You might be interested in experimental philosophy. It's where philosophers quiz people to probe at how common a given intuition is. There's ongoing debate regarding whether the results pose a problem for certain meta-ethical positions (e.g. moral-realism). https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/experimental-moral/#MorJu...
Also of note is Utilitarianism. Utilitarianism is a moral theory that we ought to maximize the amount of happiness in the world/universe/multiverse while minimizing the amount of suffering. And that the morality of an action just relates to its consequences. So it's ok to lie/cheat/steal for the greater good.
Often, objections to Utilitarianism come in the form of "consider situation X. In X, maximizing utility requires us to do something horrible. Our intuitions scream not to do it, so utilitarianism is wrong". However, if these intuitions are unreliable, then so are the objections. Utilitarians can then come out and say 'the intuitions required for our theory are much more obvious/reliable/<other positive adjectives>, so our theory is better supported'.
But I don't want to say that Utilitarianism is the be all end all. For instance, there's Kant, who built his moral theory on abstract first principles rather than situational intuitions. I, unfortunately, am not well versed in him, so that's all the detail that I'll go into.
Now, there are a couple of points that you made which I'd like to respond to.
> If I don't agree with 1, your whole argument breaks down.
As an addendum, this is a good thing! It means that this premise, if true, directly supports the conclusion. Arguments with unnecessary premises get confusing. They're bad practice - just like dead code is bad. It's expected that you need to accept all of the premises in order to get to the conclusion.
Oh, and I think that your points above are really a rebuttal of (3.), not (1.). Even if other people have other intuitions, hopefully you still believe that (1.) I have the intuition that everyone ought to avoid causing unecessary suffering? It's just not clear that (3.) my intuition of 1. provides at least some evidence that 1 may be true.
> <virmundi's examples of questionable intuitions>
Your examples are all great, but I disagree with the point you're trying to make. 100% consensus on moral intuitions isn't necessary. They're clearly a flawed sense that is prone to error. The important question is, rather, do they lead to truth more often than they lead to falsehood? I don't know the answer to that question, but it's the vital one.
> seldom is there a Joker as in Heath Ledger's character. If a person fully believes that others don't count, at all, then the rule breaks down.
I want to take a hit at this one separately too. The existence of s/a hypothetical Joker/very real sociopaths/ is not necessarily proof against moral intuitions. These people might just have an impaired ability to sense moral truths.
And all of this leads us back to whether moral intuitions are generally mostly sort-of good indicators of truth. Here experimental philosophers could disprove this by showing great enough variance in moral intuitions. Or close off this avenue of criticism by showing a high degree of correlation between many moral views of many people.
Otherwise, questioning whether moral intuitions are evidence go pretty deep into Epistomology, the study of how we know what we know. That's a giant pile of worms. Great fun, but I've already created a monster with this post so I'll leave it.
TL;DR: It's all really a question of whether or not moral intuitions provide solid evidence for moral claims. Also, I want to see Batman again.
Also related is moral cognitivism and/or noncognitivism (are moral statements factual statements, or more like expressions of emotion, preference or command?). https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-cognitivism/
Here's a drastically simplified argument for moral realism:
1. I have the intuition that everyone ought to avoid causing unecessary suffering.
2. When I mean that everyone ought to avoid causing unecessary suffering, I am personally making a factual claim.
3. My intuition of 1. provides at least some evidence that 1 may be true.
Addendum: When dealing with philosophy, often intuitions are the best evidence we've got.
4. If I have the intuition described in 1, 1 is a factual claim, and my intuition of 1 provides at least some evidence for 1, then there is some evidence of an objective moral fact.
C. Therefore, there is some evidence of an objective moral fact.
Finally, here's a survey of academic philosophers. You can Ctrl-F for "moral realism" and "cognitivism" to see what proportion of philosophers hold these views. You'll note that both views have >50% support.
> ... wouldn't it be acceptable for humans to do the same?
Edit: Re-reading your comment, I think this isn't a charitable interpretation. I'll assume that you don't think cruelty in nature justifies human cruelty unless the animals are knowingly cruel.
I still don't agree with you however. I don't think it's acceptable to wrong someone/an animal just because they knowingly wronged someone else/a different animal.
As a counterpoint, you can do an absolutely absurd amount of good with this kind of money. With a salary of 250k, you could donate 150k to charity, and still be quite well off.
I like to go by effectiveness estimates from www.givewell.org. One of the charities they approve of is GiveDirectly (www.givedirectly.org), which makes direct cash transfers to people living in extreme poverty. They feel confident in the claim that the average person receiving money from GiveDirectly lives on the equivalent of about $0.66 (U.S) per day[1]. GiveDirectly has an organizational overhead of about 15%.
Another charity they like, the Against Malaria Foundation (AMF), distributes anti-malarial bednets. The nets cost something in the ballpark of $5-6 to make and distribute[2], including organizational overhead. They make a much more tentative estimate that each $2,800 sent to the AMF results in about one life saved[3] (of a child under 5).
So, by donating 150k, you could plausibly:
1) Double the yearly income of about 531 people
(66c * 365 = $240)
($150,000 * 0.85 (efficiency) / $240) = 531
2) More tentatively, save the lives of about 53 children.
It's an emacs configuration meant to be a hybrid of the best in emacs and vim. I'm a vim user of several years, and am just beginning to do some clojure development of my own, so I recently made the switch.
There's definitely a learning curve, but it's much, much less involved then learning either emacs or vim on their own. And you get to keep the vim editing style.
A couple of things to get used to:
- Space for the leader (it's actually great).
- Escape mostly stops things, but not always. Ctrl-g is a safer option.
- q closes many popup windows.
- Using lisp to do everything in the config file (.spacemacs)
The docs are a good place to start. Also C-h will bring up an extensive help menu.
You'll want to add the clojure layer to your .spacemacs, as one of the dotspacemacs-configuration-layers.
Also of note is Utilitarianism. Utilitarianism is a moral theory that we ought to maximize the amount of happiness in the world/universe/multiverse while minimizing the amount of suffering. And that the morality of an action just relates to its consequences. So it's ok to lie/cheat/steal for the greater good.
Often, objections to Utilitarianism come in the form of "consider situation X. In X, maximizing utility requires us to do something horrible. Our intuitions scream not to do it, so utilitarianism is wrong". However, if these intuitions are unreliable, then so are the objections. Utilitarians can then come out and say 'the intuitions required for our theory are much more obvious/reliable/<other positive adjectives>, so our theory is better supported'.
But I don't want to say that Utilitarianism is the be all end all. For instance, there's Kant, who built his moral theory on abstract first principles rather than situational intuitions. I, unfortunately, am not well versed in him, so that's all the detail that I'll go into.
Now, there are a couple of points that you made which I'd like to respond to.
> If I don't agree with 1, your whole argument breaks down.
As an addendum, this is a good thing! It means that this premise, if true, directly supports the conclusion. Arguments with unnecessary premises get confusing. They're bad practice - just like dead code is bad. It's expected that you need to accept all of the premises in order to get to the conclusion.
Oh, and I think that your points above are really a rebuttal of (3.), not (1.). Even if other people have other intuitions, hopefully you still believe that (1.) I have the intuition that everyone ought to avoid causing unecessary suffering? It's just not clear that (3.) my intuition of 1. provides at least some evidence that 1 may be true.
> <virmundi's examples of questionable intuitions>
Your examples are all great, but I disagree with the point you're trying to make. 100% consensus on moral intuitions isn't necessary. They're clearly a flawed sense that is prone to error. The important question is, rather, do they lead to truth more often than they lead to falsehood? I don't know the answer to that question, but it's the vital one.
> seldom is there a Joker as in Heath Ledger's character. If a person fully believes that others don't count, at all, then the rule breaks down.
I want to take a hit at this one separately too. The existence of s/a hypothetical Joker/very real sociopaths/ is not necessarily proof against moral intuitions. These people might just have an impaired ability to sense moral truths.
And all of this leads us back to whether moral intuitions are generally mostly sort-of good indicators of truth. Here experimental philosophers could disprove this by showing great enough variance in moral intuitions. Or close off this avenue of criticism by showing a high degree of correlation between many moral views of many people.
Otherwise, questioning whether moral intuitions are evidence go pretty deep into Epistomology, the study of how we know what we know. That's a giant pile of worms. Great fun, but I've already created a monster with this post so I'll leave it.
TL;DR: It's all really a question of whether or not moral intuitions provide solid evidence for moral claims. Also, I want to see Batman again.