"Third, I propose computational antitrust: the principle that market complexity itself is a competitive safeguard, and that regulators should consider computational difficulty as a design parameter."
This "should" is doing a lot of work here. The paper is mainly about a game-theoretic model allegedly corresponding to real markets, but establishing what regulators ought to do requires far more rationale than mere math. It requires a bridge from "is" to "ought." It reminds me of Hume's warning about this kind of non-sequitur:
"In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of reasoning, ... ; when all of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is however, of the last consequence."
It's a double-edged sword: ancestor-worship blocks progress, but throwing the baby out with the bathwater also blocks progress. Real fundamental progress comes from the tiny minority that avoids both.
I'm pretty sure they're being intentionally programmed to fake alignment in at least the respect of gaslighting the user into thinking the AI agrees/aligns with them. I.e. intentionally programmed hypocritical agreeableness -- it will say one agreeable thing to one user and another agreeable thing to another user wherein each user has opposite viewpoints.
This "should" is doing a lot of work here. The paper is mainly about a game-theoretic model allegedly corresponding to real markets, but establishing what regulators ought to do requires far more rationale than mere math. It requires a bridge from "is" to "ought." It reminds me of Hume's warning about this kind of non-sequitur:
"In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of reasoning, ... ; when all of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is however, of the last consequence."