The Epistemology of Microphysics(edwardfeser.com)
edwardfeser.com
The Epistemology of Microphysics
https://www.edwardfeser.com/unpublishedpapers/microphysics.html
29 comments
I still don't know why the author brought religion/faith/god into the discussion; he seems like a religionist trying to come to grips with the dominance of our world by science and the scientific epistemology.
Beeeecause this was a lecture delivered at a Catholic philosophy/theology conference?
> he seems like a religionist trying to come to grips with the dominance of our world by science and the scientific epistemology.
That's because he is. Take a look at the articles listed on his website.
That's because he is. Take a look at the articles listed on his website.
I think the reason is because he was trying illustrate that you can say an awful lot (in analogical language) about things that are not empirically observable.
> scientific epistemology
Science can't tell us so far what really exists. It can only predict experiments. To put it in more common terms, "is the wave function real or not?", or "do quantum fields really exist, or are just elegant mathematical abstractions for explaining experiments?"
Or as others say "shut up and calculate".
Science can't tell us so far what really exists. It can only predict experiments. To put it in more common terms, "is the wave function real or not?", or "do quantum fields really exist, or are just elegant mathematical abstractions for explaining experiments?"
Or as others say "shut up and calculate".
> It can only predict experiments.
Your "only" here makes it seem like predicting experiments is a narrow thing. It's not. All of the modern technologies we have--including the computers we're all using to post here--are based on science "predicting experiments"--but the "experiments" are things like building computers, or the Internet, or the GPS system. The fact that all those things work exactly as our science predicts makes it very hard to view that science as "only predicting experiments". It's telling us how to use real things to build real technologies that have real impacts on people's lives.
Your "only" here makes it seem like predicting experiments is a narrow thing. It's not. All of the modern technologies we have--including the computers we're all using to post here--are based on science "predicting experiments"--but the "experiments" are things like building computers, or the Internet, or the GPS system. The fact that all those things work exactly as our science predicts makes it very hard to view that science as "only predicting experiments". It's telling us how to use real things to build real technologies that have real impacts on people's lives.
Not only that - one could argue that all observed phenomena are experiments, and the way we behave in the world is based on predicting them.
A religious person - if not honest enough to simply say "existence of God is an axiom and cannot be derived from reason alone" - uses the very predictions of experiments to reason God into existence: everything that exists has a cause; universe exists; therefore universe has a cause.
A religious person - if not honest enough to simply say "existence of God is an axiom and cannot be derived from reason alone" - uses the very predictions of experiments to reason God into existence: everything that exists has a cause; universe exists; therefore universe has a cause.
Epistemically speaking, the existence of God is not axiomatic. Your second claims is more accurate, though not entirely. Knowledge of God's existence is derived from observed features of reality. However, these features are very general and not scientific per se; rather, they are presupposed by empirical science. Examples include the reality of change, causality (especially per se vs. what science is generally concerned with, per accidens), or the existence of things. The denial of these general features would undermine not just the possibility of science, but the very intelligibility of the world. You would hang yourself by your own skepticism.
These are also not axiomatically accepted features either (except perhaps in the sense that they are in relation to the empirical sciences, as science presupposes their existence).
These are also not axiomatically accepted features either (except perhaps in the sense that they are in relation to the empirical sciences, as science presupposes their existence).
> Knowledge of God's existence is derived from observed features of reality.
If it were so, God's existence would be just another scientific fact.
If it were so, God's existence would be just another scientific fact.
Did you read my entire post? I already explained to you why this isn't the case. We known that, for example, change is real through general observation, but it is not something belonging to any empirical science per se. Rather, it is presupposed by each of those sciences.
Of course, the classical definition of "science" is more expansive, including what would be the most general science - metaphysics - so in that sense, yes, you can say the existence of God is a "scientific fact". (God here is self-subsisting being, not some ridiculous "sky fairy" straw man of New Atheist imagination.)
Of course, the classical definition of "science" is more expansive, including what would be the most general science - metaphysics - so in that sense, yes, you can say the existence of God is a "scientific fact". (God here is self-subsisting being, not some ridiculous "sky fairy" straw man of New Atheist imagination.)
Yes I did, but the rest of the comment hangs on the initial claim I replied to.
If you redefine God to mean "fundamental assumptions of the universe", its existence becomes tautological. But that is not what most people mean (including the author of the article we're commenting on) when they say "God".
If you redefine God to mean "fundamental assumptions of the universe", its existence becomes tautological. But that is not what most people mean (including the author of the article we're commenting on) when they say "God".
> Yes I did, but the rest of the comment hangs on the initial claim I replied to.
It does not, because the crux of the matter isn't observation as such, but that there is a difference between observing particular events or "special facts" (those the special sciences deal with), which carry with them greater uncertainty and error, and general observations and general facts. It is more certain, not less, that change is a feature of the world, that things exist, and so on, than whether the universe is expanding or whether some species has a mating ritual or whatever.
Otherwise, I have no idea what your point is.
> If you redefine God to mean "fundamental assumptions of the universe", its existence becomes tautological. But that is not what most people mean (including the author of the article we're commenting on) when they say "God".
This is confused.
The first thing one must do is distinguish between the epistemic order and the metaphysical order. That is, the order in which we know things is not the same as the causal order of things known. In fact, it is generally the reverse, because we see the effects of things before we come to know their causes. Thus, while God is metaphysically speaking the first cause, epistemically we begin with everyday general observation and through rational demonstration arrive at what must be the first cause, what must be true of of the first cause, etc, in order for general facts under consideration to hold. (And axioms are, strictly speaking, entities belonging to the epistemic order; in the causal order, you can talk about first cause(s).)
What the author means by "God" is exactly what I wrote - self-subsisting being. I know this because he is a Thomist, and this is the archetypal notion of God of classical theism (unlike views like so-called theistic personalism). It is irrelevant what most people (ostensibly) believe "is God", because we're not interested in taking a vote. We're interested in determining what the ultimate cause of everything is, what must be true of this cause, and so on. "God" is the traditional name for this first cause.
It does not, because the crux of the matter isn't observation as such, but that there is a difference between observing particular events or "special facts" (those the special sciences deal with), which carry with them greater uncertainty and error, and general observations and general facts. It is more certain, not less, that change is a feature of the world, that things exist, and so on, than whether the universe is expanding or whether some species has a mating ritual or whatever.
Otherwise, I have no idea what your point is.
> If you redefine God to mean "fundamental assumptions of the universe", its existence becomes tautological. But that is not what most people mean (including the author of the article we're commenting on) when they say "God".
This is confused.
The first thing one must do is distinguish between the epistemic order and the metaphysical order. That is, the order in which we know things is not the same as the causal order of things known. In fact, it is generally the reverse, because we see the effects of things before we come to know their causes. Thus, while God is metaphysically speaking the first cause, epistemically we begin with everyday general observation and through rational demonstration arrive at what must be the first cause, what must be true of of the first cause, etc, in order for general facts under consideration to hold. (And axioms are, strictly speaking, entities belonging to the epistemic order; in the causal order, you can talk about first cause(s).)
What the author means by "God" is exactly what I wrote - self-subsisting being. I know this because he is a Thomist, and this is the archetypal notion of God of classical theism (unlike views like so-called theistic personalism). It is irrelevant what most people (ostensibly) believe "is God", because we're not interested in taking a vote. We're interested in determining what the ultimate cause of everything is, what must be true of this cause, and so on. "God" is the traditional name for this first cause.
> It is irrelevant what most people (ostensibly) believe "is God", because we're not interested in taking a vote.
This concedes exactly the point I was making. You are stripping the word "God" of its established attributes (such as intellect, intent, and agency) and reducing it to a highly specific technical definition of a "self-subsisting being" or "first cause".
> "God" is the traditional name for this first cause.
This is a linguistic bait-and-switch. You cannot use a strictly literal, narrowed definition of a term to construct a logical proof, and then implicitly rely on the common interpretation of that same term to assert a broader reality. Labeling a mechanical first cause as "God" deliberately smuggles in the classical theistic baggage that your general observations about causality do not actually demonstrate.
Observing that change exists and positing a fundamental necessity for it does not prove a deity. Calling that fundamental necessity "God" is just a tautology designed to shield a religious premise behind sterile metaphysical jargon.
This concedes exactly the point I was making. You are stripping the word "God" of its established attributes (such as intellect, intent, and agency) and reducing it to a highly specific technical definition of a "self-subsisting being" or "first cause".
> "God" is the traditional name for this first cause.
This is a linguistic bait-and-switch. You cannot use a strictly literal, narrowed definition of a term to construct a logical proof, and then implicitly rely on the common interpretation of that same term to assert a broader reality. Labeling a mechanical first cause as "God" deliberately smuggles in the classical theistic baggage that your general observations about causality do not actually demonstrate.
Observing that change exists and positing a fundamental necessity for it does not prove a deity. Calling that fundamental necessity "God" is just a tautology designed to shield a religious premise behind sterile metaphysical jargon.
That's a straightforwardly circular argument - creating your own definition, then using it as a proof.
Change is not presupposed by science. Various experiences/models of change are described by science, which is not the same thing at all.
There are block universe interpretations of cosmology which do not require change.
Change is not presupposed by science. Various experiences/models of change are described by science, which is not the same thing at all.
There are block universe interpretations of cosmology which do not require change.
> That's a straightforwardly circular argument - creating your own definition, then using it as a proof.
Which definition? That of "God"? I didn't "create" that definition. It is the archetype of classical theism. It is the product of analysis from which we get the famous distinction between existence and essence. Only in God is there no distinction between existence in essence, as the first cause's essence is "to be".
And besides, when do you not define something before proving it? This isn't circular. I don't see where you are noting circularity. In fact, I didn't prove anything at all. Others have.
> Change is not presupposed by science. Various experiences/models of change are described by science, which is not the same thing at all.
Of course change is presupposed. It isn't explicitly stated, just as the presupposition that the world is intelligible isn't explicitly presupposed, but it is tacitly presupposed by the scientific enterprise itself. Science cannot deny such basic presuppositions without upending itself.
If you can't see that w.r.t. change, then consider some of the other presuppositions, like the fact that things exist.
> There are block universe interpretations of cosmology which do not require change.
So much worse for the block universe! It is as self-refuting to deny the reality of change - the very act of denying it involves change - as it is to claim that it is true that there is no truth, or that it is true that we cannot know the truth.
Scientific models - or more likely their interpretations - are not always faithful to reality as such. They can have observational correspondence without fidelity. Interpretations are where people often read in their bad metaphysical presuppositions into bona fide scientific results, forgetting the distinction. For instance, a Platonic interpretation of mathematics might lead some to think that the world represented by their physical model is actually static and eternal, but even though that is bogus, that physical theory can still function predicatively. Evolution suffers from similar problems, where evolutionism is presented by some as a necessary reading of evolutionary theory.
Which definition? That of "God"? I didn't "create" that definition. It is the archetype of classical theism. It is the product of analysis from which we get the famous distinction between existence and essence. Only in God is there no distinction between existence in essence, as the first cause's essence is "to be".
And besides, when do you not define something before proving it? This isn't circular. I don't see where you are noting circularity. In fact, I didn't prove anything at all. Others have.
> Change is not presupposed by science. Various experiences/models of change are described by science, which is not the same thing at all.
Of course change is presupposed. It isn't explicitly stated, just as the presupposition that the world is intelligible isn't explicitly presupposed, but it is tacitly presupposed by the scientific enterprise itself. Science cannot deny such basic presuppositions without upending itself.
If you can't see that w.r.t. change, then consider some of the other presuppositions, like the fact that things exist.
> There are block universe interpretations of cosmology which do not require change.
So much worse for the block universe! It is as self-refuting to deny the reality of change - the very act of denying it involves change - as it is to claim that it is true that there is no truth, or that it is true that we cannot know the truth.
Scientific models - or more likely their interpretations - are not always faithful to reality as such. They can have observational correspondence without fidelity. Interpretations are where people often read in their bad metaphysical presuppositions into bona fide scientific results, forgetting the distinction. For instance, a Platonic interpretation of mathematics might lead some to think that the world represented by their physical model is actually static and eternal, but even though that is bogus, that physical theory can still function predicatively. Evolution suffers from similar problems, where evolutionism is presented by some as a necessary reading of evolutionary theory.
> Examples include the reality of change, causality (especially per se vs. what science is generally concerned with, per accidens), or the existence of things.
How do any of these things allow you to derive knowledge of God's existence?
How do any of these things allow you to derive knowledge of God's existence?
> It's telling us how to use real things to build real technologies that have real impacts on people's lives.
That's the popular definition of the word "real".
But this article is about the philosophical meaning of the word "real". And from that viewpoint science hasn't delivered yet, science doesn't know yet what "really exists out there", it can only predict how that thing behaves in experiments.
That's the popular definition of the word "real".
But this article is about the philosophical meaning of the word "real". And from that viewpoint science hasn't delivered yet, science doesn't know yet what "really exists out there", it can only predict how that thing behaves in experiments.
> this article is about the philosophical meaning of the word "real".
If the philosophical meaning of "real" admits that computers, the Internet, and the GPS system are real, then I don't see what grounds it has for rejecting that things like transistors and electrons and other such underlying things are real as well, since transistors and electrons and other such underlying things are what we build computers, the Internet, and the GPS system out of.
If the philosophical meaning of "real" casts doubt on whether computers, the Internet, and the GPS system are "real", then why should we care about it?
> from that viewpoint science hasn't delivered yet
If science hasn't, then neither has anything else.
If the philosophical meaning of "real" admits that computers, the Internet, and the GPS system are real, then I don't see what grounds it has for rejecting that things like transistors and electrons and other such underlying things are real as well, since transistors and electrons and other such underlying things are what we build computers, the Internet, and the GPS system out of.
If the philosophical meaning of "real" casts doubt on whether computers, the Internet, and the GPS system are "real", then why should we care about it?
> from that viewpoint science hasn't delivered yet
If science hasn't, then neither has anything else.
It does neither. The philosophical meaning of "real" is exactly the process of exploring the various possible definitions.
And it leads to the observation that our experience of reality is not objective, not absolute, and is likely very species-specific.
A cat can sit on a laptop without understanding the laptop or the Internet. All it experiences is a warm object
Is it rational or realistic to assume we don't have analogous perceptual and conceptual limitations which - of course - we're not aware of?
And it leads to the observation that our experience of reality is not objective, not absolute, and is likely very species-specific.
A cat can sit on a laptop without understanding the laptop or the Internet. All it experiences is a warm object
Is it rational or realistic to assume we don't have analogous perceptual and conceptual limitations which - of course - we're not aware of?
> Is it rational or realistic to assume we don't have analogous perceptual and conceptual limitations
I never claimed we don't have perceptual and conceptual limitations. Indeed, recognizing that we do should make us extremely wary of "philosophical" concepts like "real" that appear to go beyond the obvious pragmatic definitions that I described, that are grounded in what we can actually do with things.
I never claimed we don't have perceptual and conceptual limitations. Indeed, recognizing that we do should make us extremely wary of "philosophical" concepts like "real" that appear to go beyond the obvious pragmatic definitions that I described, that are grounded in what we can actually do with things.
Pragmatism as a broad, basic, and reductive view of knowledge is self-refuting and incoherent. If "truth is what is useful" or "what works," you face a self-refutation problem. If you claim something is just "useful" rather than objectively true, then it has no authority. If it is claimed as objectively true, it contradicts the pragmatic premise that truth isn't a relation to reality. And what is "useful", anyhow? Is usefulness useful?
> Pragmatism as a broad, basic, and reductive view of knowledge
I have nowhere advocated any such thing. The fact that I used the word "pragmatic" does not mean I was adopting the view you describe here. Not everyone agrees with your philosophical jargon and the baggage it carries with it.
I have nowhere advocated any such thing. The fact that I used the word "pragmatic" does not mean I was adopting the view you describe here. Not everyone agrees with your philosophical jargon and the baggage it carries with it.
you are confused.
the question is about what does fundamentally exist, not what you perceive through eyes or experiments.
do particles exist or not? is it all just in your imagination because you are a "brain in a vat?" what about the everettian multi-verse, is that real or not?
by saying these SCIENTIFIC questions are trivial to answer because you can hold a GPS receiver in your hand is to completly misunderstand what is being discussed here
nobody said something else deliverd on this question. but neither did science. it's the consensus in physics right now that it can't say what "really exists", this is not a fringe position
the question is about what does fundamentally exist, not what you perceive through eyes or experiments.
do particles exist or not? is it all just in your imagination because you are a "brain in a vat?" what about the everettian multi-verse, is that real or not?
by saying these SCIENTIFIC questions are trivial to answer because you can hold a GPS receiver in your hand is to completly misunderstand what is being discussed here
nobody said something else deliverd on this question. but neither did science. it's the consensus in physics right now that it can't say what "really exists", this is not a fringe position
> you are confused
No, I'm not. I'm just not drinking the "philosophical" Kool-Aid.
> do particles exist or not?
What difference does it make? What should I expect to see if particles "exist", that I should not expect to see if they don't?
> what about the everettian multi-verse, is that real or not?
Same question as above.
> by saying these SCIENTIFIC questions
If you can't answer the questions I posed above about what difference it makes, on what grounds are you saying such questions are scientific?
> are trivial to answer
I made no such claim. You are attacking a straw man.
> it's the consensus in physics right now that it can't say what "really exists"
I completely agree.
But you appear to think this is a flaw in science. I think it'a a flaw in the question "what really exists?" And as far as I can tell, that's what most physicists who hold the "consensus" position you describe think as well.
No, I'm not. I'm just not drinking the "philosophical" Kool-Aid.
> do particles exist or not?
What difference does it make? What should I expect to see if particles "exist", that I should not expect to see if they don't?
> what about the everettian multi-verse, is that real or not?
Same question as above.
> by saying these SCIENTIFIC questions
If you can't answer the questions I posed above about what difference it makes, on what grounds are you saying such questions are scientific?
> are trivial to answer
I made no such claim. You are attacking a straw man.
> it's the consensus in physics right now that it can't say what "really exists"
I completely agree.
But you appear to think this is a flaw in science. I think it'a a flaw in the question "what really exists?" And as far as I can tell, that's what most physicists who hold the "consensus" position you describe think as well.
>Science can't tell us so far what really exists.
Only inasmuch as nothing can tell us what "really" exists. By any practical definitions of any of the words in that sentence science is the best way of determining what exists.
Only inasmuch as nothing can tell us what "really" exists. By any practical definitions of any of the words in that sentence science is the best way of determining what exists.
... which is still far more than religion can provably do.
> Microphysics is the branch of physics that studies molecules, atoms, and elementary particles.
So not quite chemistry, but particle physics?
So not quite chemistry, but particle physics?
I don't think it's that narrow. The article mentions the kinetic theory of gases, which explains the observed properties of gases in terms of statistics of the motions of the atoms or molecules that make up the gas. Chemistry also explains observed properties of chemical elements and compounds based on the properties of atoms and molecules. I think those are included in "microphysics" as the article is using the term.
The article does focus on particle physics, I think because that's the most fundamental level of physics we have--everything else is built on it.
The article does focus on particle physics, I think because that's the most fundamental level of physics we have--everything else is built on it.