Interesting framing. The runtime interception approach makes sense for catching dangerous syscalls in real-time. There's a complementary angle though — gating the code quality before it ever runs. When I audited the OpenClaw codebase, the most concerning pattern wasn't what the code does at runtime, it's that it silently suppresses errors at the source level. Empty catch blocks, swallowed exceptions, error paths that return nil without logging.
No runtime sandbox catches that because the code isn't doing anything 'dangerous' — it's just quietly failing. The full safety stack probably needs both: pre-commit quality gates on what the agent writes, and runtime interception on what it executes.
OpenClaw Got Banned. Here Is Why That Should Worry You · HackerTrans
No runtime sandbox catches that because the code isn't doing anything 'dangerous' — it's just quietly failing. The full safety stack probably needs both: pre-commit quality gates on what the agent writes, and runtime interception on what it executes.