>This is a collection of anonymous user stories from people who rely on Tor to protect their privacy and anonymity. We encourage you to share their experiences with your network, friends and family, or as part of your work to promote the use of privacy-preserving technologies like ours and help us defend strong online protections.
Please read the blog post:"It is important to note that Onion Services are only accessible from within the Tor network, which is why the discussion of exit nodes is irrelevant in this case."
"Hereinafter, the owner(s) of the 'Dreaming at Dusk' NFT on November 1st 2021 00:00UTC shall be called "The Owners". The Owners shall receive the RSA1024 private key of this onion service. The private key shall be sent to The Owners in any way preferable to them -- let that be an encrypted message over their protocol of choice, uploaded on a blockchain, or physically shipped in a USB stick or DVD drive. Following the receipt of the private key by them, the private key belongs to The Owners and may be used in whatever way The Owners find suitable. The Owners may contact us at dusk[at]torproject.org. The Owners may refuse to accept the private key if they so want. "
The Tor community improved a lot the Tor Relay Guide in the last two years. Actually now you can easily setup a relay following the instructions: https://community.torproject.org/relay/setup/
An onion service's IP address is protected. Onion services are an overlay network on top of TCP/IP, so in some sense IP addresses are not even meaningful to onion services: they are not even used in the protocol.
End-to-end authentication
When a user visits a particular onion, they know that the content they are seeing can only come from that particular onion. No impersonation is possible, which is generally not the case. Usually, reaching a website does not mean that a man-in-the-middle did not reroute to some other location (e.g. DNS attacks).
End-to-end encryption
Onion service traffic is encrypted from the client to the onion host. This is like getting strong SSL/HTTPS for free.
And there's another good reason for the Tor network: if you run an onion service, the traffic will use only Tor non-exit nodes in the circuit, giving a relief to the exit nodes.
>For example in a hospital, there is no good reason for employee to use Tor on work computer.
"I'm a doctor in a very political town. When I have to do research on diseases and treatment or look into aspects of my patients' histories, I am well aware that my search histories might be correlated to patient visits and leak information about their health, families, and personal lives. I use Tor to do much of my research when I think there is a risk of correlating it to patient visits. - Anonymous Tor User"
Yes, we are aware of some flaws in the current documentation that have been migrated from the old site to the new site. Very soon we will improve this.
https://community.torproject.org/outreach/stories/