, are just so deeply ingrained in us that you don't notice that you are using them if you don't pay careful attention.
That is I asked for the empty universe, I wanted to take away all the objects on which you could accidentally impose structure. If math were truly fundamental, if Platonism were true, then seven should still exist in an empty universe. I don't see how this would be true in any meaningful way.
If we added a mathematician to our empty universe, he could invent math. He could come up with the idea of objects and identity and set of objects and he could think about operations with those objects and consequences of the definitions he made. But it would all have no relation to the otherwise empty universe, it would be a game of formal rules, mostly manipulating strings of symbols. If the mathematician had great imagination, maybe he could imagine actual things existing in the universe, how he could label them with those numbers he invented, and how he could visualize addition by moving things around.
I want to argue that whenever you think that there is some math already contained in the universe, it is actually you accidentally introducing it without noticing it. Look, trees! One, two, three, ... See? There are numbers in the universe. And look, I can add the number of trees in this wood and that wood.
It is of course tempting to conclude that the math was already there. But I argue that it was not, that it is you inventing it. It is your concept of object identity that defines what a tree is and when two trees are the same or different trees, you divide the world into different objects. It is your concept of grouping objects into sets. It is your concept of pairing the elements of two different sets to compare their cardinalities. It is your concept of including one more element in a set that defines what counting means. It is your concept of combining two sets that defines what addition is.
That are all things you can do with objects in the universe, but nothing of that is inherent. If you look carefully enough, all the things that look like math already exists in the universe actually require you making use of a lot of abstract man-made concepts. Many of them, like object identity and counting, are just so deeply ingrained in us that you don't notice that you are using them if you don't pay careful attention.
That is I asked for the empty universe, I wanted to take away all the objects on which you could accidentally impose structure. If math were truly fundamental, if Platonism were true, then seven should still exist in an empty universe. I don't see how this would be true in any meaningful way.
If we added a mathematician to our empty universe, he could invent math. He could come up with the idea of objects and identity and set of objects and he could think about operations with those objects and consequences of the definitions he made. But it would all have no relation to the otherwise empty universe, it would be a game of formal rules, mostly manipulating strings of symbols. If the mathematician had great imagination, maybe he could imagine actual things existing in the universe, how he could label them with those numbers he invented, and how he could visualize addition by moving things around.
Is time passing?
Without anything in the universe that could change over time and therefore indicate the passing of time that seems to be rather inconsequential to me at first glance, if it is even meaningful to talk about time in such a universe. I'd say I leave that to your choosing. Also have as many space dimensions as you like and whatnot, I don't want to be to picky. I just want to take away all the objects you could use to implement sets with and on top of which you could then continue to build more structures.
Numbers need a reduction of reality to exist.
There is an infinite number between 0.1 and 0.00000000000000000000000001
The only reason we can grable with these things in mathematics is because we are conscious minds who create symbolic meaning.
There aren't any numbers "out there".
"Out there" there are no perspectives only everything at once.
There is an infinite number between 0.1 and 0.00000000000000000000000001
The only reason we can grable with these things in mathematics is because we are conscious minds who create symbolic meaning.
There aren't any numbers "out there".
"Out there" there are no perspectives only everything at once.
but my argument is that mathematics is the infinite values 'between 0.1 and 0.00000000000000000000000001' stead some symbolic subset i am using to describe some physical phenomena
..edit.. I'm unable to reply again so I'll clarify what I mean here: for me physics is behavior, mathematics is existence
..edit.. I'm unable to reply again so I'll clarify what I mean here: for me physics is behavior, mathematics is existence
the infinite values between 0.1 and 0.00000000000000000000000000001 is infinite and thus nothing. It's in reality a gradient with no distinct steps.
Only when you reduce reality (like humans do) and you start manipulating with symbols do you get mathematics.
This manipulation with symbols (and it's foundation of a quantifiable universe on top of a quantum universe) is the foundation of math, not the other way around.
Math is simply a way this underlying reality gets expressed, it is not what the reality is.
Only when you reduce reality (like humans do) and you start manipulating with symbols do you get mathematics.
This manipulation with symbols (and it's foundation of a quantifiable universe on top of a quantum universe) is the foundation of math, not the other way around.
Math is simply a way this underlying reality gets expressed, it is not what the reality is.
That depend from which vantage point you are asking that question.
World Science Festival has a slew of really awesome talks etc on this subject posted to youtube:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4H9ul7pqezs&list=PLKy-B3Qf_R...
And The Neuroscience of Consciousness – with Anil Seth is really great: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xRel1JKOEbI
Information, Evolution, and intelligent Design - With Daniel Dennett: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AZX6awZq5Z0
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4H9ul7pqezs&list=PLKy-B3Qf_R...
And The Neuroscience of Consciousness – with Anil Seth is really great: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xRel1JKOEbI
Information, Evolution, and intelligent Design - With Daniel Dennett: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AZX6awZq5Z0
That second talk is fantastic. Thanks for sharing.
One interesting note he makes is that (according to metrics they developed) the hallucinogens really do help you achieve higher level of consciousness. All those self-reports of reaching "awakening" and "enlightenment" could actually be supported by neuroscience. Unfortunately it's too hard to get proper funding for any research on subject.
One interesting note he makes is that (according to metrics they developed) the hallucinogens really do help you achieve higher level of consciousness. All those self-reports of reaching "awakening" and "enlightenment" could actually be supported by neuroscience. Unfortunately it's too hard to get proper funding for any research on subject.
It doesn't really matter what is running the physics, whether it's a "real" world doing that, or some other process that some then call "illusion" which imho the same anyway after all it's real enough that we're able to think inside of it. Whether it's an illusion or not, the fact is that the consciousness is still there. The process that makes us aware (not just the sensing, the ability to know you think about it etc...) of the information (the world, no matter how it works) needs to be explained.
Imho Douglas Hofstadter comes closest to trying to explain it without all that kind of pitfalls in "I Am a Strange Loop". Not that it actually truly explains it, but at least it acknowledges those things that make me normally dismiss theories that could explain consciousness.
Imho Douglas Hofstadter comes closest to trying to explain it without all that kind of pitfalls in "I Am a Strange Loop". Not that it actually truly explains it, but at least it acknowledges those things that make me normally dismiss theories that could explain consciousness.
>fact is that the consciousness is still there.
There is a small problem with this claim. Or, at least there is a problem if you happen to believe in popperian philosophy of science that says that claims that are not falsifiable are non-scientific.
Obviously, from popperian point of view that claim is about as unfalsifiable as is the claim that God created earth and everything on it. Which may be true or may be not, but the claim is not a claim in the scientific realm but in religious realm, and I would be a bit vary to consider claims in religious (or non-scientific if that is a bit less sensitive word) realm "facts".
I mean, it feels obvious that I have conscience, but how do you prove or disprove that claim? I have no idea. It feels obvious that earth is flat, but there are ways to prove that wrong.
There is a small problem with this claim. Or, at least there is a problem if you happen to believe in popperian philosophy of science that says that claims that are not falsifiable are non-scientific.
Obviously, from popperian point of view that claim is about as unfalsifiable as is the claim that God created earth and everything on it. Which may be true or may be not, but the claim is not a claim in the scientific realm but in religious realm, and I would be a bit vary to consider claims in religious (or non-scientific if that is a bit less sensitive word) realm "facts".
I mean, it feels obvious that I have conscience, but how do you prove or disprove that claim? I have no idea. It feels obvious that earth is flat, but there are ways to prove that wrong.
The fact that we are talking (in this physical world) about consciousness, gives me a strong indication that at least consciousness is interacting bi-directionally with physics (from a dualistic viewpoint), so it should fall in the realm of science.
Of course, consciousness could be generated by physics alone, but then we would not be aware of it, so alternatively, consciousness could be generated by physics AND exist separately from it (as an observer), but this seems much more contrived.
Of course, consciousness could be generated by physics alone, but then we would not be aware of it, so alternatively, consciousness could be generated by physics AND exist separately from it (as an observer), but this seems much more contrived.
it feels obvious that I have conscience, but how do you prove or disprove that claim?
Why do you need to prove the obvious?
It feels obvious that earth is flat
It doesn't if you climb a mountain or see a ship under the horizon. It's a very thin layer of "obviousness" that disappears with very little reasoning.
There's nothing similar for consciousness, on the contrary every argument that has been tried against it feels terribly clumsy and artificial.
Why do you need to prove the obvious?
It feels obvious that earth is flat
It doesn't if you climb a mountain or see a ship under the horizon. It's a very thin layer of "obviousness" that disappears with very little reasoning.
There's nothing similar for consciousness, on the contrary every argument that has been tried against it feels terribly clumsy and artificial.
The question already has uses. It is worth asking ourselves wether other animals are conscious. It is worth asking ourselves whether a human phoetus is conscious. And sooner or later we will need to ask ourselves wether machines are conscious.
The first two questions are tricky. The third is really the reason we're reading about consciousness so often. But I'm not sure that questioning consciousness reality itself is so useful to replicate it.
Presence of consciousness is falsifiable, albeit indirectly and after the fact (unlike existence which is real time).
Self-awareness/consciousness can verify its own falsifiability by using periods of unconsciousness such as dreamless sleep, fainting, etc. as evidence.
Self-awareness/consciousness can verify its own falsifiability by using periods of unconsciousness such as dreamless sleep, fainting, etc. as evidence.
I think you might be dismissing the article while actually agreeing with its core argument. It's not about a substrate on which reality is running - it's about access to the mechanisms of consciousness and how our view of consciousness doesn't reflect those mechanisms fully.
Dennett's explanation basically uses Hofstadter's conception.
Dennett's explanation basically uses Hofstadter's conception.
It doesn't matter for now. AI is coming. We better have it figured out by then.
The very notion doesn't even make sense.
Illusion presupposes consciousness.
Illusion presupposes consciousness.
It sounds like you might have skipped over the part of the article that clarifies how Dennett is using that word. I excerpted it here: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13791547
But there's nothing in that passage to counter what I said. Illusion still needs some conscious entity to be fooled.
Besides, the idea that: "The underlying reality, however, what exists in itself and not just for us or for other creatures, is accurately represented only by the scientific image—ultimately in the language of physics, chemistry, molecular biology, and neurophysiology."
That's again a certain, centuries old, epistemology. And not a very good one. I would be better if he would have said "is best approximated" rather than "accurately represented".
Besides, the idea that: "The underlying reality, however, what exists in itself and not just for us or for other creatures, is accurately represented only by the scientific image—ultimately in the language of physics, chemistry, molecular biology, and neurophysiology."
That's again a certain, centuries old, epistemology. And not a very good one. I would be better if he would have said "is best approximated" rather than "accurately represented".
Humour me, I'm a bit slow. It sounds like he's using the word "illusion" to mean "illusion", as in something which seems real but is fake. Does this not still entail a Cartesian theater and a consciousness watching it to be fooled by the illusion ?
[deleted]
s/consciousness/self for a more sensible sound bite.
Ha-ha-ha. Exactly.
Illusion of WHO?
Anything that can have illusions is a consciousness.
Illusion of WHO?
Anything that can have illusions is a consciousness.
I disagree. I have shown a random blob to an face-recognition algorithm. It "saw" a face were there was none. It was not conscious, but it was perfectly able to have illusions.
>It was not conscious, but it was perfectly able to have illusions.
An algorithmic error is not the same as an illusion.
To take it to be so, is to presuppose what you're supposed to prove.
An algorithmic error is not the same as an illusion.
To take it to be so, is to presuppose what you're supposed to prove.
I came up with this analogy to think about prior and new knowledge: Aliens.
If aliens exist, they will have existed a priori, or before thought or knowledge. Granted, they wouldn't have existed a priori from their standpoint, but the logical conclusion, once you've found some aliens, is that there are always more aliens.
i.e. If life is a "thing" in the universe, it is a "thing" because of a priori knowledge.
If aliens don't exist, then that fact would also be a priori, given you could do an exhaustive search for aliens in the universe. As you probably can't do an exhaustive search because of size/energy constraints, you can look at the claim "there are no aliens" as one which is unprovable, and thus irrational.
i.e. If we never find aliens in the universe, it is a "thing" that can not be a priori (or a posteriori for that matter).
This "alternate fact" itself may be a priori, inasmuch as the state of being of some things may not be proved while being limited to observations (and perhaps perception) within the search scope.
Edited for logic errors. Also, the last statement here takes a stab at why the current administration's use of alternate facts can be considered a "tactic" in which the scope of observation and perception of others is greatly limited.
If aliens exist, they will have existed a priori, or before thought or knowledge. Granted, they wouldn't have existed a priori from their standpoint, but the logical conclusion, once you've found some aliens, is that there are always more aliens.
i.e. If life is a "thing" in the universe, it is a "thing" because of a priori knowledge.
If aliens don't exist, then that fact would also be a priori, given you could do an exhaustive search for aliens in the universe. As you probably can't do an exhaustive search because of size/energy constraints, you can look at the claim "there are no aliens" as one which is unprovable, and thus irrational.
i.e. If we never find aliens in the universe, it is a "thing" that can not be a priori (or a posteriori for that matter).
This "alternate fact" itself may be a priori, inasmuch as the state of being of some things may not be proved while being limited to observations (and perhaps perception) within the search scope.
Edited for logic errors. Also, the last statement here takes a stab at why the current administration's use of alternate facts can be considered a "tactic" in which the scope of observation and perception of others is greatly limited.
One thing that always strikes me about this kind of analysis or discussion is that it presupposes we have reached some kind of evolutionary final state -- that humans now possess all of the "competence" and "affordances" that will be necessary to comprehend the true nature of our existence and experience. Personally, I think that's naive, and that we are still very far from true understanding. In the same way that a cat is very far from comprehending geopolitics or calculus.
Related to "final state" is the assumption that there will be no successor beings. Surely evolution will continue to create beings (bio or silicon) that are more competent than humans -- perhaps it already has. Cattle can observe humans and their actions, but the cattle do not comprehend that they are captive and food. I'm not sure why it would be any different between humans and successors.
Related to "final state" is the assumption that there will be no successor beings. Surely evolution will continue to create beings (bio or silicon) that are more competent than humans -- perhaps it already has. Cattle can observe humans and their actions, but the cattle do not comprehend that they are captive and food. I'm not sure why it would be any different between humans and successors.
Dennett denies his own first person evidence of his own consciousness so that he can sustain his belief that all that exists is the materialistic world view. Motivated reasoning in the extreme and completely violating Occam's Razor which is quite ironic.
I believe the counterargument is that subjective personal experience, even when shared by lots of people, doesn't count as evidence. Subjective experience has been proven unreliable well enough through history, even for massively shared cases.
first person evidence doesen't lead you anywhere. Its a = a, true but quite trivial.
First person evidence is relevant when many people replicate the experiment and get the same result, no?
This book makes a compelling argument that scientific progress is currently blocked on major questions by the "Taboo of Subjectivity":
http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/1144208.The_Taboo_of_Subj...
This book makes a compelling argument that scientific progress is currently blocked on major questions by the "Taboo of Subjectivity":
http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/1144208.The_Taboo_of_Subj...
No which is why scientific facts are considered temporary.
Also any deep dive into how hard it is to say anything objective is making it very clearly that the only thing fhat block objectivity is the lack of its existence.
Also any deep dive into how hard it is to say anything objective is making it very clearly that the only thing fhat block objectivity is the lack of its existence.
I agree with your point that objectivity does not exist. Any scientific observation is ultimately a subjective experience. It is only replication of an experiment by others that leads the scientific community to (temporarily) accept it as fact. My point is that there is no reason why we can't apply the scientific method to the subjective experience of our own minds as well.
I agree with your point that objectivity does not exist. Any scientific observation is ultimately a subjective experience.
I don't think the first sentence follows from the second one and I doubt that the second sentence is as strong as you may think. Look at any modern physical experiment, the observations are made by apparatuses and transformed many times before a human sees the result on a screen.
How would you argue that you subjectively experiencing numbers on a screen can introduce any [significant] subjectivity into the observed? There is just so much between the observed and the observer.
And even if observations would necessarily be subjective, you would have to explain the consistency of observations between different observers across space and time. But I just realize that I am here more arguing for an objective observer-independent reality than for objective observers but I will keep it anyway.
I also think the somewhat temporary nature of physics has no large bearing on objectivity. We are well aware of measurement errors and the fact that theories are often just approximations. Better measurements or theories rarely make previous results objectively wrong. But I will acknowledge that especially theories with a lot of interpretations in them have a real risk to turn out wrong.
I don't think the first sentence follows from the second one and I doubt that the second sentence is as strong as you may think. Look at any modern physical experiment, the observations are made by apparatuses and transformed many times before a human sees the result on a screen.
How would you argue that you subjectively experiencing numbers on a screen can introduce any [significant] subjectivity into the observed? There is just so much between the observed and the observer.
And even if observations would necessarily be subjective, you would have to explain the consistency of observations between different observers across space and time. But I just realize that I am here more arguing for an objective observer-independent reality than for objective observers but I will keep it anyway.
I also think the somewhat temporary nature of physics has no large bearing on objectivity. We are well aware of measurement errors and the fact that theories are often just approximations. Better measurements or theories rarely make previous results objectively wrong. But I will acknowledge that especially theories with a lot of interpretations in them have a real risk to turn out wrong.
There is. The very fact that no to subjects can ever experience exactly the same. It wouldnt help anything as disagreement would still be there. If reslity was something objective we could access objectively there would never be any disagreements.
It does when the question is, "Does first person evidence exist?"
First person evidence obviously does exist (unless I'm responding to a philosophical zombie), the problem is that it is cannot be verified by an outside observer. I suppose you could say that something only becomes evidence when externally verified, but my response to that is that you have no way of knowing if that external verification is real or just a figment of your imagination, so that external verification doesn't really get you anywhere.
You could very be a philosophical zombie yourself, just one programmed by evolution to experience consciousness. That's the argument as far as I understand it.
But that is self evident. The problem is that it doesent lead us anywhere.
Ok, so where does Dennett's view lead that is in anyway more interesting?!
what would a 3rd person evidence of consciousness be like?
The user-illusion metaphor is a central idea in Donald Hoffman's work. I'm not sure who borrowed it from whom.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oYp5XuGYqqY
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oYp5XuGYqqY
This still seems not to [try to] answer the really hard question - how does a bunch of quarks and electrons go from mindlessly following the laws of physics to saying »Look, we are a bunch of quarks and electrons!«? I admittedly found it somewhat hard at times to follow the argument of the article, but in the end it seems to argue that consciousness is just one of many models embedded in our brain, more specifically a metamodel of the other models. But, assuming that I did not misunderstand the argument, that seems not to help much to explain how the laws of physics manage to reflect on themselves and bring the the awareness of existence into existence.
The reason for this is solidly rooted in evolution. Having an internal model of your surroundings allows you to better interact with your surroundings. This is an evolutionary advantage. At some point, this expands to a model of yourself.
I can see 2 ways for this model to come about. The first is directly, where being able to anticipate your own reactions is advantageous. The second is socially. That is, you need to model others to better anticipate their reactions. When those others are similar enough to yourself, those same modeling procedures also start working on yourself.
This kind of modeling can get started by very simple correlations. Say you accidentally get some photo-sensitive cells. Over time, if their output starts affecting what direction you move (say away from the cells when less light falls on them) and all of a sudden you are capable of fleeing from predators.
I can see 2 ways for this model to come about. The first is directly, where being able to anticipate your own reactions is advantageous. The second is socially. That is, you need to model others to better anticipate their reactions. When those others are similar enough to yourself, those same modeling procedures also start working on yourself.
This kind of modeling can get started by very simple correlations. Say you accidentally get some photo-sensitive cells. Over time, if their output starts affecting what direction you move (say away from the cells when less light falls on them) and all of a sudden you are capable of fleeing from predators.
That is certainly a point of view I would agree with, but that is not what I meant. I did not mean how the structure forms but how the structure becomes conscious and self-aware. Let me try to explain with a though experiment, assuming humans are purely physical.
You build a human-like robot with cameras, and microphones and actuators. You also build a gigantic mechanical computer out of gears and hook up the sensors and actuators of the robot to the mechanical computer. Finally you run a quantum mechanical simulation of a human brain and nerve system on the mechanical computer.
Shouldn't the whole thing now be equivalent to a human? Shouldn't it be conscious and self-aware? This then raises the question, when and how did the gears stop to just turn according to simple rules and became a mind capable of exploring and thinking about the world? There seems to be some kind of large jump between mindless rotating gears and becoming aware of you own existence. I have a hard time making really precise what I mean, but I hope you get the idea.
You build a human-like robot with cameras, and microphones and actuators. You also build a gigantic mechanical computer out of gears and hook up the sensors and actuators of the robot to the mechanical computer. Finally you run a quantum mechanical simulation of a human brain and nerve system on the mechanical computer.
Shouldn't the whole thing now be equivalent to a human? Shouldn't it be conscious and self-aware? This then raises the question, when and how did the gears stop to just turn according to simple rules and became a mind capable of exploring and thinking about the world? There seems to be some kind of large jump between mindless rotating gears and becoming aware of you own existence. I have a hard time making really precise what I mean, but I hope you get the idea.
I'd say that such a 'philosophical' zombie would indeed be conscious. In fact, I'd call it human.
As for how it arose, I'd posit a theory: As an animal starts modeling others, at some point it's model includes the others are also modeling others. Now, combine this with that animal (and the others) also modeling themselves. At some point, probably during collaboration, it starts becoming useful to start reconciling these models with each other by communicating about them.
Now, reconciling models about a third party is already a big step, but essentially speculation. At some point though, someone might want to reconcile their model of you with your own model of yourself. After all, your model is probably a better source of truth. This requires phrases like: "I think that", "I wanted", perhaps even "I wondered".
Interestingly, this account of consciousness is rooted very deeply in the 'second-person'. It is very much a social construct. I'd also like to point out this is naught but a hypothesis.
As for how it arose, I'd posit a theory: As an animal starts modeling others, at some point it's model includes the others are also modeling others. Now, combine this with that animal (and the others) also modeling themselves. At some point, probably during collaboration, it starts becoming useful to start reconciling these models with each other by communicating about them.
Now, reconciling models about a third party is already a big step, but essentially speculation. At some point though, someone might want to reconcile their model of you with your own model of yourself. After all, your model is probably a better source of truth. This requires phrases like: "I think that", "I wanted", perhaps even "I wondered".
Interestingly, this account of consciousness is rooted very deeply in the 'second-person'. It is very much a social construct. I'd also like to point out this is naught but a hypothesis.
There is probably some truth in the mind being a result of social interaction. If you read about feral children, a common theme seems to be that those children end up somewhat like animals lacking essential human characteristics.
I'd say that such a 'philosophical' zombie would indeed be conscious. In fact, I'd call it human.
I don't think those two are compatible. A philosophical zombie lacks consciousness, sentience, and qualia, a human does not. And I don't see why this collection of gears should lack any of them, why it should be a philosophical zombie. Those gear should feel pain, and not in the sense that the positions of some of those gears indicate that there is pain, like a bit in a computer memory, but just like you and me experience pain.
And that seems, at least to me, a gigantic leap. I can perfectly understand how you could evaluate different sensor inputs, calculate a pain level, and store it somewhere in memory. And then you could easily create reactions, try to get away from whatever causes you pain, you could make the robot scream.
But that seems nothing like how I experience pain, I really feel it. Humans don't even need external sources of pain, we can experience pain from memories and thoughts alone. Admittedly that may be an artificial distinction, one could certainly imagine a kind of internal sensor input that does not sense external stimuli but the state of other parts of your brain.
But all that doesn't help, at least me, at all understanding why I can feel pain and what it means to feel pain in the first place. I can not make the jump from a physical and inanimate picture of a human made out of particles to how it feels to be a human. I can not understand how a collection of gears could possibly feel pain.
And when I say not understand I mean it in the most powerful way. It's not that I can not understand the details, it's not that I don't understand anything about it but know how I could learn about it, it's much worse, I can not even imagine how I could possibly try to understand it.
I'd say that such a 'philosophical' zombie would indeed be conscious. In fact, I'd call it human.
I don't think those two are compatible. A philosophical zombie lacks consciousness, sentience, and qualia, a human does not. And I don't see why this collection of gears should lack any of them, why it should be a philosophical zombie. Those gear should feel pain, and not in the sense that the positions of some of those gears indicate that there is pain, like a bit in a computer memory, but just like you and me experience pain.
And that seems, at least to me, a gigantic leap. I can perfectly understand how you could evaluate different sensor inputs, calculate a pain level, and store it somewhere in memory. And then you could easily create reactions, try to get away from whatever causes you pain, you could make the robot scream.
But that seems nothing like how I experience pain, I really feel it. Humans don't even need external sources of pain, we can experience pain from memories and thoughts alone. Admittedly that may be an artificial distinction, one could certainly imagine a kind of internal sensor input that does not sense external stimuli but the state of other parts of your brain.
But all that doesn't help, at least me, at all understanding why I can feel pain and what it means to feel pain in the first place. I can not make the jump from a physical and inanimate picture of a human made out of particles to how it feels to be a human. I can not understand how a collection of gears could possibly feel pain.
And when I say not understand I mean it in the most powerful way. It's not that I can not understand the details, it's not that I don't understand anything about it but know how I could learn about it, it's much worse, I can not even imagine how I could possibly try to understand it.
The idea of the illusion is not really a new one: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maya_(illusion) .
That is completely different though. Hinduism states that other than consciousness everything else is an illusion.
As I read it, this is an argument about what it means to be 'real'. The argument goes along the lines of consciousness can only be described behaviouristically. Therefore it is a behaviour. Moreover, consciousness only is a 'metaphor' for the material world, rather than a description of the material world.
This is then taken to mean that it is so far divorced from the material world so as to merely be an illusion.
This is then taken to mean that it is so far divorced from the material world so as to merely be an illusion.
No. It's not an illusion. It's an ability to perceive abstract meaning from raw data, evaluate and act in order to maximize future rewards and the ability to learn in order to improve perception and acting.
The article says that abstract concepts representing whole classes of perceptions are user-illusions. They are just patterns, and the concepts they represent are the best explainers of the data. The patterns exist in the data, they are not made-up as the article might imply. They are patterns discovered by experience, and learned.
Even if consciousness and abstract concepts were all "illusions", that would expand the meaning of illusion, they would become equal to the concepts of mind and soul of the past.
My position on consciousness is that we don't need the concept of consciousness. We should use the concepts of Reinforcement Learning instead. Instead of consciousness, we're concerned with an agent. The agent is just an entity embedded in a world, an external environment. It can sense the environment and act, trying to maximize its rewards. For humans, the ultimate reward is survival and reproduction (which is another kind of survival). So it's a loop of perception-judgement-action-reward.
We don't need the often mystical and imprecise concept of consciousness because it generates useless debates. It's too loaded, everyone means something else by it, the experts can't even define it in a way they can all agree upon. It's a legacy from the past, one step above the concept of soul, but one step behind that of autonomous agent optimizing actions and learning from rewards. The concept of agent is much more parsimonious, it can be easily defined, measured, simulated and studied from the 3rd person perspective, unlike consciousness.
The article says that abstract concepts representing whole classes of perceptions are user-illusions. They are just patterns, and the concepts they represent are the best explainers of the data. The patterns exist in the data, they are not made-up as the article might imply. They are patterns discovered by experience, and learned.
Even if consciousness and abstract concepts were all "illusions", that would expand the meaning of illusion, they would become equal to the concepts of mind and soul of the past.
My position on consciousness is that we don't need the concept of consciousness. We should use the concepts of Reinforcement Learning instead. Instead of consciousness, we're concerned with an agent. The agent is just an entity embedded in a world, an external environment. It can sense the environment and act, trying to maximize its rewards. For humans, the ultimate reward is survival and reproduction (which is another kind of survival). So it's a loop of perception-judgement-action-reward.
We don't need the often mystical and imprecise concept of consciousness because it generates useless debates. It's too loaded, everyone means something else by it, the experts can't even define it in a way they can all agree upon. It's a legacy from the past, one step above the concept of soul, but one step behind that of autonomous agent optimizing actions and learning from rewards. The concept of agent is much more parsimonious, it can be easily defined, measured, simulated and studied from the 3rd person perspective, unlike consciousness.
The question is incredibly ridiculous. Consciousness is the most first-hand evidence we have. Everything is experienced via consciousness. You could ask if neurons are illusions, or if matter and energy are illusions, but it's ridiculous to ask if consciousness is an illusion.
If rats could talk they would say they have consciousness. This is not a human trait as even some philosophers seem to believe.
If you ask me, the idea that consciousness is an illusion is an illusion...huh
Doesn't an illusion imply a consciousness to experience the illusion?
Betteridge's Law holds, and the author misrepresents Dennett's thesis. Dennett doesn't deny the existence of consciousness, animals, etc. as claimed, but rather says that our conceptions of consciousness, animals, etc. represent only the subset of existent phenomena that can be conceptualized with hardware that evolved via natural selection. Dennett posits that this effect favors conceptions that benefit the conceiver's chances of reproduction (either in a genetic or memetic sense) rather than conceptions that accurately represent the phenomena.
Dennett's work is much better than this review, and I recommend reading the book rather than the review.
Dennett's work is much better than this review, and I recommend reading the book rather than the review.
That's just a wordy way of saying that we evolved according to Darwin and our consciousness was selected. Not terribly original or deep. Yawn.
Is that a critique of the few sentences in the post you're replying to, or a considered rebuttal of your reading of the content of the book?
It is a critique of the criticism of the review. If the review is wrong and Dennett's point is really just the standard materialistic worldview plus the trivial observation that consciousness evolved according to Darwin's laws, then it is really trifling.
The book isn't just that...
I'd expect the book to contain well thought-out non-obvious conclusions from those rather obvious assumptions. Perhaps expanded by giving examples of potential underlying mechanisms.
If it is, is this an indictment of consciousness? Or of illusion?
If consciousness is an illusion, who is it falling for it?
We are, obviously. From the article:
"Nor do we have to understand the mechanisms that underlie those competencies. In an illuminating metaphor, Dennett asserts that the manifest image that depicts the world in which we live our everyday lives is composed of a set of user-illusions,
'like the ingenious user-illusion of click-and-drag icons, little tan folders into which files may be dropped, and the rest of the ever more familiar items on your computer’s desktop. What is actually going on behind the desktop is mind-numbingly complicated, but users don’t need to know about it, so intelligent interface designers have simplified the affordances, making them particularly salient for human eyes, and adding sound effects to help direct attention. Nothing compact and salient inside the computer corresponds to that little tan file-folder on the desktop screen.'
He says that the manifest image of each species is 'a user-illusion brilliantly designed by evolution to fit the needs of its users.' In spite of the word 'illusion' he doesn’t wish simply to deny the reality of the things that compose the manifest image; the things we see and hear and interact with are 'not mere fictions but different versions of what actually exists: real patterns.' The underlying reality, however, what exists in itself and not just for us or for other creatures, is accurately represented only by the scientific image—ultimately in the language of physics, chemistry, molecular biology, and neurophysiology."
"Nor do we have to understand the mechanisms that underlie those competencies. In an illuminating metaphor, Dennett asserts that the manifest image that depicts the world in which we live our everyday lives is composed of a set of user-illusions,
'like the ingenious user-illusion of click-and-drag icons, little tan folders into which files may be dropped, and the rest of the ever more familiar items on your computer’s desktop. What is actually going on behind the desktop is mind-numbingly complicated, but users don’t need to know about it, so intelligent interface designers have simplified the affordances, making them particularly salient for human eyes, and adding sound effects to help direct attention. Nothing compact and salient inside the computer corresponds to that little tan file-folder on the desktop screen.'
He says that the manifest image of each species is 'a user-illusion brilliantly designed by evolution to fit the needs of its users.' In spite of the word 'illusion' he doesn’t wish simply to deny the reality of the things that compose the manifest image; the things we see and hear and interact with are 'not mere fictions but different versions of what actually exists: real patterns.' The underlying reality, however, what exists in itself and not just for us or for other creatures, is accurately represented only by the scientific image—ultimately in the language of physics, chemistry, molecular biology, and neurophysiology."
>The underlying reality, however, what exists in itself and not just for us or for other creatures, is accurately represented only by the scientific image—ultimately in the language of physics, chemistry, molecular biology, and neurophysiology."
They are also mediated by consciousness. Unconscious scientists rarely do experiments or interpret their results.
This is epistemology 101.
They are also mediated by consciousness. Unconscious scientists rarely do experiments or interpret their results.
This is epistemology 101.
The underlying reality is absolutely not mediated by human consciousness, and I think the author's mistake here is even bringing up the human scientific fields, which muddies their point.
Dennett does end up explaining a lot of epistemology 101 because his audience isn't philosophy academia.
Dennett's innovation, which isn't described well by this book review, is to assert that epistemology is driven by reproductive pressure (both genetic and memetic).
Dennett does end up explaining a lot of epistemology 101 because his audience isn't philosophy academia.
Dennett's innovation, which isn't described well by this book review, is to assert that epistemology is driven by reproductive pressure (both genetic and memetic).
>The underlying reality is absolutely not mediated by human consciousness...
and, being a conscious human who can only rely on data inferred through his sense organs: who are _you_ to say?
and, being a conscious human who can only rely on data inferred through his sense organs: who are _you_ to say?
How is that an innovation?!
Materialists have been asserting since forever that consciousness arises from the brain and that the brain evolved according to Darwin's laws. What is new in Dennett's viewpoint?
Materialists have been asserting since forever that consciousness arises from the brain and that the brain evolved according to Darwin's laws. What is new in Dennett's viewpoint?
Dennett goes into a lot more detail as to the processes by which evolution affects consciousness and the resulting properties of consciousness than anyone in my (admittedly limited) reading.
>The underlying reality is absolutely not mediated by human consciousness
How does anybody even know that, or anything else, except through their, wait for it..., human consciousness?
How does anybody even know that, or anything else, except through their, wait for it..., human consciousness?
There are two pieces of evidence which allow me to hypothesize the existence of an objective reality from within my subjective experience:
1. My subjective experience makes predictions which are wrong within my subjective experience in ways which my subjective experience does not explain. Or put another way, I experience cognitive dissonance.
2. When I attempt to align my subjective experience with a hypothetical objective reality (that is, when I attempt to learn) the predictions made from my subjective experience are wrong less frequently. Or put another way, learning decreases cognitive dissonance.
Of course, these subjective experiences could be explained by a self-flagellating subjective experience that inflicts me with cognitive dissonance and then rewards me for attempting to align my subjective experience with a nonexistent objective reality. But that is (subjectively!) too convoluted an explanation to be satisfactory.
1. My subjective experience makes predictions which are wrong within my subjective experience in ways which my subjective experience does not explain. Or put another way, I experience cognitive dissonance.
2. When I attempt to align my subjective experience with a hypothetical objective reality (that is, when I attempt to learn) the predictions made from my subjective experience are wrong less frequently. Or put another way, learning decreases cognitive dissonance.
Of course, these subjective experiences could be explained by a self-flagellating subjective experience that inflicts me with cognitive dissonance and then rewards me for attempting to align my subjective experience with a nonexistent objective reality. But that is (subjectively!) too convoluted an explanation to be satisfactory.
And yes, of course it's epistemology 101. But a lot of people haven't taken epistemology, and this article is a review of Dennett's book which delves into these issues for the general public.
Edit: typo has been fixed.
Edit: typo has been fixed.
>I assume you mean "mediated" rather than "medicated".
Oops, yes, fixed that. I always make tons of typos on my HN comments.
Oops, yes, fixed that. I always make tons of typos on my HN comments.
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I think consciousness is a concept created by our brain. It likes the concept of 'angry'. We all know what it feels like. But there is no 'angry'thing, our brain created it too.
Sam Harris disagrees, arguing "Consciousness is the one thing in this universe that cannot be an illusion"
https://www.samharris.org/blog/item/the-mystery-of-conscious...
>MARCH 9, 2017 ISSUE
That's from the future!
That's from the future!
No.
We are pattern recognizing feedback loops (with memory) who simulate a reality not the reality.
This simulation happen to be calibrated in such a way that it allow us to navigate the reality with some success by proxy of our simulation of it.