Boeing safety system not at fault, says chief executive(bbc.co.uk)
bbc.co.uk
Boeing safety system not at fault, says chief executive
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-47980959
68 comments
Highly disingenuous to infer that if multiple factors that coincide to create a failure, that this component is not "the cause".
Of course there are always multiple factors, but all the evidence points to the MCAS system as a major contributor to these catastrophes.
I don't know who's advising Boeing on their crisis management and media strategy, but they're doing it wrong.
Every time Boeing attempts to sidestep or minimize this it makes me trust them less.
Take a lesson from the Tylenol poisonings [0] and the Rogers Commission investigation of the Challenger disaster [1].
Step 1 in enlightened crisis management: accept responsibility.
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chicago_Tylenol_murders
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rogers_Commission_Report
Of course there are always multiple factors, but all the evidence points to the MCAS system as a major contributor to these catastrophes.
I don't know who's advising Boeing on their crisis management and media strategy, but they're doing it wrong.
Every time Boeing attempts to sidestep or minimize this it makes me trust them less.
Take a lesson from the Tylenol poisonings [0] and the Rogers Commission investigation of the Challenger disaster [1].
Step 1 in enlightened crisis management: accept responsibility.
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chicago_Tylenol_murders
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rogers_Commission_Report
> Step 1 in enlightened crisis management: accept responsibility.
Agreed completely, but let me be devil's advocate here.
If he accepts responsibility then boeing is presumably fully and immediately legally liable. I guess that, particularly under US culture of suing anything that moves, everyone will try to cash in to the maximal extent possible. Including airlines possibly cancelling their existing orders - might they cancel 4,700 plane orders? What would that do to the company? By how much would boeing's liability increase on a straightforward "mea culpa"?
I can't agree with his butt-covering but I can see why it's happening. There seems to be little upside to accepting the blame. Could it destroy boeing? How many jobs lost?
"Boeing employs more than 153,000 people across the United States and in more than 65 countries" <https://www.boeing.com/company/general-info/> and a whole long-tail of US jobs indirectly.
How would it affect the US economy and standing in the world (I mean, more than it's already doing now)? I'm sure he's being leant on from above.
etc.
(please note I'm presenting a possible explanation, not endorsing it. There seems no moral way out of this. The real cause is the historical stupidity that allowed this to occur, for which he should definitely swing, and a few more suits. I am NOT endorsing these things I wrote but they seem things he will have considered. NB am a brit so I'm looking at this from the outside).
Agreed completely, but let me be devil's advocate here.
If he accepts responsibility then boeing is presumably fully and immediately legally liable. I guess that, particularly under US culture of suing anything that moves, everyone will try to cash in to the maximal extent possible. Including airlines possibly cancelling their existing orders - might they cancel 4,700 plane orders? What would that do to the company? By how much would boeing's liability increase on a straightforward "mea culpa"?
I can't agree with his butt-covering but I can see why it's happening. There seems to be little upside to accepting the blame. Could it destroy boeing? How many jobs lost?
"Boeing employs more than 153,000 people across the United States and in more than 65 countries" <https://www.boeing.com/company/general-info/> and a whole long-tail of US jobs indirectly.
How would it affect the US economy and standing in the world (I mean, more than it's already doing now)? I'm sure he's being leant on from above.
etc.
(please note I'm presenting a possible explanation, not endorsing it. There seems no moral way out of this. The real cause is the historical stupidity that allowed this to occur, for which he should definitely swing, and a few more suits. I am NOT endorsing these things I wrote but they seem things he will have considered. NB am a brit so I'm looking at this from the outside).
I suspect this is exactly what's happening - butt covering up and down the chain of command to avoid blame and legal liability.
This makes sense in a short-term, myopic view limited to first-order effects.
Enlightened crisis management isn't about the moral way out just for the sake of morality. It's about looking ahead to the second- and third-order effects.
When Tylenol was poisoned with cyanide, Johnson & Johnson could have taken the short-term, myopic approach. They could have held press conferences to explain how this wasn't their fault, it wasn't their responsibility, that many factors contributed to the catastrophe. They could have lobbied regulators to leave Tylenol on store shelves because it was an isolated incident.
Instead, Johnson & Johnson took responsibility. They communicated continuously. They to the initiative to remove all Tylenol products from the shelves. They redesigned the product to make it tamper-evident. And they led a campaign to educate people to inspect the seal and return any product where it was broken.
This was very expensive. In the short term, Johnson & Johnson would have made more profit just concerning themselves with first-order effects.
But in the long term, second- and third-order effects dominate. J&J enhanced their image, they made the Tylenol brand more valuable, and they built a deep reservoir of trust.
Boeing should take a lesson.
This makes sense in a short-term, myopic view limited to first-order effects.
Enlightened crisis management isn't about the moral way out just for the sake of morality. It's about looking ahead to the second- and third-order effects.
When Tylenol was poisoned with cyanide, Johnson & Johnson could have taken the short-term, myopic approach. They could have held press conferences to explain how this wasn't their fault, it wasn't their responsibility, that many factors contributed to the catastrophe. They could have lobbied regulators to leave Tylenol on store shelves because it was an isolated incident.
Instead, Johnson & Johnson took responsibility. They communicated continuously. They to the initiative to remove all Tylenol products from the shelves. They redesigned the product to make it tamper-evident. And they led a campaign to educate people to inspect the seal and return any product where it was broken.
This was very expensive. In the short term, Johnson & Johnson would have made more profit just concerning themselves with first-order effects.
But in the long term, second- and third-order effects dominate. J&J enhanced their image, they made the Tylenol brand more valuable, and they built a deep reservoir of trust.
Boeing should take a lesson.
You're comparing apples and oranges here. In the Tylenol case, it seemed clear that the cause wasn't neglicance on the part of J&J, and the remedy of clearing all product off the shelves probably cost them somewhere in the millions of dollars.
In Boeing's case, the issue almost certainly is due to intentional actions taken by a number of people, and buying back existing 737 MAX8s + cancelling all future orders would amount to billions and could very well sink the company.
I think the parent comment is spot-on. Boeing is playing a game of damage control, and they're presumably being advised by some smart and experienced people. They're not accepting blame, an act which we can assume is motivated by the legal implications of doing so.
In Boeing's case, the issue almost certainly is due to intentional actions taken by a number of people, and buying back existing 737 MAX8s + cancelling all future orders would amount to billions and could very well sink the company.
I think the parent comment is spot-on. Boeing is playing a game of damage control, and they're presumably being advised by some smart and experienced people. They're not accepting blame, an act which we can assume is motivated by the legal implications of doing so.
Yeah, based on all the info we have so far it appears MCAS was the root cause. Mounting bigger engines higher up and forward changed the plane's center of gravity and made it more likely to go too high AoA under acceleration and stall. MCAS was installed to fix that, but was sloppily implemented, misinterpreted AoA sensor data under some conditions, and was not pilot-overide-able.
Major fuckup by Boeing that cost many lives. They've already lost the narrative on this. The CEO's equivocation isn't helping.
Major fuckup by Boeing that cost many lives. They've already lost the narrative on this. The CEO's equivocation isn't helping.
Step 0 in enlightened crisis management: don't be perceived as corrupt and greedy
Which they've mostly already failed, so that strategy is a wash
Which they've mostly already failed, so that strategy is a wash
> I don't know who's advising Boeing on their crisis management and media strategy, but they're doing it wrong.
You have to consider the four possibilities. Whether the media strategy is in the interest of
1. The flying public.
2. The Boeing as a company.
3. Boeing's stockholders.
4. The perceived interest of Dennis Muilenburg.
I'm assuming #4
You have to consider the four possibilities. Whether the media strategy is in the interest of
1. The flying public.
2. The Boeing as a company.
3. Boeing's stockholders.
4. The perceived interest of Dennis Muilenburg.
I'm assuming #4
Well,
From [1] : Boeing CEO says 737 Max was designed properly and pilots did not 'completely' follow procedure
So he still can't resist smearing the pilots, despite the facts coming to light until now.
In my book Boeing changed into the epitome of an evil company, putting profits vastly before safety of their (end) customers. I would be very, very reluctant to set foot into this murder machine. Despite the additional software kludges they try to apply.
Kludges onto a 50 year old designe rendered aerodynamically unstable by bigger and diffferent positioned engines.
[1] https://edition.cnn.com/2019/04/29/investing/boeing-annual-m... (warning! auto-play video)
From [1] : Boeing CEO says 737 Max was designed properly and pilots did not 'completely' follow procedure
So he still can't resist smearing the pilots, despite the facts coming to light until now.
In my book Boeing changed into the epitome of an evil company, putting profits vastly before safety of their (end) customers. I would be very, very reluctant to set foot into this murder machine. Despite the additional software kludges they try to apply.
Kludges onto a 50 year old designe rendered aerodynamically unstable by bigger and diffferent positioned engines.
[1] https://edition.cnn.com/2019/04/29/investing/boeing-annual-m... (warning! auto-play video)
> He maintained that all accidents are a result of a series of events, all of which would have to occur for there to be a crash.
That statement is a truism to deflect blame. He also blamed the pilots for not following the checklist.
That statement is a truism to deflect blame. He also blamed the pilots for not following the checklist.
They followed Boeing's checklist in one of the two, and still crashed. Boeing's checklist doesn't account for high aerodynamic loads on the horizontal stabilizer making manual trim adjustment difficult to impractical.
Ethiopian is an interesting crash because they followed Boeing's procedure, were still in imminent danger, and then had to diverge from procedure (i.e. re-enable electronic trim to electronic adjust) but that only worsened the problem since MCAS's five second delay had elapsed.
I'd hope we're well passed blaming pilots for this one. Even Lion Air's maintenance team might deserve a little slack, as the MCAS system kept on switching between faulty AoA sensor and working one every time the aircraft was restarted, meaning the maintenance team might not have been able to reproduce the issue.
Ethiopian is an interesting crash because they followed Boeing's procedure, were still in imminent danger, and then had to diverge from procedure (i.e. re-enable electronic trim to electronic adjust) but that only worsened the problem since MCAS's five second delay had elapsed.
I'd hope we're well passed blaming pilots for this one. Even Lion Air's maintenance team might deserve a little slack, as the MCAS system kept on switching between faulty AoA sensor and working one every time the aircraft was restarted, meaning the maintenance team might not have been able to reproduce the issue.
>> They followed Boeing's checklist in one of the two, and still crashed.
They did not follow it completely, the last item is to leave the cutout switches in cutout, which they did not.
They cut the electric trim back in and inexplicably did not correct the trim or further manage it. I suspect that Crew Resource Management was not effective at that point and both pilots were distracted.
They did not follow it completely, the last item is to leave the cutout switches in cutout, which they did not.
They cut the electric trim back in and inexplicably did not correct the trim or further manage it. I suspect that Crew Resource Management was not effective at that point and both pilots were distracted.
You didn't read the post you replied to. The pilots being forced to diverge (and why) in order to recover the aircraft was discussed.
> They cut the electric trim back in and inexplicably did not correct the trim or further manage it.
That's incorrect. They did in fact apply manual trim adjustments after the trim cutout were reset (see the graph on page 26, specifically the TRIM UP-MAN).
> I suspect that Crew Resource Management was not effective at that point and both pilots were distracted.
And I suspect you haven't read enough about this topic (or half read it like the post you're replying to) and are jumping to unfounded conclusions.
> They cut the electric trim back in and inexplicably did not correct the trim or further manage it.
That's incorrect. They did in fact apply manual trim adjustments after the trim cutout were reset (see the graph on page 26, specifically the TRIM UP-MAN).
> I suspect that Crew Resource Management was not effective at that point and both pilots were distracted.
And I suspect you haven't read enough about this topic (or half read it like the post you're replying to) and are jumping to unfounded conclusions.
I'm well aware. Because of the reasons you state, I was surprised that he mentioned this again in the video.
According to the classic book "Normal Accidents" by Charles Perrow, "tight coupling" of events in a chain is invariably the critical factor.
Would the chain of events have been stopped by a functioning MCAS?
If it wasn't for MCAS being present, the chain of events would have never started! It's only there because they cut corners in the first place.
If there’s any corner cutting here it’s around AoA sensor redundancy and flight worthiness testing.
The reason MCAS is there is that the 737 was too low to the ground to fit newer, bigger, more fuel-efficient engines under the wing, which is what Boeing’s customers wanted, so they had to move the engines forward and compensate for the resulting handling effects in software.
Without some form of MCAS there would be no 737-MAX at all, and it’s not fair to say that the whole plane was a corner cutting exercise either, it was an attempt to improve an older, proven design driven by customer demand.
The reason MCAS is there is that the 737 was too low to the ground to fit newer, bigger, more fuel-efficient engines under the wing, which is what Boeing’s customers wanted, so they had to move the engines forward and compensate for the resulting handling effects in software.
Without some form of MCAS there would be no 737-MAX at all, and it’s not fair to say that the whole plane was a corner cutting exercise either, it was an attempt to improve an older, proven design driven by customer demand.
Without some form of MCAS there would be no 737-MAX at all, and it’s not fair to say that the whole plane was a corner cutting exercise either, it was an attempt to improve an older, proven design driven by customer demand.
I would argue that they applied a software kludge on a design, which is basically no more fit to fly in such a configuration.
They did that because Airbus' 320 NEO put them into full throttle panic mode. Espeically since American, a lifelong Boeing customer, considered a pretty big order with Airbus.
So, instead of a completely new clean-sheet design (which they considered) they rushed a plane to market, which needed to be fixed with software because it's inherently not fit to fly without such fixes and slapped a 737 sticker onto the plane because of competitive advantage.
The obviously dodgy shenanigans applied in the certification process also don't really help.
I would argue that they applied a software kludge on a design, which is basically no more fit to fly in such a configuration.
They did that because Airbus' 320 NEO put them into full throttle panic mode. Espeically since American, a lifelong Boeing customer, considered a pretty big order with Airbus.
So, instead of a completely new clean-sheet design (which they considered) they rushed a plane to market, which needed to be fixed with software because it's inherently not fit to fly without such fixes and slapped a 737 sticker onto the plane because of competitive advantage.
The obviously dodgy shenanigans applied in the certification process also don't really help.
He said the MCAS system met its "design and certification criteria". Yet a couple of paragraphs later, we read that "a report suggested that the system malfunctioned, and forced the plane's nose down more than 20 times before it plummeted into the sea."
Is that what it was designed and certified to do? Ouch.
Is that what it was designed and certified to do? Ouch.
If you read between the lines, he's basically saying that they did not have complete design and certification criteria for this feature of their aircraft and that that's ultimately at fault. In other words the MCAS met the design criteria established by the systems engineers, and the AoA sensor met the design criteria established by the systems engineers. And it passed all of the system-level testing established for the plane. It's just that the design criteria didn't include statements describing the AoA sensor data as being critical for the MCAS to function effectively.
And as a result nobody analyzed the software design to determine whether a fault in the AoA sensor could cause the MCAS to perform in a state inconsistent with aerodynamics. And nobody who was working on the AoA readout was aware that the AoA sensor fault indicator would also indicate a problem with MCAS. What he's strongly implying is that this was a mistake on Boeing's part.
However what he can't do is come out and say "I'm sorry guys. We fucked up. Our systems people failed to fully and properly account for this new system in the design criteria and as a result we failed to dedicate enough engineering resources to ensuring that faulty sensor inputs to this system couldn't result in a crash."
And as a result nobody analyzed the software design to determine whether a fault in the AoA sensor could cause the MCAS to perform in a state inconsistent with aerodynamics. And nobody who was working on the AoA readout was aware that the AoA sensor fault indicator would also indicate a problem with MCAS. What he's strongly implying is that this was a mistake on Boeing's part.
However what he can't do is come out and say "I'm sorry guys. We fucked up. Our systems people failed to fully and properly account for this new system in the design criteria and as a result we failed to dedicate enough engineering resources to ensuring that faulty sensor inputs to this system couldn't result in a crash."
This is why we have airworthiness certification, though. If you give full nosedown control authority to some system, that system needs to be redundant and have its failure probabilities modeled and accounted for, or the plane isn't fit to fly. Seems like the only way this "lack of criteria" can happen is when there's something very close to criminal negligence on Boeing's end and a regulator who either doesn't care or is being successfully lied to.
And that was the second part of his statement, that the design was certified by the FAA at the time.
Not sure if he is trying to push the blame onto the FAA or imply that the FAA agrees MCAS isn't at fault.
Not sure if he is trying to push the blame onto the FAA or imply that the FAA agrees MCAS isn't at fault.
To me this sounds a lot like everybody is trying to shift their responsibility around in the hope that it will just vanish.
The thing is: if Boeing can’t precisely pinpoint the fault, how should anybody else? And if nobdy else can and Boeing won’t, why would you trust them as a customer?
The thing is: if Boeing can’t precisely pinpoint the fault, how should anybody else? And if nobdy else can and Boeing won’t, why would you trust them as a customer?
This is why you should not write your own tests. Where were the FAA when this system was verified? Did they even know it existed?
> Where were the FAA when this system was verified?
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/faile...
"The FAA, citing lack of funding and resources, has over the years delegated increasing authority to Boeing to take on more of the work of certifying the safety of its own airplanes."
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/faile...
"The FAA, citing lack of funding and resources, has over the years delegated increasing authority to Boeing to take on more of the work of certifying the safety of its own airplanes."
Well that fills me with confidence for the future of safe air travel. What could possibly go wrong?
Not much without international media backlash and terrible pr it seems.
Basically the equivalent of a programmer saying "garbage in, garbage out". He's saying MCAS chews on the AoA sensor, and the AoA sensor was malfunctioning (therefore shifting the blame to the user, who is responsible for maintenance). But failing to mention that Boeing had a role to play in those links of the chain too, first in using only one of the AoA sensors and not having the disagree alert work, and two in that there's a rumor that it's a Boeing problem causing the AoA sensors to become damaged in the first place.
Also, isn't there something about the MCAS system originally being certified to make only a fairly limited adjustment to the trim, and subsequently being modified (without re-certifying) to make a much greater adjustment?
So it was designed and certified to be able to nudge the nose down a certain amount. Then they changed it to be able to force the nose down much more severely. And it did.
Without being an expert, it sure sounds like the Boeing "safety system" is at fault here...
So it was designed and certified to be able to nudge the nose down a certain amount. Then they changed it to be able to force the nose down much more severely. And it did.
Without being an expert, it sure sounds like the Boeing "safety system" is at fault here...
I read the same thing in an article but can't remember exactly where. Why manufacturers should be allowed to certify the safety of certain components of their own airplanes is beyond me.
I think the Seattle Times originally broke it: https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/faile...
===
After the Lion Air Flight 610 crash, Boeing for the first time provided to airlines details about MCAS. Boeing’s bulletin to the airlines stated that the limit of MCAS’s command was 2.5 degrees.
That number was new to FAA engineers who had seen 0.6 degrees in the safety assessment.
“The FAA believed the airplane was designed to the 0.6 limit, and that’s what the foreign regulatory authorities thought, too,” said an FAA engineer. “It makes a difference in your assessment of the hazard involved.”
===
After the Lion Air Flight 610 crash, Boeing for the first time provided to airlines details about MCAS. Boeing’s bulletin to the airlines stated that the limit of MCAS’s command was 2.5 degrees.
That number was new to FAA engineers who had seen 0.6 degrees in the safety assessment.
“The FAA believed the airplane was designed to the 0.6 limit, and that’s what the foreign regulatory authorities thought, too,” said an FAA engineer. “It makes a difference in your assessment of the hazard involved.”
You really think they're saying it was designed and certified to plummet airplanes into the sea?
If your design and certification criteria are insufficient, you can meet your design and certification criteria and still experience a failure.
If your design and certification criteria are insufficient, you can meet your design and certification criteria and still experience a failure.
> You really think they're saying it was designed and certified to plummet airplanes into the sea?
He's saying that's what Boeing said. I'm sure it isn't what they meant, but it is what they said.
He's saying that's what Boeing said. I'm sure it isn't what they meant, but it is what they said.
"The software wouldn't have crashed if the user didn't click these buttons in a weird order. The bug was only one factor in a chain of events that led to the segfault."
Unfortunately, the Ethiopian crash did pretty much everything they were told to do (disable electric stabilizer trim) for the alleged 'memory checklist' procedure and it still wasn't enough.
"Crappy sensor failure, crappy software failure, crappy aerodynamic failure" would be the chain of events, because the pilots did everything right.
"Crappy sensor failure, crappy software failure, crappy aerodynamic failure" would be the chain of events, because the pilots did everything right.
Reading a lot of detailed reports, I concluded that nobody at Boeing ever properly tested the conditions that happened by both Lion Air and Ethiopian, until much after the second crash. Boeing didn't do enough steps to reconstruct what happened by Lion Air, otherwise they would have never published totally useless procedure which was then followed by the pilots of Ethiopian. The actual testing in the proper simulator would have shown that the emergency procedure, as written by Boeing after Lion Air crash, just can't work.
The pilots in Ethiopian and all the passengers paid with their lives for a whole world to learn that.
The world knows because one pilot tried to partially reconstruct the conditions on his own in an older simulator, as there were effectively almost no new simulators because the Boeing's selling point was that the new model of the plane is same as an old one model, just to avoid the recertification and pilot retraining. So the said pilot did the test for youtube, showed that what the pilots probably did matched the emergency procedure, and that exactly that following the procedure most probably results in the crash, but had to remove the video once his employer became aware of what he did.
I've posted the link to that original source then, but HN moderators marked it then as a "dupe":
https://leehamnews.com/2019/04/03/et302-used-the-cut-out-swi...
The pilots in Ethiopian and all the passengers paid with their lives for a whole world to learn that.
The world knows because one pilot tried to partially reconstruct the conditions on his own in an older simulator, as there were effectively almost no new simulators because the Boeing's selling point was that the new model of the plane is same as an old one model, just to avoid the recertification and pilot retraining. So the said pilot did the test for youtube, showed that what the pilots probably did matched the emergency procedure, and that exactly that following the procedure most probably results in the crash, but had to remove the video once his employer became aware of what he did.
I've posted the link to that original source then, but HN moderators marked it then as a "dupe":
https://leehamnews.com/2019/04/03/et302-used-the-cut-out-swi...
Not everyone agrees. There is some argument over why they did not throttle back and ended up overspeeding, which meant they could not manually trim, and why they re-engaged automatic stabiliser trim when the memory items explicitly state not to do so. The throttles were at maximum during the entire episode. My understanding is somewhat limited but I’ve read that the stick shaker activation might have made them leave the throttles alone, and that they may have re-enabled automatic trim because the manual trim wheels were impossible to move at such high velocity. Re-enabling auto trim is what ultimately allowed MCAS to push the nose down for the last time, but it’s not clear to me as a layman whether they could have saved the plane given their situation prior to re-enabling it anyway.
Since the main battle to getting this plane flying again is going to be public trust, I think they’re going about this all wrong.
First admit full responsibility. Then at least you have a shot at people trusting you to fix it.
First admit full responsibility. Then at least you have a shot at people trusting you to fix it.
At this point the planes either need to be retrofitted with their original engines or scrapped. They will remain flying deathtraps no matter how much software is piled on to patch the issue.
[deleted]
Why? What I've heard is that if the pilots know how to disable the pitch correction, the plane won't fight them in the event of a sensor failure and they can land safely.
From what I've heard, trimming a large jet engine plane by hand is physically difficult, even if you manage to disable the MCAS system. Additionally, I believe the core issue is that pilots were meant to fly these plans without additional retraining, which is why MCAS was added in the first place.
Isn't that exactly what happened with Ethiopian Airlines? The pilots knew about the MCAS, knew what was happening, disabled the system, but were unable to physically adjust the trim to prevent the crash?
I’ve not read anything that suggested they knew about MCAS. They knew about automatic stabiliser trim, which is a different system also present on the older 737 NG. The way MCAS monitors angle of attack, and the way it is temporarily disabled by pilot trim inputs was not known to them.
They followed the recovery checklist. Step 1: Use the trim cut-out switches to stop MCAS. After the first crash, any MAX pilot would have to be a moron to not be informed about the issue and Boeing's (useless) guidance to resolve it.
Yes I agree, they knew about the possibility of runaway stabiliser and they were not morons. Boeing’s guidance was useless to them because it left out a description of how MCAS operates, and I’m not sure it even mentioned it by name but I may be wrong on that.
If they had known that MCAS is disabled for 15 seconds by pilot trim inputs, they could have saved the plane. Toward the end of the flight they went off-book and re-enabled auto trim, blipped the trim a few times and 15 seconds later MCAS jumps on and dives them into the ground. All they needed to do was keep making small trims.
If they had known that MCAS is disabled for 15 seconds by pilot trim inputs, they could have saved the plane. Toward the end of the flight they went off-book and re-enabled auto trim, blipped the trim a few times and 15 seconds later MCAS jumps on and dives them into the ground. All they needed to do was keep making small trims.
> If they had known that MCAS is disabled for 15 seconds by pilot trim inputs, they could have saved the plane.
I understand it as "if they were able to consistently, all the time, until they land, fight the plane which was trying to kill them every 15 seconds turning the nose to the ground, resulting all the time in even harder position (due to the forces involved) they would..."
Flying death trap indeed.
I understand it as "if they were able to consistently, all the time, until they land, fight the plane which was trying to kill them every 15 seconds turning the nose to the ground, resulting all the time in even harder position (due to the forces involved) they would..."
Flying death trap indeed.
Perhaps, but it's understandable why Boeing is parsing their words carefully here. For some critics full responsibility would mean nothing short of Boeing admitting the 737 design had reached end of life and they should have never tried to shoehorn larger engines onto the 737 airframe. That would mean ceding the trillion dollar narrowbody market to Airbus for the foreseeable future.
I just think they need to accept responsibility for all those dead people.
Personally I don't see anything wrong with the idea of the redesign. It's the execution that was the problem.
If he came out and said, look we screwed up. There should have been a backup sensor/proper training/proper manuals/software that took a bloody hint and maybe there should be more gov oversight in general because this kind of cock up should not be possible. At least then you'd believe they're actually tackling the problem.
Reading all that back, it is actually quite a lot to ask for isn't it.
Personally I don't see anything wrong with the idea of the redesign. It's the execution that was the problem.
If he came out and said, look we screwed up. There should have been a backup sensor/proper training/proper manuals/software that took a bloody hint and maybe there should be more gov oversight in general because this kind of cock up should not be possible. At least then you'd believe they're actually tackling the problem.
Reading all that back, it is actually quite a lot to ask for isn't it.
> Personally I don't see anything wrong with the idea of the redesign.
You don't think that there's anything fundamentally wrong with designing an aerodynamically unstable airframe, that needs software overrides to keep the plane flying?
A 737 shouldn't fly like a fighter jet.
You don't think that there's anything fundamentally wrong with designing an aerodynamically unstable airframe, that needs software overrides to keep the plane flying?
A 737 shouldn't fly like a fighter jet.
Probably should have said _a_ redesign rather than _the_ redesign. But even so, if they’d been up front about what they were doing and why and put proper safety systems in place I don’t think it’s that different to other planes is it? They just did it badly and secretly.
It’s not like the plane was uncontrollable without MCAS, it’s more that it did not fly like a 737-NG, and so would have required extra pilot training to compensate, which would have made the plane less attractive to airlines.
Video of Muilenburg press conference: https://youtu.be/xOQmQpKHVWA
He says MCAS is a “system that’s designed to provide handling qualities to the pilot that meet pilot preferences.” That’s somewhat economical with the truth. It’s designed more to meet the airline’s preference not to have to retrain their pilots, and Boeing’s preference to recover lost market share from Airbus.
He says MCAS is a “system that’s designed to provide handling qualities to the pilot that meet pilot preferences.” That’s somewhat economical with the truth. It’s designed more to meet the airline’s preference not to have to retrain their pilots, and Boeing’s preference to recover lost market share from Airbus.
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The scary thing I take away from this, is that I'm now interested to know what plane I'm going to get on.
For my entire life I'd thought (rightly) that "aircraft are the safest mode of travel" - this issue has for the first time ever made me realize that aircraft safety is not an absolute. People making planes put up with all the same crap I do at work.
For my entire life I'd thought (rightly) that "aircraft are the safest mode of travel" - this issue has for the first time ever made me realize that aircraft safety is not an absolute. People making planes put up with all the same crap I do at work.
> Mr Muilenburg said that both accidents occurred because of faulty data from a sensor which triggered the plane's Manoeuvring Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS).
As if Boeing wasn't responsible for the faulty data and the poor programming that caused the plane to nose into the ground?
I suppose we should just go ahead and blame the earth for being in the flight path as the leading factor in the crash.
As if Boeing wasn't responsible for the faulty data and the poor programming that caused the plane to nose into the ground?
I suppose we should just go ahead and blame the earth for being in the flight path as the leading factor in the crash.
> It said that once the 737 Max 8 returns to the skies, it will "have an activated and operable disagree alert and an optional angle of attack indicator".
Really, after all that they're still going to hide part of that arguably critical system behind a (presumably paid-for) option ?
Really, after all that they're still going to hide part of that arguably critical system behind a (presumably paid-for) option ?
The disagree alert/indicator was previously an optional extra[0]. Boeing are saying it will now be fitted as standard on all 737-MAX, including those already out there.
[0] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-crash-boeing-ao...
[0] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-crash-boeing-ao...
Well that's too late, isn't it? Personally I'm not getting into any of those flying death traps ever
He added: "As in most accidents, there are a chain of events that occur. It is not correct to attribute that to any single item."
He is selling this point hard. The problem is the chain is short and every chain has Boeing's fingerprint on it.
He is selling this point hard. The problem is the chain is short and every chain has Boeing's fingerprint on it.
The only thing that could get Boeing out of the hole this guy keeps digging deeper and deeper would be for him and his chief engineer to resign.
The longer he takes about it, the worse it will get.
The longer he takes about it, the worse it will get.
Boeing just keeps digging in and it's both a bad look and a poor strategy. This is not how you should react when people are scared to fly on planes you manufactured.
xbas10(1)
I watched the actual event and this is generally accurate. He maintained that all accidents are a result of a series of events, all of which would have to occur for there to be a crash.
He did not say that MCAS was not at fault - the opposite, in fact, since he said they were testing a new version of MCAS to prevent future crashes.