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foo3a9c4

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foo3a9c4
·2 lata temu·discuss
Thank you for the thoughtful reply.

> Premise 3 is where the problem is, of course.

I don't believe premise 3 is a problem exactly, but I do believe that it is a non-trivial challenge to determine whether or not it is true.

> We have no idea how to build AGI. We know LLMs won't be it.

> Even if we create AGI, we have no indication it is possible to build a orders-of-magnitude more "intelligent" thing. This is predicated entirely on the notion that if you can do it at scale, you get more, and there's no evidence thinking more makes for more intelligence.

> Even if that were possible and we build an ASI, it's not at all clear this would lead to existential catastrophe. An ASI is presumably smart enough to see it's about to end the world as we know it, and knows where its power supply comes from.

> This leaves us with an xrisk probability so close to zero it's virtually indistinguishable from zero. The only way to make it mean anything is "let's multiply it with infinity" - "it will end humanity, and my own survival is endangered".

It looks to me that you are making the following argument:

  Premise G1. Humans do not currently know how to build AGI.
  Premise G2. It might be impossible to build ASI.
  Premise G3. It is unclear how likely an ASI is to cause an existential catastrophe.
  Conclusion. There is not a significant chance of catastrophe from ASI.
I believe that argument is about an important point (chance of AI catastrophe) and that it is a pretty good argument. But the original premise 3 says, "If ASI is built before alignment is understood, then there is a significant chance of existential catastrophe.", so AFAICT your argument doesn't substantively address it. (ie, your argument's conclusion doesn't tell me anything about whether or not premise 3 is true)

I apologize if I have misunderstood your point.

> Alignment is a tool that works with LLMs, but we don't know if it will work for whatever produces AGI.

We may be using the word "alignment" slightly differently. By "alignment" I just meant getting the algorithmic system to have precisely the goal that its human programmers want it to have. I would call, for example, RLHF a "tool" for trying to achieve alignment.

How do you want to use the terms "alignment" and "alignment tool" going forward in the discussion?

> Meanwhile, ordinary humans can use currently existing tools to end the world just fine. Nukes are readily available. We're obviously not really interested in public health. Climate refugees will be a giant problem soon-ish. The economy is very much a house of cards, but a house of cards that keeps society functioning as-is.

I agree that there are other plausible sources of catastrophe for humans, to name a few others: asteroids, supervolcanoes and population collapse.

I understand you to be making a new point now, but I just want to state that I do not believe the existence of other plausible existential threats to be a rebuttal of premise 3.

> LLMs are a fantastic disinfo tool right now. There's a reasonably good chance they will calcify biases. They will cause large economic damage because 1) they lift up the baseline of work, and 2) they're just good enough that there's economic incentive to replace workers with it, but 3) they're shitty enough that the resulting output will ultimately be worse because we removed humans from the loop.

I agree that LLMs may plausibly cause significant harm in the short term via disinformation and unemployment.

And again, I understand you to be making a new point, but I just want to state that I do not believe the plausibility of such LLM harms is a rebuttal against premise 3.

> Those are actual risks. That we sweep under the carpet, because "xrisk" makes for much more grabby headlines.

I'm not sure who you mean by "we" here, so I'm not sure if your claim about them is true or not.
foo3a9c4
·2 lata temu·discuss
(this discussion is quite nuanced so I apologize in advance for any uncharitable interpretations that I may make.)

> I'm not really trying to rebut Michael's argument -- I think it's true, to an extent, some of the time. But I think it's more true more of the time in the reverse direction.

I understand you to be saying:

Michael: Pro AI capabilities people are ignoring AIXR ideas because they are very excited about benefiting from (the funding of) future AI systems.

Reverse Direction: ainotkilleveryoneism people are ignoring AIXR ideas because they are very excited about benefiting from the funding of AI safety organizations.

And that (RD) is more frequently true than (M).

IMO both (RD) and (M) are true in many cases. IME it seems like (M) is true more often. But I haven't tried to gather any data and I wouldn't be surprised if it turned out to actually be the other way.

> So I don't think it's a good argument.

I might be misunderstanding you here because I don't see Michael making an argument at all. I just see him making the assertion (M).

> And more importantly, I think it fails to properly grapple with the ideas, instead using an ad hominem approach to discarding them somewhat thoughtless.

I am ambivalent toward this point. On one hand Michael is just making a straightforward (possibly false) empirical claim about the minds of certain people (specifically, a claim of the form: these people are doing X because of Y). It might really be the case that people are failing to grapple with AIXR ideas because they are so excited about benefiting from future AI tech, and if it were, then it seems like the sort of thing that it would be good to point out.

But OTOH he doesn't produce an argument against the claim "AIXR is just marketing hype." which is unfair to someone who has genuinely come to that conclusion via careful deliberation.

> On your last point, I do think it's important to note, and reflect carefully on, the extremely high overlap between those funding ai notkilleveryoneism and those funding capabilities development.

Thanks for pointing this out. Indeed, why are people who profess that AI has a not insignificant chance of killing everyone also starting companies that do AI capabilities development? Maybe they don't believe what they say and are just trying to get exclusive control of future AI technology. IMO there is a significant chance that some parties are doing just that. But even if that is true, then it might still be the case that ASI is an XR.
foo3a9c4
·2 lata temu·discuss
> There are far far more dollars available to people that are on the "AI Safety" bandwagon than to those pushing back against it.

> The idea that the Upton Sinclair effect is the source of pushback against AI Safety zealotry, is getting things largely backwards AFAICT.

> Folks that are stressing the importance of studying the impact of concentrated corporate power, or the risk of profit-driven AI deployment, and so forth are receiving very little financial support.

IMO your comment doesn't substantively address michael_nielsen's comment, but I might be wrong. The following is how I understand your exchange with michael_nielsen.

The two of you are talking about three sets of people:

  Let A be AI notkilleveryoneism people.
  Let B be AI capabilities developers/supporters.
  Let C be people concerned with regulatory capture and centralization by AI firms.

  A and B are disjoint.
  A and C have some overlap.
  B and C have considerable overlap.
michael_nielsen is suggesting that the people of B are refusing to take AI risk seriously because they are excited about profiting from AI capabilities and its funding. (eg, a senior research engineer at OpenAI who makes $350k/year might be inclined to ignore AIXR and the same with a VC who has a portfolio full of AI companies)

And then you are pointing out that people of C are getting less money to investigate AI centralization than people of A are getting to investigate/propagandize AI notkilleveryoneism.

So, your claim is probably true, but it doesn't rebut what michael_nielsen suggested.

And I believe it's also critical to keep in mind that the actual funding is like this:

capabilities development >>>>>>>>>> ai notkilleveryoneism > ai centralization investigation
foo3a9c4
·2 lata temu·discuss
> Neural networks are not new

I agree. The McCullough-Pitts paper was published in 1943.

> they're just mathematical systems.

What do you mean by "mathematical system"? AFAIK the GPT4 model is literally a computer program.

> LLMs don't think. At all.

This is the same assertion that OP made and I'm still confused as to how anyone could be certain of its truth given that no one actually knows what is going on inside of the GPT4 program.

> They're basically glorified autocorrect. What they're good for is generating a lot of natural-sounding text that fools people into thinking there's more going on than there really is.

Is that an argument for the claim "LLMs don't think."? It doesn't seem like it to me, but maybe I'm mistaken.
foo3a9c4
·2 lata temu·discuss
Thanks for engaging in a discussion about AIXR. IMO it's important to figure out if we are actually about to kill ourselves or whether some people are just getting worked up over nothing.

> We should also deeply worry about space aliens showing up and blasting us out of the sky. If they're sufficiently powerful, that could absolutely happen! Stop any radio emissions!

If I believed that dangerous space aliens were likely, then I would be interested in investigating ways to avert/survive such an encounter. This seems pretty rational to me, but maybe I'm confused.

> xRisk is an absolutely stupid way to reason about AI. It's an unprovable risk that requires "mitigation just in case".

By "unprovable risk" do you mean that it's literally impossible to know anything about the likelihood that dangerous algorithms could kill (nearly) all people on Earth?

> All this is is saying "but if it were to happen, the cost is infinity, so any risk is a danger! Infinity times anything is infinity!". It's playground reasoning.

Maybe you've seen people make that argument, but it strikes me as a strawman. Here is what I consider to be a better argument for not rushing ahead with capabilities development.

Premise 1. I value my own survival over just about anything else.

Premise 2. If an existential catastrophe occurs, then I will die.

Premise 3. If ASI is built before alignment is understood, then there is a significant chance of existential catastrophe.

Conclusion. So, I strongly prefer that ASI not be built until alignment is understood.
foo3a9c4
·2 lata temu·discuss
> It’s definitely not the case. LLMs of any sort do not in any sense reason or understand anything.

This seems like a claim about the way that the LLM neural net algorithm works. But AFAIK no one has a good understanding of how the LLM NNs work.

Why are you so certain that the LLM NN isn't doing the reasoning-algorithm or the understanding-algorithm?
foo3a9c4
·2 lata temu·discuss
My understanding is that (P3) of the original argument (https://aiadventures.net/summaries/agi-ruin-list-of-lethalit...) uses "goals" as in (II).

But earlier you said this:

> 1. States things like "Finding goals that are extinction-level bad and relatively useful appears to be easy: for example, advanced AI with the sole objective ‘increase company.com revenue’ might be highly valuable to company.com for a time, but risks longer term harms to society, if powerfully accruing resources and power toward this end with no regard for ethics beyond laws that are still too expensive to break." But even current-gen LLMs sidestep this pretty easily, and if you ask them to increase e.g. revenue, they do not propose extinction-level events or propose eschewing basic ethics.

And in this quote it looks to me that you are using "goals" as in (III).

(I'm not an expert on these matters and I am admittedly still very confused about them. Minimally I'd like to make sure that we aren't talking past one another.)
foo3a9c4
·2 lata temu·discuss
(I don't currently have the energy to engage with each argument, so I'm just responding to the first.)

> (P1) Current SOTA AI is good at understanding implicit context, and improved versions will likely be better at understanding implicit context (much like gpt-4 is better at understanding context than gpt-3, and llama2 is better than llama1, and mixtral is better than gpt-3 and better than claude, etc).

I believe that (P1) is probably true.

> (P2) Most misalignments within the observable behavior of current AI do not produce extinction-level goals, and given (P1), it is unclear why someone would believe it's likely going to in the future, since they'll be even better at understanding implicit human context of goals (e.g. implicit goals like do not make humanity extinct, don't turn the entire surface of the planet into an AI lab, etc).

I'm confused about what exactly you mean by "goals" in (P2). Are you referring to (I) the loss function used by the algorithm that trained GPT4, or (II) goals and sub-goals which are internal parts of the GPT4 model, or (III) the sub-goals that GPT4 writes into a response when a user asks it "What is the best way to do X?"
foo3a9c4
·2 lata temu·discuss
> 1. I am saying that the claim "it is easy to find goals that are extinction-level bad" with regards to the AI tech that we can see today is incorrect. LLMs can understand context, and seem to generally understand that when you give them a goal of e.g. "increase revenue," that also includes various sub-goals like "don't kill everyone" that are implicit and don't need stating. Scaling LLMs to be smarter, to me, does not seem like it would reduce their ability to implicitly understand sub-goals like that.

I agree with both of these claims (A) it is hard to find goals that are extinction-level bad for current SOTA LLMs, and (B) current SOTA LLMs understand at least some important context around the requests made to them.

But I'm also skeptical that they understand _all_ of the important context around requests made to them. Do you believe that they understand _all_ of the important context? If so, why?

> P2 states that "superhuman" AI will be uncontrollable — once again, I do not think that is obvious, and depends on your definition of superhuman. Does "superhuman" mean dramatically better at every mental task, e.g. a human compared to a slug? Does it mean "average at most tasks, but much better at a few?" Well, then it depends what few tasks it's better at.

I take "superhuman" to mean dramatically better than humans at every mental task.

> Similarly, it anthropomorphizes these systems and assumes they want to "escape" or not be controlled; it is not obvious that a superhumanly-intelligent system will "want" anything; Stockfish is superhuman at chess, but does not "want" to escape or do anything at all: it simply analyzes and predicts the best next chess move. The idea of "desire" on the part of the programs is a large unstated assumption that I think does not necessarily hold.

Would you have less of a problem with this premise if instead it talked about "Superhuman AI agents"? I agree that some systems seem more like oracles rather than agents, that is, they just answer questions rather than pursuing goals in the world.

Consider self-driving cars, regardless of whether or not self-driving cars 'really want' to avoid hitting pedestrians, they do in fact avoid hitting pedestrians. And then P2 is roughly asserting, regardless of whether or not a superhuman AI agent 'really wants' to escape control by humans, it will in fact not be controllable by humans.

> Finally, P3 asserts that AI will be "misaligned by default" and that "misaligned" means that it will produce extinction or extinction-level results, which to me feels like a very large assumption. How much misalignment is required for extinction? Yud has previously made very off-base claims on this, e.g. believing that instruction-following would mean that an AI would kill your grandmother when tasked with getting a strawberry (if your grandmother had a strawberry), whereas current tech can already implicitly understand your various unstated goals in strawberry-fetching like "don't kill grandma." The idea that any degree of "misalignment" will be so destructive that it would cause extinction-level events is a) a stretch to me, and b) not supported by the evidence we have today.

I'm often unsure whether you are making claims about all future AI systems or just future LLMs.

> In fact a pretty simple thought experiment in the converse is: a superhumanly-intelligent system that is misaligned on many important values, but is aligned on creating AI that aligns with human values, might help produce more-intelligent and better-aligned systems that would filter out the misaligned goals — so even a fair degree of misalignment doesn't seem obviously extinction-creating.

Maybe. Or the misaligned system will just disinterestedly and indirectly kill everyone by repurposing the Earth's surface into a giant lab and factory for making the aligned AI.

> Furthermore, it is not obvious that we will produce misaligned AI by default. If we're training AI by giving it large corpuses of human text (or images, etc), and evaluating success by the model producing human-like output that matches the corpus, that... is already a form of an alignment process: how well does the model align to human thought and values in the training corpus?

I believe it is likely that this process does some small amount of alignment work. But I would still expect the system to be mostly confused about what humans want.

Is this roughly the argument that you are making?

  (P1) Current SOTA LLMs are good at understanding implicit context.
  (P2) A system must be extremely misaligned in order to cause a catastrophe.
  (C) So, it will be easy to sufficiently align future more powerful LLMs.
foo3a9c4
·2 lata temu·discuss
> 1. States things like "Finding goals that are extinction-level bad and relatively useful appears to be easy: for example, advanced AI with the sole objective ‘increase company.com revenue’ might be highly valuable to company.com for a time, but risks longer term harms to society, if powerfully accruing resources and power toward this end with no regard for ethics beyond laws that are still too expensive to break." But even current-gen LLMs sidestep this pretty easily, and if you ask them to increase e.g. revenue, they do not propose extinction-level events or propose eschewing basic ethics. This argument falls apart upon contact with reality.

Are you claiming that (A) nice behavior in current LLMs is good evidence that all future AI systems will behave nicely, or (B) nice behavior in current LLMs is good evidence that future LLMs will behave nicely?

> 3. Requires accepting that we will by default build a misaligned superhuman AI that will cause humanity to go extinct as the basic premises of the argument (P1-P3), which makes the conclusions not particularly convincing if you don't already believe that.

P3 from the argument says, "Superhuman AGI will be misaligned by default". I interpret that as meaning: if there isn't a highly resourced and focused effort to align superhuman AGI systems in advance of their creation, then the first systems we build will be misaligned.

Is that the some way you are interpreting it? If so, why do you believe it is probably false?
foo3a9c4
·2 lata temu·discuss
> I don't think anyone seriously believes this. It's very very clear to all humans that have ever played a game of any kind that they can be defeated in unexpected ways. I don't even think that anyone believes the claim "it's impossible for AGI to pose an existential risk to humanity".

Okay. So we agree that (A) powerful systems can best weaker systems in ways that are unexpected to the weaker system, and (B) it is possible that AGI poses an existential risk to humanity.

> The negation of the claim "AGI poses an existential risk to humanity" is "AGI doesn't necessarily pose an existential risk to humanity".

It seems to me that the negation of your first claim is just "AGI doesn't pose an existential risk to humanity". Is "necessarily" doing some important work in your second claim?

>> https://wiki.aiimpacts.org/doku.php?id=arguments_for_ai_risk...

> The argument here works just as much for single-minded humans, so it's quite moot.

I don't understand why the argument being applicable to humans would make it moot. Please explain.

>> https://aiadventures.net/summaries/agi-ruin-list-of-lethalit...

> This seems to agree with my previously stated positions. It does try to establish a canonical argument, as you say, but then it goes on to explain why they don't think it's persuasive.

Is there a particular premise or inferential step in the blog's argument that you believe to be mistaken? (I've copied the argument below.)

  P1: The current trajectory of AI research will lead to superhuman AGI.
  P2: Superhuman AGI will be capable of escaping any human efforts to control it.
  P3: Superhuman AGI will be misaligned by default, i.e. it will likely adopt values and/or set long-term goals that will lead to extinction-level outcomes, meaning outcomes that are as bad as human extinction.
  P4: We do not know how to align superhuman AGI, i.e. reliably imbue it with values or define long-term goals that will ensure it does not ultimately lead to an extinction-level outcome, without some amount of trial & error (how nearly all of scientific research works).
  
  C1: P2 + P3 In the case of superhuman AGI, since it will be able to escape human control and misaligned by default, the only survivable path to alignment cannot involve trial & error because the first failed try will result in an extinction-level outcome.
  C2: P4 + C1 This means we will not survive superhuman AGI, because our survival would require alignment, towards which we have no survivable path: the only path we know of involves trial & error, which is not survivable.
  C3: P1 + C2 Therefore the current trajectory of AI research which will produce superhuman AGI leads to an outcome where we do not survive.
foo3a9c4
·2 lata temu·discuss
> The first links are spiffy little metaphors, but apply just as much at "God could smite all of humanity, even if you don't understand how". They're not making any argument, just assumptions. In particular, they accidentally show how an AI can be superhumanly capable at certain tasks (chess), but be easily defeated by humans at others (anything else, in the case of Stockfish).

As I understand it, Yud is actually providing a counterexample to a premise that other people are using to argue that humans will probably not be disempowered by AI systems. The relevant argument looks like this:

  P1: If intelligent system A cannot give a detailed account of how it would be bested by a more intelligent system B, then A will not be bested by B.
  P2: Humans (so far) cannot give a detailed account of how a more intelligent AI system would best them.
  C: So, humans will not be bested by a more intelligent AI system.
Yud is using the unskilled chess player and Magnus as a counterexample to P1.

> The argument starts with a hypothetical ("there is a possible artificial agent"), and it fails to be scary: there are (apparently) already humans that can kill 70% of humanity, and yet most of humanity is still alive. So an AGI that could also do it is not implicitly scarier.

Right, it's only an argument for the possibility of AGI catastrophe. It doesn't make any move to convince you that the scenario is likely. And it sounds like you already accept that the scenario is possible, so shrug.

> The final twitter thread is basically a thread of people saying "no, there is no canonical, well-formulated argument for AGI catastrophe", so I'm not sure why you shared it.

Maybe there is no canonical argument, but the thread definitely features arguments for likely AI catastrophe:

  https://wiki.aiimpacts.org/doku.php?id=arguments_for_ai_risk:is_ai_an_existential_threat_to_humanity:will_malign_ai_agents_control_the_future:argument_for_ai_x-risk_from_competent_malign_agents:start
  https://arxiv.org/abs/2206.13353
  https://aiadventures.net/summaries/agi-ruin-list-of-lethalities.html
foo3a9c4
·2 lata temu·discuss
> in observable reality asking ChatGPT to maximize paperclip production does not in fact lead to ChatGPT attempting to turn all life on Earth into paperclips (nor does asking the open source LLMs result in that behavior out of the box either)

I agree with you that current publicly available LLMs do not pose an existential risk to humanity. On the other hand I believe there is a better than 10% chance that the cutting edge LLMs of 2044 will be very powerful.

Do you believe (A) that LLMs are unlikely to become powerful in the short term, and/or (B) that if LLMs become powerful, then they are likely to be safe even without a significant and concerted alignment effort?

IMO even if LLMs are extremely unlikely to become powerful in the short term, then I still might be better off if LLM development is banned, ie:

  P1: Humans are close to developing powerful non-LLM AI systems.
  P2: Humans are not close to developing techniques for safely using powerful AI systems.
  P3: If governments ban AI development, then the speed of AI capabilities development will be significantly reduced.
  P4: It is a waste of scarce expertise and political capital to focus on making an LLM carve out in AI regulation legislation.
  C: If it is extremely unlikely that LLMs will become powerful in the near future, then I am made much better off if governments ban all AI capabilities research (including LLMs).
foo3a9c4
·2 lata temu·discuss
> For info: I don't believe (1), I do believe (2) although not that strongly

Thanks for clarifying. Do you believe there is a better than 20% chance that humans will develop AGI in the next 30 years?

> I simply don't see anything right now that convinces me it's just over the next hill.

These are the reasons that I believe we are close to developing an AGI system.

  (1) Many smart people are working on capabilities.
  (2) Many investment dollars will flow into AI development in the near future.
  (3) Many impressive AI systems have recently been developed: Meta's CICERO, OpenAI's GPT4, DeepMind's AlphaGo.
  (4) Hardware will continue to improve.
  (5) LLM performance significantly improved as data volume and training time increased.
  (6) Humans have built other complex artefacts without good theories of the artefact, including: operating systems, airplanes, beer.
foo3a9c4
·2 lata temu·discuss
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foo3a9c4
·2 lata temu·discuss
> With AI, there still seems to be a lot of hand-waving between where we are now and "AGI".

> I am more than prepared to admit that I may not be seeing (for various reasons) the evidence that this is near/possible - but I would also claim that nobody is convincingly showing any either.

If I understand you correctly, then (1) you doubt that AGI systems are possible and (2) even if they are possible, you believe that humans are still very far away from developing one.

The following is an argument for the possibility of AGI systems.

  Premise 1: Human brains are generally intelligent.
  Premise 2: If humans brains are generally intelligent, then software simulations of human brains at the level of inter-neuron dynamics are generally intelligent.
  Conclusion: Software simulations of human brains at the level of inter-neuron dynamics are generally intelligent.
(fyi I believe there is an ~82% chance humans will develop an AGI within the next 30 years.)