What is consciousness? Some new perspectives from our physics project(writings.stephenwolfram.com)
writings.stephenwolfram.com
What is consciousness? Some new perspectives from our physics project
https://writings.stephenwolfram.com/2021/03/what-is-consciousness-some-new-perspectives-from-our-physics-project/
102 comments
What do psychedelics have to do with computability?
To add one more critic: A couple minutes into the text, I still didnt read something of substance/consequence.
Lots of hand waiving and describing the usual phenomena in other terms.
I will follow this thread hoping someone points out that good stuff is coming later in the text, but I doubt it.
Lots of hand waiving and describing the usual phenomena in other terms.
I will follow this thread hoping someone points out that good stuff is coming later in the text, but I doubt it.
> Lots of hand waiving and describing the usual phenomena in other terms.
Pretty par for the course when it comes to Stephen Wolfram. I generally find it hard to take him seriously for that very reason.
Pretty par for the course when it comes to Stephen Wolfram. I generally find it hard to take him seriously for that very reason.
I thought it was an interesting article, I would be interested if he eventually dives into the math of it though.
> Lots of hand waiving and describing the usual phenomena in other terms.
Not even that. These are impressionistic attempts to describe physics. I suggest people look into how Wolfram says he derived special relativity from his theory.
Spoiler, had you not know special relativity you won't have the slightest idea of what it is after he claims to derive it.
Not even that. These are impressionistic attempts to describe physics. I suggest people look into how Wolfram says he derived special relativity from his theory.
Spoiler, had you not know special relativity you won't have the slightest idea of what it is after he claims to derive it.
This seems to follow a theme I've observed lately around the underlying laws of physics and the quantum nature of consciousness, here's some research that's more on the theoretical side: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=26505858
I think of consciousness as a feeling and nothing more. Similar to the feeling of free will, both are an "illusion" and we're not actually aware or free. The universe is made of instructions that everything follows and including us. We believing in awareness is just instructions for how we operate as subsystems of the Universe and like or unlike other subsystems of the universe. I find the idea simpler to grasp if you think of the Universe just bruteforcing every possible sequence of patterns and where we eventually have subsystems assuming they have awareness & free will.
Even if it was "just a feeling", who said a feeling is something simple? Feelings and qualia are just as mysteries as consciousness.
The rest is reductionist. "The universe is made of instructions that everything follows and including us" is so 19th century.
>We believing in awareness is just instructions for how we operate as subsystems of the Universe and like or unlike other subsystems of the universe.
"Subsystems of the universe" merely running as automated systems based on rules have resulted in the Kardashians fanbase, people debating NY vs Chicago pizza, and OnlyFans?
The rest is reductionist. "The universe is made of instructions that everything follows and including us" is so 19th century.
>We believing in awareness is just instructions for how we operate as subsystems of the Universe and like or unlike other subsystems of the universe.
"Subsystems of the universe" merely running as automated systems based on rules have resulted in the Kardashians fanbase, people debating NY vs Chicago pizza, and OnlyFans?
But to feel is the core of consciousness/qualia. You can postulate free will as an illusion, but is harder with consciousness.
Exactly.
I struggle hard with this topic. I feel like being here, perceiving the world. Yet, if I simulated every molecule of my body, the simulated me would seemingly "feel" the same things, think likewise.
It feels there is more to "me" than what would be of the _simulated_ me. On the other hand I see no way to prove so.
I struggle hard with this topic. I feel like being here, perceiving the world. Yet, if I simulated every molecule of my body, the simulated me would seemingly "feel" the same things, think likewise.
It feels there is more to "me" than what would be of the _simulated_ me. On the other hand I see no way to prove so.
Consider the possibility that your brain is a liar.
Maybe our brains, as an evolutionary strategy, have tricked us into believing that the universe is fundamentally knowable and that the brain is the only reliable knowledge machine.
How would you know it's not true?
Maybe our brains, as an evolutionary strategy, have tricked us into believing that the universe is fundamentally knowable and that the brain is the only reliable knowledge machine.
How would you know it's not true?
> Yet, if I simulated every molecule of my body
This gets into the concept of free will.
If you have free will, then it is your own conscious decisions that are affecting the universe, and not the universe affecting your conscious decisions.
In this scenario, you can't "simulate every molecule" of your body, because that simulation will have to include whether or not you decided to touch that hot stove. And that decision rested solely with you, in your mind.
If we do not have free will, and this whole thing is "on rails", then we are essentially watching an elaborate movie play out that we have no control over.
This gets into the concept of free will.
If you have free will, then it is your own conscious decisions that are affecting the universe, and not the universe affecting your conscious decisions.
In this scenario, you can't "simulate every molecule" of your body, because that simulation will have to include whether or not you decided to touch that hot stove. And that decision rested solely with you, in your mind.
If we do not have free will, and this whole thing is "on rails", then we are essentially watching an elaborate movie play out that we have no control over.
I don't see how this is related. I subscribe simultaneously to 'qualia is a real problem' and 'free will is an incoherent term'.
I think whether you think a perfect simulation of a person has subjective experiences depends on what you think the substrate of that subjectivity is. If you think of it as a computational property then you'll be inclined to say "no, that simulation is experiencing things". If you think it is some kind of fundamental property of the universe, like pan-psychism, then you'll think the simulation is 'missing' subjectivity. Nothing in there about free will in my thinking.
I think whether you think a perfect simulation of a person has subjective experiences depends on what you think the substrate of that subjectivity is. If you think of it as a computational property then you'll be inclined to say "no, that simulation is experiencing things". If you think it is some kind of fundamental property of the universe, like pan-psychism, then you'll think the simulation is 'missing' subjectivity. Nothing in there about free will in my thinking.
I don't think free will is an illusion. Rather, I think it's complete nonsense. If we are completely deterministic, then the only way we can operate is deterministic.
Now, if you're talking about agency. That's a bit different.
We believing in awareness
I don't think your answers suffice. Clearly, there's an operational definition of awareness as defined by outside observers. We can test if a person is aware or distinguish colors and even determine if ability to perceive colors remain the same across test subjects but we have no idea on how to access the subjective experience.
Really, I don't think your explanation explains anything.
Now, if you're talking about agency. That's a bit different.
We believing in awareness
I don't think your answers suffice. Clearly, there's an operational definition of awareness as defined by outside observers. We can test if a person is aware or distinguish colors and even determine if ability to perceive colors remain the same across test subjects but we have no idea on how to access the subjective experience.
Really, I don't think your explanation explains anything.
So, what would you say a "feeling" is, exactly?
It's just a type of sensation!
That is not correct. Not all words mean the same as each other. A sensation is an experience. A feeling is an emotional state. Sometimes, a feeling is idiomatically thought of as an unfounded belief, which can be traced back to a belief founded on an emotional state.
You sure use 'I' a lot for someone who believes in neither free will nor awareness.
I don't know if something of this is real, falsifiable, or how much of it is original work (and surely you need to peel off the Wolfram classic ego driven sentences) but I think I'm not the only one finding this project thought provoking and beautiful, at least in a poetic sense.
I like panpsychism: everything in the universe exhibits varying degrees of "consciousness."
This is probably true. There are things definitely less conscious than us. It'll be interesting if it is possible for us to comprehend higher consciousness or if its like a never ending race to the top. Creatures so intelligent they are just beyond our comprehension.
Intuitively we can postulate the humans are more conscientious than a chicken, and the chicken is more conscientious than a bacteria, and the bacteria (maybe it can "feel" pain) is more conscientious than the thermostat (who probably is not conscientious in any way). But conscience is not really measurable, so, we can't be really sure if a rock is more conscientious than us, or than a fellow human is conscientious at all (p-zombies).
Who says? We used to could.not measure light precisely, only vague notions of color. Maybe we are just in a similar state.
It really doesn't matter to know exactly what consciousness is.
Because high levels of intelligence and auto-drive can fully operate complexly enough to seem "conscious".
I would start a research stating exactly what would constitute a "conscious human", maybe we could find not every human on the planet is actually conscious.
Maybe most people are just looping into some psychological / environmental / sociological context, just like scripts running happily in loop, but not stepping outside its own code, at least not intentionally.
The hypoteshis of humans being complex algorithms, beside the tabu chit-chat, implies the possibility of hacking minds just we can hack programs, looking for their bugs, triggering exploits to fully manage humans into a different setup, in order to make them work towards a different goal from what they were originally intended (having being pre-programmed by the society and/or parents).
Because high levels of intelligence and auto-drive can fully operate complexly enough to seem "conscious".
I would start a research stating exactly what would constitute a "conscious human", maybe we could find not every human on the planet is actually conscious.
Maybe most people are just looping into some psychological / environmental / sociological context, just like scripts running happily in loop, but not stepping outside its own code, at least not intentionally.
The hypoteshis of humans being complex algorithms, beside the tabu chit-chat, implies the possibility of hacking minds just we can hack programs, looking for their bugs, triggering exploits to fully manage humans into a different setup, in order to make them work towards a different goal from what they were originally intended (having being pre-programmed by the society and/or parents).
Consciousness... from a physics perspective. Well that sets off alarms already with the title.
goign through the article, it does get better, but not much. the first step they go through is redefining consciousness. Well, most definitions of consciousness are vague and nearly meaningless, so that would be good news if there's wasn't. But it is... just as vague and meaningless as any other definition, but without the benefit of at least being the same thing other people are talking about.
After that I feel like this gets into my complaints about most philosophy I've read. Complicated ideas based on vague ideas that just sorta ask you to go along and accept it on feel. IMO, I find the whole thing needs some major simplification and/or far more solid premises.
goign through the article, it does get better, but not much. the first step they go through is redefining consciousness. Well, most definitions of consciousness are vague and nearly meaningless, so that would be good news if there's wasn't. But it is... just as vague and meaningless as any other definition, but without the benefit of at least being the same thing other people are talking about.
After that I feel like this gets into my complaints about most philosophy I've read. Complicated ideas based on vague ideas that just sorta ask you to go along and accept it on feel. IMO, I find the whole thing needs some major simplification and/or far more solid premises.
I'm not a philosopher, but I don't understand why we need an explanation for subjective experience, how could we exist without it? If someone were to shove their hand into an open flame, but they also happened to lack the subjective experience of pain, it's conceivable they might not immediately recoil from the flame. This type of reaction doesn't seem compatible with our evolutionary history, the subjective experience of pain is unbearable because if it wasn't it wouldn't function as an efficient guide for avoiding damage to the body. All other subjective experiences seem to follow from the same logic.
Because there is nothing but subjective experience.
Not knowing what subjective experience is means there's literally no objective explanation for anything.
Everything you experience - including all of science and math - is filtered through subjective processes.
If you think this is wrong, try to prove that math exists in a self-consistent form without any subjectivity at all.
You won't be able to.
If you read Hilbert's original notes on his Project, he was using words like "intuitive" to describe certain fundamental elements in math. This bothered him, but the problem turned out to be more complex than he expected.
Philosophers have a special word - 'intersubjective' - to describe how these experiences work. Intersubjective experiences are collectively consistent and reliable but are not provably independent and objective. The best you'll get from them is consistency and predictability.
It's easy to confuse this with objectivity, but as members of the human species we can only know our own experiences, and we don't know anything at all about what other possible experiences are available.
So it would be naive - and a denial of the Copernican Principle - to assume that human intersubjectivity is somehow definitive and ultimate.
Not knowing what subjective experience is means there's literally no objective explanation for anything.
Everything you experience - including all of science and math - is filtered through subjective processes.
If you think this is wrong, try to prove that math exists in a self-consistent form without any subjectivity at all.
You won't be able to.
If you read Hilbert's original notes on his Project, he was using words like "intuitive" to describe certain fundamental elements in math. This bothered him, but the problem turned out to be more complex than he expected.
Philosophers have a special word - 'intersubjective' - to describe how these experiences work. Intersubjective experiences are collectively consistent and reliable but are not provably independent and objective. The best you'll get from them is consistency and predictability.
It's easy to confuse this with objectivity, but as members of the human species we can only know our own experiences, and we don't know anything at all about what other possible experiences are available.
So it would be naive - and a denial of the Copernican Principle - to assume that human intersubjectivity is somehow definitive and ultimate.
> Not knowing what subjective experience is means there's literally no objective explanation for anything. Everything you experience - including all of science and math - is filtered through subjective processes.
I'm not following the logic here, unless you're suggesting some type of solipsism. Yes, my experience that 2+2=4 is technically subjective, but I'm not sure what it would even mean to "objectively" understand this to be true, I can't understand how it would have any consequences for any aspect of reality as we understand it.
> Intersubjective experiences are collectively consistent and reliable but are not provably independent and objective. The best you'll get from them is consistency and predictability.
Thanks for this term, TIL. I suppose my question is, what value does objectivity have over intersubjectitivy? I doesn't sound like this type of objectivity is even a coherent concept because it seems like a definitional contradiction to have any experience of objective reality. If something is objective but fundamentally unknowable, it might as well not exist, right?
I'm not following the logic here, unless you're suggesting some type of solipsism. Yes, my experience that 2+2=4 is technically subjective, but I'm not sure what it would even mean to "objectively" understand this to be true, I can't understand how it would have any consequences for any aspect of reality as we understand it.
> Intersubjective experiences are collectively consistent and reliable but are not provably independent and objective. The best you'll get from them is consistency and predictability.
Thanks for this term, TIL. I suppose my question is, what value does objectivity have over intersubjectitivy? I doesn't sound like this type of objectivity is even a coherent concept because it seems like a definitional contradiction to have any experience of objective reality. If something is objective but fundamentally unknowable, it might as well not exist, right?
I think the HN community can do better re Wolfram. He is productive and accomplished, and another poster said long ago great to work with. In his interview with Fridman he appears quite enjoyable. It seems Wolfram has a good record of not being factually wrong.
Now, regarding this article. I don't know enough math or physics (he has a PHD from Caltech) to be able to judge it on those terms. I also don't know enough philosophy or neurology to be able to pick apart his definition of consciousness. On the other hand, like most of us, I've thought and read about what consciousness might be, and this article expands my thinking space.
Now, regarding this article. I don't know enough math or physics (he has a PHD from Caltech) to be able to judge it on those terms. I also don't know enough philosophy or neurology to be able to pick apart his definition of consciousness. On the other hand, like most of us, I've thought and read about what consciousness might be, and this article expands my thinking space.
It's all a bit "if we assume there is an observer that can make sense of things, then they do indeed make sense of things". Like confirmation bias incarnate.
No explanation of consciousness cuts it if it does not address how first person perspective comes about. No computation results in first person perspective.
What does this even mean? A computation that results in the thought "I am seeing blue" could be defined as first-person perspective without any problem, and I don't think it's possible to prove this definition differs in any way from your first person perspective.
How much are you willing to bet that consciousness is not a computation? What else could it be? If we don't live in a world organized by physics and causality, then it would extremely unlikely life could even emerge altogether. The fact that the world is ultimately predictable makes it more likely we emerge, not less.
What do you define as "a computation"? If water runs down a hill following a windy path to the lowest point, is there any computation happening as it "chooses" its way? If you throw a ball up, is there any computation as it "decides" when to turn around and fall down? If a mirror reflects light rays, is it computing anything as it does so? When a fire burns, is there computation in its flames? When you drop string and it falls into a tangle, is it computing how to land? It seems to me that you could model some factors of those processes in a computer, but they are not in themselves computations.
Do you define computation so broadly as to be "anything matter and energy does"?
You can look at avatars (human faces on website chat bots) that try to add natural human-like movements, and their eyes move around in different directions governed by a random number generator; the result is that they don't look at all human, human eyes do move around a lot but not at random. Humans look at specific things in the environment, and that comes from having an awareness of the environment - people look at faces, windows, shadows, moving things, clocks, art, and not empty space, walls, nowhere, nothing. Even looking away "at nothing" and thinking has a distinctive look to it.
All of this is based on the idea that a human exists in a specific location, and the looking around is about getting information of what might be dangerous/advantageous to the human. I don't really see that you can abstract such a thing away from the meat body and do the same computation in an orbital computer with no inputs and outputs whatsoever, or on pencils and paper spread over thousands of square miles and thousands of years, and say it's the same thing. It's a bit like saying that a human can draw a stick figure or a horse, but a computer can use no ink and that counts as a drawing of everything, a universal drawing, without limits, gasp! Human style consciousness is part of our limits - our limited excent in time, space, amount of energy we can expend, mortality and risks of harm. Take all that away, you don't get a universal consciousness, you get a blank slate. Abstract of any matter and energy and specific situations, what is there to computer? And in a specific situation, a tired human sits like hot wood burns, it just happens. When you sit, is it computational sitting? When you open the irrigation valves on your field and the water flows down the grooves instead of over the surface, is that computation? When you trigger a stored memory release and the neuronal signals flow down the worn grooves of learned patterns, is that somehow different? If so, why, just because they're smaller or there's more of them? You can't grow plants with simulated water, why assume you can think simulated signal flow patterns?
> "What else could it be?"
A Buddhist monk walks up to a hot dog vendor and says "Make me one with everything". All our words and descriptions of things as discrete, seperate, entities with clear edges, are wrong (but useful). There is only one whole universe, no parts to it. You are what you eat, there's no place in your intestines where molecules change from being food and start being your body, it's a continuum. A sound is a pressure wave in the air, but you can't separate "the sound" from the moving speaker, the moving electric currents in the amplifier, the moving air molecules, the moving eardum, the moving ear canal innards, the moving electric currents in the brain, it's all one continuous system. It's not the case that "sound" is what the air does and those other bits are irrelevant, it's just convenient to talk and build things that way. There isn't really any sound at all, Vitamin D doesn't come from sunlight, the energy in sunlight affects vitamin D precursors in your skin. There is no separation between the light energy affecting your retinas and the consequent electric patterns in your visual cortex anymore than the sound is a separate thing.
In this model (wrong, but useful), there is no separate consciousness and no creatures which can be conscious. If there is any consciousness, it's the whole universe which has it in the sense "we are the universe experiencing itself", and your head is one (X,Y,Z,t) coordinate and the computer is another coordinate, and they are different by virtue of being different parts of the universe. Whether you can imbue the computer with the consciousness of a person stops being such an important question - you can clearly organise bits of the universe into responding like consciousness because you can have children and they wind new matter up into thinking, but that only says that "matter thinks", it doesn't say "matter /does/ thinking as a thing which can be separated from that matter". What else could it be? It could be nothing; some bits of matter exhibit complex behaviours and there's no more to it than that. Cameras aren't "seeing", why think eyes are "seeing"? Instead of discussing whether we can make cameras that see, why not discuss whether retinas interacting with photons are doing any more than cameras are, and seeing is an big fuzzy concept blob memory pattern and not a physical phenomenon that exists separate from matter?
You can talk about being "right handed", what does it mean to make a computation done in a computer with no hands "left handed" or "right handed"? It makes no sense to take that idea away from a creature with two hands in an environment where they use the hands to do things and have to deal with the limitations of having only two hands and no tentacles/tractor beams/prehensile tails/elephant noses/etc. Does it make any more sense to take "thinking" away from brains?
Do you define computation so broadly as to be "anything matter and energy does"?
You can look at avatars (human faces on website chat bots) that try to add natural human-like movements, and their eyes move around in different directions governed by a random number generator; the result is that they don't look at all human, human eyes do move around a lot but not at random. Humans look at specific things in the environment, and that comes from having an awareness of the environment - people look at faces, windows, shadows, moving things, clocks, art, and not empty space, walls, nowhere, nothing. Even looking away "at nothing" and thinking has a distinctive look to it.
All of this is based on the idea that a human exists in a specific location, and the looking around is about getting information of what might be dangerous/advantageous to the human. I don't really see that you can abstract such a thing away from the meat body and do the same computation in an orbital computer with no inputs and outputs whatsoever, or on pencils and paper spread over thousands of square miles and thousands of years, and say it's the same thing. It's a bit like saying that a human can draw a stick figure or a horse, but a computer can use no ink and that counts as a drawing of everything, a universal drawing, without limits, gasp! Human style consciousness is part of our limits - our limited excent in time, space, amount of energy we can expend, mortality and risks of harm. Take all that away, you don't get a universal consciousness, you get a blank slate. Abstract of any matter and energy and specific situations, what is there to computer? And in a specific situation, a tired human sits like hot wood burns, it just happens. When you sit, is it computational sitting? When you open the irrigation valves on your field and the water flows down the grooves instead of over the surface, is that computation? When you trigger a stored memory release and the neuronal signals flow down the worn grooves of learned patterns, is that somehow different? If so, why, just because they're smaller or there's more of them? You can't grow plants with simulated water, why assume you can think simulated signal flow patterns?
> "What else could it be?"
A Buddhist monk walks up to a hot dog vendor and says "Make me one with everything". All our words and descriptions of things as discrete, seperate, entities with clear edges, are wrong (but useful). There is only one whole universe, no parts to it. You are what you eat, there's no place in your intestines where molecules change from being food and start being your body, it's a continuum. A sound is a pressure wave in the air, but you can't separate "the sound" from the moving speaker, the moving electric currents in the amplifier, the moving air molecules, the moving eardum, the moving ear canal innards, the moving electric currents in the brain, it's all one continuous system. It's not the case that "sound" is what the air does and those other bits are irrelevant, it's just convenient to talk and build things that way. There isn't really any sound at all, Vitamin D doesn't come from sunlight, the energy in sunlight affects vitamin D precursors in your skin. There is no separation between the light energy affecting your retinas and the consequent electric patterns in your visual cortex anymore than the sound is a separate thing.
In this model (wrong, but useful), there is no separate consciousness and no creatures which can be conscious. If there is any consciousness, it's the whole universe which has it in the sense "we are the universe experiencing itself", and your head is one (X,Y,Z,t) coordinate and the computer is another coordinate, and they are different by virtue of being different parts of the universe. Whether you can imbue the computer with the consciousness of a person stops being such an important question - you can clearly organise bits of the universe into responding like consciousness because you can have children and they wind new matter up into thinking, but that only says that "matter thinks", it doesn't say "matter /does/ thinking as a thing which can be separated from that matter". What else could it be? It could be nothing; some bits of matter exhibit complex behaviours and there's no more to it than that. Cameras aren't "seeing", why think eyes are "seeing"? Instead of discussing whether we can make cameras that see, why not discuss whether retinas interacting with photons are doing any more than cameras are, and seeing is an big fuzzy concept blob memory pattern and not a physical phenomenon that exists separate from matter?
You can talk about being "right handed", what does it mean to make a computation done in a computer with no hands "left handed" or "right handed"? It makes no sense to take that idea away from a creature with two hands in an environment where they use the hands to do things and have to deal with the limitations of having only two hands and no tentacles/tractor beams/prehensile tails/elephant noses/etc. Does it make any more sense to take "thinking" away from brains?
To your first 4 paragraphs, you jump around alot to many different points. But I think I can best concisely illustrate that you and I are not working with the same basic semantics. For instance, I have definitely grown plants with simulated water in a Zelda game.
I think when you here computation, you should learn more about quantum mechanics and how systems are describe in terms of discrete pieces of information. As it is, we can implant electrodes in human brains and send artificial signals to them already and people begin to "see" things that are not there.
How does saying thinking is just a form of computation taking it away from brains? Why does thinking have to be something different from just running probability calculations given the current input and the likely next step including for a given output we can take upon given "input"? It seems that for you that the possibility is entirely out of the realm of possibility. It's not that thinking can't be explained by computation, it's that is must NOT be explained by computation.
I think when you here computation, you should learn more about quantum mechanics and how systems are describe in terms of discrete pieces of information. As it is, we can implant electrodes in human brains and send artificial signals to them already and people begin to "see" things that are not there.
How does saying thinking is just a form of computation taking it away from brains? Why does thinking have to be something different from just running probability calculations given the current input and the likely next step including for a given output we can take upon given "input"? It seems that for you that the possibility is entirely out of the realm of possibility. It's not that thinking can't be explained by computation, it's that is must NOT be explained by computation.
If you want an excuse for foreclosing on certain lines of inquiry, this is as good as any other.
> No computation results in first person perspective.
But how would you know that?
But how would you know that?
Computation that results in first person perspective:
#include <iostream>
int main() {
std::cout << "I am running this code that prints this line\n";
return 0;
}Wouldn't that be the default? Like in it's limited way a Tesla must think something like darn I'm going to hit that truck rather a red Tesla that is me is going to...
If you think of your brain as a predictive machine that makes models of the world around it, then “first person perspective” is your brain’s model of itself in the world.
We can hear our thoughts and we can remember having "heard" them. I think that is consciousness. It is sensory perception of some of our brain-processes, interpreted by our brain, just like brain can categorize seeing blue as just that.
Why do you say “sensory” perception? Do you just mean that we think about our brain processes, or something else?
That's a good question. Somehow we perceive our thoughts. We perceive whether they are in English or in German. We perceive the likeness of what our ears would perceive if we spoke those thoughts out. Now what kind of sensor-mechanism could there be that would perceive those non-spoken thoughts? Well it can simply be perception of "brain-waves".
The (original) stimuli for perception need not come from the outside only. When the light enters the eye it immediately becomes brain-signal. Same with our ears etc. So what we "perceive" is really brain-signals all the way. Therefore it does not sound mysterious to me how we could be able to "perceive thoughts", and it appears we can, we can "hear our thoughts".
The (original) stimuli for perception need not come from the outside only. When the light enters the eye it immediately becomes brain-signal. Same with our ears etc. So what we "perceive" is really brain-signals all the way. Therefore it does not sound mysterious to me how we could be able to "perceive thoughts", and it appears we can, we can "hear our thoughts".
OK, I'll admit that I enjoy Stephen's writing on this topic, though I find it very longwinded. I like that it gets me thinking in weird directions, very outside the box
Wait, Wolfram has a physics project? Like, with a lab and everything?
Oh, no, not like with a lab. Like with "make some assumptions about what's going on that match Wolfram's pre-conceived ideas, then run some simulations and see if anything that looks somewhat like reality falls out". It's quite a stretch to call that a "physics project".
From that starting point, I'm skeptical that anything that falls out is going to shed light on actual real-world consciousness.
Oh, no, not like with a lab. Like with "make some assumptions about what's going on that match Wolfram's pre-conceived ideas, then run some simulations and see if anything that looks somewhat like reality falls out". It's quite a stretch to call that a "physics project".
From that starting point, I'm skeptical that anything that falls out is going to shed light on actual real-world consciousness.
Wait, Einstein had a physics project? Like, with lab and everything?
He did not. But Einstein was still far more driven by experimental results (that is to say, by physical reality) than Wolfram is.
How can we tell what actually drives Wolfram?
Paging Greg Egan
Also Peter Watts
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blindsight_(Watts_novel)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blindsight_(Watts_novel)
Careful. "Consciousness" may just be a language issue. It seems like a profound concept but it's really just a word with a very vague and complex definition.
If someone tried to formalize "consciousness" it would be a technical book about 1000 pages long or something and all we're doing is debating about what goes in the book.
It's very similar to the question what is "life?" I mean we understand that biology is just carbon based molecular machines, debating what "life" is as a general concept outside of biology is not a profound issue, it's just a language issue and you'd just be debating what the definition of a word "life" should encompass.
If someone tried to formalize "consciousness" it would be a technical book about 1000 pages long or something and all we're doing is debating about what goes in the book.
It's very similar to the question what is "life?" I mean we understand that biology is just carbon based molecular machines, debating what "life" is as a general concept outside of biology is not a profound issue, it's just a language issue and you'd just be debating what the definition of a word "life" should encompass.
I agree.
The ultimate question of consciousness regards the phenomenological experience of being - what is it? Where does it come from? What does it mean about us? Who else shares it?
Any theory of consciousness that doesn’t address those questions may indeed be addressing some version of how we might define consciousness, but it’s redefining the mountain from the foothills - justify it all you like, but nobody’s giving you credit for the summit.
The ultimate question of consciousness regards the phenomenological experience of being - what is it? Where does it come from? What does it mean about us? Who else shares it?
Any theory of consciousness that doesn’t address those questions may indeed be addressing some version of how we might define consciousness, but it’s redefining the mountain from the foothills - justify it all you like, but nobody’s giving you credit for the summit.
Before any of THOSE questions can be asked, we first have to arrive at some sort of consensus concerning what constitutes a phenomena...
> Who else shares it?
Or what else shares it?
Or what else shares it?
At the point at which we can determine with certainty something else shares a phenomenological experience of consciousness, I think we're obligated to grant it personhood.
Not sure about that. There is a hypothesis that what you describe is simply a fundamental property of matter:
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panpsychism
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panpsychism
That's precisely the problem - we can't yet formalize the concept we understand as "consciousness", and so any attempts to find a physical/mathematical definition are almost doomed to fail, as they can't really guarantee they are defining the actual concept we have in our minds when we say "consciousness".
My argument is a bit more subtle. I'm saying asking what "consciousness" is like asking "what does it mean to be American."
Does it make sense to attempt to find a mathematical definition of "American." No because being American is largely a made up concept. It's a complex category no doubt but it is not fundamental to the structure of the universe.
I'm saying "Consciousness" is the same thing. It's an ingrained concept we feel is fundamental, but if you think about it, it's really just a made up word.
Does it make sense to attempt to find a mathematical definition of "American." No because being American is largely a made up concept. It's a complex category no doubt but it is not fundamental to the structure of the universe.
I'm saying "Consciousness" is the same thing. It's an ingrained concept we feel is fundamental, but if you think about it, it's really just a made up word.
To have a complete accounting of the entire universe, we need at some point to have a mathematical model of the human mind and human society. If we did, we could then give a formal definition of "what it means to be American" or "what does seeing green feel like", and indeed "what is consciousness".
Regardless of what you think the mind is (if you believe, like me, that it is fundamentally a physical computer, or if you believe it is something else entirely), our picture of the universe is never going to be satisfactory until we can account for how we integrate with it. So yes, for every made up human notion, there needs to be some way to physically define that human notion, if we had a physical model of the human mind (even if that definition is as simple as "an illusion caused by such and such series of events").
It may well be that consciousness is not a fundamental concept in the sense that it is a uniquely human illusion, not something that could not be properly extended to non-human agents. But even if that is true, it doesn't mean that there can't be a precise definition of how the feeling of consciousness arises in humans, what properties of our minds make us think that we have this property and that it is important.
Regardless of what you think the mind is (if you believe, like me, that it is fundamentally a physical computer, or if you believe it is something else entirely), our picture of the universe is never going to be satisfactory until we can account for how we integrate with it. So yes, for every made up human notion, there needs to be some way to physically define that human notion, if we had a physical model of the human mind (even if that definition is as simple as "an illusion caused by such and such series of events").
It may well be that consciousness is not a fundamental concept in the sense that it is a uniquely human illusion, not something that could not be properly extended to non-human agents. But even if that is true, it doesn't mean that there can't be a precise definition of how the feeling of consciousness arises in humans, what properties of our minds make us think that we have this property and that it is important.
>But even if that is true, it doesn't mean that there can't be a precise definition of how the feeling of consciousness arises in humans,
You could say this about "American" as well. Trying to pinpoint the formal definition of "American" is likely possible but also completely pointless because it's an arbitrary made up concept. Just like consciousness.
As a user of the word. You don't even know what it means. All you know is that when you look at something, your brain automatically tells you what is conscious and what is not. Your brain does the same thing with "American." Attempting to formalize this category is pointless.
>what properties of our minds make us think that we have this property and that it is important.
The property in your mind that does this is the same property that effects the word "American." It is the recursive nature of consciousness along with the ambiguity of the category that imprints the word with a false sense of importance.
The reality is, consciousness is simply a line of demarcation between calculator and computer or bug and human. Somewhere there is a boundary where we classify something as conscious or not conscious. What's actually going on is a gradient, and the hard boundary is made up by humans. There is little fundamental importance where you place this boundary at all.
For example are humans more conscious than a bug? Is a bug more conscious than a Machine learning AI? Is a machine learning AI more conscious than a calculator. There is very little importance in how you answer these questions. If an AI is more conscious than a calculator... so what? You arbitrarily defined your boundary to be there. You can arbitrarily define it to be anywhere you want, technically.
The search for what "consciousness" means is essentially just looking for where our brains have collectively chosen to draw this line of demarcation. It is searching for an arbitrary property that is essentially made up by the human condition.
You could say this about "American" as well. Trying to pinpoint the formal definition of "American" is likely possible but also completely pointless because it's an arbitrary made up concept. Just like consciousness.
As a user of the word. You don't even know what it means. All you know is that when you look at something, your brain automatically tells you what is conscious and what is not. Your brain does the same thing with "American." Attempting to formalize this category is pointless.
>what properties of our minds make us think that we have this property and that it is important.
The property in your mind that does this is the same property that effects the word "American." It is the recursive nature of consciousness along with the ambiguity of the category that imprints the word with a false sense of importance.
The reality is, consciousness is simply a line of demarcation between calculator and computer or bug and human. Somewhere there is a boundary where we classify something as conscious or not conscious. What's actually going on is a gradient, and the hard boundary is made up by humans. There is little fundamental importance where you place this boundary at all.
For example are humans more conscious than a bug? Is a bug more conscious than a Machine learning AI? Is a machine learning AI more conscious than a calculator. There is very little importance in how you answer these questions. If an AI is more conscious than a calculator... so what? You arbitrarily defined your boundary to be there. You can arbitrarily define it to be anywhere you want, technically.
The search for what "consciousness" means is essentially just looking for where our brains have collectively chosen to draw this line of demarcation. It is searching for an arbitrary property that is essentially made up by the human condition.
The essential feature is subjective experience of sensations, referred to as qualia. I've seen no debate about that.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia
Scroll down to the section "Critics of Qualia", and you will find a lot. I agree with Dennett and others that the concept does not make sense.
In Buddhism, there are separate words for consciousness and qualia. Moreover, many different consciousnesses are recognized.
I'm not an expert, but I strongly suspect that you haven't looked for debate very hard. I strongly suspect that there is a fair amount of debate on that question. In fact, I'm pretty sure I've seen debate on that question, right here on HN.
The first sentence on that Wikipedia page:
"In philosophy and certain models of psychology, qualia (/ˈkwɑːliə/ or /ˈkweɪliə/; singular form: quale) are defined as individual instances of subjective, conscious experience"
Shows that qualia is defined in terms of "conscious experience." If qualia is an essential feature of consciousness then the Wikipedia definition is a recursive definition.
The definition of the word "Sword" is "Sword" which is true but tells me nothing at the same time.
"In philosophy and certain models of psychology, qualia (/ˈkwɑːliə/ or /ˈkweɪliə/; singular form: quale) are defined as individual instances of subjective, conscious experience"
Shows that qualia is defined in terms of "conscious experience." If qualia is an essential feature of consciousness then the Wikipedia definition is a recursive definition.
The definition of the word "Sword" is "Sword" which is true but tells me nothing at the same time.
Ostensive definitions can be indistinguishable from tautologies. A definition which ultimately boils down to a formula such as:
"The thing that is indicated when you say 'that thing there!'"
appears linguistically empty, because its meaning is not found in the words, but in something extra-verbal that it is intended to point to.
The problem in the debate surrounding consciousness is that there are two basic positions to hold, which are often talking past each other:
1) Oh yes, I see what is being indicated! There is something to discuss.
2) There is nothing here but a meaningless verbal tangle which will disappear when it is untangled.
This problem is similar to, but more intractable than discussing the color blue with someone who has always been blind. The blind person may never actually experience what it is to see blue, the 'qualium,' but there are physical hooks such as the associated frequency of light, and a tangible consensus amongst those who are not blind as to whether an object can be called blue or not.
The latter is missing from the problem of consciousness, which makes it a far more difficult and fascinating problem.
"The thing that is indicated when you say 'that thing there!'"
appears linguistically empty, because its meaning is not found in the words, but in something extra-verbal that it is intended to point to.
The problem in the debate surrounding consciousness is that there are two basic positions to hold, which are often talking past each other:
1) Oh yes, I see what is being indicated! There is something to discuss.
2) There is nothing here but a meaningless verbal tangle which will disappear when it is untangled.
This problem is similar to, but more intractable than discussing the color blue with someone who has always been blind. The blind person may never actually experience what it is to see blue, the 'qualium,' but there are physical hooks such as the associated frequency of light, and a tangible consensus amongst those who are not blind as to whether an object can be called blue or not.
The latter is missing from the problem of consciousness, which makes it a far more difficult and fascinating problem.
>and a tangible consensus amongst those who are not blind as to whether an object can be called blue or not.
>The latter is missing from the problem of consciousness, which makes it a far more difficult and fascinating problem.
You are talking about whether some topic can be observed. The example you cite is observation through sight. A blind person cannot observe color. Observation is the key to gathering evidence. The words an "observation" and a piece of "evidence" refer to the exact same concept. Thus your statement is equivalent to saying Blind men can only gain knowledge about color through evidence and that consciousness lacks any sort of evidence.
Many things in this world lack evidence including Scientology and Creationism. We classify some of these things as absurd. Other things are classified as religion or something that is not absurd.
In my mind the logic is equivalent. The vast number of possibilities of the unknown renders most unobserved theories to be by probability more likely to be absurd. Thus Christianity is just as absurd as Scientology. However extraneous factors influence Christianity to be perceived differently even though logically the foundations come from the same absurd unobservable arguments.
Consciousness I believe is much of the same thing. A linguistic phenomenon lending weight to what is otherwise absurd by default. It is just a complicated category where the capability of being able to have certain thoughts is classified as conscious. Or should I say the ability to be aware of certain things? I'm not sure? Fascinating yes but if you look carefully at what I was actually fascinated about you'll see that I'm just talking about how to define a word. Is "consciousnesses" awareness or thought? A definition of a word is not profound.
The profoundness you feel is again just a linguistic illusion. It's similar to the question: "What does it mean to be American?" American is purely a made up word and basically just a over complicated category with nothing intrinsically interesting about it outside of American culture.
To sum it all up. A recursive definition and lack of evidence renders the whole quest to discover what consciousness is quite uninteresting.
>The latter is missing from the problem of consciousness, which makes it a far more difficult and fascinating problem.
You are talking about whether some topic can be observed. The example you cite is observation through sight. A blind person cannot observe color. Observation is the key to gathering evidence. The words an "observation" and a piece of "evidence" refer to the exact same concept. Thus your statement is equivalent to saying Blind men can only gain knowledge about color through evidence and that consciousness lacks any sort of evidence.
Many things in this world lack evidence including Scientology and Creationism. We classify some of these things as absurd. Other things are classified as religion or something that is not absurd.
In my mind the logic is equivalent. The vast number of possibilities of the unknown renders most unobserved theories to be by probability more likely to be absurd. Thus Christianity is just as absurd as Scientology. However extraneous factors influence Christianity to be perceived differently even though logically the foundations come from the same absurd unobservable arguments.
Consciousness I believe is much of the same thing. A linguistic phenomenon lending weight to what is otherwise absurd by default. It is just a complicated category where the capability of being able to have certain thoughts is classified as conscious. Or should I say the ability to be aware of certain things? I'm not sure? Fascinating yes but if you look carefully at what I was actually fascinated about you'll see that I'm just talking about how to define a word. Is "consciousnesses" awareness or thought? A definition of a word is not profound.
The profoundness you feel is again just a linguistic illusion. It's similar to the question: "What does it mean to be American?" American is purely a made up word and basically just a over complicated category with nothing intrinsically interesting about it outside of American culture.
To sum it all up. A recursive definition and lack of evidence renders the whole quest to discover what consciousness is quite uninteresting.
Whenever I encounter someone trying to tell me that consciousness is ill-defined or not a real thing that actually exists (which happens surprisingly often), I feel like I’m taking crazy pills - or perhaps that philosophical zombies walk among us. Not only am I 100% sure that (my) consciousness exists, it’s literally the only thing I can be 100% sure exists.
I was about to debate your point. I decided to flag you instead.
> I feel like I’m taking crazy pills - or perhaps that philosophical zombies walk among us.
Basically the above is an insult. Essentially you're calling me and anyone with a differing opinion then you "crazy" or a walking philosophical zombie. Literally you're just trying to get around a technicality by indirectly labeling me. Might as well just say "Reading your post I feel like I'm taking crazy pills."
Feel free to debate my points but nobody feels good when they're labeled as crazy.
> I feel like I’m taking crazy pills - or perhaps that philosophical zombies walk among us.
Basically the above is an insult. Essentially you're calling me and anyone with a differing opinion then you "crazy" or a walking philosophical zombie. Literally you're just trying to get around a technicality by indirectly labeling me. Might as well just say "Reading your post I feel like I'm taking crazy pills."
Feel free to debate my points but nobody feels good when they're labeled as crazy.
Consciousness is something that is directly observed. In fact, it is perhaps the most directly observed of all phenomena. The problem lies in deciding how to think about it, and how to speak of it.
So? it's still pointless. Gender is observed to. Is it interesting to discuss all the possible gender categories that can exist? No because a lot of these gender categories were made up in the last decade.
I am saying consciousness is just an arbitrary category for an arbitrary set of phenomena. Trying to codify this arbitrary category is like trying to codify what it means to be American, or what it means to be Trans or whatever. It's Pointless because the complexity within these categories are purely made up.
I'm saying consciousness is the same thing. Is an Ant conscious? Well it depends on your arbitrary classification of what it means to be conscious. And that's the point. It's Arbitrary. It's made up. It's not worth talking about what it is to be American in a scientific paper anymore then it is to talk about what it means to be conscious.
Some may argue that an ant is conscious because it feels pain. Others may argue that consciousness does not involve pain. And if you observe this from a very high level you will see the argument is simply about a definition of an arbitrary word. It is not interesting to debate about vocabulary.
I am saying consciousness is just an arbitrary category for an arbitrary set of phenomena. Trying to codify this arbitrary category is like trying to codify what it means to be American, or what it means to be Trans or whatever. It's Pointless because the complexity within these categories are purely made up.
I'm saying consciousness is the same thing. Is an Ant conscious? Well it depends on your arbitrary classification of what it means to be conscious. And that's the point. It's Arbitrary. It's made up. It's not worth talking about what it is to be American in a scientific paper anymore then it is to talk about what it means to be conscious.
Some may argue that an ant is conscious because it feels pain. Others may argue that consciousness does not involve pain. And if you observe this from a very high level you will see the argument is simply about a definition of an arbitrary word. It is not interesting to debate about vocabulary.
[deleted]
The problem with that definition is that it’s subjective. You can only know for yourself, but not for anyone else. That makes it completely useless.
Of course it's subjective. That's the whole point.
And knowing for yourself still needs an explanation.
And knowing for yourself still needs an explanation.
Qualia is actually only a subset of consciousness, generally referring to the coarsest types of consciousness (i.e. that which is readily identifiable). But qualia is by no means the entirety of consciousness.
> debating what "life" is as a general concept outside of biology is not a profound issue
I'm not sure this is true. I think I disagree with much of your neat frame-setting here. For example, some of my favourite recent podcasts from complexity science involve clever folks like Sara Imari Walker discussing "life" as what emerges from a dense information well.[1] These questions are not just simple inventories.
But yes, I do agree that this may be just "a language issue". But there are other streams of thought that are actively promoting language into a more respectable realm of complexity science, where "just a language issue" actually downplays what may be going on in that "resolving" process of language itself[2] (h/t Nicole Creanza, whose research in birdsong & human cultural evolution is profiled)
tl;dr - I would argue that these questions are "profound" all the way down, if we start looking at it in the right way.
[1]: https://complexity.simplecast.com/episodes/40-ImRdTdBt
[2]: https://complexity.simplecast.com/episodes/22-yTXhvGCS
I'm not sure this is true. I think I disagree with much of your neat frame-setting here. For example, some of my favourite recent podcasts from complexity science involve clever folks like Sara Imari Walker discussing "life" as what emerges from a dense information well.[1] These questions are not just simple inventories.
But yes, I do agree that this may be just "a language issue". But there are other streams of thought that are actively promoting language into a more respectable realm of complexity science, where "just a language issue" actually downplays what may be going on in that "resolving" process of language itself[2] (h/t Nicole Creanza, whose research in birdsong & human cultural evolution is profiled)
tl;dr - I would argue that these questions are "profound" all the way down, if we start looking at it in the right way.
[1]: https://complexity.simplecast.com/episodes/40-ImRdTdBt
[2]: https://complexity.simplecast.com/episodes/22-yTXhvGCS
>Walker discussing "life" as what emerges from a dense information well
This is still a language thing. Nothing new is uncovered here. All Walker did is imbue complexity onto a vocabulary word. No new information was introduced. The profoundness is an illusion.
This is still a language thing. Nothing new is uncovered here. All Walker did is imbue complexity onto a vocabulary word. No new information was introduced. The profoundness is an illusion.
I'm grateful for the reply :) I respectfully disagree. You have me asking myself why though. I'm thinking about this quote by Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes:
"For the simplicity that lies this side of complexity, I would not give a fig, but for the simplicity that lies on the other side of complexity, I would give my life."[1]
I'm also thinking about Copernicus and how people were actually modelling planetary motion in workable ways before him, though perhaps with a few more variables.
Lastly, I'm thinking of "Object-Oriented Ontology: A New Theory of Everything", by Graham Harman. I don't subscribe to it fully, but it raises a case for how a truly explanatory theory of our universe MUST encompass fiction and metaphor and language as "real". So if true, then physics must have explanatory power over what happens in language. So I really don't vibe with the downplay of "just a language spin for the same thing", because new terms/framings are crucial to the ecology of science/tech/progress. Discovering "a language thing" is sometimes no less a discovery than finding a new sub-species of toad. The toad is just an instantiation of information in a different substrate, if you get my drift :) a dense network of biochemical interactions vs a distributed network of neural interactions. The universe doesn't care that we find one substrate more intuitive and innate (language). The objective universe "sees" each as a manifestation of novel information that self-reinforces and persists its structure through time
Thanks for giving me the opportunity to work through this thought :)
Disclosure: My background is not just tech, but biochemistry: the nitty gritty chemical mechanics of life. I'm wondering if this gives me different context on how important Imari's discovery of these new framings and models.
[1]: http://www.jonkolko.com/writingSimplicityComplexity.php#brea...
"For the simplicity that lies this side of complexity, I would not give a fig, but for the simplicity that lies on the other side of complexity, I would give my life."[1]
I'm also thinking about Copernicus and how people were actually modelling planetary motion in workable ways before him, though perhaps with a few more variables.
Lastly, I'm thinking of "Object-Oriented Ontology: A New Theory of Everything", by Graham Harman. I don't subscribe to it fully, but it raises a case for how a truly explanatory theory of our universe MUST encompass fiction and metaphor and language as "real". So if true, then physics must have explanatory power over what happens in language. So I really don't vibe with the downplay of "just a language spin for the same thing", because new terms/framings are crucial to the ecology of science/tech/progress. Discovering "a language thing" is sometimes no less a discovery than finding a new sub-species of toad. The toad is just an instantiation of information in a different substrate, if you get my drift :) a dense network of biochemical interactions vs a distributed network of neural interactions. The universe doesn't care that we find one substrate more intuitive and innate (language). The objective universe "sees" each as a manifestation of novel information that self-reinforces and persists its structure through time
Thanks for giving me the opportunity to work through this thought :)
Disclosure: My background is not just tech, but biochemistry: the nitty gritty chemical mechanics of life. I'm wondering if this gives me different context on how important Imari's discovery of these new framings and models.
[1]: http://www.jonkolko.com/writingSimplicityComplexity.php#brea...
>So I really don't vibe with the downplay of "just a language spin for the same thing", because new terms/framings are crucial to the ecology of science/tech/progress. Discovering "a language thing" is sometimes no less a discovery than finding a new sub-species of toad. The toad is just an instantiation of information in a different substrate, if you get my drift
This sentence is in itself wordplay. You are aware of the differences between the toad and the toad subspecies. To imbue both with a different word is a separate thing disconnected from the actual differences.
Words that encompass categories may help us humans understand things, but these are just tools for us to understand certain things, they do not change reality itself.
In fact words can create illusions of categories that don't exist from certain perspectives. For example what does it mean to be "American." It's a complex word with a complex category but largely pointless in the grand universal scheme of things. The category only exists because humans formed out pure chance a country called America out of all the possible countries and empires that could have existed.
I'm saying consciousness is the same thing. It's as arbitrary as asking what it means to be American. Now it may not feel this way but humans are born with large consistent biases that are very hard to remove. Almost all cultures believe in the concept of gods even though scientifically the concept is arbitrary. My claim is that consciousness is a similar thing. It is an illusion.
You do not actually know what the word consciousness means. You just know when something belongs in the consciousness category and when it does not. Much of the question is to find out what the algorithm is actually doing in your head. I think this endeavor is pointless because the algorithm is arbitrary. Whether you consider an ant to be consciousness or not based off certain qualities is uninteresting and arbitrary.
This sentence is in itself wordplay. You are aware of the differences between the toad and the toad subspecies. To imbue both with a different word is a separate thing disconnected from the actual differences.
Words that encompass categories may help us humans understand things, but these are just tools for us to understand certain things, they do not change reality itself.
In fact words can create illusions of categories that don't exist from certain perspectives. For example what does it mean to be "American." It's a complex word with a complex category but largely pointless in the grand universal scheme of things. The category only exists because humans formed out pure chance a country called America out of all the possible countries and empires that could have existed.
I'm saying consciousness is the same thing. It's as arbitrary as asking what it means to be American. Now it may not feel this way but humans are born with large consistent biases that are very hard to remove. Almost all cultures believe in the concept of gods even though scientifically the concept is arbitrary. My claim is that consciousness is a similar thing. It is an illusion.
You do not actually know what the word consciousness means. You just know when something belongs in the consciousness category and when it does not. Much of the question is to find out what the algorithm is actually doing in your head. I think this endeavor is pointless because the algorithm is arbitrary. Whether you consider an ant to be consciousness or not based off certain qualities is uninteresting and arbitrary.
I agree with the language part you said. I find worrying that Wolfram is not talking enough about it.
It’s because it’s probably not possible to define within the standard “toolset”. Look at for example the thoughts of the definition of energy by R. Feynman. You might think us physicists for sure can define energy. After all it’s one of the basis of physics. But it turns out it’s not possible without circular arguments
It's possible that energy is a sort of axiomatic property. Meaning it can't be further deduced or explained similar to a mathematical axiom.
I doubt consciousness is such a thing though. Asking "what is Consciousness?" is like asking "What does it mean to be American?" Being American is purely a made up phenomenon and my argument is that although it is may not seem this way, the word consciousness is largely the same thing, just a complex category.
I doubt consciousness is such a thing though. Asking "what is Consciousness?" is like asking "What does it mean to be American?" Being American is purely a made up phenomenon and my argument is that although it is may not seem this way, the word consciousness is largely the same thing, just a complex category.
English is an awful for scientific communication due to its inherently complex rules and ambiguous lexicon. It's great for marketing and business though!
I would argue you're talking about "human language" itself as all languages have some word that is similar to consciousness. That being said, I largely agree with your overall point.
_y5hn(1)
I'd take more seriously Mr. Wolfram's ideas if he pointed out research by others too, not just himself.
I understand, but please let's avoid going to the place that all Wolfram threads go. It's not that it's wrong, necessarily, but it's utterly predictable, and therefore uninteresting, and we're trying for something else here.
https://hn.algolia.com/?dateRange=all&page=0&prefix=false&qu...
https://hn.algolia.com/?dateRange=all&page=0&prefix=false&so...
https://news.ycombinator.com/newsguidelines.html
Wolfram articles are a perfect medium-difficulty exercise for this community: can we respond to the interesting parts while leaving the provocative bits where they are? Both are present every time.
https://hn.algolia.com/?dateRange=all&page=0&prefix=false&qu...
https://hn.algolia.com/?dateRange=all&page=0&prefix=false&so...
https://news.ycombinator.com/newsguidelines.html
Wolfram articles are a perfect medium-difficulty exercise for this community: can we respond to the interesting parts while leaving the provocative bits where they are? Both are present every time.
The unexplainable: why are you you and cosmogony.
Consciousness seems to be a mostly self-assembling, emergent property of suitably complex learning systems that are capable of abstract pattern matching, modeling, and anticipation. I have a difficult time (intractable) understanding from where you or I come into being as a conscious entity.
Consciousness seems to be a mostly self-assembling, emergent property of suitably complex learning systems that are capable of abstract pattern matching, modeling, and anticipation. I have a difficult time (intractable) understanding from where you or I come into being as a conscious entity.
But in this article Wolfram's view on consciousness occurs to be nothing more than a bunch of abstraction layers put together in a badly baked Lasagna.
For anyone who is computationally minded, I believe by just having a psychedlic experience one would gain mucher greater insight into the intricacies of consciousness than reading articles like this.
I highly doubt without constant experimentation with psychedlics one can come up with anything computationally insightful about consciousness, espeically theroies and mathematical models with practical applications in emerging fields such as BCI
e.g.
- models about how the brain's (sub)conscious attention mechanism works and how it plays a part in the (sub)conscious process of habit forming
- models about the conscious percpetion of time and how can one go about slowing it down or speeding it up and how will that play out in the (sub)conscious memory encoding and decoding processes
I believe the study of consciousness ultimiately resolves around the study of cybernetics in a none-ergodicity system within a certain set of constraint satisfactions. I think perhaps one can even apply frameworks such as homotopy type theory (HoTT) for a certain categorical formalization.