> Laws of nature are not externally imposed influences. They are human descriptions of what we observe to happen under certain conditions. They are called laws because we have no reason to think they are ever violated. [...] Not because of any externally imposed influence but because an intrinsic property of a sphere [...]
Sure, but what you're describing is not characteristic of the mechanical world picture. It's actually more Aristotelian. Of course, Aristotelian science is not content with mere observed correlations, but with their causes; modern science more often accepts the former, because it often suffices for technological purposes. In any case, in the Aristotelian view, things have natures. Here, the nature of a sphere entails the property you've described. Sphericity is itself an abstracted nature—you don't encounter spheres-as-such in the concrete—that we can analyze to discover properties like the one you've given (in the case of sphericity, this is the province of geometry).
> However, evidence is the only way to separate reality from make-believe
Is the claim "evidence is the only way to separate reality from make-believe" itself evident? If by "evidence" you mean strict empirical, scientific data, then this assertion is self-defeating: there is no empirical evidence that can scientifically demonstrate that "empirical evidence" is the sole criterion for truth. It is a metaphysical assertion, not a scientific finding. Your position would entail that it is itself make-believe.
I would take a more nuanced view of "evidence" here.
All human reasoning ultimately rests on first principles (such as the principle of non-contradiction or the principle of causality). These foundational truths are not known via empirical evidence in the modern sense. Rather, they are self-evident once the terms—themselves drawn from the senses—are grasped. Without these non-empirical, rational foundations, the very project of gathering and interpreting scientific evidence cannot even begin.
Furthermore, the view of "evidence" as a purely neutral arbiter of reality is naive. Evidence is inherently theory-laden. Consider that experiments never test a single isolated hypothesis, but an entire web of theoretical and background assumptions. When "evidence" conflicts with a theory, it merely tells us that something within our massive theoretical web needs adjusting. The data does not interpret itself. There is a parsimony in how we try to address such inconsistencies, but that's a practical decision.
Finally, the laws of modern physics describe highly idealized models operating in highly constrained environments. The "evidence" we gather in controlled laboratory settings relies on stripping away the complexity of the actual world. To accurately map what happens outside of these artificial models, we must actually appeal to the natures of things. (I would also add that science uses methodological and working assumptions a great deal. A big one is the uniformity of nature. Would those be "make-believe"?)
> and there is not one scintilla of evidence that anything exists apart from the universe we see all around us.
It sounds like you maintain that final causality is something external, but this is a view that the mechanistic picture encourages. In the Aristotelian view, the final cause of an acorn or an oak tree, for instance, is not external to it, but inherent to the kind of thing it is. Without telos, you could not even explain why a given efficient cause results in a certain effect. Why does striking a match consistently produce fire instead of elephants or arbitrary things or nothing at all? Because the match is causally ordered toward an effect.
I think the emphasis is on official. That is, it would function as the common language of administration, communication, diplomacy, etc. (i.e., lingua franca), but it wouldn't replace vernacular languages. This was the norm centuries ago in Europe.
One advantage of it being "dead" is that the meanings of terms are much more stable. They don't undergo the usual slippage and mutation of spoken languages. This advantage would be lost if it were to replace existing vernacular languages.
Yes, Latin was indeed the lingua franca of Europe then, but the situation is even more interesting here.
1. Poland at the time was an expansive, multi-ethnic state, and while Polish gained increasing dominance as the lingua franca of the state (other languages of the state administration included German and Ruthenian), Latin was for a long time the lingua franca even just within the Polish state itself.
2. Unlike other countries where education was concentrated exclusively in cities, Poland also had a dense network of parish schools that diffused knowledge of Latin among even the rural nobility and town-dwelling population. Later, there was also a network of Jesuit colleges that followed the Ratio Studiorum which included extensive education in Latin and made an elite education accessible not just to wealthy magnates, but to poorer nobles as well. Recall that the Polish szlachta alone comprised on average about 11% of the population, compared to the corresponding 1-2% in France or England.
3. Because of Poland's republican style of government, public speaking, oratory and debate were essential for political participation. This was all carried out in Latin. Sarmatian culture also saw the Res Publica Poloniae as a "spiritual successor" of Rome and saw the Latin language as part of its identity. Furthermore, during the era of the elected monarchs, kings were not always fluent or able to speak in Polish, but they would have known Latin.
Programs are a socially constructed artifact that help communicate and express a model (which is perpetually locked in people's heads with variance across engineers; divergence is addressed as the program develops). Determining what should or should not be done is a matter of not just domain knowledge, but practical reason, which is to say prudence, which is a virtue that can only be acquired by experience. It is an ability to apply universal principles to particular situations.
This is why young devs, even when clever in some local sense, are worse at understanding the right moves to make in context. Code does not stand alone. It exists entirely in the service of something and is bound by constraints that are external to it.
The classic text is Nielsen and Chuang's "Quantum Computation and Quantum Information" [0]. Whatever else you choose to supplement this book with, it is worth having in your library.
No, although the popular uses of the word “religion” are notoriously vague and ill-defined, so you would have to elaborate.
Natural law ethics grounds morality in human nature. A good action accords with the telos of human nature. An evil one frustrates it. Aristotle is perhaps the best known defender of it on purely rational grounds.
"Laying the foundations for integral calculus and foreshadowing the concept of the limit, ancient Greek mathematician Eudoxus of Cnidus (c. 390–337 BC) developed the method of exhaustion to prove the formulas for cone and pyramid volumes.
"During the Hellenistic period, this method was further developed by Archimedes (c. 287 – c. 212 BC), who combined it with a concept of the indivisibles—a precursor to infinitesimals—allowing him to solve several problems now treated by integral calculus. In 'The Method of Mechanical Theorems' he describes, for example, calculating the center of gravity of a solid hemisphere, the center of gravity of a frustum of a circular paraboloid, and the area of a region bounded by a parabola and one of its secant lines."
"Bhāskara II (c. 1114–1185) was acquainted with some ideas of differential calculus and suggested that the "differential coefficient" vanishes at an extremum value of the function.[18] In his astronomical work, he gave a procedure that looked like a precursor to infinitesimal methods. [...] In the 14th century, Indian mathematicians gave a non-rigorous method, resembling differentiation, applicable to some trigonometric functions. Madhava of Sangamagrama and the Kerala School of Astronomy and Mathematics stated components of calculus. They studied series equivalent to the Maclaurin expansions of [redacted] more than two hundred years before their introduction in Europe. [...] however, were not able to 'combine many differing ideas under the two unifying themes of the derivative and the integral, show the connection between the two, and turn calculus into the great problem-solving tool we have today.'"
Sure, but what you're describing is not characteristic of the mechanical world picture. It's actually more Aristotelian. Of course, Aristotelian science is not content with mere observed correlations, but with their causes; modern science more often accepts the former, because it often suffices for technological purposes. In any case, in the Aristotelian view, things have natures. Here, the nature of a sphere entails the property you've described. Sphericity is itself an abstracted nature—you don't encounter spheres-as-such in the concrete—that we can analyze to discover properties like the one you've given (in the case of sphericity, this is the province of geometry).
> However, evidence is the only way to separate reality from make-believe
Is the claim "evidence is the only way to separate reality from make-believe" itself evident? If by "evidence" you mean strict empirical, scientific data, then this assertion is self-defeating: there is no empirical evidence that can scientifically demonstrate that "empirical evidence" is the sole criterion for truth. It is a metaphysical assertion, not a scientific finding. Your position would entail that it is itself make-believe.
I would take a more nuanced view of "evidence" here.
All human reasoning ultimately rests on first principles (such as the principle of non-contradiction or the principle of causality). These foundational truths are not known via empirical evidence in the modern sense. Rather, they are self-evident once the terms—themselves drawn from the senses—are grasped. Without these non-empirical, rational foundations, the very project of gathering and interpreting scientific evidence cannot even begin.
Furthermore, the view of "evidence" as a purely neutral arbiter of reality is naive. Evidence is inherently theory-laden. Consider that experiments never test a single isolated hypothesis, but an entire web of theoretical and background assumptions. When "evidence" conflicts with a theory, it merely tells us that something within our massive theoretical web needs adjusting. The data does not interpret itself. There is a parsimony in how we try to address such inconsistencies, but that's a practical decision.
Finally, the laws of modern physics describe highly idealized models operating in highly constrained environments. The "evidence" we gather in controlled laboratory settings relies on stripping away the complexity of the actual world. To accurately map what happens outside of these artificial models, we must actually appeal to the natures of things. (I would also add that science uses methodological and working assumptions a great deal. A big one is the uniformity of nature. Would those be "make-believe"?)
> and there is not one scintilla of evidence that anything exists apart from the universe we see all around us.
It sounds like you maintain that final causality is something external, but this is a view that the mechanistic picture encourages. In the Aristotelian view, the final cause of an acorn or an oak tree, for instance, is not external to it, but inherent to the kind of thing it is. Without telos, you could not even explain why a given efficient cause results in a certain effect. Why does striking a match consistently produce fire instead of elephants or arbitrary things or nothing at all? Because the match is causally ordered toward an effect.