A whole age of warfare sank with the Moskva(theatlantic.com)
theatlantic.com
A whole age of warfare sank with the Moskva
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/05/ukraine-russia-moskva-military-marine-corps/629930/
391 comments
The fact that Ukraine seems to have had, or had access to, uncannily accurate intelligence does seem to be the signature fact of this war.
Arms without targeting are at best areal suppression weapons. Russia's impressive-looking mobile rocket-launcher batteries appear formidable, but their effect seems largely to be producing a few seconds of terror over a few hectares of land.
Ukraine's ability to target individual generals with precision, to distract and destroy naval flagships, to down helicoptors, to drop munitions on or through tank hatches, to land artillery and rockets with precision on massed troops and materiel ... has been tremendously effective. The shot:kill ratios seem to be extremely high.
At the same time, the US has telegraphed Russian moves, plans, and force structures with precision as well.
What the state and source of this intelligence is varies. Part clearly comes from near-theatre sources such as the Poseidon, other AWACS assets, and probably other capabilities in Nato Europe, Turkey (itself both part of Europe and Nato, though notable for its position on the Black Sea and control of the Bosperous). Much all but certainly from satellite observations. And I'd suspect a considerable degree is based on signals intelligence.
Russia does not control those domains, and has been unable to establish clear control within them. This is unlike, say, any major US campaign of the past 30 years, whatever other concerns might have as to their legitimacy, with the exclusion of satellite capabilities. To date, Russia has not felt it has the ability to move against those intelligence assets. It certainly has the ability to do so should it choose, and a more general conflict might result in that. But for now, it is pinned down in a fishbowl.
Effect here though seems to be a combination of intelligence as to enemy position and operations, the ability to deliver force to specific points of need, invulnerability of observation posts, and a general popular support within the theatre of operations. As well as remarkable material support from outside entities.
This will be (and all but certainly is being) studied in war colleges and curricula for generations.
Arms without targeting are at best areal suppression weapons. Russia's impressive-looking mobile rocket-launcher batteries appear formidable, but their effect seems largely to be producing a few seconds of terror over a few hectares of land.
Ukraine's ability to target individual generals with precision, to distract and destroy naval flagships, to down helicoptors, to drop munitions on or through tank hatches, to land artillery and rockets with precision on massed troops and materiel ... has been tremendously effective. The shot:kill ratios seem to be extremely high.
At the same time, the US has telegraphed Russian moves, plans, and force structures with precision as well.
What the state and source of this intelligence is varies. Part clearly comes from near-theatre sources such as the Poseidon, other AWACS assets, and probably other capabilities in Nato Europe, Turkey (itself both part of Europe and Nato, though notable for its position on the Black Sea and control of the Bosperous). Much all but certainly from satellite observations. And I'd suspect a considerable degree is based on signals intelligence.
Russia does not control those domains, and has been unable to establish clear control within them. This is unlike, say, any major US campaign of the past 30 years, whatever other concerns might have as to their legitimacy, with the exclusion of satellite capabilities. To date, Russia has not felt it has the ability to move against those intelligence assets. It certainly has the ability to do so should it choose, and a more general conflict might result in that. But for now, it is pinned down in a fishbowl.
Effect here though seems to be a combination of intelligence as to enemy position and operations, the ability to deliver force to specific points of need, invulnerability of observation posts, and a general popular support within the theatre of operations. As well as remarkable material support from outside entities.
This will be (and all but certainly is being) studied in war colleges and curricula for generations.
The intel sharing arrangements (I wonder who's actually calling the shots—literally—for fire control purposes... every link in the chain slows things down, and they seem to be working very effectively, which implies few links indeed) seem to me to be clearly the most interesting and effective facet of this war. Pity we may never get the story of what's actually going on, because it seems to be a really remarkable effort.
The impression I get is that the US feeds them satellite info on the general disposition of Russian forces, but the individual targeting seems to be done by drones, some of which are consumer-grade. They seem incredibly accurate.
It seems unlikely that there is direct US involvement - the US doesn't want that and it would slow the Ukranians down.
They seem to have their own networked fire control: https://en.defence-ua.com/events/digitization_of_ukrainian_a... , and have said that Starlink was critical, after the Russian cyberattack bricked a lot of satellite terminals.
They even have a local drone startup: https://interestingengineering.com/ukraines-combat-drone-the...
It seems unlikely that there is direct US involvement - the US doesn't want that and it would slow the Ukranians down.
They seem to have their own networked fire control: https://en.defence-ua.com/events/digitization_of_ukrainian_a... , and have said that Starlink was critical, after the Russian cyberattack bricked a lot of satellite terminals.
They even have a local drone startup: https://interestingengineering.com/ukraines-combat-drone-the...
The irony is that as warfare increasingly goes in the direction of technological signals and controls, the meaning of "direct involvement" diffuses such that belligerents cannot be pinned down on the nature or degree of their involvement. If the US provided people that deployed in Ukraine to do reconnaissance, that would be "direct". But if it's satellite data or drones, they're shielded from blame; and yet, the generals would in almost every case prefer more technology over more troops, because it automates away a slew of logistical and operational issues and gives them more options moment-to-moment, even if it creates a larger dependency on having the best tech.
If the trend towards use of technology continues in this way, future wars between nations will be stopped before they go kinetic by reframing the entire coordination problem that causes them into something addressed through information warfare instead. At worst, you might see low-level stochastic violence.
If the trend towards use of technology continues in this way, future wars between nations will be stopped before they go kinetic by reframing the entire coordination problem that causes them into something addressed through information warfare instead. At worst, you might see low-level stochastic violence.
> At worst, you might see low-level stochastic violence
Perhaps worth looking at all the stochastic violence in the US (and occasionally exported) to see where that's driven from.
Perhaps worth looking at all the stochastic violence in the US (and occasionally exported) to see where that's driven from.
And not 16 hours later:
https://text.npr.org/1101037902
https://text.npr.org/1101037902
>the individual targeting seems to be done by drones, some of which are consumer-grade. They seem incredibly accurate.
a very impressive example https://www.reddit.com/r/CombatFootage/comments/tttrzs/ukrai...
Wrt. original article - Moskva's air-defenses weren't upgraded during last modernization (completed 2020) due to budget. They upgraded its cruise missiles which got land attack capabilities though - that tells about Russian priorities. The old air-defenses - S-300 and OSA - had issues against such a low flying missiles like Neptunes (i.e. 2-4 meters) though AK-630 CIWS could have potentially shot down those missile if activated on time by the info from the main radar. There are also unconfirmed reports that a Bayraktar was hanging around and took away a lot of attention and probably took down the main S-300 radar antenna of the Moskva right before the attack. The Bayraktar also was doing the mid-course guidance of the missiles thus allowing to not use the main radar of the Neptune battery thus avoiding the battery position detection by Russia.
a very impressive example https://www.reddit.com/r/CombatFootage/comments/tttrzs/ukrai...
Wrt. original article - Moskva's air-defenses weren't upgraded during last modernization (completed 2020) due to budget. They upgraded its cruise missiles which got land attack capabilities though - that tells about Russian priorities. The old air-defenses - S-300 and OSA - had issues against such a low flying missiles like Neptunes (i.e. 2-4 meters) though AK-630 CIWS could have potentially shot down those missile if activated on time by the info from the main radar. There are also unconfirmed reports that a Bayraktar was hanging around and took away a lot of attention and probably took down the main S-300 radar antenna of the Moskva right before the attack. The Bayraktar also was doing the mid-course guidance of the missiles thus allowing to not use the main radar of the Neptune battery thus avoiding the battery position detection by Russia.
Not just satellites. The US and other NATO allies are also feeding Ukraine intelligence from a variety of reconnaissance and electronic warfare aircraft operating just outside the border.
>This is unlike, say, any major US campaign of the past 30 years
because the US did not face a formidable adversary in the past 75 years
in a war somewhat comparable with this one in terms of manpower and tech - the Korean War, the US had suffered heavy casualties and had only narrowly escaped a complete defeat
because the US did not face a formidable adversary in the past 75 years
in a war somewhat comparable with this one in terms of manpower and tech - the Korean War, the US had suffered heavy casualties and had only narrowly escaped a complete defeat
There are of course two ways of looking at this.
One would be that the US chooses its engagements. Even given that, Korea (1950--53, within your 75 year window), Vietnam, and the Yugoslav war (in which the US was not a major participant but did contribute to the no-fly zone) were reasonably significant, involving Chinese and Russian forces and arms. The Iraq conflicts were not highly symmetric, but did involve threats to US forces, which the US mitigated. On balance, the US seems to treat even highly asymmetric opponents with respect as concerns their ability to inflict harm and damage, and seeks to minimise that.
Another is that even where it faces a highly asymmetric adversary, there are:
- A long and formidible force build-up.
- A preliminary air-superiority campaign in which any possible defences are neutralised.
- A concerted effort to maintain superiority.
I'd say it's a bit from A, a bit from B. But the clear lessons are that the U.S. values, and achieves, total air superiority. In the present conflict in Ukraine, Russia did not, and has not.
Technology has also clearly moved on. The major development of the aughts was in IEDs and remote attacks. To an extent, the US applied countermeasures here again via air and intelligence superiority, with reconnaissance which both detected in advance and replayed after successful attacks the placement and entities engaged in IED emplacements.
I've had discussions elsewhere over the characteristics of Switchblade drones, in particular their one-way "kamikazi" modes. I see two principle advantages:
- A one-way mission should nearly double range, and increase defended area by the square of the range.
- A returning low-speed munition would tend to invite return-fire on the launch point.
Since Switchblade and Phoenix Ghost drones are carried into the field by individual troops, increased mass, decreased range, and greater vulnerability of the deploying troops would all be strongly negative characteristics. My counterypart in that discussion was not convinced, though I find the rationale fairly strong.
One would be that the US chooses its engagements. Even given that, Korea (1950--53, within your 75 year window), Vietnam, and the Yugoslav war (in which the US was not a major participant but did contribute to the no-fly zone) were reasonably significant, involving Chinese and Russian forces and arms. The Iraq conflicts were not highly symmetric, but did involve threats to US forces, which the US mitigated. On balance, the US seems to treat even highly asymmetric opponents with respect as concerns their ability to inflict harm and damage, and seeks to minimise that.
Another is that even where it faces a highly asymmetric adversary, there are:
- A long and formidible force build-up.
- A preliminary air-superiority campaign in which any possible defences are neutralised.
- A concerted effort to maintain superiority.
I'd say it's a bit from A, a bit from B. But the clear lessons are that the U.S. values, and achieves, total air superiority. In the present conflict in Ukraine, Russia did not, and has not.
Technology has also clearly moved on. The major development of the aughts was in IEDs and remote attacks. To an extent, the US applied countermeasures here again via air and intelligence superiority, with reconnaissance which both detected in advance and replayed after successful attacks the placement and entities engaged in IED emplacements.
I've had discussions elsewhere over the characteristics of Switchblade drones, in particular their one-way "kamikazi" modes. I see two principle advantages:
- A one-way mission should nearly double range, and increase defended area by the square of the range.
- A returning low-speed munition would tend to invite return-fire on the launch point.
Since Switchblade and Phoenix Ghost drones are carried into the field by individual troops, increased mass, decreased range, and greater vulnerability of the deploying troops would all be strongly negative characteristics. My counterypart in that discussion was not convinced, though I find the rationale fairly strong.
>My counterypart in that discussion was not convinced, though I find the rationale fairly strong.
I also see drones primarily (and incredibly) useful for recon, but not for combat - we already have cruise missiles and guided artillery for that, and under wartime economy, they could be mass produced much cheaper than they are now
I also see drones primarily (and incredibly) useful for recon, but not for combat - we already have cruise missiles and guided artillery for that, and under wartime economy, they could be mass produced much cheaper than they are now
Clearly both.
But the combat results do appear impressive, both on the video-watching public and on Russian invading forces and their leadership, for whom plans appear to have significantly changed.
But the combat results do appear impressive, both on the video-watching public and on Russian invading forces and their leadership, for whom plans appear to have significantly changed.
because the US did not face a formidable
adversary in the past 75 years
Those were not green troops. They had fought Iran for close to a decade, were well-equipped, and were fighting on their home terrain against a US force that had little to no modern desert warfare experience.
I don't think the US-led coalition's brilliant strategy and execution should be confused with a total lack of fighting prowess on Iraq's part.
I have done much study of the Iran-Iraq War. Although the Iraqis were not green troops, they had extremely poor tactical leadership. They were completely inept at maneuver and combined arms combat. When you consider also the vast superiority in precision and range of Coalition weapons, the Iraqis really stood no chance. The Russian army, bad as it is, it capable of much better tactical performance. Their intelligence capability is also much superior to Iraq's.
What do you mean by "comparable with this one in terms of manpower and tech"?
South Korea and allied powers were significantly outmanned during the Korean War, and the idea that the US had any kind of decisive technology advantage in theatre is belied by the accounts of lack of US preparedness post WWII.
South Korea and allied powers were significantly outmanned during the Korean War, and the idea that the US had any kind of decisive technology advantage in theatre is belied by the accounts of lack of US preparedness post WWII.
yes, that's exactly why it's comparable
I still don't understand how it's comparable.
US had the handicap of fighting along side South Korea while a full ocean away when the North had direct assistance from 2 massive neighboring land joined countries. China alone had nearly 2 million forces committed, and still couldn't take the entire south.
That's not what your original comment said.
Is the Korean war comparable, or a non-significant adversary of the past 75 years?
(The Korean war began 72 years ago, and ended with an armistice 69 years ago.)
Is the Korean war comparable, or a non-significant adversary of the past 75 years?
(The Korean war began 72 years ago, and ended with an armistice 69 years ago.)
I guess I just have no idea what you're calling comparable. In this analogy, is the US Ukraine? Is North Korea Russia? What is the point you're trying to make?
a numerically inferior force (the US / Russia) up against an adversary (North Korea + China / Ukraine) funded, armed with modern tech by a powerful entity (USSR / NATO)
and the point I'm trying to make is that it is laughable to compare fighting a modern military to Iraq and Afghanistan
and the point I'm trying to make is that it is laughable to compare fighting a modern military to Iraq and Afghanistan
Russia is the numerically inferior force vs. Ukraine in this example? Uhm OK.
I understand where did you get the impression that Russia is waging a total war, but they only have 200K or so troops deployed in Ukraine
The 2003 US invasion of Iraq was launched with 160,000 troops on the ground.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2003_invasion_of_Iraq
http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/02/18/sprj.irq.deploymen...
Russian forces in the 1st & 2nd Chechen wars (1994--6 and 1999--2009, respectively) were in the 70k -- 80k range.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Chechen_War
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Chechen_War
A force of 200,000 is a very considerable invasion force.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2003_invasion_of_Iraq
http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/02/18/sprj.irq.deploymen...
Russian forces in the 1st & 2nd Chechen wars (1994--6 and 1999--2009, respectively) were in the 70k -- 80k range.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Chechen_War
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Chechen_War
A force of 200,000 is a very considerable invasion force.
> A force of 200,000 is a very considerable invasion force.
Yes, but Ukraine has 900k reservists and a reason to activate them all.
Russia, thus far, has hoped to avoid having to do a big manpower increase.
Yes, but Ukraine has 900k reservists and a reason to activate them all.
Russia, thus far, has hoped to avoid having to do a big manpower increase.
According to Zelensky, Ukraine has now 700 000 on active duty.
They're still not totally comparable. US was having to force project across an ocean while Russia seems to be having issues just past its boarders, despite being geared towards land wars, judging by their lack of progress and signs of logistical desperation in abandoned camps.
Much of Ukraine's equipment is Soviet era just like Russia's is. USSR was a direct belligerent in the Korean War, not just a supporter like NATO is.
Prior to the start of this conflict Russia had superior numbers and pounced before Ukraine mobilized.
Russia also has the massive advantage of being able to strike from their own and neighboring territories without retaliation.
Constant nuclear-whining is preventing NATO from performing air interventions like the USSR saw fit to do during the Korean and Vietnam war.
Too many differences in variables. Russia's incompetence alone does not make this comparable.
Much of Ukraine's equipment is Soviet era just like Russia's is. USSR was a direct belligerent in the Korean War, not just a supporter like NATO is.
Prior to the start of this conflict Russia had superior numbers and pounced before Ukraine mobilized.
Russia also has the massive advantage of being able to strike from their own and neighboring territories without retaliation.
Constant nuclear-whining is preventing NATO from performing air interventions like the USSR saw fit to do during the Korean and Vietnam war.
Too many differences in variables. Russia's incompetence alone does not make this comparable.
Don't forget the United States and a succession of puppet regimes in South Vietnam/Cambodia lost to the North Vietnamese/Vietnamese despite managing to inflict losses of approximately 100x enemy and civilians and other countries residents (the favorite accounting method of measuring success at the time) by 1980.
That was a political decision, not a military defeat. Politicians never allowed the military to attack the north. Instead, the military was given a purely defensive mission, which they performed successfully, until politicians ordered them to leave.
It's no less a military defeat than Russia's in Ukraine.
When the military is bogged down and draining the nations treasury and making the gov't look bad, the political decision is inevitable.
When the military is bogged down and draining the nations treasury and making the gov't look bad, the political decision is inevitable.
The difference is that Russia tried to invade Kiev, but America never tried to invade North Vietnam.
As for "draining the nations treasury", US military spending actually increased after the end of the Vietnam War.
As for "draining the nations treasury", US military spending actually increased after the end of the Vietnam War.
The US was bombing Cambodia, Laos, North Vietnam, etc. all the way up to Hanoi [https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/2eae918ca40a4bd7a55390b...]
It may not have been tanks on the ground, but that is small consolation for those blown to bits - even still today due to unexploded ordnance.
It also led to outsized inflation (which contributed to the out of control inflation in the early 80's, along with the increase in other military spending to 'fight the cold war') and cost an inflation adjusted $1 trln dollars.
The US wasn't broke, but it contributed to the giant inflation spike that then had to be tamped down with sky high fed fund rates. It wasn't without impact.
It may not have been tanks on the ground, but that is small consolation for those blown to bits - even still today due to unexploded ordnance.
It also led to outsized inflation (which contributed to the out of control inflation in the early 80's, along with the increase in other military spending to 'fight the cold war') and cost an inflation adjusted $1 trln dollars.
The US wasn't broke, but it contributed to the giant inflation spike that then had to be tamped down with sky high fed fund rates. It wasn't without impact.
They never attacked north Vietnam by land. They bombed it into the dust, but China rebuilt it all.
Politically there was no will to occupy North Vietnam and end up facing China directly.
Politically there was no will to occupy North Vietnam and end up facing China directly.
Did China help Vietnam rebuild before or after China declared war on Vietnam? Relationship was already tense during the US-Vietnam war between China and Vietnam, it only took 4 years after the US-Vietnam war for China to declare war, and from what I understand it was the Soviet Union that helped rebuild after that point. China's support of Vietnam during the US-Vietnam war was mainly to try and reduce US influence. China literally looted and burned parts of Northern Vietnam on their way out.
Interestingly it has some analogs to the current Russian invasion of Ukraine https://time.com/100417/china-vietnam-sino-vietnamese-war-so...
China believed it would be a quick and easy conflict where they would blitz Hanoi. Instead they fought with outdated and ineffective tactics, failed to use their air forces properly, and could not make it that deep into north Vietnam before being stonewalled by the more experienced Vietnamese. In response China began brutalizing the countryside out of spite, burning crops, killing civilians on sight, booby-trapping civilian structures, demolishing factories, killing livestock.
Interestingly it has some analogs to the current Russian invasion of Ukraine https://time.com/100417/china-vietnam-sino-vietnamese-war-so...
China believed it would be a quick and easy conflict where they would blitz Hanoi. Instead they fought with outdated and ineffective tactics, failed to use their air forces properly, and could not make it that deep into north Vietnam before being stonewalled by the more experienced Vietnamese. In response China began brutalizing the countryside out of spite, burning crops, killing civilians on sight, booby-trapping civilian structures, demolishing factories, killing livestock.
Thanks for bringing that up. It gives me an opportunity to introduce this statement from the relevant Wikipedia page, which I think sums up the situation pithily:
> The limited goals entailed in American foreign policy and the military's goal of total victory were simply not reconcilable. The great conundrum had then become how to defeat North Vietnam without defeating North Vietnam.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Rolling_Thunder
> The limited goals entailed in American foreign policy and the military's goal of total victory were simply not reconcilable. The great conundrum had then become how to defeat North Vietnam without defeating North Vietnam.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Rolling_Thunder
Maybe the Vietnamese/Chinese intelligence was better than the US intelligence.
A very good reason Russia won't touch satellite assets is that most of the early warning systems are based on those: if your early warning system goes down, then you're exceptionally vulnerable to a first strike.
Even worse: with the loss of early-warning satellite assets, you have to decide how to use (or not!) nuclear weapons with extremely noisy information.
Just a few weeks ago there was a US aircraft carrier in northern Aegean, just a few miles off the port of Alexandroupolis where there is a US naval base. It seemed odd that for such a low significance base the US would bring an aircraft carrier in the area, but my guess is that it was involved in some kind of operations in the Black Sea region.
The US moves carriers into trouble areas as a show of force. It’s like having having a bouncer’s attention at a bar. There’s a world of hurt waiting if you step out of line.
It's not merely display.
A CTG affords considerable intelligence, logistical, and rapid-response capabilities.
A CTG affords considerable intelligence, logistical, and rapid-response capabilities.
They've been in the Med for a while: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_191063.htm
What I have wondered: let's say the US gives some predator drones to Ukraine, and then "trains" their military to use them. What is to stop the US from actually piloting these drones from Tampa or whatever, perhaps through a cable from Ukraine to Poland? Would be very hard to prove who were actually piloting them at any given time.
What is to stop the US from actually piloting these drones
Diplomatically? The risk of nuclear escalation or various WWIII-esque scenarios, because at that point you have the US military directly killing Russians.
Assuming that the US (gulp) does not actually want WWIII, I can't see them flying the drones themselves unless they could somehow have 100% plausible deniability. Keep in mind that Ukranian facilities and perhaps the whole country itself could fall to Russia, and all secrets might then be revealed to the Russians. Or a single base could be captured. Or Russia may be able to spy/intercept/deduce this information.
>The risk of nuclear escalation or various WWIII-esque scenarios, because at that point you have the US military directly killing Russians.
Just as Soviet pilots have been killing Americans in Korea and Vietnam, despite not technically part of the war.
There is no "simple legal trick" to start a war.
Just as Soviet pilots have been killing Americans in Korea and Vietnam, despite not technically part of the war.
There is no "simple legal trick" to start a war.
The issue is that predator drones will be shot down almost immediately which makes it a non-starter. It flies high and slow which makes it extremely easy to attack. Even fighters on both sides have been flying extremely low due to both sides having an abundance of anti-air.
Are they any easier to shoot down than the Bayraktars?
They are significantly larger and made of materials that are much easier to spot compared to Bayraktars. Predators were made with complete air superiority in mind.
> to drop munitions on or through tank hatches
I don't think this is down to intelligence, it is just how the NATO anti-tank missiles are designed to work.
I don't think this is down to intelligence, it is just how the NATO anti-tank missiles are designed to work.
Drops are usually made through consumer-grade drones.
Those drones have limited range, and need to be proximate to, and be able to rapidly find, targets.
Which requires intel.
At this point ... I lack specific information on where or how that intel is aquired. Some may be from surveillance-drone flights or getting lucky sending out individual drone-attack missions. I suspect more, however.
Those drones have limited range, and need to be proximate to, and be able to rapidly find, targets.
Which requires intel.
At this point ... I lack specific information on where or how that intel is aquired. Some may be from surveillance-drone flights or getting lucky sending out individual drone-attack missions. I suspect more, however.
Are there figures available on how many Russian tanks have been destroyed by drones and how many by Javelin and NLAW?
Totally unreliable personal take of public tank busting videos: Stugna-P is the most common, then various drones dropping AT grenades. These two lead by a large margin, followed by Javelin and NLAW, and finally a scattering of others like Panzerfaust.
I'm sure the reality could be something quite different.
I'm sure the reality could be something quite different.
Considering I didn't find a single successful Switchblade drone video in 3 months (1 which missed quite a bit), I would say this output is heavily moderated and for good reasons.
Ukrainians want to prop their technology for sales/morale (Stugna), US probably doesn't want to show off their latest technology marvel.
The other option is, Switchblade drones are completely useless and thus unused by Ukraine. I don't believe that even if it may not be some wonder weapon to solve it all.
Ukrainians want to prop their technology for sales/morale (Stugna), US probably doesn't want to show off their latest technology marvel.
The other option is, Switchblade drones are completely useless and thus unused by Ukraine. I don't believe that even if it may not be some wonder weapon to solve it all.
Switchblades do seem curiously missing-in-action.
From past and current online research: Switchblades seem to have only recently been announced for shipping to Ukraine. I've found one video claiming to be a strike (against a machine-gun nest), though that seems more probably to be mortar rounds.
There is also a report of Switchblade remains reported by Russians, though again, only in poorly-sourced video.
My read is that the munitions haven't entered active use at large scale. The Switchblade 300 is largely an antipersonnel / nonarmoured vehicle weapon, and may not be as telegenic as tank-busting Javelins and NLAWs.
From past and current online research: Switchblades seem to have only recently been announced for shipping to Ukraine. I've found one video claiming to be a strike (against a machine-gun nest), though that seems more probably to be mortar rounds.
There is also a report of Switchblade remains reported by Russians, though again, only in poorly-sourced video.
My read is that the munitions haven't entered active use at large scale. The Switchblade 300 is largely an antipersonnel / nonarmoured vehicle weapon, and may not be as telegenic as tank-busting Javelins and NLAWs.
There is now circulating a video of a claimed successful Switchblade attack: https://v.redd.it/7gu7hlbxod191
Switchblades have appeared:
https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/05/watch-the-seamless-launc...
https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/05/watch-the-seamless-launc...
There may be secrecy too, but Stugna and drone hits are also the easiest to document so makes sense we have video material for those. Probably also at least one order of magnitude more widespread among the troops than the Switchblades.
I don't know offhand, though among the more reliable open sources groups seems to be Oryx.
They've been reporting on verified losses, but not means of loss so far as I'm aware.
https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-docum...
They've been reporting on verified losses, but not means of loss so far as I'm aware.
https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-docum...
USA flaunting its intelligence from before the invasion to now has got to be the biggest flex of the past 30+ years on the world stage.
> This is unlike, say, any major US campaign of the past 30 years
This seems exactly like both Iraq wars, except that Sadam's troops might have had working encrypted radios.
In the first war, massively undergunned (in terms of number of rounds of ammunition) US tanks would enter a battle, and 66% of them would immediately get stuck in a boot loop, or otherwise break down.
The remaining ones would rapidly fire a dozen rounds or so a few miles in a dozen different directions, anihilating enemy equipment well before it had any hope of striking back.
Then, logistics people would go out and fix the stranded tanks.
It's pretty obvious that the targeting systems and supply lines were what held everything together during those campaigns.
Ukraine has been dominating in those two dimensions as well (using US equipment and intelligence, in many cases).
This seems exactly like both Iraq wars, except that Sadam's troops might have had working encrypted radios.
In the first war, massively undergunned (in terms of number of rounds of ammunition) US tanks would enter a battle, and 66% of them would immediately get stuck in a boot loop, or otherwise break down.
The remaining ones would rapidly fire a dozen rounds or so a few miles in a dozen different directions, anihilating enemy equipment well before it had any hope of striking back.
Then, logistics people would go out and fix the stranded tanks.
It's pretty obvious that the targeting systems and supply lines were what held everything together during those campaigns.
Ukraine has been dominating in those two dimensions as well (using US equipment and intelligence, in many cases).
Not according to a report to the Government Accountability Office about the Abrams and Bradley vehicles. However, the report does say the support and recover vehicles caused slowdowns.
>During the war, the Abrams tank exhibited good reliability, lethality, sur- vivability, and mobility, but limited range, according to the observations of commanders, crews, maintenance personnel, and Army after action reports. Reported Army readiness rates for the Abrams were 90 percent or higher during the ground war-indicating a high availability to move, shoot, and communicate during combat.[1]
[1]https://www.gao.gov/assets/nsiad-92-94.pdf
>During the war, the Abrams tank exhibited good reliability, lethality, sur- vivability, and mobility, but limited range, according to the observations of commanders, crews, maintenance personnel, and Army after action reports. Reported Army readiness rates for the Abrams were 90 percent or higher during the ground war-indicating a high availability to move, shoot, and communicate during combat.[1]
[1]https://www.gao.gov/assets/nsiad-92-94.pdf
I heard it word of mouth from people that were there, operating or maintaining the tanks, and it was widely reported.
The GAO report you linked is conspicuously missing failure rates, and doesn't contradict anything I said above. In fact, it supports my claims.
Turning on 90% of the time immediately after being repaired doesn't mean its running at the end of the day, or even an hour later!
From the GAO report you linked, they ran out of most types (60%) of spare parts and started cannibalizing tanks after only 4 days of operations. They had major computer issues ("communication issues" according to the report), and had to fall back on old fashioned radios and obsolete targeting.
In addition to the availability issues, these problems caused the US to accidentally or intentionally destroy 1% of its own tanks during the 4 day operation (the breakdown from the report is below).
The report also talks about how the recovery vehicles were unreliable and had major problems reaching broken down tanks. It makes it clear parts shortages were due to the tanks burning through a large stockpile of parts that had been shipped there before the operation began, not due to poor planning.
There's no way those tanks would have survived an operation that dragged on for months like Ukraine has.
However, the operation was a success despite this.
I think this supports my conclusion that superior targeting and logistics won that war, not reliable, robust hardware platforms.
The rest is pasted from the GAO report (I didn't correct their OCR errors):
Abrams crews indicated that its range was limited because it frequently had to stop to (1) refuel to compensate for high fuel consumption and faulty fuel pumps and (2) clean air filters due to extremely sandy conditions.
Bradley and Abrams crews reported problems obtaining repair parts, and many had exhausted their limited supply of some parts by the end of the loo-hour ground war. Because of these problems, according to some Army logistics personnel, sustainability could have become a major problem had the war lasted longer. Crews also experienced problems in posit,ively identifying enemy targets and in having to use outdated and unreliable radios.
...
For example, logistics personnel from the 1st Cavalry Division told us that about 60 percent of the parts they were authorized had zero balances by the end of the war. To compensate for the inability of the established system to provide needed parts, combat units had to search logistics bases for needed parts, to trade with other combat units, or to take parts from other vehicles. According to some Army personnel, the inability to replenish parts reserves could have impeded sustained combat operations in a longer war.
...
23 Abrams were destroyed or damaged in the Persian Gulf area. Of the nine Abrams destroyed, seven were due to friendly fire, and two were intentionally destroyed to prevent capture after they became disabled. Similarly, of the 28 Bradleys destroyed or damaged, 20 were due to friendly fire. Moreover, weapon system capabilities were not optimized because the weapons’ ranges were greater than the sights’ ranges. Crews also noted problems with ineffective radios and suggested that a navigation system be installed in every Bradley and Abram% Army officials recognized the need for improvements in these areas (see app. III).
The GAO report you linked is conspicuously missing failure rates, and doesn't contradict anything I said above. In fact, it supports my claims.
Turning on 90% of the time immediately after being repaired doesn't mean its running at the end of the day, or even an hour later!
From the GAO report you linked, they ran out of most types (60%) of spare parts and started cannibalizing tanks after only 4 days of operations. They had major computer issues ("communication issues" according to the report), and had to fall back on old fashioned radios and obsolete targeting.
In addition to the availability issues, these problems caused the US to accidentally or intentionally destroy 1% of its own tanks during the 4 day operation (the breakdown from the report is below).
The report also talks about how the recovery vehicles were unreliable and had major problems reaching broken down tanks. It makes it clear parts shortages were due to the tanks burning through a large stockpile of parts that had been shipped there before the operation began, not due to poor planning.
There's no way those tanks would have survived an operation that dragged on for months like Ukraine has.
However, the operation was a success despite this.
I think this supports my conclusion that superior targeting and logistics won that war, not reliable, robust hardware platforms.
The rest is pasted from the GAO report (I didn't correct their OCR errors):
Abrams crews indicated that its range was limited because it frequently had to stop to (1) refuel to compensate for high fuel consumption and faulty fuel pumps and (2) clean air filters due to extremely sandy conditions.
Bradley and Abrams crews reported problems obtaining repair parts, and many had exhausted their limited supply of some parts by the end of the loo-hour ground war. Because of these problems, according to some Army logistics personnel, sustainability could have become a major problem had the war lasted longer. Crews also experienced problems in posit,ively identifying enemy targets and in having to use outdated and unreliable radios.
...
For example, logistics personnel from the 1st Cavalry Division told us that about 60 percent of the parts they were authorized had zero balances by the end of the war. To compensate for the inability of the established system to provide needed parts, combat units had to search logistics bases for needed parts, to trade with other combat units, or to take parts from other vehicles. According to some Army personnel, the inability to replenish parts reserves could have impeded sustained combat operations in a longer war.
...
23 Abrams were destroyed or damaged in the Persian Gulf area. Of the nine Abrams destroyed, seven were due to friendly fire, and two were intentionally destroyed to prevent capture after they became disabled. Similarly, of the 28 Bradleys destroyed or damaged, 20 were due to friendly fire. Moreover, weapon system capabilities were not optimized because the weapons’ ranges were greater than the sights’ ranges. Crews also noted problems with ineffective radios and suggested that a navigation system be installed in every Bradley and Abram% Army officials recognized the need for improvements in these areas (see app. III).
Thanks.
You'd have done very much better to have included at least the fact that this was personal communication (a valid citation, if difficult to verify), and responded earlier to questions regarding your source.
The additional detail is helpful, but wouldn't have necessarily been required in your first comment. (It would have been useful on a request for more information.)
I'm still dubious, as this being a widespread occurrence of systems being in a boot-loop occurred in both wars, as a major engagement and two or three decades of soldiers' tales, congressional hearings, press accounts, documentaries, etc., would have tended to reveal this.
The cited sections from your GAO report don't refer to software or electronics re-cycling / re-booting issues specifically. Fuel, air filters, failed parts (unspecified), friendly fire, limited weapons systems ranges, dodgey radios, and missing navigation systems ... are still not "boot-loops".
So: you've provided a citation. It fails to support your claims.
You'd have done very much better to have included at least the fact that this was personal communication (a valid citation, if difficult to verify), and responded earlier to questions regarding your source.
The additional detail is helpful, but wouldn't have necessarily been required in your first comment. (It would have been useful on a request for more information.)
I'm still dubious, as this being a widespread occurrence of systems being in a boot-loop occurred in both wars, as a major engagement and two or three decades of soldiers' tales, congressional hearings, press accounts, documentaries, etc., would have tended to reveal this.
The cited sections from your GAO report don't refer to software or electronics re-cycling / re-booting issues specifically. Fuel, air filters, failed parts (unspecified), friendly fire, limited weapons systems ranges, dodgey radios, and missing navigation systems ... are still not "boot-loops".
So: you've provided a citation. It fails to support your claims.
Source on the tank boot-loop issues?
First I've ever heard of that.
First I've ever heard of that.
I love when I find new source material for /r/NCD in the wild.
Shortly after the sinking, reports emerged that a U.S. Navy P-8A Poseidon was in the area before the attack, suggesting that the U.S. may have provided detailed targeting information to the Ukrainians to target the ship.
Carlson said while the U.S. could give Ukrainian forces a general idea of where the ship was, it could not provide necessary tracking information to the Neptunes because P-8s datalinks were incompatible.
https://news.usni.org/2022/05/05/warship-moskva-was-blind-to...
Carlson said while the U.S. could give Ukrainian forces a general idea of where the ship was, it could not provide necessary tracking information to the Neptunes because P-8s datalinks were incompatible.
https://news.usni.org/2022/05/05/warship-moskva-was-blind-to...
That's probably where the reported TB2 came into play. The U.S. gives them general information, but it's more than enough for the Ukrainians to vector in one of their drones, which they likely do have those links for, and feed that to the missile battery.
I thought the TB2's were used as decoys? Apparently Russian ships can only target in a 180 degree arc, so send some TB2's highly visible but out of range on one side and send some ocean skimming missiles in from the other side.
That's been stated a number of places, but it's an inaccurate analysis, likely stemming from confusing a tracking radar (and missing that a Slava-class cruiser has several) from the search radar (360). From an article:
>There’s also some other speculation suggesting that “Moskva has/had a single main air defence radar (3P41 Volna) for guiding S300 missiles, which has only a 180 degree field of view. Therefore, 360-degree coverage is provided by the 3-D long-range air search radars MR -800 Voshkod/Top Pair for short-range missiles SA -8.” The claim reveals that the Top Pair radar couldn’t distinguish the Neptunes flying over the sea from the crests of the waves due to the stormy weather.
These claims lack a solid basis, as the ship in question is a cruiser with good air defense capabilities. Although TB2 drones are very useful in naval warfare, cruiser-type ships are designed to track and repel multiple air contacts. As a result, paralyzing a Slava-class cruiser with one or more drones is unrealistic.
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/04/analysis-chain-...
>Though it makes for a compelling tale, this narrative is almost certain to be false. Not only are the radars and their operators onboard a warship like the Moskva more than capable of detecting and tracking more than just a single target, and would in fact do so virtually automatically so long as they were operating, but if they were in fact tracking a drone then situational awareness should have been at at a higher level than if the attack had occurred out of the blue.
https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/04/neptunes-wrath-flagshi...
On paper, a Slava-Class cruiser should have no issues tracking a drone and plenty of other incoming missiles and aircraft. That was in fact, the scenario it was designed to face. I suspect there's just simply too much we don't know and too many unanswered questions. There's a lot that would have to work correctly for the Neptunes to be targeted, from the search radar, handoff to tracking radar, and then successful intercepts by the medium tier SAMs and if not those, the CWIS. There's plenty that can go wrong. And keep in mind, there have been very few successful AShM intercepts in history.
If the full story ever gets told, it will be read by many, I'm sure.
>There’s also some other speculation suggesting that “Moskva has/had a single main air defence radar (3P41 Volna) for guiding S300 missiles, which has only a 180 degree field of view. Therefore, 360-degree coverage is provided by the 3-D long-range air search radars MR -800 Voshkod/Top Pair for short-range missiles SA -8.” The claim reveals that the Top Pair radar couldn’t distinguish the Neptunes flying over the sea from the crests of the waves due to the stormy weather.
These claims lack a solid basis, as the ship in question is a cruiser with good air defense capabilities. Although TB2 drones are very useful in naval warfare, cruiser-type ships are designed to track and repel multiple air contacts. As a result, paralyzing a Slava-class cruiser with one or more drones is unrealistic.
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/04/analysis-chain-...
>Though it makes for a compelling tale, this narrative is almost certain to be false. Not only are the radars and their operators onboard a warship like the Moskva more than capable of detecting and tracking more than just a single target, and would in fact do so virtually automatically so long as they were operating, but if they were in fact tracking a drone then situational awareness should have been at at a higher level than if the attack had occurred out of the blue.
https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/04/neptunes-wrath-flagshi...
On paper, a Slava-Class cruiser should have no issues tracking a drone and plenty of other incoming missiles and aircraft. That was in fact, the scenario it was designed to face. I suspect there's just simply too much we don't know and too many unanswered questions. There's a lot that would have to work correctly for the Neptunes to be targeted, from the search radar, handoff to tracking radar, and then successful intercepts by the medium tier SAMs and if not those, the CWIS. There's plenty that can go wrong. And keep in mind, there have been very few successful AShM intercepts in history.
If the full story ever gets told, it will be read by many, I'm sure.
> cruiser-type ships are designed to track and repel multiple air contacts
Not your text, but that assumes a design focus that is not in evidence. It's a necessary focus for a USN cruiser, but that consideration isn't necessarily the case for a USSR designed cruiser, especially if the translation isn't one to one.
Not your text, but that assumes a design focus that is not in evidence. It's a necessary focus for a USN cruiser, but that consideration isn't necessarily the case for a USSR designed cruiser, especially if the translation isn't one to one.
The S-300 Fort installation practically implies it, as this is an area air defense system and not strictly a self-defense or point-defense system. With three layers of air defense, anti-air is a primary mission of these ships.
Compare this to a contemporary like the Sovremenny, which carries only medium range SAMs and point-defense.
I agree that the primary mission of USN cruisers and USSR ones are different, but the Slava-class is designed for area air defense, bot for itself and for the rest of it's surface group.
Compare this to a contemporary like the Sovremenny, which carries only medium range SAMs and point-defense.
I agree that the primary mission of USN cruisers and USSR ones are different, but the Slava-class is designed for area air defense, bot for itself and for the rest of it's surface group.
There's some (relatively unsophisticated) analysis against the drone argument:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NIjoyIieOzY&t=1163s
The 2 Neptunes were probably enough, given the right circumstances (ie, lack of fast response by the Russians).
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NIjoyIieOzY&t=1163s
The 2 Neptunes were probably enough, given the right circumstances (ie, lack of fast response by the Russians).
Targeting information no, but that's a distraction in the news to downplay the significance.
* Boat moving slowly? Check.
* Boat oriented in correct direction for broadside attack at the waterline? Check.
* Short range defense radars down? Check.
* Other defense assets out of the area? Check.
"Ok bring up your targeting radars and fire"
* Boat moving slowly? Check.
* Boat oriented in correct direction for broadside attack at the waterline? Check.
* Short range defense radars down? Check.
* Other defense assets out of the area? Check.
"Ok bring up your targeting radars and fire"
So, the hypothesis is that both the Russian and Ukrainian stories are accurate? The ship was disabled by fire, and then attacked when weakened?
No, I think the hypothesis is that the ship's short-range radar was disabled due to crew errors or equipment obsolescence, something which the P-8A Poseidon could detect and relay to the Ukrainians. That provided a window during which Neptune missiles could be successfully used. The "fire" started after the missiles struck the ship.
Every part of that whole operation was significant.
But the core of the article still stays - smaller weaponry is becoming much more effective and in any future conflict will be critical.
We can see it through the centuries - from big castles and heavy armoured knights, to lightly armoured mobile units and temporary fortifications.
But the core of the article still stays - smaller weaponry is becoming much more effective and in any future conflict will be critical.
We can see it through the centuries - from big castles and heavy armoured knights, to lightly armoured mobile units and temporary fortifications.
Many people think that radar won WW2. The US used radar-guided anti-aircraft guns, which doubled their accuracy (in essence doubling the number of guns). Flak guns used radar proximity fuses in the shells. Ship big guns used radar targeting. And, of course, radar made for long range detection of where the enemy was.
In the Gulf War, when the enemy fired a shell, radar was used to calculate where it was fired from, and that location got a radar-directed shell directly onto it.
Incredibly effective.
In the Gulf War, when the enemy fired a shell, radar was used to calculate where it was fired from, and that location got a radar-directed shell directly onto it.
Incredibly effective.
I keep a mental list of things that are claimed to have won WW2. Some of them are radar, cryptography, oil, the atomic bomb, industrial production, economic power, Colossus, the Eastern front, hydroelectric power, air power, and rubber. (I'm sure I'm forgetting lots.) My conclusion is that you can pick just about anything and explain how it won the war.
> I'm sure I'm forgetting lots
Logistics
Logistics
Proximity fuses vastly increased the effectiveness of anti-aircraft fire and the story of their development is fascinating.
See https://www.historynet.com/proximity-fuze/
See https://www.historynet.com/proximity-fuze/
They were impressive: a four tube electronic device that could survive being fired from a gun.
Counter artillery is incredible effective. When I was in the army they told us to never be close to artillery firing as it was expected that the location would be determined by radar from the shell and you would expect an answer very quickly.
Note that Ukraine now has gotten new artillery from France that has longer range than apparently anything the Russians have.
Note that Ukraine now has gotten new artillery from France that has longer range than apparently anything the Russians have.
Cryptonomicon (a fictional book) basically argues cryptography won the war.
The best discussion of this I've heared was from a docent at the National Crypologic Museum, located on the NSA grounds. His version was that the war was won by those fighting it, but if it hadn't been for good intelligence, they could have fought just as hard and been less effective.
Radar won the tactical battlefield. Intelligence won the strategic war.
Industrial capacity won WW2.
90% of the merchant vessels in the world belonged to the British.
The British Empire and the the USA were the 2 largest economies in the world.
Once the USA entered the war the outcome was not in doubt, even if the German army hadn't been given mission impossible vs. the Russians - although if they hadn't then the Russians would have attacked them.
90% of the merchant vessels in the world belonged to the British.
The British Empire and the the USA were the 2 largest economies in the world.
Once the USA entered the war the outcome was not in doubt, even if the German army hadn't been given mission impossible vs. the Russians - although if they hadn't then the Russians would have attacked them.
Radar had the effect of doubling the firepower of the US's guns. It's hard to overstate what an advantage that is.
Also access to oil was a big deal. Hitler attacking the Soviet Union was at least partially to secure access to oil.
It's not an unreasonable point of view. It certainly played a large role in the victory at Midway, and the defeat of the U-Boot campaign.
This is all very fascinating as a minor theoretical discussion, I'm sure, but we all know that WWII was actually won by Wolverine and Captain America. ;)
The Neptune is a rather unremarkable anti-surface missile with underwhelming capabilities.
It had enough range to reach the target from shore, enough precision to hit it, and enough warhead to kill it. That's good enough.
The lesson from this is that warships can no longer operate with impunity near a hostile shore against a reasonably equipped opponent. "Near" is at least 100km. A truck-mounted system can now take out a major combatant vessel.
Finding large ships isn't that difficult any more. They show up on everything from civilian satellite imagery to drone cameras.
It had enough range to reach the target from shore, enough precision to hit it, and enough warhead to kill it. That's good enough.
The lesson from this is that warships can no longer operate with impunity near a hostile shore against a reasonably equipped opponent. "Near" is at least 100km. A truck-mounted system can now take out a major combatant vessel.
Finding large ships isn't that difficult any more. They show up on everything from civilian satellite imagery to drone cameras.
>> The Neptune is a rather unremarkable anti-surface missile with underwhelming capabilities.
> It had enough range to reach the target from shore, enough precision to hit it, and enough warhead to kill it. That's good enough.
When you put it like that, it's kind of scary to think what GP's definition of whelming capabilities would be.
> It had enough range to reach the target from shore, enough precision to hit it, and enough warhead to kill it. That's good enough.
When you put it like that, it's kind of scary to think what GP's definition of whelming capabilities would be.
300+ nautical mile range. Onboard threat detection and evasion. Ability to identify between different ship types and prioritize accordingly. Re-attack capability if it misses. Low observability features
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AGM-158C_LRASM
Then there's hypersonics, which, when flying at low-level, reduce the possible reaction time by the target by several orders from the moment it is detected at the radar horizon (best case!) to impact. Subsonic missiles, provided they're detected, take longer and allow for more reaction time.
The Neptune is basically a domestically built version of the Soviet Kh-35, with minor improvements. It's a contemporary of the U.S. Harpoon, and that one is rather long in the tooth. It's not to say that they're bad, nor is it any dig against the Ukrainians. Any capability is better than no capability! But it wasn't a frighteningly new technology either, and one that, on paper, the Moskava should have been capable of handling. It didn't, and it raises questions.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AGM-158C_LRASM
Then there's hypersonics, which, when flying at low-level, reduce the possible reaction time by the target by several orders from the moment it is detected at the radar horizon (best case!) to impact. Subsonic missiles, provided they're detected, take longer and allow for more reaction time.
The Neptune is basically a domestically built version of the Soviet Kh-35, with minor improvements. It's a contemporary of the U.S. Harpoon, and that one is rather long in the tooth. It's not to say that they're bad, nor is it any dig against the Ukrainians. Any capability is better than no capability! But it wasn't a frighteningly new technology either, and one that, on paper, the Moskava should have been capable of handling. It didn't, and it raises questions.
It's far more complicated than you think to sink a modern combat ship with a missile. The Neptune would qualify as "minimally capable" and if it weren't for Russian incompetence and target intelligence, or it wouldn't have succeeded.
First, you have the sea. It's flat, it's quiet, and it's pretty much void of surface and aerial radar contacts. Missile stealth is really hard in this environment because of the quiet background, and the Neptune is not stealthy. The ship-based radars are really only limited to the curvature of the earth... so for the Moskva, that's probably 9miles in bad conditions, 18miles in best conditions. The cold background even allows IRST to work quite effectively (not sure if the Moskva has that capability). The target ship is going to know you're coming, especially the Moskva, as in the absolute worst conditions, that's about 30s-45s of warning time, or 10m-15m if you have an AEW radar.
Second, radar blindness is a two way street. You can fire a missile, but it will be blind to its target until it's pretty close and can activate some sort of terminal phase guidance. Navies _always_ keep their ships moving to avoid attacks. Basically, for a sub-sonic missile, you can fire it at where the target is now, but by the time it gets to where it thinks the target is, it may not be there anymore. There's a couple of ways to handle this. For Navy's very modern LRASM, that's a passive link receiving mid-course updates, with fallback to GPS/Inertial guidance. For the Neptune, it's just inertial guidance. Just _moving_ the target ship around randomly is enough to protect it from a Neptune strike and Russia did not do this.
Third, your missile needs to broadside. Ships are designed to cut through the water, so a head-on attack will just cause the missile to skip off the bow. Your missile needs to have enough spare fuel to turn about and detect the orientation of the ship. Again, you can defeat this by randomly turning your ship a bunch of times. There's a case in the Falklands war where an Exocet was coming in hard for a kill, but the ship's commander had enough time to orient the ship towards the missile with full rudder, and the Exocet bounced, then exploded on the deck rather than penetrating. There was damage, but ship stayed in combat. The Neptune doesn't have great loiter time. And its rudimentary radar terminal guidance it's probably easily attacked electronically anyway.
Finally you have point defenses. Russia actually has quite sophisticated CIWS systems, both missile and rotary cannon. It's speculated that the only really guaranteed way to defeat these systems is a saturation attack, which was not the case, or a supersonic terminal phase, which the Neptune is not capable of. Russia pretty much had all its defenses down.
So no, the Neptune is really not that sophisticated. This attack was successful purely based on knowing the limitations of the weapon system and timely intelligence.
First, you have the sea. It's flat, it's quiet, and it's pretty much void of surface and aerial radar contacts. Missile stealth is really hard in this environment because of the quiet background, and the Neptune is not stealthy. The ship-based radars are really only limited to the curvature of the earth... so for the Moskva, that's probably 9miles in bad conditions, 18miles in best conditions. The cold background even allows IRST to work quite effectively (not sure if the Moskva has that capability). The target ship is going to know you're coming, especially the Moskva, as in the absolute worst conditions, that's about 30s-45s of warning time, or 10m-15m if you have an AEW radar.
Second, radar blindness is a two way street. You can fire a missile, but it will be blind to its target until it's pretty close and can activate some sort of terminal phase guidance. Navies _always_ keep their ships moving to avoid attacks. Basically, for a sub-sonic missile, you can fire it at where the target is now, but by the time it gets to where it thinks the target is, it may not be there anymore. There's a couple of ways to handle this. For Navy's very modern LRASM, that's a passive link receiving mid-course updates, with fallback to GPS/Inertial guidance. For the Neptune, it's just inertial guidance. Just _moving_ the target ship around randomly is enough to protect it from a Neptune strike and Russia did not do this.
Third, your missile needs to broadside. Ships are designed to cut through the water, so a head-on attack will just cause the missile to skip off the bow. Your missile needs to have enough spare fuel to turn about and detect the orientation of the ship. Again, you can defeat this by randomly turning your ship a bunch of times. There's a case in the Falklands war where an Exocet was coming in hard for a kill, but the ship's commander had enough time to orient the ship towards the missile with full rudder, and the Exocet bounced, then exploded on the deck rather than penetrating. There was damage, but ship stayed in combat. The Neptune doesn't have great loiter time. And its rudimentary radar terminal guidance it's probably easily attacked electronically anyway.
Finally you have point defenses. Russia actually has quite sophisticated CIWS systems, both missile and rotary cannon. It's speculated that the only really guaranteed way to defeat these systems is a saturation attack, which was not the case, or a supersonic terminal phase, which the Neptune is not capable of. Russia pretty much had all its defenses down.
So no, the Neptune is really not that sophisticated. This attack was successful purely based on knowing the limitations of the weapon system and timely intelligence.
It's speculated that the only really guaranteed way to
defeat these systems is a saturation attack
Obviously, there haven't been a whole lot of naval conflicts in recent decades. And antiship missiles are not cheap (although, obviously much cheaper than ships)
But, still. They seem like such an obvious method of attack that it seems weird we haven't really seen one in earnest.
Are there specific technological issues that need to be worked out?
So far even stupid simple drones like Orlan have a sticker price of $100K despite being <$10K BOM and wide availability of suitable civilian open source software and hardware packages. ardupilot PX4 Paparazzi MultiWii Cleanflight Betaflight OpenPilot BetaPilot, the list goes on and on and on. You can easily build $200-300 decoy drones (no RX radio, pre programmed flight plan) pretending to be Bayraktar (suitable radar reflectors) and just flood Donbas with 20-50 launches per day spending less in four months than cost of one real Bayraktar. Such operation would probably deplete Russian AA ammo stock in less than a month, not to mention successfully screen real UAV deployments.
Russia deploys E95M decoy drones, but only in singular quantities aimed at baiting SAMs to reveal their positions.
Ukraine even dug out ancient TU-143 drones for that purpose, but again, single units.
Aerorozvidka is a good attempt at manufacturing domestically cheap reliable alternatives to primary military contractor offerings. But it still looks to be low volume specialized affair.
Russia deploys E95M decoy drones, but only in singular quantities aimed at baiting SAMs to reveal their positions.
Ukraine even dug out ancient TU-143 drones for that purpose, but again, single units.
Aerorozvidka is a good attempt at manufacturing domestically cheap reliable alternatives to primary military contractor offerings. But it still looks to be low volume specialized affair.
Oryx made a good point that I hadn't realized until I read it:
>*In this context it should be noted that no reports thus far have explicitely mentioned the number of AShMs supposedly launched (as opposed to the number that impacted), so that a scenario in which the Moskva's defences were overwhelmed by a well-planned volley of missiles is not out of the question.
https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/04/neptunes-wrath-flagshi...
Answering this would require some sleuthing as to how many they're estimated to possess. I understand there's been some attacks since (rumored), so they didn't expend all of them, apparently:
https://eurasiantimes.com/russian-warship-hit-by-ukranian-an...
>*In this context it should be noted that no reports thus far have explicitely mentioned the number of AShMs supposedly launched (as opposed to the number that impacted), so that a scenario in which the Moskva's defences were overwhelmed by a well-planned volley of missiles is not out of the question.
https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/04/neptunes-wrath-flagshi...
Answering this would require some sleuthing as to how many they're estimated to possess. I understand there's been some attacks since (rumored), so they didn't expend all of them, apparently:
https://eurasiantimes.com/russian-warship-hit-by-ukranian-an...
There is an interesting speculation that perhaps most of its way the missiles where in either in the radar shadow of the Snake island or the island added sufficient noise to hide the missiles.
It's possible they had fired them from the coast behind the island, doglegged them around the island (I dunno if the Neptune has this capability, but older AShMs do, so I don't think it's unreasonable), and therefor reduced the possible reaction time of the Moskava as they would have appeared only 40-50 miles away as opposed to 80, according to this map and my rough Google Earth estimates.
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/04/satellite-image...
Doing some really rough napkin math gives you 3-6 minutes of warning, assuming the missiles were detected the moment they cleared the island. The island wouldn't have generated "noise" (doesn't work like that) but as a shadow, sure. I don't know that I would say that was the winning factor however.
But now that I think about it, given how tiny (some consider it a rock, not an island) Snake Island is, you'd have to be darn precise to get your launchers on a spot on the coast to perfectly place the island between them and the ship, and I can't see those constraints being practical to make an attack in a timely fashion. So I suspect it's a stretch at best.
(On the other hand and slightly unrelated, in the flight sim DCS World, we'd take AJS-37 Viggens with RB-15 AShMs and dogleg missiles around features against ships on the Persian Gulf map. This sorta angling becomes a lot easier if your launch platform is far more mobile like an aircraft. Depending on where your target is, you can set up some good ambushes with very little warning if you get your timing right. It's part of the reason the littoral areas can be so darn scary to fight in.)
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/04/satellite-image...
Doing some really rough napkin math gives you 3-6 minutes of warning, assuming the missiles were detected the moment they cleared the island. The island wouldn't have generated "noise" (doesn't work like that) but as a shadow, sure. I don't know that I would say that was the winning factor however.
But now that I think about it, given how tiny (some consider it a rock, not an island) Snake Island is, you'd have to be darn precise to get your launchers on a spot on the coast to perfectly place the island between them and the ship, and I can't see those constraints being practical to make an attack in a timely fashion. So I suspect it's a stretch at best.
(On the other hand and slightly unrelated, in the flight sim DCS World, we'd take AJS-37 Viggens with RB-15 AShMs and dogleg missiles around features against ships on the Persian Gulf map. This sorta angling becomes a lot easier if your launch platform is far more mobile like an aircraft. Depending on where your target is, you can set up some good ambushes with very little warning if you get your timing right. It's part of the reason the littoral areas can be so darn scary to fight in.)
There are some military installations on the island that can reflect the radar signal and that are placed on top of the island, close to 40 meters above the see.
> No doubt the Poseidon has watched every Russian Naval asset to figure out they were taking down defense radars and they devised a plan to sneak a relatively crappy Neptune missile in.
Is it just me, or does this comment appear arrogant?
You you are taking all the credit and belittling the folks that did all the fighting, based on nothing but your own speculation?
Is it just me, or does this comment appear arrogant?
You you are taking all the credit and belittling the folks that did all the fighting, based on nothing but your own speculation?
I get into arguments with pro-Navy people about the laughable waste of Naval surface ships.
As you state, antiship missiles are unremarkable, I believe 1980s pop and drop from above are undefendable. I got argued down about antiship ICBM/IRBMs, but I still think they will work. And drone subs will make any nearshore unnavigable to capital ships, if the cost of your carrier is 10x the cost of a fleet of 100 drone subs whose only job is basically fire a couple torpedos.
Drones/infantry portable weapons are being tested in real time by the pentagon with the Ukraine war, against a reasonable facsimile of a peer war.
The only thing lacking is high altitude anti air, but I think this war will result in the true air superiority denial weapon: the cheap air drone. Hell, it could be a solar balloon-drone hybrid: stay up as long as you want, relocate with "acceptable" flexibility, fire missiles at aircraft.
That will push more emphasis to Space superiority I predict.
The other aspect of force multiplication of drones hasn't been properly explored or used yet in this war: drones are currently used as CENTRALLY coordinated weapons. But if you also have combined arms drones coordinated by boots-on-ground infantry, that means your ten man squad can direct (with low casualty risk) ten faster, better armed, more capable drones in helicopter, grenade shelling, scouting, and direct fire. And if you can give basic AI orders to a drone once you get it place and then direct other drones into position, then a 10 man squad may be able to direct 20-30 ones. And they can have reserves to deploy if their controlled drones get damaged. And they are probably more durable to fire.
Truly effective infantry forces have sergeants and officers with ability to adapt tactical battle plans on the fly. Current drone organization doesn't strongly support this, but then again we are in the stone age of drones.
As you state, antiship missiles are unremarkable, I believe 1980s pop and drop from above are undefendable. I got argued down about antiship ICBM/IRBMs, but I still think they will work. And drone subs will make any nearshore unnavigable to capital ships, if the cost of your carrier is 10x the cost of a fleet of 100 drone subs whose only job is basically fire a couple torpedos.
Drones/infantry portable weapons are being tested in real time by the pentagon with the Ukraine war, against a reasonable facsimile of a peer war.
The only thing lacking is high altitude anti air, but I think this war will result in the true air superiority denial weapon: the cheap air drone. Hell, it could be a solar balloon-drone hybrid: stay up as long as you want, relocate with "acceptable" flexibility, fire missiles at aircraft.
That will push more emphasis to Space superiority I predict.
The other aspect of force multiplication of drones hasn't been properly explored or used yet in this war: drones are currently used as CENTRALLY coordinated weapons. But if you also have combined arms drones coordinated by boots-on-ground infantry, that means your ten man squad can direct (with low casualty risk) ten faster, better armed, more capable drones in helicopter, grenade shelling, scouting, and direct fire. And if you can give basic AI orders to a drone once you get it place and then direct other drones into position, then a 10 man squad may be able to direct 20-30 ones. And they can have reserves to deploy if their controlled drones get damaged. And they are probably more durable to fire.
Truly effective infantry forces have sergeants and officers with ability to adapt tactical battle plans on the fly. Current drone organization doesn't strongly support this, but then again we are in the stone age of drones.
Why would "pop and drop" be undefendable? It's not as if the ship won't be able to see the ASCM the entire time it's doing that maneuver. The Harpoon does it because of it's origin: it was supposed to hit surfaced Soviet submarines, and it needs to do it in order to actually hit the target. But that target class disappeared before it really reached service.
ASBMs have a similar issue in that there's no way for them to get out of the radar view of the target (or a ship near the target). And we've got missiles designed to take them out as part of the target set (SM-3 and SM-6 are quite capable, depending on range).
Drone subs are just mobile minefields. The idea of a mobile minefield isn't new, and you have all the problems of a minefield (including, but not limited to: sinking ships you didn't intend to), along with new challenges like: how do you communicate with your drone subs?
Your cheap anti-air drone is just a missile carrier? You're thinking weapons, not systems here. How do you target with them? And how do you keep them from getting targeted? Even being 20kft up (and improving the range that way), an equivalent AAM from a fighter will have longer range, simply because it's able to be launched from Mach 0.85, instead of 30kts. Sure, the drone might be cheap, but the missile won't be.
ASBMs have a similar issue in that there's no way for them to get out of the radar view of the target (or a ship near the target). And we've got missiles designed to take them out as part of the target set (SM-3 and SM-6 are quite capable, depending on range).
Drone subs are just mobile minefields. The idea of a mobile minefield isn't new, and you have all the problems of a minefield (including, but not limited to: sinking ships you didn't intend to), along with new challenges like: how do you communicate with your drone subs?
Your cheap anti-air drone is just a missile carrier? You're thinking weapons, not systems here. How do you target with them? And how do you keep them from getting targeted? Even being 20kft up (and improving the range that way), an equivalent AAM from a fighter will have longer range, simply because it's able to be launched from Mach 0.85, instead of 30kts. Sure, the drone might be cheap, but the missile won't be.
> But if you also have combined arms drones coordinated by boots-on-ground infantry,
Brings back memories of Network-Centric Warfare [0], with self-synchronising edge-based forces operating on the cusp of tactical anarchy, IIRC.
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network-centric_warfare
Brings back memories of Network-Centric Warfare [0], with self-synchronising edge-based forces operating on the cusp of tactical anarchy, IIRC.
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network-centric_warfare
For anyone else thinking (especially later in this thread) "what is AWACS?":
> AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) is the name of the specific system installed in the E-3 and Japanese Boeing E-767 AEW&C airframes, but is often used as a general synonym for AEW&C.
> An airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) system is an airborne radar system designed to detect aircraft, ships, vehicles, missiles, and other incoming projectiles at long ranges and perform command and control
from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Airborne_early_warning_and_con...
> AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) is the name of the specific system installed in the E-3 and Japanese Boeing E-767 AEW&C airframes, but is often used as a general synonym for AEW&C.
> An airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) system is an airborne radar system designed to detect aircraft, ships, vehicles, missiles, and other incoming projectiles at long ranges and perform command and control
from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Airborne_early_warning_and_con...
Well, not really. The defining thing here is grey-zone warfare.
The Moskva (and ships in general) aren't really made for a war where you can't shoot down AWACS. Because they can't be.
Generally the assumption is that the AWACS is going to be shot down, very fast. It's a pretty solid one to make, too.
But of course there was also a lot of incompetence, and the sheer age and obsolescence of the Moskva didn't help either.
The Moskva (and ships in general) aren't really made for a war where you can't shoot down AWACS. Because they can't be.
Generally the assumption is that the AWACS is going to be shot down, very fast. It's a pretty solid one to make, too.
But of course there was also a lot of incompetence, and the sheer age and obsolescence of the Moskva didn't help either.
Why would that be a solid assumption? If Russia were actually engaging US forces and was "allowed" to shoot the AWACS, then they would also be engaging the USAF - by far the most effective air force in the world - who would deny such attempts.
The USAF (nor anyone else) has no practical way to defend an AWACS against a near-peer enemy. That's kind of the point of the R-37 or PL-15 (even moreso the PL-21), soft targets such as AWACS are vulnerable at 300-400km. That's also the real value proposition of the Su-57, even though they are few and probably can't defeat an F-22, it sure can defeat an AWACS and it's not feasible to detect it before it gets within 300km of an AWACS.
You're making huge assumptions here. One is the reliability of anti-AWACs AAMs, while ignoring both kill-chain issues and ECM etc. Sure the Russian AF might be able to use them during a "bolt out of the blue" attack, but once hostilities have commenced, any airbase that hosts MIG-31BMs will be targeted heavily.
The killchain issues are very easy to deal with. An AWACS is a massive target, it doesn't take much to get a missile there.
As far as ECM, it works a lot better when you have a small radar cross section. The burn through range for a frequency agile radar at that cross section is going to be far too much.
> but once hostilities have commenced, any airbase that hosts MIG-31BMs will be targeted heavily.
People say this a lot, but Ukrainian and Iraqi planes were flying weeks after that. And it's not just the MiG-31BM that can carry them.
As far as ECM, it works a lot better when you have a small radar cross section. The burn through range for a frequency agile radar at that cross section is going to be far too much.
> but once hostilities have commenced, any airbase that hosts MIG-31BMs will be targeted heavily.
People say this a lot, but Ukrainian and Iraqi planes were flying weeks after that. And it's not just the MiG-31BM that can carry them.
This is just LARPing. A TB2 could spot that ship just as well and neither it nor the P8 can guide the anti-ship missile that was used.
I read that the opportunity wasn’t due to defense radars being down. It was due to a diversion tactic (annoyance drone) created to fool the radar operators into focusing on a false flag.
Intelligence is one of the most important aspects.
Through also we had been at a point where a lot of trope movements are always under watch by satellites and now supplemented by various kinds of drones (some call it the unblinking eye) before.
We also have a lot of ways to take advantage of it (long range artillery, big drones, Javelins, small suicide drones, etc.).
What changed is not the general capabilities we have nothing I listed (except maybe the small suicide drones) is new.
What is new is how we can and in case of Ukrain do combine this weaponry and information systems.
So I don't thing any of the tech involved is the defining factor, it's the combination of them in the right strategy.
Through also we had been at a point where a lot of trope movements are always under watch by satellites and now supplemented by various kinds of drones (some call it the unblinking eye) before.
We also have a lot of ways to take advantage of it (long range artillery, big drones, Javelins, small suicide drones, etc.).
What changed is not the general capabilities we have nothing I listed (except maybe the small suicide drones) is new.
What is new is how we can and in case of Ukrain do combine this weaponry and information systems.
So I don't thing any of the tech involved is the defining factor, it's the combination of them in the right strategy.
Link to intel report?
There have also been regular AWACS circular flights over Romania near the Black Sea and Global Hawk flights in the Black Sea.
There have also been regular AWACS circular flights over Romania near the Black Sea and Global Hawk flights in the Black Sea.
By the way, Poseidon occupied in the Greek Pantheon a role very similar to the Roman Neptune.
Navy weapon-namegivers lack imagination.
Navy weapon-namegivers lack imagination.
I think the more interesting part to think about is drones which were involved in this sinking. This is a very rapidly evolving area of warfare.
Right now we're using drones like we used early WW1 aircraft. As spotters for long range weapons and very occasionally as direct bombers. We haven't yet developed drones that shoot down other drones cheaply. So we can spot enemy formations, ships, tanks etc. without any cost effective way to stop the small spotter drones.
I see this changing soon. We will soon have small cheap drones that will take down nearby spotter drones and the balance will change yet again.
So don't throw away old tactics and equipment just yet. There's a gap where we have no reasonable way to stop drones that will soon be addressed.
Right now we're using drones like we used early WW1 aircraft. As spotters for long range weapons and very occasionally as direct bombers. We haven't yet developed drones that shoot down other drones cheaply. So we can spot enemy formations, ships, tanks etc. without any cost effective way to stop the small spotter drones.
I see this changing soon. We will soon have small cheap drones that will take down nearby spotter drones and the balance will change yet again.
So don't throw away old tactics and equipment just yet. There's a gap where we have no reasonable way to stop drones that will soon be addressed.
I think the natural progression of war is going to be remote controlled systems. Drones are for flying.
Remote Controlled land and water units would also work.
There are multiple reasons why it's the future.
1. Cheap to make
2. Can be smaller since they don't have to have space for humans to sit in them, which might increase ability to carry things, longer range etc.
3. Because humans don't have to be inside of them they can also go a higher speeds, maneuver faster without human body limitations
4. If a drone goes down, the drone pilot can man another one. All that training and knowledge is retained. Human operated vehicles have a high probability of losing their occupants.
5. If 5,000 drones get destroyed, it's lost money. If 5,000 military personnel gets killed it appears much worse in terms of optics, value of life etc.
Remote Controlled land and water units would also work.
There are multiple reasons why it's the future.
1. Cheap to make
2. Can be smaller since they don't have to have space for humans to sit in them, which might increase ability to carry things, longer range etc.
3. Because humans don't have to be inside of them they can also go a higher speeds, maneuver faster without human body limitations
4. If a drone goes down, the drone pilot can man another one. All that training and knowledge is retained. Human operated vehicles have a high probability of losing their occupants.
5. If 5,000 drones get destroyed, it's lost money. If 5,000 military personnel gets killed it appears much worse in terms of optics, value of life etc.
The next issue to arise in this paradigm is that autonomous machines are most analogous to mercenaries, with no fixed allegiance to the nation they are fighting for. Thus this army of 5,000 drones could alarmingly be converted to an enemy force in a way a normal army could not.
And the natural progression of war will lead to the toner wars. The drones will become so small that they become next mesothelioma: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Diamond_Age: "Nell's older brother, who plays an important role in the beginning as her protector; he obtains the Primer for his sister by mugging John Percival Hackworth. Harv is forced to leave Nell when she is accepted by the Neo-Victorians, and is later bedridden by asthma caused by the inhalation of dead nanomachines ("toner") in his childhood."
I would expect that, at the low end, a drone's maximum velocity and its range would be proportional to its size. Really small drones would be perfect for loitering (unless it's windy), but less good for getting to a denied location (unless it's downwind). That seems to me to really limit the usefulness of really small drones.
Now they're talking semi-autonomous mobile weapons systems to accompany special operators. The drone wars will scale up from the bottom and scale down from the top to meet in the middle for a full spectrum of robot-on-robot mayhem. And thus SkyNet was born...
The era of remote control won't last too long though because of signal jamming. Autonomous systems that don't need constant control by a human operator is the next logical progression.
The problem with jamming is that in order to be effective the transponder has to be very "loud", which means it can be destroyed by a missile which is built to target the "loudest" object in front of it. Active radar can partially avoid these systems by turning off during inactivity, but jamming has to be continuous to really be effective
CDMA and other spread-spectrum radio tech was developed to counter signal jamming. If your comms is split amongst a range of frequencies and extractible with pseudo-random codes or other trunking scheme then you've raised the cost of jamming significantly.
And jammers are always going to leave parts of the spectrum untouched so the owners of the jammers can still communicate.
There are a myriad of ways to work through signal jamming.Something designed to work in a battlefield can utilize one or several methods.
Most civilian devices aren't designed to do that because it's usually more expensive. There are also nebulous arguments about hindering law enforcement (but also counter-arguments about criminals eg "if you outlaw guns then only outlaws will have guns").
Most civilian devices aren't designed to do that because it's usually more expensive. There are also nebulous arguments about hindering law enforcement (but also counter-arguments about criminals eg "if you outlaw guns then only outlaws will have guns").
I can imagine a semi-disposable drone-like device being used for fast and cheap reconnaissance. If cost of something with a camera and rough lidar can be brought to $200, then why not turn it into a 'consumable' item that can be deployed from out of a briefcase?
I feel like assuming that the device will be lost/destroyed can help optimize for short-term performance. Why not add a few grams of C4 to it, to make sure that it and its silicon are absolutely unrecoverable and in many pieces after its operational lifetime?
I feel like assuming that the device will be lost/destroyed can help optimize for short-term performance. Why not add a few grams of C4 to it, to make sure that it and its silicon are absolutely unrecoverable and in many pieces after its operational lifetime?
I feel like you just described the Switchblade drones.
https://www.avinc.com/tms/switchblade
https://www.avinc.com/tms/switchblade
The animated image is cracking me the hell up. It just glides out of the tube like WHOOP!
But, that's actually very close to what I was thinking about! I was imagining something with a much shorter range, however. Something like 1km, compared to that thing's 10km.
But, that's actually very close to what I was thinking about! I was imagining something with a much shorter range, however. Something like 1km, compared to that thing's 10km.
You're almost describing the Russian Orlan-10, except you've got the cost off by an order of magnitude (they cost around $2,000 each).
$200 is an incredibly ambitious target that's unlikely to be hit, but it's also not necessary to bring costs that low. Our military budget is $800B/yr and our current drones cost way more than $2000. Simply bringing the costs down a bit would get us sufficient quantity.
$200 is an incredibly ambitious target that's unlikely to be hit, but it's also not necessary to bring costs that low. Our military budget is $800B/yr and our current drones cost way more than $2000. Simply bringing the costs down a bit would get us sufficient quantity.
Oh, that's much larger than I was thinking of. I was thinking somewhere on low-single-digit-km range, and probably sized to where carbon fiber + aluminum are still the best choices for the frame materials. Roughly, the size of 2 beer bottles?
Nah, custom FPV drones are in that range.
It’s doable rn
It’s doable rn
You're the one replier so far to who I must say, larger, but not by too much. 1 or 2 beer bottles of size is what I was thinking of.
I suspect the cheapest option would be cameras mounted on artillery shells.
https://www.afcea.org/content/artillery-eyes-provide-sight-g...
The U S army worked on putting cameras in howitzer shells as far back as the 70’s, so short-ish range (10 miles or so), but cheap by military standards.
Though these days a cheap plastic drone might easily be less expensive if mass produced.
https://www.afcea.org/content/artillery-eyes-provide-sight-g...
The U S army worked on putting cameras in howitzer shells as far back as the 70’s, so short-ish range (10 miles or so), but cheap by military standards.
Though these days a cheap plastic drone might easily be less expensive if mass produced.
I suspect this is exactly what they are going for but at the same time, reliability is critical if you only have a handful of them you can't afford for some to not work, so by the time you use some prime components, they start costing "military" money instead!
6. Killing someone by clicking a button and watching the explosion on a TV is much easier than pulling a trigger in the real-world
The PTSD articles from people in Las Vegas driving drones in the Middle East seem to indicate otherwise. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/15/us/drones-airstrikes-ptsd...
It’s not the killing.
It’s the watching, tracking, and recording. It’s the months of getting to know every aspect of the individuals.
They become real, not just the ‘enemy’.
It’s the watching, tracking, and recording. It’s the months of getting to know every aspect of the individuals.
They become real, not just the ‘enemy’.
I don't think the majority of deaths in combat have been from humans killing other humans that they can see with their eyes for a long time. Possibly well over a hundred years.
If killing someone through a camera is action-at-a-distance, so is blowing up an opaque metal box that you know probably has four humans in it, or firing your artillery piece at a grid square that probably has some humans in it, or dropping a bomb on a glowing blob on a thermal sensor that's probably a human. Even in daytime infantry-on-infantry combat, at a lot of ranges you're not shooting at people, you're shooting at piece of cover you saw gunfire emanate from. All of these partially-removed actions are also mainly what we're seeing drones do well at.
While one could design a killer robot to go inside buildings and shoot people while looking them in the eye, the complexities and timeframes of close-range combat make it seems like the very last place for robots to replace infantry.
If killing someone through a camera is action-at-a-distance, so is blowing up an opaque metal box that you know probably has four humans in it, or firing your artillery piece at a grid square that probably has some humans in it, or dropping a bomb on a glowing blob on a thermal sensor that's probably a human. Even in daytime infantry-on-infantry combat, at a lot of ranges you're not shooting at people, you're shooting at piece of cover you saw gunfire emanate from. All of these partially-removed actions are also mainly what we're seeing drones do well at.
While one could design a killer robot to go inside buildings and shoot people while looking them in the eye, the complexities and timeframes of close-range combat make it seems like the very last place for robots to replace infantry.
Attended a dinner with dozens of active and retired pilots from three services. The highlight were two speakers who saw combat in the Gulf War I. Wing Commander’s SiL (F-16) pilot and son (SAR medic).
They loved the formers gun camera videos and stories. They squirmed and looked at their desserts when the latter showed up close and personal pics of the “Highway of Death”in Kuwait. Miles and miles of burned bodies in the sands.
Pilots don’t have to watch in 4k like the button clickers do.
They loved the formers gun camera videos and stories. They squirmed and looked at their desserts when the latter showed up close and personal pics of the “Highway of Death”in Kuwait. Miles and miles of burned bodies in the sands.
Pilots don’t have to watch in 4k like the button clickers do.
Isn't the difference more about collateral damage? In the battle, you have at least an inkling of the person you are shooting being an enemy, if you are ordered to bomb a house and find out that a load of kids were killed as well as the target, it becomes much more traumatic.
I have zero military experience so just guessing!
I have zero military experience so just guessing!
From what I hear, PTSD is pretty bad among stateside UAV operators. https://dronecenter.bard.edu/burdens-war-crews-drone-aircraf...
It may or may not be easier to remotely kill someone else from across the world, but I suspect that drone warfare will evolve quickly so it’s drone vs drone. I suspect few people would feel bad about shooting down some pieces of metal and plastic.
This is a false ethical concern: it's harder in person because the other guy can shoot back.
This contributes another ethical quality though: if the other person can shoot back, you have a right to go all out in order to defend yourself. The same cannot be said for unmanned warfare, where the immediate danger is asymmetric.
I don't think it's possible to reconcile the battlefield with an ethics of self defense. You can pick a side that way, yes, but the doctrines of justifiable homicide simply don't hold up in battle.
In modern wars, especially those were one party is a lot stronger than the other and wants to keep the moral high ground, ethics does come into play.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rules_of_engagement:
“Rules of engagement (ROE) are the internal rules or directives afforded military forces (including individuals) that define the circumstances, conditions, degree, and manner in which the use of force, or actions which might be construed as provocative, may be applied. They provide authorization for and/or limits on, among other things, the use of force and the employment of certain specific capabilities. In some nations, articulated ROE have the status of guidance to military forces, while in other nations, ROE constitute lawful command. Rules of engagement do not normally dictate how a result is to be achieved, but will indicate what measures may be unacceptable.”
Soldiers won’t be allowed to destroy a house on the grounds that it can be used by a sniper, for example, but must have reasonable certainty that it is being used as such.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rules_of_engagement:
“Rules of engagement (ROE) are the internal rules or directives afforded military forces (including individuals) that define the circumstances, conditions, degree, and manner in which the use of force, or actions which might be construed as provocative, may be applied. They provide authorization for and/or limits on, among other things, the use of force and the employment of certain specific capabilities. In some nations, articulated ROE have the status of guidance to military forces, while in other nations, ROE constitute lawful command. Rules of engagement do not normally dictate how a result is to be achieved, but will indicate what measures may be unacceptable.”
Soldiers won’t be allowed to destroy a house on the grounds that it can be used by a sniper, for example, but must have reasonable certainty that it is being used as such.
Yes but not the ethics of self defense, such as a doctrine of clear and present danger.
Self defense doesn't have a concept of a combatant, only an immediate threat to the safety of yourself or another.
Self defense doesn't have a concept of a combatant, only an immediate threat to the safety of yourself or another.
Couldn't the same be said of an artilleryman? Or a bomber pilot dropping ordnance on a position with no AA defense? Or a tanker shelling infantry with no AT gear?
This is also a way to think about the UFOs. If they are uncrewed, then it's quite possible it took them tens or hundreds of years to get here, and once here, to seek out US Navy maneuvers (cos that's where the most interesting electromagnetic spectrum is), and then toy with them to check our capabilities. And then report back. If the "UFO attack" on Washington DC in the early 50s was one series of contacts, then there's been decades for them pesky aliens to work up another wave of drones to come say hi and mess with naval aviators' heads.
Remote controlled drones only work reliably at short range. At longer ranges they stop working once the enemy knocks out your communications relays. Communications satellites are no longer survivable. In the future AI technology might solve the problem but outside of simple loitering munitions, AI can't do much today. In some scenarios we may see drones controlled by manned aircraft that are just a few miles behind and still within communications line of sight.
Maneuverability doesn't count for a whole lot in the real world. For manned aircraft the trend is to de-emphasize maneuverability in favor of signature reduction, ECM, and decoys. While it's theoretically possible to design a UCAV that could pull >9Gs, in practice it's totally pointless. That would make the airframe too heavy and expensive, and would adversely impact other more important qualities like endurance and magazine depth.
Maneuverability doesn't count for a whole lot in the real world. For manned aircraft the trend is to de-emphasize maneuverability in favor of signature reduction, ECM, and decoys. While it's theoretically possible to design a UCAV that could pull >9Gs, in practice it's totally pointless. That would make the airframe too heavy and expensive, and would adversely impact other more important qualities like endurance and magazine depth.
Drones are vulnerable because they have to transmit a video feed over many miles for a remote operator to be able to control them. And the enemy can easily detect that, and then launch a missile that homes in on that signal. That's why there aren't any stealth drones. Drones shouldn't work against a first rate 21st century military, but Russia has proven in this war that they are not in that group.
One way to make a stealth drone is to make it operate autonomously, without sending back a video feed. But nobody is comfortable with that for obvious reasons.
The approach the French have proposed for their next gen fighter jet is to have a stealth jet surrounded by a swarm of stealth drones. The pilot commands all the drones, and so any radio links would be short range and therefore hard for an adversary to detect.
One way to make a stealth drone is to make it operate autonomously, without sending back a video feed. But nobody is comfortable with that for obvious reasons.
The approach the French have proposed for their next gen fighter jet is to have a stealth jet surrounded by a swarm of stealth drones. The pilot commands all the drones, and so any radio links would be short range and therefore hard for an adversary to detect.
> and then launch a missile that homes in on that signal
Can signal relay swarm mitigate this threat?
Can signal relay swarm mitigate this threat?
> 2. Can be smaller since they don't have to have space for humans to sit in them, which might increase ability to carry things, longer range etc.
To an extent, but the large the drone is (so it's more capable of range and payload capacity), the less the relative manned penalty is.
> 3. Because humans don't have to be inside of them they can also go a higher speeds, maneuver faster without human body limitations
Similar to above: the bigger the drone, the more they get constrained by other factors than the human body. A drone the size of a F-15 isn't going to be significantly more manueverable or faster than a F-15, simply because the G limit is in part due to the fact that plane can only be so strong, and the engines can only supply so much thrust.
To an extent, but the large the drone is (so it's more capable of range and payload capacity), the less the relative manned penalty is.
> 3. Because humans don't have to be inside of them they can also go a higher speeds, maneuver faster without human body limitations
Similar to above: the bigger the drone, the more they get constrained by other factors than the human body. A drone the size of a F-15 isn't going to be significantly more manueverable or faster than a F-15, simply because the G limit is in part due to the fact that plane can only be so strong, and the engines can only supply so much thrust.
If a drone goes down, the drone pilot can man another one. All that training and knowledge is retained.
We have only to look to WWII to see the strategic value of sapping the enemy of their experienced pilots. Which, in turn, could mean that shooting down enemy drones is no longer a goal. Perhaps it becomes more like a carrier formation, with a drone formation defending the operators, and the aggressor looking to destroy the operators instead of the drones. Much like how a carrier is a far larger prize than a carrier fighter.
We have only to look to WWII to see the strategic value of sapping the enemy of their experienced pilots. Which, in turn, could mean that shooting down enemy drones is no longer a goal. Perhaps it becomes more like a carrier formation, with a drone formation defending the operators, and the aggressor looking to destroy the operators instead of the drones. Much like how a carrier is a far larger prize than a carrier fighter.
Volunteer armies have much lower death rates, because the commanders cannot afford to squander their lives.
Conscript armies get treated as cannon fodder.
Conscript armies get treated as cannon fodder.
> Conscript armies get treated as cannon fodder.
Counter example is the conscripted Allied armies at the end of WW2. In the last few months, the allies would much rather expend a mass of munitions rather than lose troops, especially front-line infantry, who were very hard to replace.
Counter example is the conscripted Allied armies at the end of WW2. In the last few months, the allies would much rather expend a mass of munitions rather than lose troops, especially front-line infantry, who were very hard to replace.
The marines, air force, and navy were all volunteers in WW2. The marines were front line. The army had a lot of volunteers, too, like the paratroopers.
The US military is all volunteer today, and is very parsimonious with the lives of servicemen.
The US military is all volunteer today, and is very parsimonious with the lives of servicemen.
Exactly. Drones only look powerful because they're a recent innovation (in terms of military procurement timelines).
They're being shot down with air defense missiles designed for helicopters, because that's the cheapest option we currently have.
Once RFPs, responses, and projects work their way to completion, everyone will have anti-drone air defense missiles that, while still expensive, will be better cost:capability calibrated.
The real difference that drone warfare seems to make is in persistence of ISR, which is why so much funding seems to be going into stealthy HALE platforms with stealthy networking and sensors (point to point and LPIR).
The correct lesson to take away from Ukraine seems to be that future battlefields will have key assets (tanks, ships, supply stores, HQs, etc) under threat to a greater depth behind front lines. And not because of a capability change (i.e. a drone can get there with a weapon), but because of a visibility change (a drone can loiter and identify the asset).
Creating a smoking hole in the ground at an arbitrary location is a capability most advanced militaries have had since the 1990s.
What's changed is the ability to find something valuable to place that hole on, at all times, anywhere, at a cost you can organically equip smaller units with.
They're being shot down with air defense missiles designed for helicopters, because that's the cheapest option we currently have.
Once RFPs, responses, and projects work their way to completion, everyone will have anti-drone air defense missiles that, while still expensive, will be better cost:capability calibrated.
The real difference that drone warfare seems to make is in persistence of ISR, which is why so much funding seems to be going into stealthy HALE platforms with stealthy networking and sensors (point to point and LPIR).
The correct lesson to take away from Ukraine seems to be that future battlefields will have key assets (tanks, ships, supply stores, HQs, etc) under threat to a greater depth behind front lines. And not because of a capability change (i.e. a drone can get there with a weapon), but because of a visibility change (a drone can loiter and identify the asset).
Creating a smoking hole in the ground at an arbitrary location is a capability most advanced militaries have had since the 1990s.
What's changed is the ability to find something valuable to place that hole on, at all times, anywhere, at a cost you can organically equip smaller units with.
Meanwhile, spotter drones are getting smaller and more stealthy. How do you detect, much less shoot down, a drone the size of a small bird or even an insect?
My only concern here, is a mini-nuke on board.
Ever C4 inside a grasshopper (as the grasshopper also need space to move), is going to be tiny.
Even if you made the grasshopper out of solid, but explosive plastic, a mini nuke would be far scarier.
I wonder, what the minimal size of a nuke is. I'm sure we have limits, due to materials, explosive force to cause the compression wave, etc, but I wonder the theoretical limited mini size.
I mean, what if an earwig could enter your ear, into your canal, then go boom, and turn your brain to mush?
Ever C4 inside a grasshopper (as the grasshopper also need space to move), is going to be tiny.
Even if you made the grasshopper out of solid, but explosive plastic, a mini nuke would be far scarier.
I wonder, what the minimal size of a nuke is. I'm sure we have limits, due to materials, explosive force to cause the compression wave, etc, but I wonder the theoretical limited mini size.
I mean, what if an earwig could enter your ear, into your canal, then go boom, and turn your brain to mush?
If a robotic earwig can make it into your ear, it can kill you with milligrams of simple poison.
Critical mass for plutonium is 10 KG. A nuke needs to be supercritical, plus the mechanism of the bomb itself. Smallest nuke ever built is 50kg, https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Davy_Crockett_(nuclear_devic...
Smallest nukes were phased out by all major nations because there is too much risk of them getting lost, falling into wrong hands, being used without authorisation, etc. Several 'big' nukes were already lost and never found
Critical mass for plutonium is 10 KG. A nuke needs to be supercritical, plus the mechanism of the bomb itself. Smallest nuke ever built is 50kg, https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Davy_Crockett_(nuclear_devic...
Smallest nukes were phased out by all major nations because there is too much risk of them getting lost, falling into wrong hands, being used without authorisation, etc. Several 'big' nukes were already lost and never found
23.1Kg. ~50lbs
There's a minimum critical mass for fission weapons that means they are never going to be earwig-size [1]. Fusion weapons require a fission trigger so they are no smaller than the smallest fission weapon. The only earwig-size nuclear explosive that might theoretically exist is one based on antimatter, but with present and currently foreseeable technology that is the stuff of science fiction.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Critical_mass#Critical_mass_of... Note that explosive compression lowers the critical mass, but it soon requires more than one gram of high explosive to trim the fissile material budget by one gram, so minimal-size devices are still in the range of kilograms.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Critical_mass#Critical_mass_of... Note that explosive compression lowers the critical mass, but it soon requires more than one gram of high explosive to trim the fissile material budget by one gram, so minimal-size devices are still in the range of kilograms.
The most obvious use case for a grasshopper/earwig size explosive is as a self-assembling munition. Users dial in the critical mass necessary for destruction of the target and program the members of the munition group to identify, track, and assemble at the target's weak point, insuring that at least one of the explosive initiators (primers) makes it into the assembled munition and once their internal mesh network confirms that critical mass, primer, etc are in place, a detonation is initiated.
The individual units could travel a circuitous route to the actual target without raising much suspicion and once in the immediate vicinity they could be programmed to rapidly converge on the target.
That's how I see it. With self-assembling munitions you have less waste of resources, you can target individuals in a command structure or individual critical components of their military infrastructure and you could do it with things that could be made to be relatively inconspicuous so that an observer could see them as a normal part of the environment. Until they converge of course and if this happens fast enough it can be difficult for the targeted entity to unravel exactly how it all went down.
Future war looks scary to me.
The individual units could travel a circuitous route to the actual target without raising much suspicion and once in the immediate vicinity they could be programmed to rapidly converge on the target.
That's how I see it. With self-assembling munitions you have less waste of resources, you can target individuals in a command structure or individual critical components of their military infrastructure and you could do it with things that could be made to be relatively inconspicuous so that an observer could see them as a normal part of the environment. Until they converge of course and if this happens fast enough it can be difficult for the targeted entity to unravel exactly how it all went down.
Future war looks scary to me.
Futurist predictions tend to most often be wrong because they fail to account for easier / cheaper ways of obtaining the same effect. This seems like such a case.
Why are you self-assembling anything when you can park a remotely operated machine gun along someone's driving route?
Why are you self-assembling anything when you can park a remotely operated machine gun along someone's driving route?
>Why are you self-assembling anything...
This just provides another tool in the inventory. You're forcing the adversary to plan for strategies to mitigate attacks like this. Everyone already knows about remote-controlled machine guns and those who feel threatened by the prospect of having something like this used against them are actively working to mitigate the threat.
With a self-assembling munition you have a new, novel method of conducting an attack that literally forces an adversary to use a zero trust threat model 24 hours a day against every little thing that moves once the adversary understands how it happened.
When the grass can suddenly come alive with dormant, self-assembling munitions that have suddenly detected that a target on their list is in the vicinity then it adds another layer of complexity to force protection since both human and material assets could be targeted at any time from any direction by something like a bug-sized bot that may not even register in your consciousness until it is too late.
That's all I'm thinking.
This just provides another tool in the inventory. You're forcing the adversary to plan for strategies to mitigate attacks like this. Everyone already knows about remote-controlled machine guns and those who feel threatened by the prospect of having something like this used against them are actively working to mitigate the threat.
With a self-assembling munition you have a new, novel method of conducting an attack that literally forces an adversary to use a zero trust threat model 24 hours a day against every little thing that moves once the adversary understands how it happened.
When the grass can suddenly come alive with dormant, self-assembling munitions that have suddenly detected that a target on their list is in the vicinity then it adds another layer of complexity to force protection since both human and material assets could be targeted at any time from any direction by something like a bug-sized bot that may not even register in your consciousness until it is too late.
That's all I'm thinking.
It might take a (human) generation to get us there. It might not.
During the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union had nuclear artillery shells for 155mm and 152mm howitzers, respectively -- those would have a yield of about 100 tons on the low end, up to 2 kilotons on the high end. Higher-caliber artillery pieces, like a 203mm piece, could have a shell on the order of 10 to 15 kilotons, roughly approaching the Hiroshima bomb's power.
The American W82 155mm nuclear artillery shell[0] weighed 43kg (95lb), was 860 mm (34 in) long, and had a yield of 2 kilotons -- equivalent to 500 full WW2 heavy bomber loads.
These shells (as well as bombs and warheads with similar yields, carried by planes and missiles, respectively) are called tactical nuclear weapons -- meant for use on the battlefield, to break up enemy formations. Their blast radius is relatively small. It was theorized that if the Cold War went hot and a conventional WW3 broke out, if the Soviet Union was pushing NATO forces back, then the Americans would authorize the use of tactical nuclear warheads. This would likely cause a spiral of escalation, up to a strategic nuclear exchange.
[0]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/W82
The American W82 155mm nuclear artillery shell[0] weighed 43kg (95lb), was 860 mm (34 in) long, and had a yield of 2 kilotons -- equivalent to 500 full WW2 heavy bomber loads.
These shells (as well as bombs and warheads with similar yields, carried by planes and missiles, respectively) are called tactical nuclear weapons -- meant for use on the battlefield, to break up enemy formations. Their blast radius is relatively small. It was theorized that if the Cold War went hot and a conventional WW3 broke out, if the Soviet Union was pushing NATO forces back, then the Americans would authorize the use of tactical nuclear warheads. This would likely cause a spiral of escalation, up to a strategic nuclear exchange.
[0]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/W82
[deleted]
I love the WW1 analogy!
I think anti-drone drones are going to quickly move to being autonomous. No one's going to worry too much about "accidentally" taking down a simple drone and the threat of just one kamikaze drone getting through is too high to chance a delayed human reaction. Plus jamming or other measures will make direct control more difficult. An army will likely have a few circling "CAP" drones overhead at all times.
I think anti-drone drones are going to quickly move to being autonomous. No one's going to worry too much about "accidentally" taking down a simple drone and the threat of just one kamikaze drone getting through is too high to chance a delayed human reaction. Plus jamming or other measures will make direct control more difficult. An army will likely have a few circling "CAP" drones overhead at all times.
I think you need to think about drone swarms or herds. Not all of the drones need AI or the same level of AI. Some drones will support the costs of a higher level AI and others will have lower AI capabilities and refocus resources on other capacities like attack. Simple drones in volume may be used to overwhelm defenses.
I agree, the anti-drone aspect needs to be low-latency. But I actually expect that soon, most drones will come with some anti-drones aspects, and some will will be multi-purpuse, capable of launcing some anti ground ordenance. For that part, they may come with a manual mode, for a while longer.
Assume there will be IFF for drones. With crypto key rotation to keep it reliable.
Not sure why you're getting downvoted - this entire operation should cause a major rethink of military operations based on new technology.
The proximal goal of any weapons system or operation is to deliver live ordinance to the target, preferably at minimal risk to those doing the delivering.
From WWI to WWII, the progress seemed to be to deliver larger volumes of ordinance, with some increases in accuracy. Since then, it's been longer range and higher accuracy, to the point now that we often need only a pair of 'smart bombs' or JDAMs to take out a target that used to take multiple full bomber loads. With highly accurate targeting, we can even deliver non-explosive ordinance just to minimize collateral damage. Of course Javelins, Switchblades,etc. make it close to 1-shot-one-kill on tanks and other heavily armored vehicles that used to be tough to kill.
Following the trend further, drones and AI recognition technology seem likely to make this even more effective. I'm sure everyone has seen the Slaughterbots video [1], but much loser in technology is killing swarms of small bots specifically targeting enemy equipment, and the loitering switchblade is already here - just add some recognition, maybe it recognizes, operator confirms, and the drone tracks it for the optimal strike moment. Add the swarm then seeks and destroys other examples of the same vehicle.... Small self-contained flying ordinance delivery drones being disgorged from larger carrier drones or aircraft - already in design & testing stages. This IS all going to change and fast, and the smart militaries are taking a LOT of notes on this battle.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Slaughterbots
The proximal goal of any weapons system or operation is to deliver live ordinance to the target, preferably at minimal risk to those doing the delivering.
From WWI to WWII, the progress seemed to be to deliver larger volumes of ordinance, with some increases in accuracy. Since then, it's been longer range and higher accuracy, to the point now that we often need only a pair of 'smart bombs' or JDAMs to take out a target that used to take multiple full bomber loads. With highly accurate targeting, we can even deliver non-explosive ordinance just to minimize collateral damage. Of course Javelins, Switchblades,etc. make it close to 1-shot-one-kill on tanks and other heavily armored vehicles that used to be tough to kill.
Following the trend further, drones and AI recognition technology seem likely to make this even more effective. I'm sure everyone has seen the Slaughterbots video [1], but much loser in technology is killing swarms of small bots specifically targeting enemy equipment, and the loitering switchblade is already here - just add some recognition, maybe it recognizes, operator confirms, and the drone tracks it for the optimal strike moment. Add the swarm then seeks and destroys other examples of the same vehicle.... Small self-contained flying ordinance delivery drones being disgorged from larger carrier drones or aircraft - already in design & testing stages. This IS all going to change and fast, and the smart militaries are taking a LOT of notes on this battle.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Slaughterbots
> I see this changing soon. We will soon have small cheap drones that will take down nearby spotter drones and the balance will change yet again.
That's hard to imagine. You can do the spotting job with a $400 consumer device. No piece of autonomous weapons delivery hardware in the modern world exists with a price tag less than 100x that amount. Drones are simply too cheap.
If there's a reasonable countermeasure, look to ECM (though frankly modern broadband wifi is remarkably resistant there too, given all the "jamming" present in modern coffee establishments!) and not drone killers.
That's hard to imagine. You can do the spotting job with a $400 consumer device. No piece of autonomous weapons delivery hardware in the modern world exists with a price tag less than 100x that amount. Drones are simply too cheap.
If there's a reasonable countermeasure, look to ECM (though frankly modern broadband wifi is remarkably resistant there too, given all the "jamming" present in modern coffee establishments!) and not drone killers.
What I've imagined for the past decade or so, are spotter drones that are about the same size as the drones they are design to shoot down. These spotter drones could be built much like WW1/WW2 aircraft, just much smaller, with top speeds between 50-200knots for the smaller versions.
As a weapon, they could carry weapons similar to submachineguns, shotguns or light marchine guns, depending on the size of the target. Add an AI of about the same level of sophistication as the "autopilots" in cars, and they should be able to identify and shoot down hostile drones relatively cost efficiently. Produced at scale, the smallest versions (designed to shoot down comercially available drones, for instance), would not have to cost all that much more than the drones they are designed to shoot down, if produced at scale.
I'm imagining at least 3-4 size categories, lets say. 1) Tiny, able to shoot down most quad copters. Top speed of 50-100knots. Price needs to be low enough to allow tens of thousands to be produced. Could potentially also double as anti-infantry weapons by strafing. 2) Small. Able to shoot down switchblade-sized drones. Top speed of maybe 200 knots. Can be produced in numbers of thousands. 3) Medium. Sutable to hunt small UAV's, such as Buyraktar. Top speed of several hundered knots, maybe just below Mach 1. Somewhat more expensive than the Buyraktar, but can also carry some of the same ordanance, like a tiny fighter-bomber. 4) Full-sized, possibly supersonic. Basically the same as the Loyal Wingman concept. Designed to counter other full-sized drones as well as manned aircraft.
Basically, the removal of a pilot, allows aircraft to span a wide range of sizes, and I would expect all sizes to be produced, as it is uneconomical to hunt quadcopters with full sized aircraft, while it is impossible to hunt supersonic aircraft with switchblade type aircraft.
In a way, this would be analogous to naval vessels, with different sizes serving different roles, from corvettes, MTB's and attacks subs, through frigates and cruisers, to WW2 style batlleships or carriers.
Now, for the AI researchers out there, imagine the careers that can be built around providing AI's for these vehicles. To see your own AI locked in a WW2 style dogfight with a similar drone from another country, in a real-time feed.....
As a weapon, they could carry weapons similar to submachineguns, shotguns or light marchine guns, depending on the size of the target. Add an AI of about the same level of sophistication as the "autopilots" in cars, and they should be able to identify and shoot down hostile drones relatively cost efficiently. Produced at scale, the smallest versions (designed to shoot down comercially available drones, for instance), would not have to cost all that much more than the drones they are designed to shoot down, if produced at scale.
I'm imagining at least 3-4 size categories, lets say. 1) Tiny, able to shoot down most quad copters. Top speed of 50-100knots. Price needs to be low enough to allow tens of thousands to be produced. Could potentially also double as anti-infantry weapons by strafing. 2) Small. Able to shoot down switchblade-sized drones. Top speed of maybe 200 knots. Can be produced in numbers of thousands. 3) Medium. Sutable to hunt small UAV's, such as Buyraktar. Top speed of several hundered knots, maybe just below Mach 1. Somewhat more expensive than the Buyraktar, but can also carry some of the same ordanance, like a tiny fighter-bomber. 4) Full-sized, possibly supersonic. Basically the same as the Loyal Wingman concept. Designed to counter other full-sized drones as well as manned aircraft.
Basically, the removal of a pilot, allows aircraft to span a wide range of sizes, and I would expect all sizes to be produced, as it is uneconomical to hunt quadcopters with full sized aircraft, while it is impossible to hunt supersonic aircraft with switchblade type aircraft.
In a way, this would be analogous to naval vessels, with different sizes serving different roles, from corvettes, MTB's and attacks subs, through frigates and cruisers, to WW2 style batlleships or carriers.
Now, for the AI researchers out there, imagine the careers that can be built around providing AI's for these vehicles. To see your own AI locked in a WW2 style dogfight with a similar drone from another country, in a real-time feed.....
Human drone pilots are cheap and reasonably easy to train. The "AI" that you need is the targeting and guidance system. If I can see any enemy drone on a camera, all I need to do is get a lock and fire.
The problem is that precision guided munitions are fairly expensive. Drones are cheap, but giving them any kind of offensive ability increases the cost significantly. A switchblade drone only costs about $6,000 and there still aren't swarms of thousands of them. Maybe once the economics enable massing hundreds of thousands of drones, autonomous control will become more reasonable.
The problem is that precision guided munitions are fairly expensive. Drones are cheap, but giving them any kind of offensive ability increases the cost significantly. A switchblade drone only costs about $6,000 and there still aren't swarms of thousands of them. Maybe once the economics enable massing hundreds of thousands of drones, autonomous control will become more reasonable.
> The problem is that precision guided munitions are fairly expensive. Drones are cheap, but giving them any kind of offensive ability increases the cost significantly. A switchblade drone only costs about $6,000 and there still aren't swarms of thousands of them. Maybe once the economics enable massing hundreds of thousands of drones, autonomous control will become more reasonable.
Exactly this. How many drones can you get for the price of 100 F35's?
If you get that many drones, you want to have drones that can attack both enemy land units AND enemy drones.
Exactly this. How many drones can you get for the price of 100 F35's?
If you get that many drones, you want to have drones that can attack both enemy land units AND enemy drones.
This is just silly and unrealistic. You have completely neglected detection and targeting issues. What types of sensors would be needed? What field of view do they have? How much power do they consume? How much does that sensor suite cost?
I answered a lot of this in another subthread.
Here I will just provide a couple of links to a couple of anti-air drone systems under development:
> But concepts that would fall under this class are under development. One relativly large example is Baykar Bayraktar Kızılelma:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baykar_Bayraktar_K%C4%B1z%C4%B...
> This one is a hybrid drone, capable of both anti-air and anti-ground missions. It would fall under what I would consider "medium" size.
> Here is an early model of a Russian attempt: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UcAqF5BVLU4
Here I will just provide a couple of links to a couple of anti-air drone systems under development:
> But concepts that would fall under this class are under development. One relativly large example is Baykar Bayraktar Kızılelma:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baykar_Bayraktar_K%C4%B1z%C4%B...
> This one is a hybrid drone, capable of both anti-air and anti-ground missions. It would fall under what I would consider "medium" size.
> Here is an early model of a Russian attempt: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UcAqF5BVLU4
You haven't actually answered anything. Sure it's theoretically possible to build a large, fast UCAV with advanced sensors. But it will be nearly as expensive as current manned fighters, and still not very useful at countering small, low-altitude drones.
Which is why I (a few posts up) argued that several size categories of drones are needed.
To counter the the small, low altitude drones, I argue for similarly small drones to be used. To counter a drone that costs $500-$5000 to make, one should build drones that cost $1000-$10000 (possibly a bit more expensive when adjusting for R&D and military inefficiency). These will not carry more advanced sensors than what you see on a modern car, primarily a few optical cameras.
Since one can built A LOT of such small drones (10s or 100s of thousand, if needed), they can be spread out along a frontline. They would be carried in a manner similar to switchblade drones or mounted on vehicles, and take off when a threat is detected in the vicinity. A drone (or a small swarm) would search for the enemy drone using primarily optical (including IR), and try to shoot it down WW1/WW2 style.
And, like manned fighters, they would not be restricted to purely defensive missions. These drones could also double as recon craft, do strafing against infantry or even carry small grenades or bombs.
Since these would be recoverable, it would be fine to use a $10000 drone to shoot down a $500 drone, instead of using a stinger missile.
Larger drones would be available in smaller numbers, but those would primarily be used vs larger drones and manned aircraft.
To counter the the small, low altitude drones, I argue for similarly small drones to be used. To counter a drone that costs $500-$5000 to make, one should build drones that cost $1000-$10000 (possibly a bit more expensive when adjusting for R&D and military inefficiency). These will not carry more advanced sensors than what you see on a modern car, primarily a few optical cameras.
Since one can built A LOT of such small drones (10s or 100s of thousand, if needed), they can be spread out along a frontline. They would be carried in a manner similar to switchblade drones or mounted on vehicles, and take off when a threat is detected in the vicinity. A drone (or a small swarm) would search for the enemy drone using primarily optical (including IR), and try to shoot it down WW1/WW2 style.
And, like manned fighters, they would not be restricted to purely defensive missions. These drones could also double as recon craft, do strafing against infantry or even carry small grenades or bombs.
Since these would be recoverable, it would be fine to use a $10000 drone to shoot down a $500 drone, instead of using a stinger missile.
Larger drones would be available in smaller numbers, but those would primarily be used vs larger drones and manned aircraft.
Optical and IR sensors are not adequate for the stated mission. The prices you stated are completely disconnected from reality. You're just making things up.
A Switchblade 300 costs $6000. Swap out the payload with a small gun as well as a better computer (to enable better AI).
Maybe make the wings a bit wider, to improve manouverability. The price should still be below $10000.
Provide one such unit per 20 infantrymen + a couple of units per artillery squad and other units that are particularily vulnerable, logistic vehicles, etc.
Maybe make the wings a bit wider, to improve manouverability. The price should still be below $10000.
Provide one such unit per 20 infantrymen + a couple of units per artillery squad and other units that are particularily vulnerable, logistic vehicles, etc.
Right now they're shooting down small drones with $100k manpads. I'm not convinced drones are sensitive to ECM.
Russia said they're shooting down drones with laser weapons, which sounds kinda reasonable. Probably fairly quick to aim, and definitely very quick to deliver.
Colourless, instant laser is the Star Wars we deserve, not the Star Wars we wanted, though ;)
Colourless, instant laser is the Star Wars we deserve, not the Star Wars we wanted, though ;)
>Russia said they're shooting down drones with laser weapons
I tend not to believe this. In part because Russia is very comfortable with shameless lying, and in part because it's really hard to deliver enough energy with a laser to a moving target. That said, non-moving (hovering) drones would be very reasonable targets as you can illuminate for as long as it takes for an important part to melt.
BTW my favorite anti-drone tech are trained hunting hawks. Hawks are a weapon for a more...civilized time.
I tend not to believe this. In part because Russia is very comfortable with shameless lying, and in part because it's really hard to deliver enough energy with a laser to a moving target. That said, non-moving (hovering) drones would be very reasonable targets as you can illuminate for as long as it takes for an important part to melt.
BTW my favorite anti-drone tech are trained hunting hawks. Hawks are a weapon for a more...civilized time.
Weaponised hawks have many interesting properties. They don't emit radio waves, and not much infrared either, so are hard to locate and shoot down. They can loiter forever (well, limited by hawk's lifetime, whatever it is), are self-refueling, and, to some extent, also self-repairing and self-replicating.
Hawks also can't be suborned.
>it's really hard to deliver enough energy with a laser to a moving target.
Israel demonstrated that capability earlier this year. https://news.yahoo.com/video-shows-israel-testing-iron-13004...
Israel demonstrated that capability earlier this year. https://news.yahoo.com/video-shows-israel-testing-iron-13004...
Sounds like a fantastic way to rapidly maim a hawk.
I think the goal with this method could be to train the hawk to carry an object such as a net or dangling string that the hawk would drop into the propellers of the drone, thus disabling it.
One could also use a hawk as a platform to carry electronic means of disabling drones.
The problem with hawks and drones becomes one of teaching the hawk to recognize enemy drones since it is likely in future wars that all sides will use drones and that it may be difficult to identify who controls a particular drone without monitoring that drone to map its communication path.
It's cool to use a bird that instinctively hunts other birds but we need to understand that hawks are not hard to see and to eliminate so their utility on a battlefield is limited.
One could also use a hawk as a platform to carry electronic means of disabling drones.
The problem with hawks and drones becomes one of teaching the hawk to recognize enemy drones since it is likely in future wars that all sides will use drones and that it may be difficult to identify who controls a particular drone without monitoring that drone to map its communication path.
It's cool to use a bird that instinctively hunts other birds but we need to understand that hawks are not hard to see and to eliminate so their utility on a battlefield is limited.
I upvoted you because you may be right. I don't really know if people are IRL training hawks for this purpose, but if they did maybe they could give them protection of some kind, like articulated metal "shoes". It's also possible that smaller drones' propellers just don't have the kinetic energy to damage a bird in any meaningful way. It's all speculation, but I still think it would be very cool.
The problem with laser weapons so far is that they have insufficient power and are fighting the inverse square law.
Heating to create sufficient damage takes multiple seconds in good conditions. They work great in field tests where the operator can keep the target aligned exactly for a while and the target operator isn't evading. Add mirror finishes, thermal shielding, automated detection and evasion, much of which is cheap, and that'll stay a demonstrator weapon for a long time.
I don't think anyone is worried about the claimed Russian lasers against drones (particularly since Russia tends to tout a lot of vaporware), but I'd be worried that since Russia is already happy to systematically commit and even advertise their war crimes, that they'd start using the lasers as blinding weapons despite the fact that it is also a war crime.
Heating to create sufficient damage takes multiple seconds in good conditions. They work great in field tests where the operator can keep the target aligned exactly for a while and the target operator isn't evading. Add mirror finishes, thermal shielding, automated detection and evasion, much of which is cheap, and that'll stay a demonstrator weapon for a long time.
I don't think anyone is worried about the claimed Russian lasers against drones (particularly since Russia tends to tout a lot of vaporware), but I'd be worried that since Russia is already happy to systematically commit and even advertise their war crimes, that they'd start using the lasers as blinding weapons despite the fact that it is also a war crime.
Laser weapons of this sort aren't manually operated. They automatically track the target while they are firing, and they are normally pulsed to allow higher instantaneous powers, which make mirror finishes useless (the pulsed power is high enough that the amount of power that isn't reflected is enough to heat the surface of the mirror finish enough to make it non-reflective). The target also becomes very bright while it's being engaged, making it much easier for electro-optical systems to track.
The multiple seconds to kill is dependent on the laser power, the higher the power, the longer it takes to kill. The LaWS tested by the USN was 30kW or so, but they're looking at lasers with 10x the power for operational use. So the 2 seconds to down a UAV turns into 2/10s of a second, which is probably beyond reaction time, even for automated detection and evasion.
The multiple seconds to kill is dependent on the laser power, the higher the power, the longer it takes to kill. The LaWS tested by the USN was 30kW or so, but they're looking at lasers with 10x the power for operational use. So the 2 seconds to down a UAV turns into 2/10s of a second, which is probably beyond reaction time, even for automated detection and evasion.
Yes, I understand that much or all of the tracking is automated. That does not negate all countermeasures. If the laser is powerful enough to punch through a mirrored surface, then one can use a sacrificial surface, a scattering surface, heat shield, emission of a scattering fog/smoke/chaff, etc., etc., etc.
I've watched the successful tests, and I'm not impressed. sure, it can shoot down a black-painted sitting duck with no countermeasures in several seconds. Merely starting to do twisting and spinning aerobatic maneuvers would have foiled it by constantly presenting new surfaces such that no tracking would work (can't make the laser point at the same spot from the other side).
The point is that until lasers get to insane powers not yet available in any portable form, it is not at all a slam-dunk. This stuff was funded decades ago for the "Star Wars" anti-missile initiative. It could use all power in fixed positions on the ground, so as big, heavy, and sprawling as you want, and the target missiles couldn't significantly evade, and it was an utter failure. Sure, we've since seen orders of magnitude increases in strength, but we're still orders of magnitude away.
I've watched the successful tests, and I'm not impressed. sure, it can shoot down a black-painted sitting duck with no countermeasures in several seconds. Merely starting to do twisting and spinning aerobatic maneuvers would have foiled it by constantly presenting new surfaces such that no tracking would work (can't make the laser point at the same spot from the other side).
The point is that until lasers get to insane powers not yet available in any portable form, it is not at all a slam-dunk. This stuff was funded decades ago for the "Star Wars" anti-missile initiative. It could use all power in fixed positions on the ground, so as big, heavy, and sprawling as you want, and the target missiles couldn't significantly evade, and it was an utter failure. Sure, we've since seen orders of magnitude increases in strength, but we're still orders of magnitude away.
Scattering surfaces aren't going to be any better against lasers, they'll heat up and become black bodies relatively quickly. Neither will emitting smoke or fog, because we're talking about airborne items, and they won't stay surrounding the aircraft very well. Sacrificial or heat shields will help, but that's extra weight that reduces your payload, and for quadcopter type drones, you can't reasonably add those to your props.
SDI wasn't successful, no, because they didn't have the capability to make high power electrical lasers worth a damn back then. But the semi-operational AN/SEQ-1 was 30kW a decade ago, and technology has improved since then. Again, we're looking at an order of magnitude more power. And I don't think we need many more orders of magnitude to get down below the threshold of : can't do anything in the time you've got.
SDI wasn't successful, no, because they didn't have the capability to make high power electrical lasers worth a damn back then. But the semi-operational AN/SEQ-1 was 30kW a decade ago, and technology has improved since then. Again, we're looking at an order of magnitude more power. And I don't think we need many more orders of magnitude to get down below the threshold of : can't do anything in the time you've got.
Lasers also suffer from easily deployed countermeasures. Anyone who has been passed by some truck rolling coal can attest to how trivial it is for anything running a combustion engine to be modified to foul the air around it to the point of zero visibility. In addition, flying projectiles like missiles, mortars, or ICBMs can simply spin such that the laser has to heat the whole circumference of the body rather than a single point in order to be effective, which they may be doing anyway for stabilization
Just shoot some stringy gel into the propellers. I'm sure a material exists that can both tangle the propellers or block the inlets of jets which would make it effective against a variety of types.
You have to get the stringy gel to the propellers, which is most of the cost of a MANPAD. The warhead doesn't cost all that much, whether it's explosive or silly string.
>Yossarian sidled up drunkenly to Colonel Korn at the officers' club one night to kid with him about the new Lepage gun that the Germans had moved in. "What Lepage gun?" Colonel Korn inquired with curiosity. "The new three hundred and forty four millimeter Lepage glue gun," Yossarian answered. "It glues a whole formation of planes together in mid-air."
-Catch-22
-Catch-22
Thanks for this. Catch-22 is my all-time favorite war related book. There is so much in there to take in and enjoy. Absurdity, off-color humor, puns, social commentary. Heller was magnificent in this book.
Yeah you kinda expect a swarm of drones like a small ocean fleet. With smaller drones to protect the main cruiser.
Can manpads lock on 400$ DJI style drones ?
I purposely left that detail out because I dont know. They have been hitting those junk Orlans which is what I meant. I guess you can bring down the mini drones with a rifle? Like OP says there are a bunch of radio jamming guns around which probably confuse DJI.
This post says they downed 65 "targets" in one day so I'm guessing they're the cheap drones. https://t.me/LastBP/9398
This post says they downed 65 "targets" in one day so I'm guessing they're the cheap drones. https://t.me/LastBP/9398
> No piece of autonomous weapons delivery hardware in the modern world exists with a price tag less than 100x that amount. Drones are simply too cheap.
I recently found a video at https://twitter.com/FortemTech/status/1526925732122968067 (source: https://twitter.com/TomReiner4/status/1528214932461846528) which shows an anti-drone drone. Unfortunately, I couldn't find its price tag, but looking at the images in the manufacturer's site, it doesn't look like it would be much more expensive to manufacture than an equivalent-sized DJI drone.
I recently found a video at https://twitter.com/FortemTech/status/1526925732122968067 (source: https://twitter.com/TomReiner4/status/1528214932461846528) which shows an anti-drone drone. Unfortunately, I couldn't find its price tag, but looking at the images in the manufacturer's site, it doesn't look like it would be much more expensive to manufacture than an equivalent-sized DJI drone.
for quadrocopters, you want a hunter-killer drone with some kind of a net or tape to jam the propeller.
for plane-like drones... guess something similar. gliders may be super hard to spot and will still be somewhat effective without a working propeller, so tough luck.
for plane-like drones... guess something similar. gliders may be super hard to spot and will still be somewhat effective without a working propeller, so tough luck.
Net or tape? In a war? Why not suicide your drone into the target drone? If you want something reusable or longer range, a shotgun-like apparatus.
Gliders will be easier to spot because they won't be able to actively navigate through trees for cover the way the way a more nimble, powered drone could.
Gliders will be easier to spot because they won't be able to actively navigate through trees for cover the way the way a more nimble, powered drone could.
A suicidal drone is a guided missile. There are many options on the market for these already. They’re universally way more expensive than necessary to combat a cheap swarm. You want something that won’t bankrupt you while you’re mounting a defense.
Ramming seems the most practical and cost effective solution.
Have you ever tried to catch a sparrow with a drine? Imagine how hard it is to hit a target that is actively avoiding you
A good old fashioned flak cannon would do the trick, except now with modern targeting systems
what i think is concerning is that the drone will likely become the new ak47 and we will have a new era of guerilla warfare and terrorism on our hands
> drone will
ISIS peeps have been dropping mortar rounds from DJI drones for a few years now, it's already a reality
ISIS peeps have been dropping mortar rounds from DJI drones for a few years now, it's already a reality
I remember reading a concern of the US Navy that one of the few means of successfully attacking a (carrier group?) would be a drone swarm. Something where they're overwhelmed with just the sheer number of drones attacking.
Drones cheap enough to use in a swarm lack the range necessary to hit a carrier strike group operating in blue water.
isn't the point that this is only true now
This will continue to be true for at least the next few decades. There is no technology on the horizon that would allow for dramatic cost reductions in long-range drones with good sensors.
I would say the only defense againts small, cheap drones, are small cheap anti-drones. These would be able to shoot down the cheap drones at the cost of a few bullets and a gallon of fuel.
Drones are hard to detect due to small IR signature, and they are almost invisible to radar due the use of plastics and composites. So how will these small, cheap anti-drones detect them? How will they have enough fuel and maneuverability to successfully engage them? How will they shoot bullets (I assume you're saying they'll carry machine guns or cannon.)
I think once the detection methodology is worked out for ground forces (which aren't as constrained by power/weight issues as airborne systems), we'll see directed energy weapons (probably microwave) used to effectively fry these types of low performance drones. Whether the detection problem is solved is an entirely different issue than the weapons used once detected.
I think once the detection methodology is worked out for ground forces (which aren't as constrained by power/weight issues as airborne systems), we'll see directed energy weapons (probably microwave) used to effectively fry these types of low performance drones. Whether the detection problem is solved is an entirely different issue than the weapons used once detected.
> So how will these small, cheap anti-drones detect them?
For the smaller ones, optics, combined with being produced in large numbers, to basically cover an area. Basically like a Tesla detects pedestrians. Additional information can be transmitted by radio from other drones (many of which can be ground based) as well as traditional sources, such as awacs or f35/f22.
Larger ones would operate more like traditional aircraft with more internal sensors, including radar.
> How will they have enough fuel and maneuverability to successfully engage them?
Just assume that the anti-drone starts out basically as a copy of the drone it is supposed to kill. Then add 50% cost to make it a bit lighter an more manouverable. Their range doesn't need to be huge, they can be scrambled when needed. (Bigger ones can do in air refueling). A few can fly CAP missions at a time, during low threat situations.
> I think once the detection methodology is worked out for ground forces (which aren't as constrained by power/weight issues as airborne systems), we'll see directed energy weapons (probably microwave) used to effectively fry these types of low performance drones. Whether the detection problem is solved is an entirely different issue than the weapons used once detected.
Maybe some day energy weapons will be effective enough and cheap enough to distributed like that. Then we will see what countermeasures are effecient. (Mirrors, faraday cages, etc). For counter-drones, I think they should be within what can be done with tech available today. They simply have not been built due to lack of need.
But concepts that would fall under this class are under development. One relativly large example is Baykar Bayraktar Kızılelma:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baykar_Bayraktar_K%C4%B1z%C4%B...
This one is a hybrid drone, capable of both anti-air and anti-ground missions. It would fall under what I would consider "medium" size.
EDIT: Here is an early model of a Russian attempt: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UcAqF5BVLU4
For the smaller ones, optics, combined with being produced in large numbers, to basically cover an area. Basically like a Tesla detects pedestrians. Additional information can be transmitted by radio from other drones (many of which can be ground based) as well as traditional sources, such as awacs or f35/f22.
Larger ones would operate more like traditional aircraft with more internal sensors, including radar.
> How will they have enough fuel and maneuverability to successfully engage them?
Just assume that the anti-drone starts out basically as a copy of the drone it is supposed to kill. Then add 50% cost to make it a bit lighter an more manouverable. Their range doesn't need to be huge, they can be scrambled when needed. (Bigger ones can do in air refueling). A few can fly CAP missions at a time, during low threat situations.
> I think once the detection methodology is worked out for ground forces (which aren't as constrained by power/weight issues as airborne systems), we'll see directed energy weapons (probably microwave) used to effectively fry these types of low performance drones. Whether the detection problem is solved is an entirely different issue than the weapons used once detected.
Maybe some day energy weapons will be effective enough and cheap enough to distributed like that. Then we will see what countermeasures are effecient. (Mirrors, faraday cages, etc). For counter-drones, I think they should be within what can be done with tech available today. They simply have not been built due to lack of need.
But concepts that would fall under this class are under development. One relativly large example is Baykar Bayraktar Kızılelma:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baykar_Bayraktar_K%C4%B1z%C4%B...
This one is a hybrid drone, capable of both anti-air and anti-ground missions. It would fall under what I would consider "medium" size.
EDIT: Here is an early model of a Russian attempt: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UcAqF5BVLU4
LOL, you lost me when you mentioned Tesla detecting pedestrians.
Optically detecting something small at range is very difficult. When cued by other devices (radar/IR) EO systems like what the F-14 used to carry can zoom in and identify a target at range. With drones you won't have that cueing. Their IR/radar signature is generally too small unless you're talking Predator size UAVs.
And the more you add to a drone, the heavier and more expensive it becomes. Radios, advanced sensors, etc etc.
Why would I assume an anti-drone would look anything similar to a "normal" drone? Does a SAM (surface to air missile) look anything like a fighter aircraft it counters? Does an anti-tank mine resemble an armored vehicle?
And you can't just hand wave and say add 50% to the cost to make it lighter and more maneuverable. That's just ridiculous. Modern aeronautics is a mature industry, and just throwing money at something doesn't magically improve flight characteristics.
And range? Just hand-waving here as well. Range (what the experts refer to as persistence) is hugely important. If you don't have persistence, then to "scramble" as you so eloquently put it require high performance, which leads to higher weight and higher cost, as well as less maneuverability.
And in-flight refueling? That's only been demonstrated on very high performance USN UAVs, and those are basically jets, not drones. The idea that these (or any drone) is even close to flying CAP missions is unrealistic.
Currently there is no technology to build what you describe. None.
And your link to the Kızılelma just illustrates how far away this is. This is a stealthy/low RCS supersonic aircraft with an AESA radar. This is what aerospace engineers call "not-cheap."
And I wouldn't dignify the Russian "attempt" as more than someone strapping a shotgun to a hobbyist RC plane and calling it a weapon. It suffers from all the critiques I've previously outlined.
Optically detecting something small at range is very difficult. When cued by other devices (radar/IR) EO systems like what the F-14 used to carry can zoom in and identify a target at range. With drones you won't have that cueing. Their IR/radar signature is generally too small unless you're talking Predator size UAVs.
And the more you add to a drone, the heavier and more expensive it becomes. Radios, advanced sensors, etc etc.
Why would I assume an anti-drone would look anything similar to a "normal" drone? Does a SAM (surface to air missile) look anything like a fighter aircraft it counters? Does an anti-tank mine resemble an armored vehicle?
And you can't just hand wave and say add 50% to the cost to make it lighter and more maneuverable. That's just ridiculous. Modern aeronautics is a mature industry, and just throwing money at something doesn't magically improve flight characteristics.
And range? Just hand-waving here as well. Range (what the experts refer to as persistence) is hugely important. If you don't have persistence, then to "scramble" as you so eloquently put it require high performance, which leads to higher weight and higher cost, as well as less maneuverability.
And in-flight refueling? That's only been demonstrated on very high performance USN UAVs, and those are basically jets, not drones. The idea that these (or any drone) is even close to flying CAP missions is unrealistic.
Currently there is no technology to build what you describe. None.
And your link to the Kızılelma just illustrates how far away this is. This is a stealthy/low RCS supersonic aircraft with an AESA radar. This is what aerospace engineers call "not-cheap."
And I wouldn't dignify the Russian "attempt" as more than someone strapping a shotgun to a hobbyist RC plane and calling it a weapon. It suffers from all the critiques I've previously outlined.
I think you are missing one key point: numbers. Let's say a drone costs $10000, and you buy as many of them as it costs to buy+operate 100 F35. How many do you get?
The key is that you have tens of thousands of these things (more of the smaller ones), and distribute them along the front, near the infantry. Maybe instead of a hand mortar or a machine gun, some platoons would carry a couple of these. Or vehicles of all sizes could have a couple of these mounted simmilar to APS's, kind of like how naval vessels carry helicopters.
Then you make sure that the detection capability is networked between the drones, as well as with other detection systems (land based, awacs + fighters).
This way, detection is not done at rangs of 100's of km, but of 100's of meters, in the same ballpark that a car detects objects.
Also, for the same reason, this means that you don't need a combat radius of 1000km. A combat radus of 100km may be enough.
If you need to deploy them further away, one could have setups where they are deployed as munitions from other aircraft (anything from a B52 to a large UAV).
Kind of like this: https://www.technologyreview.com/2017/01/10/154651/a-100-dro...
>And you can't just hand wave and say add 50% to the cost to make it lighter and more maneuverable. That's just ridiculous. Modern aeronautics is a mature industry, and just throwing money at something doesn't magically improve flight characteristics.
A lot present days UAV's are made witha a lot of focus on cost. That's how they (some of them) cost only 10% of a stinger missile. That's also why you don't want to use a stinger to shoot down a cheap UAV.
But, obviously, these cheap drones have a lot of tradeoffs to keep the cost down. Maybe they use aluminium instead of magnesium or composites as materials? Maybe the electronics is a couple of generations older, and both a bit heavy and unsophisticated? Maybe engines are off-the-shelf versions, and not state of the art.
Except for the most advanced drones, I would expect it to be possible to pay some extra $ to get somewhat higher performance, such as 10% more speed, 5% faster turn/roll rate, 20% more advanced electronics, with enough weight saved, to be able to add a gun and maybe a better radio.
Also, keep in mind that many potential enemies are not nearly as advanced technologially as the USA. Even compared to Russia, the USA has better tech in most fields, and compared to North Korea, Iran, Afghanistan and many other potential enemies that may deploy large number of drones, USA may definitely deploy more advanced tech. With China it may be harder/more symmetrical.
> And in-flight refueling?
UAV's would exist at different sizes (I described this in another sub-thread). Only the ones that are basically the size of a fighter plane would have in-flight refueling, like the Kızılelma.
In turns of numbers, 90-99% of the UAV's I imagine in this model, would be closer to that Russian one in size, or smaller, except that the software would be mature. These are the ones that would be able to counter enemy UAV's that are too cheap to be be worth a stinger missile.
The key is that you have tens of thousands of these things (more of the smaller ones), and distribute them along the front, near the infantry. Maybe instead of a hand mortar or a machine gun, some platoons would carry a couple of these. Or vehicles of all sizes could have a couple of these mounted simmilar to APS's, kind of like how naval vessels carry helicopters.
Then you make sure that the detection capability is networked between the drones, as well as with other detection systems (land based, awacs + fighters).
This way, detection is not done at rangs of 100's of km, but of 100's of meters, in the same ballpark that a car detects objects.
Also, for the same reason, this means that you don't need a combat radius of 1000km. A combat radus of 100km may be enough.
If you need to deploy them further away, one could have setups where they are deployed as munitions from other aircraft (anything from a B52 to a large UAV).
Kind of like this: https://www.technologyreview.com/2017/01/10/154651/a-100-dro...
>And you can't just hand wave and say add 50% to the cost to make it lighter and more maneuverable. That's just ridiculous. Modern aeronautics is a mature industry, and just throwing money at something doesn't magically improve flight characteristics.
A lot present days UAV's are made witha a lot of focus on cost. That's how they (some of them) cost only 10% of a stinger missile. That's also why you don't want to use a stinger to shoot down a cheap UAV.
But, obviously, these cheap drones have a lot of tradeoffs to keep the cost down. Maybe they use aluminium instead of magnesium or composites as materials? Maybe the electronics is a couple of generations older, and both a bit heavy and unsophisticated? Maybe engines are off-the-shelf versions, and not state of the art.
Except for the most advanced drones, I would expect it to be possible to pay some extra $ to get somewhat higher performance, such as 10% more speed, 5% faster turn/roll rate, 20% more advanced electronics, with enough weight saved, to be able to add a gun and maybe a better radio.
Also, keep in mind that many potential enemies are not nearly as advanced technologially as the USA. Even compared to Russia, the USA has better tech in most fields, and compared to North Korea, Iran, Afghanistan and many other potential enemies that may deploy large number of drones, USA may definitely deploy more advanced tech. With China it may be harder/more symmetrical.
> And in-flight refueling?
UAV's would exist at different sizes (I described this in another sub-thread). Only the ones that are basically the size of a fighter plane would have in-flight refueling, like the Kızılelma.
In turns of numbers, 90-99% of the UAV's I imagine in this model, would be closer to that Russian one in size, or smaller, except that the software would be mature. These are the ones that would be able to counter enemy UAV's that are too cheap to be be worth a stinger missile.
You're missing the point. A drone like you're describing, (the Kızılelma) is not a $10k in any world. That's going to be $5-$10M each. The AESA radar alone will be $500K. So you can't just make up a fantasy price and say $10k buys you an effective drone.
The communication network you're describing doesn't exist, and would be highly susceptible to jamming, spoofing or hacking if it did. You can't hand wave away the current state of technology because the idea sounds cool. That's just sci-fi you're describing, not realistic technology.
Basically what you're describing is something that's not currently available, nor possible in the near future. It's the same story that comes out from HN about how fighter jets are obsolete because a drone can fly more Gs than a manned aircraft.
The communication network you're describing doesn't exist, and would be highly susceptible to jamming, spoofing or hacking if it did. You can't hand wave away the current state of technology because the idea sounds cool. That's just sci-fi you're describing, not realistic technology.
Basically what you're describing is something that's not currently available, nor possible in the near future. It's the same story that comes out from HN about how fighter jets are obsolete because a drone can fly more Gs than a manned aircraft.
Ok, so I suppose I only stated the premise fully in the other thread, which is my fault. My premise is that 3-4 types of drones are needed, of different sizes.
I'll quote it here for convenience:
> I'm imagining at least 3-4 size categories, lets say. 1) Tiny, able to shoot down most quad copters. Top speed of 50-100knots. Price needs to be low enough to allow tens of thousands to be produced. Could potentially also double as anti-infantry weapons by strafing. 2) Small. Able to shoot down switchblade-sized drones. Top speed of maybe 200 knots. Can be produced in numbers of thousands. 3) Medium. Sutable to hunt small UAV's, such as Buyraktar. Top speed of several hundered knots, maybe just below Mach 1. Somewhat more expensive than the Buyraktar, but can also carry some of the same ordanance, like a tiny fighter-bomber. 4) Full-sized, possibly supersonic. Basically the same as the Loyal Wingman concept. Designed to counter other full-sized drones as well as manned aircraft.
Also, the hypothesis is that drones will take up a significant share of the military budget. Let say you start with ~$20 billion, what will it buy. Thats $5 billion for each size category when split evenly, one could get something like
Size 1 (price = $10000) : 500000
Size 2 (price = $100000) : 50000
Size 3 (price = $1000000) : 5000
Size 4 (price = $10000000) : 500
(EDIT: I realize that these categories are a bit smaller at the higher end than in the other thread, anyway it is primarily an order-of-magnutude estimate.)
Total number 555500 drones. Since these vary in size from roughly a quadcopter to close to a manned fighter, they provide capabilities of airial enemies of all sizes (unless the enemy is deploying insect-sized drones). It also comes with very significant air-to-ground capability and (if properly networked) extremely good sensory capability, even if the smaller 2 categories only have basic optics + perhaps some IR.
Even if you deploy only 10% of this, you can have a few of size 1 at every km of the front. (Also, by the time $20B has been spent, the first iterations may already have become obsolete.)
> The communication network you're describing doesn't exist,
We may not be fully there, but this is already a huge trend, and basically already implemented for the higher end of the air force (F35). Some protocols are already ready, some are under development.
Ideally, the drone capability described above should be co-developed with JADC2:
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/IF11493.pdf
> Basically what you're describing is something that's not currently available, nor possible in the near future.
I suppose we just plain diagree here. I think the basic technology for this kind of capability is already there, but still evolving quickly. In other words, this arms race has already started.
In fact, with the current exposure tech like this is already getting, I would be surprised if funds and effort is not already being directed to this as we speak.
> It's the same story that comes out from HN about how fighter jets are obsolete because a drone can fly more Gs than a manned aircraft.
Not just HN. Manned fighters are not obsolete. But more and more people in the industry seems to think that Gen 6 will be dominated by unmanned aircraft. For instance, this is part of the marketing for Kızılelma.
This is also not new. F35 was designed to be able to function as a kind of a drone host, and even with the capability to be converted to an UCAV*. This is also much of the reason why it was provided with as much compute- and sensory power as it was. In other words, even during the early design phase of the F35, enough people were predicting the end of manned fighters within the F35's lifetime for that to be included in the design.
* This is from my memory from when my country selected the F35 as our fighter, I'm not sure I have more recent sources on hand.
I'll quote it here for convenience:
> I'm imagining at least 3-4 size categories, lets say. 1) Tiny, able to shoot down most quad copters. Top speed of 50-100knots. Price needs to be low enough to allow tens of thousands to be produced. Could potentially also double as anti-infantry weapons by strafing. 2) Small. Able to shoot down switchblade-sized drones. Top speed of maybe 200 knots. Can be produced in numbers of thousands. 3) Medium. Sutable to hunt small UAV's, such as Buyraktar. Top speed of several hundered knots, maybe just below Mach 1. Somewhat more expensive than the Buyraktar, but can also carry some of the same ordanance, like a tiny fighter-bomber. 4) Full-sized, possibly supersonic. Basically the same as the Loyal Wingman concept. Designed to counter other full-sized drones as well as manned aircraft.
Also, the hypothesis is that drones will take up a significant share of the military budget. Let say you start with ~$20 billion, what will it buy. Thats $5 billion for each size category when split evenly, one could get something like
Size 1 (price = $10000) : 500000
Size 2 (price = $100000) : 50000
Size 3 (price = $1000000) : 5000
Size 4 (price = $10000000) : 500
(EDIT: I realize that these categories are a bit smaller at the higher end than in the other thread, anyway it is primarily an order-of-magnutude estimate.)
Total number 555500 drones. Since these vary in size from roughly a quadcopter to close to a manned fighter, they provide capabilities of airial enemies of all sizes (unless the enemy is deploying insect-sized drones). It also comes with very significant air-to-ground capability and (if properly networked) extremely good sensory capability, even if the smaller 2 categories only have basic optics + perhaps some IR.
Even if you deploy only 10% of this, you can have a few of size 1 at every km of the front. (Also, by the time $20B has been spent, the first iterations may already have become obsolete.)
> The communication network you're describing doesn't exist,
We may not be fully there, but this is already a huge trend, and basically already implemented for the higher end of the air force (F35). Some protocols are already ready, some are under development.
Ideally, the drone capability described above should be co-developed with JADC2:
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/IF11493.pdf
> Basically what you're describing is something that's not currently available, nor possible in the near future.
I suppose we just plain diagree here. I think the basic technology for this kind of capability is already there, but still evolving quickly. In other words, this arms race has already started.
In fact, with the current exposure tech like this is already getting, I would be surprised if funds and effort is not already being directed to this as we speak.
> It's the same story that comes out from HN about how fighter jets are obsolete because a drone can fly more Gs than a manned aircraft.
Not just HN. Manned fighters are not obsolete. But more and more people in the industry seems to think that Gen 6 will be dominated by unmanned aircraft. For instance, this is part of the marketing for Kızılelma.
This is also not new. F35 was designed to be able to function as a kind of a drone host, and even with the capability to be converted to an UCAV*. This is also much of the reason why it was provided with as much compute- and sensory power as it was. In other words, even during the early design phase of the F35, enough people were predicting the end of manned fighters within the F35's lifetime for that to be included in the design.
* This is from my memory from when my country selected the F35 as our fighter, I'm not sure I have more recent sources on hand.
I don't have time to keep getting into the fantasy math here for your drones, but just wanted to correct you about the F-35. It was never part of its design to either be a drone host or to be optionally manned. And saying it has the capability to be converted to a UCAV doesn't mean much; the USAF has done that for fighters starting with the Century series up to the F-16.
Here is a link from 2015 describing the intent to have F-35 command drone swarms:
https://www.military.com/daily-news/2015/05/19/air-forces-ne...
In fact, this capability was baked in from early development through the MADL data link, sensor fusion capability and powerful processing power (at the time).
Optionally manned versions of the F35 was being discussed as late as 2015: https://www.aph.gov.au/DocumentStore.ashx?id=a26cc000-3b69-4...
Here is an excerpt from the article "Lockheed Martin has not yet officially confirmed the development of a pilotless or optionally piloted version of the F-35, but it is my understanding that they have had plans for an unmanned variant for some time now, with F-35 programmers having long ago confirmed to me that the fly-by-wire functionality was designed-in as inherent feature for later exploitation in the design of an unmanned model. I would suggest that if the Committee is not aware of such options, they be thoroughly investigated with Lockheed with a view toward exploring potential technical problems such as the lag time between commands and their execution, and the impact that removing the human from the F-35 design would have on flight characteristics. If, on the other hand, future unmanned operation has already been factored into the cost-benefit analysis by Defence decision makers and its investment partners, I would suggest that this logic be made clear to the public, especially given that it is not the only aircraft manufacturer converting its fighters for unmanned operation:"
So, I suppose it was unoffical, but the same information seemed to be given to Norwegian decision makers when we joined the programme in 2008, and there was also rumors in 2006:
https://www.flightglobal.com/lockheed-martin-reveals-plans-f...
How much this affected the design choices for the manned versions is unknown, suppose.
In fact, this capability was baked in from early development through the MADL data link, sensor fusion capability and powerful processing power (at the time).
Optionally manned versions of the F35 was being discussed as late as 2015: https://www.aph.gov.au/DocumentStore.ashx?id=a26cc000-3b69-4...
Here is an excerpt from the article "Lockheed Martin has not yet officially confirmed the development of a pilotless or optionally piloted version of the F-35, but it is my understanding that they have had plans for an unmanned variant for some time now, with F-35 programmers having long ago confirmed to me that the fly-by-wire functionality was designed-in as inherent feature for later exploitation in the design of an unmanned model. I would suggest that if the Committee is not aware of such options, they be thoroughly investigated with Lockheed with a view toward exploring potential technical problems such as the lag time between commands and their execution, and the impact that removing the human from the F-35 design would have on flight characteristics. If, on the other hand, future unmanned operation has already been factored into the cost-benefit analysis by Defence decision makers and its investment partners, I would suggest that this logic be made clear to the public, especially given that it is not the only aircraft manufacturer converting its fighters for unmanned operation:"
So, I suppose it was unoffical, but the same information seemed to be given to Norwegian decision makers when we joined the programme in 2008, and there was also rumors in 2006:
https://www.flightglobal.com/lockheed-martin-reveals-plans-f...
How much this affected the design choices for the manned versions is unknown, suppose.
I can see where a foggy night would be ideal for drone-on-drone mayhem.
I think laser systems will be used for drone defence
Laser is probably good for defending high priority targets, especially from fast flying (including hypersonic) missiles and drones.
For defence against swarms of quadcopters with hand grenades, flying low through forests, cities or trenches, I think anti-drones are the only way.
Anti-drones can also intercept enemy drones over neutral or enemy territory, through valleys, or other places a laser cannot reach. Furthermore, while a mirrored surface can protect against lasers, it will not defend very well vs bullets.
Anti-drones can also double as drones (like fighter bombers), ie just have a manouverable drone that has some kind of forward-pointing gun in addition to whatever ordenance, spy camers, etc it might carry.
For defence against swarms of quadcopters with hand grenades, flying low through forests, cities or trenches, I think anti-drones are the only way.
Anti-drones can also intercept enemy drones over neutral or enemy territory, through valleys, or other places a laser cannot reach. Furthermore, while a mirrored surface can protect against lasers, it will not defend very well vs bullets.
Anti-drones can also double as drones (like fighter bombers), ie just have a manouverable drone that has some kind of forward-pointing gun in addition to whatever ordenance, spy camers, etc it might carry.
Actually... Anduril (Palmer's company) actually has one that's called the Anvil that does exactly what you're talking about: https://www.anduril.com/hardware/anvil/
The fortunes of the front lines in WW1 varied directly with which side had air superiority at the moment. Not because the airplanes were effective at ground attack, but because of aerial reconnaissance. The defeat of Germany came because the Luftwaffe was defeated.
> The defeat of Germany came because the Luftwaffe was defeated.
It was a lot more complex than that. Lots of factors were in play, including introduction of combined-arms warfare that included aircraft but more significantly the tank. More generally, see the Hundred Days Offensive [0]
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hundred_Days_Offensive
It was a lot more complex than that. Lots of factors were in play, including introduction of combined-arms warfare that included aircraft but more significantly the tank. More generally, see the Hundred Days Offensive [0]
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hundred_Days_Offensive
I'll stand by what I wrote, because although the airplanes of the day were ineffective at attack, they were extremely effective at reconnaissance which showed where to put your firepower.
My understanding of the WW1 tank was it showed promise but was not decisive.
My understanding of the WW1 tank was it showed promise but was not decisive.
Air superiority during WW1 had an almost negligible effect on the outcome of the war. Can you name a single battle where aerial reconnaissance was decisive, or provided more value than artillery, machine guns or proto-tanks?
Even in WW2 where air power was far more powerful, it's still debated how much it contributed to success.
Even in WW2 where air power was far more powerful, it's still debated how much it contributed to success.
> Even in WW2 where air power was far more powerful, it's still debated how much it contributed to success.
The allies certainly had tactical air superiority in the last few months of the war, which hammered German Armour, but didn't in itself wipe out dogged resistance. The Luftwaffe was pretty scarce over the battlefields because it was occupied trying to stop the bomber offensive over Germany itself. The bombers themselves didn't really begin to properly dismantle German manufacturing until 1945. So air power did contribute to success in the end, but not as anticipated before the war.
The allies certainly had tactical air superiority in the last few months of the war, which hammered German Armour, but didn't in itself wipe out dogged resistance. The Luftwaffe was pretty scarce over the battlefields because it was occupied trying to stop the bomber offensive over Germany itself. The bombers themselves didn't really begin to properly dismantle German manufacturing until 1945. So air power did contribute to success in the end, but not as anticipated before the war.
Air power did little to destroy German industry, that is correct. But, and this is a big but, it was very successful at denying the German military gasoline, without which its military machine was crippled.
The Air Force was very, very effective at supporting the ground troops. Whenever the soldiers got stuck on the ground, they'd call in the P-51s to wreck whatever was blocking them. The tanks and Wiederstanden were highly vulnerable to air attack, as well as getting their supply lines cut off.
The Kriegsmarine's super battleships Bismarck and Tirpitz were destroyed by air attack. Japan's super battleship Yamato suffered a similar fate.
The Air Force was very, very effective at supporting the ground troops. Whenever the soldiers got stuck on the ground, they'd call in the P-51s to wreck whatever was blocking them. The tanks and Wiederstanden were highly vulnerable to air attack, as well as getting their supply lines cut off.
The Kriegsmarine's super battleships Bismarck and Tirpitz were destroyed by air attack. Japan's super battleship Yamato suffered a similar fate.
Germany ran out of gas because it didn't have a domestic source, and couldn't seize it in the Middle East, nor in the Caucasus region.
The Army Air Corps was decent at interdiction missions (trains etc.) and hunting tanks when given free reign; but they were tied to escort missions for far too long. Considering how much money and manpower was invested in the 8th AF, the returns were marginal. German industry was accelerating production until the very end of the war, and proved very resilient to strategic bombing.
The Bismarck, Tirpitz etc were all a waste of resources and never did much to influence the war other than to tie down the Home Fleet. The sinking of the Yamato and its sister ship Musahi were non-consequential to the outcome of the war.
The Army Air Corps was decent at interdiction missions (trains etc.) and hunting tanks when given free reign; but they were tied to escort missions for far too long. Considering how much money and manpower was invested in the 8th AF, the returns were marginal. German industry was accelerating production until the very end of the war, and proved very resilient to strategic bombing.
The Bismarck, Tirpitz etc were all a waste of resources and never did much to influence the war other than to tie down the Home Fleet. The sinking of the Yamato and its sister ship Musahi were non-consequential to the outcome of the war.
Germany's oil supply came largely from Ploiești which was destroyed by Allied bombing. The lack of gasoline, particularly high octane gas, crippled the Luftwaffe. High octane gas, in plentiful supply, led to Allied fighters having a huge performance advantage over the Luftwaffe fighters.
The battleships did not influence the war because of air power. Without airplanes, the battleships would have carpeted the Atlantic seabed with the convoys that kept Britain in the war. The Yamato also became ineffective because of air power.
The battleships did not influence the war because of air power. Without airplanes, the battleships would have carpeted the Atlantic seabed with the convoys that kept Britain in the war. The Yamato also became ineffective because of air power.
My grand-uncle flew in B-24s on the Ploesti raid (Operation Tidal Wave). It had no effect on Axis petroleum production. It's considered one of the biggest failures in WW2 airpower.
Airpower had minimal affect on stopping the Kriegsmarine from wreaking havoc in the Atlantic. The German fleet was too weak, in fact the sacrifice of the Hood led to the demise of the Bismarck. If it wasn't a torpedo from a Swordfish jamming the rudder, the rest of the Home Fleet would have crushed it eventually. The Graf Spee fared no better in the South Atlantic.
The Yamato (and Musahi) were part of a mistaken Mahanian strategy for a single decisive battle (akin to Tsushima) that would settle the entire Pacific campaign. What really one the war in the Pacific was the USN submarine fleet which put a stranglehold on Japan.
Airpower had minimal affect on stopping the Kriegsmarine from wreaking havoc in the Atlantic. The German fleet was too weak, in fact the sacrifice of the Hood led to the demise of the Bismarck. If it wasn't a torpedo from a Swordfish jamming the rudder, the rest of the Home Fleet would have crushed it eventually. The Graf Spee fared no better in the South Atlantic.
The Yamato (and Musahi) were part of a mistaken Mahanian strategy for a single decisive battle (akin to Tsushima) that would settle the entire Pacific campaign. What really one the war in the Pacific was the USN submarine fleet which put a stranglehold on Japan.
> Airpower had minimal affect on stopping the Kriegsmarine from wreaking havoc in the Atlantic.
This seriously underestimates it. Airplanes were effectively used to locate and track U-Boots and other ships, vectoring in a destroyer to sink them. Airplanes located and tracked the Bismarck, airplanes crippled it so it could not maneuver, and then the British navy pounded it into oblivion. Without Allied airplanes, the Bismarck could have sailed into any convoy and sunk it all with near impunity.
I.e. with aircraft, the Kriegsmarine could not hide. Neither could the Tirpitz.
The US wrecked Japan's fleet at Midway, all done with air power. Aircraft did a lot of the sinkings in the Battle of Leyte Gulf.
More info on German oil:
https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/1b66lm/where...
This seriously underestimates it. Airplanes were effectively used to locate and track U-Boots and other ships, vectoring in a destroyer to sink them. Airplanes located and tracked the Bismarck, airplanes crippled it so it could not maneuver, and then the British navy pounded it into oblivion. Without Allied airplanes, the Bismarck could have sailed into any convoy and sunk it all with near impunity.
I.e. with aircraft, the Kriegsmarine could not hide. Neither could the Tirpitz.
The US wrecked Japan's fleet at Midway, all done with air power. Aircraft did a lot of the sinkings in the Battle of Leyte Gulf.
More info on German oil:
https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/1b66lm/where...
> WW1
It's discussed in detail in the two volume set "Winged Mars" by Cuneo. The crux is being able to see where the enemy was weak, and you could deny the enemy seeing where you were strong. That's what the focus (pun intended) of the air war in WW1 was all about.
> Even in WW2
Not in the books I read about WW2. See the battle of Pearl Harbor, Midway, etc. Air power ended the U-Boot threat. The Battle of the Bulge was over for the Wehrmacht the moment the weather cleared and the Air Force could fly. The destruction of the German oil fields was decisive for the Allied victory. See the Battle of Britain - Hitler abandoned plans to invade Britain, knowing he could not do so without air supremacy. Eisenhower knew that D-Day would not work unless the Luftwaffe was suppressed. Air power ended Rommel's campaign in Africa (cut off the Afrika Korp's supplies).
It's discussed in detail in the two volume set "Winged Mars" by Cuneo. The crux is being able to see where the enemy was weak, and you could deny the enemy seeing where you were strong. That's what the focus (pun intended) of the air war in WW1 was all about.
> Even in WW2
Not in the books I read about WW2. See the battle of Pearl Harbor, Midway, etc. Air power ended the U-Boot threat. The Battle of the Bulge was over for the Wehrmacht the moment the weather cleared and the Air Force could fly. The destruction of the German oil fields was decisive for the Allied victory. See the Battle of Britain - Hitler abandoned plans to invade Britain, knowing he could not do so without air supremacy. Eisenhower knew that D-Day would not work unless the Luftwaffe was suppressed. Air power ended Rommel's campaign in Africa (cut off the Afrika Korp's supplies).
Pearl Harbor was a temporary tactical success, but a strategic failure. The IJN failed to destroy the fuel storage at Pearl, or to block the harbor. They also failed to destroy much of the maintenance and repair facilities.
Midway would have been an abject failure for the USN if it weren't for the codebreakers. The B-17s at Midway and most of the other aircraft were pretty useless in the battle itself. This was one of the closest naval engagements in the war, and the US was lucky to come away with the victory. But in the end, the defeat of the Kido Butai wasn't a necessary requirement for defeating Japan.
The Battle of the Atlantic was also more dependent upon code breaking than aircraft for success. Combined with the convoy system, the U-boats effect peaked in 1942. After that it was all downhill. Air power in the form of B-24s and escort carriers helped, but were not instrumental.
And the Battle of Britain, there was no chance Germany could ever successfully invade the British Isle. They simply didn't have the Navy to cross the channel.
Air power helped in many campaigns, but was not instrumental in the outcome of the war.
Midway would have been an abject failure for the USN if it weren't for the codebreakers. The B-17s at Midway and most of the other aircraft were pretty useless in the battle itself. This was one of the closest naval engagements in the war, and the US was lucky to come away with the victory. But in the end, the defeat of the Kido Butai wasn't a necessary requirement for defeating Japan.
The Battle of the Atlantic was also more dependent upon code breaking than aircraft for success. Combined with the convoy system, the U-boats effect peaked in 1942. After that it was all downhill. Air power in the form of B-24s and escort carriers helped, but were not instrumental.
And the Battle of Britain, there was no chance Germany could ever successfully invade the British Isle. They simply didn't have the Navy to cross the channel.
Air power helped in many campaigns, but was not instrumental in the outcome of the war.
> They simply didn't have the Navy to cross the channel.
The plan was to crush the RAF, which would then have made it easy for the Luftwaffe to prevent the Royal Navy from stopping them from crossing. Ships without air cover are nothing but big, fat, juicy targets, which was proven time and again in WW2.
For another example, a single Stuka sank a Russian cruiser in WW2.
The objective of the attack on Pearl Harbor was to destroy the aircraft carriers, not the battleships. The attack was a failure because the carriers were not there. Midway was the next attempt to destroy the US aircraft carriers. Instead, it destroyed Japan's carriers, and that was the end of Japan's naval ambitions.
B-17s were never designed to attack ships. Frankly, I have no idea why they were at Midway. Maybe long range reconnaissance.
The plan was to crush the RAF, which would then have made it easy for the Luftwaffe to prevent the Royal Navy from stopping them from crossing. Ships without air cover are nothing but big, fat, juicy targets, which was proven time and again in WW2.
For another example, a single Stuka sank a Russian cruiser in WW2.
The objective of the attack on Pearl Harbor was to destroy the aircraft carriers, not the battleships. The attack was a failure because the carriers were not there. Midway was the next attempt to destroy the US aircraft carriers. Instead, it destroyed Japan's carriers, and that was the end of Japan's naval ambitions.
B-17s were never designed to attack ships. Frankly, I have no idea why they were at Midway. Maybe long range reconnaissance.
Even without RAF air cover, the Royal Navy was to forge into the channel at any cost to break up an invasion. It would have been messy.
I wonder about a future of warfare that condenses to strictly targeted assassinations.
I suspect that kind of thing is prohibited by some secret convention among all more or less significant powers. otherwise, the opening act of this very war could've been a hundred cruise missiles wiping out the Kyiv's elites
there is some Ukrainian city where the Russians had attempted to kill the mayor. the missile had struck the exact part of the building where his office was located. the mayor had survived because he overslept
there is some Ukrainian city where the Russians had attempted to kill the mayor. the missile had struck the exact part of the building where his office was located. the mayor had survived because he overslept
Sounds like it describes current USA warfare doctrine?
Seems like targeted drone strikes is our main method of engagement today.
Seems like targeted drone strikes is our main method of engagement today.
> We will soon have small cheap drones that will take down nearby spotter drones and the balance will change yet again.
Necessary? We already have lots of cheap tech that can destroy drones in a naval setting.
Necessary? We already have lots of cheap tech that can destroy drones in a naval setting.
Twitter thread from Bret Devereaux with some critique of this piece.
https://twitter.com/BretDevereaux/status/1528581923446181898...
https://twitter.com/BretDevereaux/status/1528581923446181898...
I also thought of u/Sir_Budington's comment when this article was posted to r/CredibleDefense:
> The thing is that things like anti tank and ship missiles are primarily defensive weapons, not offensive ones. Sure, a Javelin can wreck a tank, but it’s not going to break through a front line. Sure, a harpoon can sink a ship, but it’s not going to project power halfway across the world. A Patriot missile can shoot down a plane, but it’s not going to target moving targets 100 miles behind enemy lines, or provide CAS.
> Does this mean that in recent years that the power balance has swung in favour of defenders? Maybe. But that doesn’t mean you get rid of offensive capabilities.
> The thing is that things like anti tank and ship missiles are primarily defensive weapons, not offensive ones. Sure, a Javelin can wreck a tank, but it’s not going to break through a front line. Sure, a harpoon can sink a ship, but it’s not going to project power halfway across the world. A Patriot missile can shoot down a plane, but it’s not going to target moving targets 100 miles behind enemy lines, or provide CAS.
> Does this mean that in recent years that the power balance has swung in favour of defenders? Maybe. But that doesn’t mean you get rid of offensive capabilities.
Well said. To build on that, it also brings to mind a few of the more expert commentary on YouTube on "why the tank is not dead". Military History Visualized has a good video on this: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QPth_xqBXGY (There's others as well, and he references them)
My overall take away from the Atlantic piece is that they've fallen into the same trap as much of the rest of the internet. Large platforms have not been rendered obsolete because of the advent of these weapons, just as they weren't during the 70s with the first large battles involving Anti-tank and Anti-Ship missiles. (The former has a number of well-cited examples, but for the latter, I call attention to the Battle of Latakia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Latakia )
It's worth nothing as well that the Neptune AShM isn't really a revolutionary weapon, and is marginally improved over classes of AShMs developed in the 80s. It's notary comes from the fact that Ukraine essentially was able redevelop the capability of the old Kh-35, with modest improvements. It's not a next-gen missile such as a LRASM.
Similarly, the Javelin, while effective and having gone through incremental upgrades, is not a wildly new weapon. It's been around for decades, and as we're finding along with the Stinger, the U.S. needs to reactivate the manufacturing to build them from scratch which has been dormant for decades.
I draw attention to the fact that these are older weapons. Drones are giving troops in the field better ability to target than ever before, but the fundamentals haven't changed and the same difficulties apply. WaPo had an exclusive stating that it was U.S. Intelligence that gave the Ukrainians the necessary info to find and target the Moskava with their missiles. The weapons themselves are just one part in long chain of capabilities.
So that's where I think this piece misses much, because it's ignorant of some of the other elements of how all this comes together. The U.S. has been aware of China's long range precision fires for quite some time, and while they're worrysome, they're not terrified. To paraphrase a quote I heard, "a long kill chain provides plenty of opportunities to disrupt it along the way."
And that's where the Russians have failed. Not because they're being surprised for the first time by these weapons (they invented many of the earliest examples themselves!) but because they're not fighting effectively. As some commentators have noted, the supporting elements that would defend against these weapons are not in place, the systems designed to counter them are not active/maintained (which was probably the case of the Moskava), and the intelligence/reconnaissance that would have identified and monitored these threats are not in place. All of this contributes to failure.
The Russians are not getting wrecked by guided missiles because they're so high tech, they're getting wrecked because they're inept.
My overall take away from the Atlantic piece is that they've fallen into the same trap as much of the rest of the internet. Large platforms have not been rendered obsolete because of the advent of these weapons, just as they weren't during the 70s with the first large battles involving Anti-tank and Anti-Ship missiles. (The former has a number of well-cited examples, but for the latter, I call attention to the Battle of Latakia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Latakia )
It's worth nothing as well that the Neptune AShM isn't really a revolutionary weapon, and is marginally improved over classes of AShMs developed in the 80s. It's notary comes from the fact that Ukraine essentially was able redevelop the capability of the old Kh-35, with modest improvements. It's not a next-gen missile such as a LRASM.
Similarly, the Javelin, while effective and having gone through incremental upgrades, is not a wildly new weapon. It's been around for decades, and as we're finding along with the Stinger, the U.S. needs to reactivate the manufacturing to build them from scratch which has been dormant for decades.
I draw attention to the fact that these are older weapons. Drones are giving troops in the field better ability to target than ever before, but the fundamentals haven't changed and the same difficulties apply. WaPo had an exclusive stating that it was U.S. Intelligence that gave the Ukrainians the necessary info to find and target the Moskava with their missiles. The weapons themselves are just one part in long chain of capabilities.
So that's where I think this piece misses much, because it's ignorant of some of the other elements of how all this comes together. The U.S. has been aware of China's long range precision fires for quite some time, and while they're worrysome, they're not terrified. To paraphrase a quote I heard, "a long kill chain provides plenty of opportunities to disrupt it along the way."
And that's where the Russians have failed. Not because they're being surprised for the first time by these weapons (they invented many of the earliest examples themselves!) but because they're not fighting effectively. As some commentators have noted, the supporting elements that would defend against these weapons are not in place, the systems designed to counter them are not active/maintained (which was probably the case of the Moskava), and the intelligence/reconnaissance that would have identified and monitored these threats are not in place. All of this contributes to failure.
The Russians are not getting wrecked by guided missiles because they're so high tech, they're getting wrecked because they're inept.
> Similarly, the Javelin, while effective and having gone through incremental upgrades, is not a wildly new weapon. It's been around for decades, and as we're finding along with the Stinger, the U.S. needs to reactivate the manufacturing to build them from scratch which has been dormant for decades.
My understanding is that the U.S. sunsetted or reduced Javelin and Stinger production because of assumed air superiority in any potential conflict (COIN or near-peer).
For all of their love of redundancy, do you think that they are overconfident in air superiority?
My understanding is that the U.S. sunsetted or reduced Javelin and Stinger production because of assumed air superiority in any potential conflict (COIN or near-peer).
For all of their love of redundancy, do you think that they are overconfident in air superiority?
Hard to say. My guess (and it's just a guess!) is that they didn't see the need to ramp up Stinger production as there were so many sitting around. (Javelin is a different question and I'll omit that one for now.)
I hear the "they'll rely on air superiority" bit a lot, but haven't read anything official that suggests that it's actual policy. It might just be one of those things that went unsaid as priorities shifted elsewhere. I think the Ballistic Missile Defense debate sucked a lot of oxygen out of the need for ground-based aircraft defense.
There's growing calls for more robust aircraft defense, both against fighter airplanes and drones, and it's getting some attention as you can read here: https://www.army-technology.com/news/us-ten-shorad-battalion...
I note though that these are short-range systems, and I haven't seen much new for longer range systems such as what some NATO countries are doing with NASAMS, and so it seems like things have been quiet in the U.S. for medium and upper tier (BMD being the exception.)
I've long wondered if there's hesitance to overlap medium and upper tier defenses with counter-air operations because of the risk of blue-on-blue engagement (See the Persian Gulf War and Patriot), and that it might be there reason why there's so little development in this space. Deconflicting those two things sounds rather difficult to me, and given our lack of success to date, the U.S. might simply have strategized that - with a few exceptions - it's best to leave medium and high altitudes to aircraft and just not worry about shooting down your own pilots.
But that's just a guess. It's an interesting question and one I'll be curious to see play out.
I hear the "they'll rely on air superiority" bit a lot, but haven't read anything official that suggests that it's actual policy. It might just be one of those things that went unsaid as priorities shifted elsewhere. I think the Ballistic Missile Defense debate sucked a lot of oxygen out of the need for ground-based aircraft defense.
There's growing calls for more robust aircraft defense, both against fighter airplanes and drones, and it's getting some attention as you can read here: https://www.army-technology.com/news/us-ten-shorad-battalion...
I note though that these are short-range systems, and I haven't seen much new for longer range systems such as what some NATO countries are doing with NASAMS, and so it seems like things have been quiet in the U.S. for medium and upper tier (BMD being the exception.)
I've long wondered if there's hesitance to overlap medium and upper tier defenses with counter-air operations because of the risk of blue-on-blue engagement (See the Persian Gulf War and Patriot), and that it might be there reason why there's so little development in this space. Deconflicting those two things sounds rather difficult to me, and given our lack of success to date, the U.S. might simply have strategized that - with a few exceptions - it's best to leave medium and high altitudes to aircraft and just not worry about shooting down your own pilots.
But that's just a guess. It's an interesting question and one I'll be curious to see play out.
Whenever I try and understand what the Pentagon's actual policies are, I give up on reading announcements from PAOs etc. and look at what items each branch is funding. The Navy has had a great UCAS for 8 years, but has barely funded it compared to how many F-18s it buys. So this tells me that the VF mafia in the Navy doesn't want competition.
The Army has cancelled the following systems in the last few decades: Comanche, Crusader, and FCS. Yet it spent the money on these and only cancelled them when the costs ballooned out of control. Other than buying Avenger in the 1980s, the Army has almost completely neglected SHORAD. This tells me they don't give a hoot about the threat. Compare that to Comanche. They are all in on the Future Vertical Lift program. For Crusader, they've decided on incremental (and seemingly perpetual) upgrades to the M109. As well as investing heavily in ATACMs and PrSM.
The Army has cancelled the following systems in the last few decades: Comanche, Crusader, and FCS. Yet it spent the money on these and only cancelled them when the costs ballooned out of control. Other than buying Avenger in the 1980s, the Army has almost completely neglected SHORAD. This tells me they don't give a hoot about the threat. Compare that to Comanche. They are all in on the Future Vertical Lift program. For Crusader, they've decided on incremental (and seemingly perpetual) upgrades to the M109. As well as investing heavily in ATACMs and PrSM.
Both the Navy and the USAF suffer from this in that the brass is staffed with former pilots, and those who have had combat experience at that. A lot of other missions have received little attention as a result, Space being a good example.
I think they're slowly coming around to the idea that they need these, though it's arriving in the form of supporting roles and to solve a pilot shortage.
With regards to ground, many of those cancellations came about as a result of the end of the Cold War. Comanche and Crusader were both 80's era programs The threat of a general European land war receded tremendously. Had those gone forward, I'm sure they'd be useful, but aged now even. I do wonder how useful Crusader would have been, given the shift to highly mobile wheeled SPGs as opposed to armored ones. (See CAESAR and Archer systems).
FCS was later, and tripped over itself I think trying to make a series of vehicles that could do everything at a time when we weren't sure what we wanted a vehicle to do other than survive IEDs. They wanted air mobility (low weight!) but networking, tons of firepower, and be resistant to ATGMs and the odd buried 155mm shell exploding underneath it. It sounds like the Bradley all over again, but it's a tricky problem to solve. A combination of electronic jamming for IEDs and active protection for ATGMs might finally solve the problem. Might.
I think you're right about SHORAD, and given the aerial performance in the Gulf and elsewhere, they've had little reason to think otherwise. The USAF and Navy have been so effective up until late that the Air-to-Air squadrons have had so little to do that the USAF invented sorties for their F-22 squadrons just to give them a shot at advancement compared to their A2G brethren. And while the Russians have been cranking out one fancy Flanker variant after another, they haven't had the funds to build them in any quality. The PAK-FA has been little more than a demonstrator. And up until relatively recently, the Chinese have been struggling to replicate Western and Russian turbofan technology. Lack of decent engines has held them back for years. It seems they're finally turning the corner on that.
So yeah, they haven't had much reason to pay attention to it. Drones are starting to make them pay attention though. https://www.army-technology.com/news/us-ten-shorad-battalion...
Better late than never I suppose.
I think they're slowly coming around to the idea that they need these, though it's arriving in the form of supporting roles and to solve a pilot shortage.
With regards to ground, many of those cancellations came about as a result of the end of the Cold War. Comanche and Crusader were both 80's era programs The threat of a general European land war receded tremendously. Had those gone forward, I'm sure they'd be useful, but aged now even. I do wonder how useful Crusader would have been, given the shift to highly mobile wheeled SPGs as opposed to armored ones. (See CAESAR and Archer systems).
FCS was later, and tripped over itself I think trying to make a series of vehicles that could do everything at a time when we weren't sure what we wanted a vehicle to do other than survive IEDs. They wanted air mobility (low weight!) but networking, tons of firepower, and be resistant to ATGMs and the odd buried 155mm shell exploding underneath it. It sounds like the Bradley all over again, but it's a tricky problem to solve. A combination of electronic jamming for IEDs and active protection for ATGMs might finally solve the problem. Might.
I think you're right about SHORAD, and given the aerial performance in the Gulf and elsewhere, they've had little reason to think otherwise. The USAF and Navy have been so effective up until late that the Air-to-Air squadrons have had so little to do that the USAF invented sorties for their F-22 squadrons just to give them a shot at advancement compared to their A2G brethren. And while the Russians have been cranking out one fancy Flanker variant after another, they haven't had the funds to build them in any quality. The PAK-FA has been little more than a demonstrator. And up until relatively recently, the Chinese have been struggling to replicate Western and Russian turbofan technology. Lack of decent engines has held them back for years. It seems they're finally turning the corner on that.
So yeah, they haven't had much reason to pay attention to it. Drones are starting to make them pay attention though. https://www.army-technology.com/news/us-ten-shorad-battalion...
Better late than never I suppose.
> they're getting wrecked because they're inept.
They're "getting wrecked" in terms of human and materiel losses, even though those seem to have stabilised compared to March/April, the reality on the ground is that the Russians have managed to acquire a land-bridge to Crimea and that they've mostly conquered the two regions of Lugansk and Donetsk.
They're "getting wrecked" in terms of human and materiel losses, even though those seem to have stabilised compared to March/April, the reality on the ground is that the Russians have managed to acquire a land-bridge to Crimea and that they've mostly conquered the two regions of Lugansk and Donetsk.
This is also roughly Nicolas "The chieftain" Moran's argument for why the tank is still an important weapon.
It’s pretty weak critique. For my entire time on earth, the threat of missiles like Exocet is a material threat that is only countered by marginally reliable SAMs and point defense. Missiles and drones only get smarter, and defense challenges get more challenging.
Even speedboats with rockets or explosives strapped to them are a threat to warships, who were mostly protected by obscurity - finding ships at sea is hard. Drones negate a lot of that.
People will wave away the obvious by saying “The Russians are idiots”, “The ship was old”, etc, but the reality is a defender only has to fuck up once. The Russians should have (and may have in other scenarios) shot down that drone, but obviously failed.
Even the mighty US Navy has trouble teaching sailors to steer ships. Operationally the US Navy is exponentially more capable than the Russians… but remember, you only need to screw up once. Fundamentally, the current operating model of big navies is on a path to irrelevance. Nerds can argue if the early ironclad battles were truly relevant, but the fact remains that whether that moment was key or not, the end result was the same.
Even speedboats with rockets or explosives strapped to them are a threat to warships, who were mostly protected by obscurity - finding ships at sea is hard. Drones negate a lot of that.
People will wave away the obvious by saying “The Russians are idiots”, “The ship was old”, etc, but the reality is a defender only has to fuck up once. The Russians should have (and may have in other scenarios) shot down that drone, but obviously failed.
Even the mighty US Navy has trouble teaching sailors to steer ships. Operationally the US Navy is exponentially more capable than the Russians… but remember, you only need to screw up once. Fundamentally, the current operating model of big navies is on a path to irrelevance. Nerds can argue if the early ironclad battles were truly relevant, but the fact remains that whether that moment was key or not, the end result was the same.
Threadreader link: https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1528581923446181898.html
God I hate twitter. Why they still hang on to their silly limited functionality, I don't know. Is it fear of change? Threadreader is even worse, with all those ads!
Try nitter.net
Guy has a blog. Rather sends 26 tweets for sake of convenience. Or is that for max exposure?
Personally, I'm new to twitter, and I much prefer these long chains of tweets rather than long form blog posts or articles. These long chains of tweets allow one to give support, comment on, disagree with, share or like a particular sentence or idea, rather than the entire collection, thus allowing more nuance.
Other advantages:
- Quickly understand which tweets/sentences matter by scanning the likes
- Debate can stem from any tweet, so discussion is immediately less conflated and more focussed on specific parts or ideas
Other advantages:
- Quickly understand which tweets/sentences matter by scanning the likes
- Debate can stem from any tweet, so discussion is immediately less conflated and more focussed on specific parts or ideas
Thank you. Lots of folks complain about twitter threads, few actually articulate any positives even when they find there to be some.
Probably because his blog is for more planned essays.
Twitter is good for one-off observations.
I've personally started a "microblog" for that kind of stuff.
Twitter is good for one-off observations.
I've personally started a "microblog" for that kind of stuff.
It seems almost bizarre that someone would try to take lessons on the US military from the Moskva. I mean.... you can but I think the lessons would be more along the lines of "Make sure you have well maintained military equipment with well trained personnel".
All the reporting I've seen suggests that the Moskva was very old, wasn't refurbished very well, and even with these big caveats something must have gone seriously wrong for it to be sunk in the way it was.
So taking that and drawing larger conclusions seems strange.
All the reporting I've seen suggests that the Moskva was very old, wasn't refurbished very well, and even with these big caveats something must have gone seriously wrong for it to be sunk in the way it was.
So taking that and drawing larger conclusions seems strange.
Yes, most of the consensus I've seen is that even if a modern ship somehow failed to intercept those missiles (which it probably wouldn't have), a modern and well-trained/motivated crew should have been able to immediately shut down the flooding and damaged caused by two comparatively small explosions, and prevented the ship from sinking. An entire ship sinking because of that level of damage is what was most mind-boggling, from what I understand.
Regardless, the point of the article is less about the specifics of the Moskva, so I think it's a fair hook.
Regardless, the point of the article is less about the specifics of the Moskva, so I think it's a fair hook.
If the missiles managed to blow the Moskva's ammo, that would certainly be enough to explain the sinking. That would've been a lucky hit however.
navies in general are in a very pondersome position in the 21st century. Most missile technology has significantly outpaced their ability to operate uncontested in blue water. this has led to endless, aimless voyages, rattling the chains of kissingers soft power to evermore capable adversaries who simply arent as interested as they were 50 years ago.
These fleets are expensive to maintain. without a purpose like the cold war which afforded constant meaningful training, they become little more than a floating maritime exercise in cleaning and cooking. The accident rate of the US navy in the past decade serves as far more of a teachable resource than the Moskva.
These fleets are expensive to maintain. without a purpose like the cold war which afforded constant meaningful training, they become little more than a floating maritime exercise in cleaning and cooking. The accident rate of the US navy in the past decade serves as far more of a teachable resource than the Moskva.
This would be a mistake: since the Millennium Challenge war games [1] its been apparent the US is making some very bold (read: dangerous) assumptions about the safety of their fleet operating in coastal areas, and a Moskva-like outcome was something which was essentially predicted by them.
Ukraine (with US support most likely) essentially pulled off this sort of operation in the exact sort of environment it was expected. The biggest distinction is the Ukranians have a very limited number of weapons in play to use on operations like this.
At the very least the US needs to assume that in limited scale regional wars like this, the presumption of ideal warfighting conditions won't exist and you might be dealing with someone overtly receiving a lot of state backing - i.e. the US can't reasonably sanction China.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millennium_Challenge_2002
Ukraine (with US support most likely) essentially pulled off this sort of operation in the exact sort of environment it was expected. The biggest distinction is the Ukranians have a very limited number of weapons in play to use on operations like this.
At the very least the US needs to assume that in limited scale regional wars like this, the presumption of ideal warfighting conditions won't exist and you might be dealing with someone overtly receiving a lot of state backing - i.e. the US can't reasonably sanction China.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millennium_Challenge_2002
MC2002 isn't a good data point for the vulnerability of the USN fleet, because the war game definition basically just plopped the fleet into being next to the coast, with no actual prep work being done. Followed by the Red team commander cheating (using missiles on boats that would be awash over the gunwales if they tried to carry that much weight, motorcycle couriers that did not actually have time delay for their reports, etc.), which was possible because the Red team didn't actually have physical presence for this.
This war is like crack cocaine for the twitter contrarian mob.
They'll complain other people are just following the current thing, but they absolutely love it too.
They'll complain other people are just following the current thing, but they absolutely love it too.
Sinking a ship via missile isn't a new thing (1980's, HMS Sheffield). One should be extremely careful drawing conclusions about military tech based on Russian performance. If I was an American captain, I wouldn't be worried about a lucky pair of missiles. A swarm of dozens of missiles would be a different story, however.
>Sinking a ship via missile isn't a new thing (1980's, HMS Sheffield).
Earlier than that- the Israelis lost the destroyer Eilat to Egyptian SS-N-2 Styx missiles in 1967.
In fact, the Germans had quite a lot of success with air-launched anti-ship missiles in WW2, although it's debatable whether those count- they were more like guided bombs.
Interestingly, though, this does seem to be the first case of a large warship being successfully sunk by a missile launched from dry land. Argentina hit HMS Glamorgan with a truck-launched Exocet in 1982, killing 14 of the crew, destroying the embarked helicopter, and achieving a successful mission kill, but it didn't sink. And Yugoslavia used an anti-tank missile to sink a small Croatian armed speedboat during the 1991 Siege of Dubrovnik. Every other sinking of a ship by a missile has involved one launched from the sea or air.
Earlier than that- the Israelis lost the destroyer Eilat to Egyptian SS-N-2 Styx missiles in 1967.
In fact, the Germans had quite a lot of success with air-launched anti-ship missiles in WW2, although it's debatable whether those count- they were more like guided bombs.
Interestingly, though, this does seem to be the first case of a large warship being successfully sunk by a missile launched from dry land. Argentina hit HMS Glamorgan with a truck-launched Exocet in 1982, killing 14 of the crew, destroying the embarked helicopter, and achieving a successful mission kill, but it didn't sink. And Yugoslavia used an anti-tank missile to sink a small Croatian armed speedboat during the 1991 Siege of Dubrovnik. Every other sinking of a ship by a missile has involved one launched from the sea or air.
You might want to read up on how the Sheffield sank - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMS_Sheffield_(D80)#Board_of_i... . Some choice bits:
- Argentine forces carefully analyzed their target, studied, trained, practiced, and drilled for the attack. Over and over and over. Almost as if they believed there was a real war on, and actually wanted to hit an enemy with their weapons...
- British forces mostly couldn't be bothered to analyze their defenses for weaknesses. Let alone train, practice, or drill. Then they footgunned their best warning system, and didn't realize they were under attack until human-eyeball lookouts saw smoke from the rocket motors of the incoming missiles. Once warned, the bridge officers basically sat on their hands and gawked. (Vs., say, alerting the crew. Or trying to use some of the various anti-missile defense systems that the ship had.)
- The ~5,000 ton "warship" was designed so poorly that one modest hit knocked out both her electrical and fire-fighting systems. Even back in WWII, having redundant critical systems was a well-known and much-valued feature of all real warships.
- Hours into the crew's efforts to fight the fires (resulting from the missile hit), coordination and command of the fire-fighting efforts were somewhere between underwhelming and non-existent.
Blunt Summary: The aircraft, missile, and anti-missile technologies used (or available) during the attack on the HMS Sheffield were no more than costumes and props in a play. The real meat of the play was a human story that would fit quite comfortably into the Old Testament. On one side was a small group of skilled and determined warriors, intensely focused on winning. On the other side was a crowd of clueless noobs, wandering through the scenery and telling themselves that they were a real army.
- Argentine forces carefully analyzed their target, studied, trained, practiced, and drilled for the attack. Over and over and over. Almost as if they believed there was a real war on, and actually wanted to hit an enemy with their weapons...
- British forces mostly couldn't be bothered to analyze their defenses for weaknesses. Let alone train, practice, or drill. Then they footgunned their best warning system, and didn't realize they were under attack until human-eyeball lookouts saw smoke from the rocket motors of the incoming missiles. Once warned, the bridge officers basically sat on their hands and gawked. (Vs., say, alerting the crew. Or trying to use some of the various anti-missile defense systems that the ship had.)
- The ~5,000 ton "warship" was designed so poorly that one modest hit knocked out both her electrical and fire-fighting systems. Even back in WWII, having redundant critical systems was a well-known and much-valued feature of all real warships.
- Hours into the crew's efforts to fight the fires (resulting from the missile hit), coordination and command of the fire-fighting efforts were somewhere between underwhelming and non-existent.
Blunt Summary: The aircraft, missile, and anti-missile technologies used (or available) during the attack on the HMS Sheffield were no more than costumes and props in a play. The real meat of the play was a human story that would fit quite comfortably into the Old Testament. On one side was a small group of skilled and determined warriors, intensely focused on winning. On the other side was a crowd of clueless noobs, wandering through the scenery and telling themselves that they were a real army.
Can I ask, did you lose a relative on the Sheffield? It's quite rare to see the Falklands conflict through the human lens rather than the almost irresistible chance to see just how effective cold-war technologies were:
- naval area denial: even if the threat of the Exocet missile was overstated, it caused the British aircraft carrier to hang back. Conversely, having a nuclear-powered attack submarine in the area was highly effective for the British.
- Aerial combat: the carrier-borne Harriers were outnumbered and outclassed, but the Sidewinder missile was devastating.
The twin of your human factors story is the infantry engagements in the Falklands: a small force of professionals with good night-vision equipment was effective against unmotivated conscripts.
- naval area denial: even if the threat of the Exocet missile was overstated, it caused the British aircraft carrier to hang back. Conversely, having a nuclear-powered attack submarine in the area was highly effective for the British.
- Aerial combat: the carrier-borne Harriers were outnumbered and outclassed, but the Sidewinder missile was devastating.
The twin of your human factors story is the infantry engagements in the Falklands: a small force of professionals with good night-vision equipment was effective against unmotivated conscripts.
Fortunately no, I did not. Though several relatives have returned or not, from various wars, with long-term damage visible or not.
Mostly, my perspective is from being (by HN standards) extremely old. It was 1808 when Napoleon wrote (paraphrasing) that military power is 3/4 the quality of the people and 1/4 the supplies and equipment. The Atlantic gushes about the sinking of the Moskva as if wooden sailing ships were about to be replaced with steam-driven iron ones. I don't see much difference between the Moskva and the IJN's Akagi and Shinano (being sunk) back in WWII. Arguably, one lone dive bomber sunk the former. Certainly one little submarine sunk the latter. (Which was, at the time, by far the heaviest aircraft carrier ever built.) Atlantic-quality journalists at the time could have gushed about how the dive bomber would be new queen of the naval battlefield (they were pretty much obsolete by the end of WWII), and how aircraft carriers would have to get tiny or they'd be doomed (again, reality was quite the opposite). Actually competent journalists could have noted that the Akagi was an extremely vulnerable ship by nature (stuffed full of airplanes, gasoline, bombs), and that damage control efforts on the latter were hopelessly incompetent.
From what I've seen, the Moskva was a very vulnerable ship by design. And the performance of the Russian Army gives no reason to suspect that the Russian Navy might be up to scratch on damage control.
But that sort of cold, people-centric old man's analysis of events is not what most folks want to hear.
Mostly, my perspective is from being (by HN standards) extremely old. It was 1808 when Napoleon wrote (paraphrasing) that military power is 3/4 the quality of the people and 1/4 the supplies and equipment. The Atlantic gushes about the sinking of the Moskva as if wooden sailing ships were about to be replaced with steam-driven iron ones. I don't see much difference between the Moskva and the IJN's Akagi and Shinano (being sunk) back in WWII. Arguably, one lone dive bomber sunk the former. Certainly one little submarine sunk the latter. (Which was, at the time, by far the heaviest aircraft carrier ever built.) Atlantic-quality journalists at the time could have gushed about how the dive bomber would be new queen of the naval battlefield (they were pretty much obsolete by the end of WWII), and how aircraft carriers would have to get tiny or they'd be doomed (again, reality was quite the opposite). Actually competent journalists could have noted that the Akagi was an extremely vulnerable ship by nature (stuffed full of airplanes, gasoline, bombs), and that damage control efforts on the latter were hopelessly incompetent.
From what I've seen, the Moskva was a very vulnerable ship by design. And the performance of the Russian Army gives no reason to suspect that the Russian Navy might be up to scratch on damage control.
But that sort of cold, people-centric old man's analysis of events is not what most folks want to hear.
In fact a US warship did successfully defend against a similar attack in 2016.
https://news.usni.org/2016/10/11/uss-mason-fired-3-missiles-...
https://news.usni.org/2016/10/11/uss-mason-fired-3-missiles-...
> o far, in Ukraine, the signature land weapon hasn’t been a tank but an anti-tank missile: the Javelin. The signature air weapon hasn’t been an aircraft, but an anti-air missile: the Stinger.
The author (a veteran US Marine) is, obviously, well more versed in this than me, a computer programmer, but I'd say that he's wrong here. The signature weapon of the war right now is artillery, on both sides, that's why most recently it was artillery pieces that the US sent to Ukraine. Artillery has been a mainstay of the wars on the Ukrainian-Russian steppes ever since Napoleon.
What this war brought new to the table, a thing which might be the real revolutionary part of this war (at least when it comes to military doctrine), is the deadly artillery + cheap aerial drones combo, it has brought havoc to both sides. Those Russian convoys were not destroyed by javelines, but by targeted Ukrainian artillery strikes (with the help of said cheap drones).
Inside of the cities (Mariupol, mostly, from where most of the images have come when it comes to urban combat in this war) the tanks have still shown their worth, as in it was mostly with tanks (and, again, with artillery) that the Russians managed to destroy (and thus conquer) most of the city (they also used some aviation to drop bombs on Azovstal, but that was towards the end of the Mariupol battle). An interesting apparition was that of the BTR-82 [1]
[1] https://old.reddit.com/r/CombatFootage/comments/twraun/russi...
The author (a veteran US Marine) is, obviously, well more versed in this than me, a computer programmer, but I'd say that he's wrong here. The signature weapon of the war right now is artillery, on both sides, that's why most recently it was artillery pieces that the US sent to Ukraine. Artillery has been a mainstay of the wars on the Ukrainian-Russian steppes ever since Napoleon.
What this war brought new to the table, a thing which might be the real revolutionary part of this war (at least when it comes to military doctrine), is the deadly artillery + cheap aerial drones combo, it has brought havoc to both sides. Those Russian convoys were not destroyed by javelines, but by targeted Ukrainian artillery strikes (with the help of said cheap drones).
Inside of the cities (Mariupol, mostly, from where most of the images have come when it comes to urban combat in this war) the tanks have still shown their worth, as in it was mostly with tanks (and, again, with artillery) that the Russians managed to destroy (and thus conquer) most of the city (they also used some aviation to drop bombs on Azovstal, but that was towards the end of the Mariupol battle). An interesting apparition was that of the BTR-82 [1]
[1] https://old.reddit.com/r/CombatFootage/comments/twraun/russi...
"So far, in Ukraine, the signature land weapon hasn’t been a tank but an anti-tank missile: the Javelin. The signature air weapon hasn’t been an aircraft, but an anti-air missile: the Stinger. And as the sinking of the Moskva showed, the signature maritime weapon hasn’t been a ship but an anti-ship missile: the Neptune."
If you look at it solely from the Ukrainian point of view - yes. The Russians are relying heavily on platforms, even if they are losing. That doesn't mean that there isn't value in those platforms, just that they are being misapplied. For example, a tank is much more valuable to use against another tank than to use against dispersed ground troops. We would likely see them being valued differently in a near-peer conflict that was more coordinated/strategic (one of the biggest enemies of the Russians has been their leaders' own greed and lack of preparation, training, and coordination).
War is largely about economics. Of course using man-portable anti-platform weapons is ideal - you can destroy equipment that takes months or years to build at .1% of it's cost. Just like using left over or homemade munitions for IEDs can generate a lot of damage (physical and economic), especially over the course of a decade or two.
If you look at it solely from the Ukrainian point of view - yes. The Russians are relying heavily on platforms, even if they are losing. That doesn't mean that there isn't value in those platforms, just that they are being misapplied. For example, a tank is much more valuable to use against another tank than to use against dispersed ground troops. We would likely see them being valued differently in a near-peer conflict that was more coordinated/strategic (one of the biggest enemies of the Russians has been their leaders' own greed and lack of preparation, training, and coordination).
War is largely about economics. Of course using man-portable anti-platform weapons is ideal - you can destroy equipment that takes months or years to build at .1% of it's cost. Just like using left over or homemade munitions for IEDs can generate a lot of damage (physical and economic), especially over the course of a decade or two.
Where are any economics in Ukraine war? Russian loses are comparable to whole army of a small country.
I'm not sure what you're asking. The west is helping Ukraine economically, especially with the delivery of weapons on a scale that they would not be able to normally pay for. The west is also implementing sanctions to hurt Russia economically (there are even some articles coming out that it is affecting daily life in Russia now). And the losses sustained by Russia in the war will take years or even decades to recover from since they can't build or finance equipment as fast as they are losing it (not even getting into the personnel side of things). It's unsustainable.
From the article: “When you look at what weapons are on top of the Ukrainians’ wish list,” Moulton told me, “it isn’t towed howitzers. Top of their list are armed drones, anti-tank missiles, and anti-ship missiles.”
Actually, no! Why is this still being rehashed?? Zelensky specifically requested: artillery, artillery shells, Multiple Launch Rocket Systems, armored vehicles, tanks, air defense systems, and military aircraft.
He said: “When some leaders ask me what weapons I need, I need a moment to calm myself, because I already told them the week before. It’s Groundhog Day. I feel like Bill Murray.” (Liberation Without Victory, The Atlantic, https://archive.ph/nz2Da)
And while Javelins, and other missiles, have proven invaluable in taking out armored vehicles, the more effective weapon has been artillery (often targeted with the aid of drones).
Actually, no! Why is this still being rehashed?? Zelensky specifically requested: artillery, artillery shells, Multiple Launch Rocket Systems, armored vehicles, tanks, air defense systems, and military aircraft.
He said: “When some leaders ask me what weapons I need, I need a moment to calm myself, because I already told them the week before. It’s Groundhog Day. I feel like Bill Murray.” (Liberation Without Victory, The Atlantic, https://archive.ph/nz2Da)
And while Javelins, and other missiles, have proven invaluable in taking out armored vehicles, the more effective weapon has been artillery (often targeted with the aid of drones).
Thank you for this comment, I had to scroll all the way down to read some good-sense (I had made a comment basically identical to yours when it comes to artillery+drones a little earlier).
I think it all comes down to the "educated" Western audiences only following this conflict through the eyes of the Western media, which Western media has its own incentives (about which this is not the place to write at length), suffice is to say that their reports don't accurately reflect the situation on the battleground.
What does reflect the situation on the battleground is the videos coming from both side (Ukrainian and Russian) which clearly show that artillery (plus cheap commercial drones used as spotters) is bringing in most of the losses. The greatest military Russian defeat [1] in this war until now was the result of artillery and drones, not of javelins, not of any fancy and expensive Western-provided weapons.
Later edit: This [2] is good, old artillery in use (in this case by the Russians). There's no javelins nor drones all by themselves that can take those artillery pieces out.
[1] https://old.reddit.com/r/ukraine/comments/uqbam9/new_drone_f...
[2] https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1528738177741201410
I think it all comes down to the "educated" Western audiences only following this conflict through the eyes of the Western media, which Western media has its own incentives (about which this is not the place to write at length), suffice is to say that their reports don't accurately reflect the situation on the battleground.
What does reflect the situation on the battleground is the videos coming from both side (Ukrainian and Russian) which clearly show that artillery (plus cheap commercial drones used as spotters) is bringing in most of the losses. The greatest military Russian defeat [1] in this war until now was the result of artillery and drones, not of javelins, not of any fancy and expensive Western-provided weapons.
Later edit: This [2] is good, old artillery in use (in this case by the Russians). There's no javelins nor drones all by themselves that can take those artillery pieces out.
[1] https://old.reddit.com/r/ukraine/comments/uqbam9/new_drone_f...
[2] https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1528738177741201410
Artillery just isn't sexy enough to capture the media's attention. The King Of Battle has knocked out far more vehicles in Ukraine than any ATGMs.
I agree that missiles are the future, but unless the enemy is coming to you as is the case with Ukraine, then you are going to need a platform to deliver the missiles.
There seems to be an assumption here that the enemy will always have a platform-centric approach to war. What if both sides have an anti-platform-centric approach? Do they shoot at each others portable MANPAD's? A hybrid approach seems necessary, tanks and ships and planes have specific uses when the opponent is not platform-centric and Stinger's and Javelin's and Neptune's can be used against platforms. Something not mentioned in the article is that unmanned platforms are likely to take over. Why put a person inside any of these craft when they can be remotely controlled? Autonomous weapons (killer robots) don't seem likely to be able to distinguish combatants from non-combatants for some time to come, so remote control seems more likely. Also, tanks, planes and ships can't do a lot to win battles in urban terrain. At best they can obliterate infrastructure. Still, it is obvious that smart weapons are making a big difference in Ukraine. You would think that the major powers that invented smart weapons and have stockpiled them would not have been surprised when they turn out to make a difference.
I think the major surprise here is the sudden increased perception that a war between peer powers is not a thing of the past. I would guess that all the major powers are not ready today to fight each other in earnest for more than months or half a year in a non-nuclear war. China and Russia would not be able to get critical parts, and the USA would have to ramp up new manufacturing capability very quickly (it imports ingredients for high explosives from China?) Note that this would be extremely expensive for all countries, it would turn a large part of useful and beneficial production capacity into building an unproductive war economy. Citizens everywhere would suffer, even if none of the new weapons were ever used.
I think the major surprise here is the sudden increased perception that a war between peer powers is not a thing of the past. I would guess that all the major powers are not ready today to fight each other in earnest for more than months or half a year in a non-nuclear war. China and Russia would not be able to get critical parts, and the USA would have to ramp up new manufacturing capability very quickly (it imports ingredients for high explosives from China?) Note that this would be extremely expensive for all countries, it would turn a large part of useful and beneficial production capacity into building an unproductive war economy. Citizens everywhere would suffer, even if none of the new weapons were ever used.
It's annoying when articles like this blindly repeat misinformation:
> On March 9, 1862, the Union warship Monitor met its Confederate counterpart, Virginia. After a four-hour exchange of fire, the two fought to a draw. It was the first battle of ironclads. In one day, every wooden ship of the line of every naval power became immediately obsolete.
Ouch, false. The ironclad ships that the US built were what became known as "[river] monitors"--they were at best barely seaworthy, since they had no freeboard worth speaking of, so any sea that was mildly stalled would cause the ships to founder. In no way were they ships-of-the-line, or capable of threatening ships-of-the-line, and the first ironclad ship-of-the-line would have been HMS Warrior, built before the US ironclads.
> On December 7, 1941, the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor. If the battle of the ironclads settled once and for all the wood-versus-iron debate, Japanese carrier-based aircraft settled the battleship-versus-carrier debate by sinking the cream of America’s battleship fleet in a single morning.
Even worse than the previous paragraph. Aircraft carriers did not render battleships obsolete at Pearl Harbor, which involved a fleet of old battleships at a state of low readiness. If the Japanese thought battleships obsolete, why did they bring them to the Battle of Midway 6 months later?
One of the things that I think is poorly comprehended by much of the lay public is that military technology really is "part of a complete package". There isn't a single technology that beats everything else; instead, it tends to end up closer to a rock-paper-scissors scenario where it turns out you need all of the weapon systems to avoid being defeated by one of them. For example, in WW1-ish naval warfare, a large capital ship like a battleship is vulnerable to torpedoes, which means it needs a fleet screen of light units to avoid the torpedo threat, but those units are vulnerable to the powerful capabilities of battleships, which requires capital ships of their own to threaten.
What makes technology obsolete isn't "this can be countered by something else," it's "this capability can be provided by something better."
> On March 9, 1862, the Union warship Monitor met its Confederate counterpart, Virginia. After a four-hour exchange of fire, the two fought to a draw. It was the first battle of ironclads. In one day, every wooden ship of the line of every naval power became immediately obsolete.
Ouch, false. The ironclad ships that the US built were what became known as "[river] monitors"--they were at best barely seaworthy, since they had no freeboard worth speaking of, so any sea that was mildly stalled would cause the ships to founder. In no way were they ships-of-the-line, or capable of threatening ships-of-the-line, and the first ironclad ship-of-the-line would have been HMS Warrior, built before the US ironclads.
> On December 7, 1941, the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor. If the battle of the ironclads settled once and for all the wood-versus-iron debate, Japanese carrier-based aircraft settled the battleship-versus-carrier debate by sinking the cream of America’s battleship fleet in a single morning.
Even worse than the previous paragraph. Aircraft carriers did not render battleships obsolete at Pearl Harbor, which involved a fleet of old battleships at a state of low readiness. If the Japanese thought battleships obsolete, why did they bring them to the Battle of Midway 6 months later?
One of the things that I think is poorly comprehended by much of the lay public is that military technology really is "part of a complete package". There isn't a single technology that beats everything else; instead, it tends to end up closer to a rock-paper-scissors scenario where it turns out you need all of the weapon systems to avoid being defeated by one of them. For example, in WW1-ish naval warfare, a large capital ship like a battleship is vulnerable to torpedoes, which means it needs a fleet screen of light units to avoid the torpedo threat, but those units are vulnerable to the powerful capabilities of battleships, which requires capital ships of their own to threaten.
What makes technology obsolete isn't "this can be countered by something else," it's "this capability can be provided by something better."
The seaworthiness of Monitor or Merrimac was immaterial to the contemporary discussion around ironclads. It was a transformative moment. There were plenty of sea-worthy ironclads already in European fleets but there had not been a battle yet between two ironclads. As usual with militaries, there had been lots of debate around how effective the new weapons system would be.
Merrimac sailed into Hampton Roads (near Chesapeake Bay) and wasted two pretty good wooden Union frigates. The Union then sent in the Monitor. The two ships spent four hours pounding away at each other at point blank range, and still managed to steam away under their own power. The cannonballs just bounced off the armor. Two ships that, as you said, were barely sea worthy. (Some contemporary writers said the same - not a fair test!)
"News of the action at Hampton Roads took the British public, press, and Parliament by storm. Large wooden steamers were clearly helpless against smaller armour-plated foes. Ironclads were fighting ironclads. Perhaps most significantly, the Americans had produced them in far less time and expense than either England or France." [1]
Lord Lyons (British ambassador the U.S.) wrote to Lord Russel (Foreign Secretary), "This is, I suppose, the severest test to which the system of coating vessels in iron armour has yet been exposed."
Admiral Milne, head of the British North Atlantic Squadron was "agog" at the results. Commander Hewett of HMS Rinaldo actually watched the battle and had the same reaction.
What was proved was that the weapons system of wooden ships-of-the-line was obsolete. Ironclads were now conclusively the future.
[1] "Seagoing purposes indispensable to the defence of this country:" Policy Pitfalls of Great Britain's Early Ironclads
Merrimac sailed into Hampton Roads (near Chesapeake Bay) and wasted two pretty good wooden Union frigates. The Union then sent in the Monitor. The two ships spent four hours pounding away at each other at point blank range, and still managed to steam away under their own power. The cannonballs just bounced off the armor. Two ships that, as you said, were barely sea worthy. (Some contemporary writers said the same - not a fair test!)
"News of the action at Hampton Roads took the British public, press, and Parliament by storm. Large wooden steamers were clearly helpless against smaller armour-plated foes. Ironclads were fighting ironclads. Perhaps most significantly, the Americans had produced them in far less time and expense than either England or France." [1]
Lord Lyons (British ambassador the U.S.) wrote to Lord Russel (Foreign Secretary), "This is, I suppose, the severest test to which the system of coating vessels in iron armour has yet been exposed."
Admiral Milne, head of the British North Atlantic Squadron was "agog" at the results. Commander Hewett of HMS Rinaldo actually watched the battle and had the same reaction.
What was proved was that the weapons system of wooden ships-of-the-line was obsolete. Ironclads were now conclusively the future.
[1] "Seagoing purposes indispensable to the defence of this country:" Policy Pitfalls of Great Britain's Early Ironclads
> Even worse than the previous paragraph. Aircraft carriers did not render battleships obsolete at Pearl Harbor, which involved a fleet of old battleships at a state of low readiness. If the Japanese thought battleships obsolete, why did they bring them to the Battle of Midway 6 months later?
Look at the Battle of Taranto in 1940. The British sent a bunch of old, WW1 biplanes against the Italian fleet in port. Three battleships, a heavy cruiser, and two destroyers were disabled. The British lost two planes.
Three days after Pearl Harbor, the Japanese hit two of the most powerful battleships in the Royal Navy (Prince of Wales & Repulse). Both battleships sunk, at a loss of six Japanese planes. Those ships were sailing and fighting back - they didn't fair any better than the ships at Pearl Harbor or Taranto.
Battleships were now obviously sitting ducks without accompanying airpower. They were obsolete in that they were no longer the ship around which the rest of the fleet was organized. The aircraft carrier was the now the most important ship in the fleet.
Look at the Battle of Taranto in 1940. The British sent a bunch of old, WW1 biplanes against the Italian fleet in port. Three battleships, a heavy cruiser, and two destroyers were disabled. The British lost two planes.
Three days after Pearl Harbor, the Japanese hit two of the most powerful battleships in the Royal Navy (Prince of Wales & Repulse). Both battleships sunk, at a loss of six Japanese planes. Those ships were sailing and fighting back - they didn't fair any better than the ships at Pearl Harbor or Taranto.
Battleships were now obviously sitting ducks without accompanying airpower. They were obsolete in that they were no longer the ship around which the rest of the fleet was organized. The aircraft carrier was the now the most important ship in the fleet.
There's also the sinking of the Bismarck. Largest battleship created by the Germans. It's fate was sealed when the rudder was disabled by biplane torpedo bombers launched from British aircraft carrier Ark Royal.
It did get sunk by battleships but only after it couldn't run anymore.
It did get sunk by battleships but only after it couldn't run anymore.
Burg. Don't talk about the Maginot if you don't know shit about the second World War. I swear hoi4 players have more knowledge than the author.
I skimmed the comments and it seems the author was wrong about a lot. I thought the Atlantic was a better than average paper, the quality must have declined.
I skimmed the comments and it seems the author was wrong about a lot. I thought the Atlantic was a better than average paper, the quality must have declined.
There was a harbinger of this in the Falklands/Malvinas conflict, when Argentine forces sunk HMS Sheffield with Exocet missiles. Also, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in 2020 was showing the effectiveness of drones, and I'm sure Ukraine was taking notes.
> The military we have—an army built around tanks, a navy built around ships, and an air force built around planes, all of which are technologically advanced and astronomically expensive—is platform-centric.
The US has been transitioning off tanks for a while now
https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2021...
I suspect, most systems will continue to move underwater for the navy. We will also likely couple it with autonomous drones and decoys
The US has been transitioning off tanks for a while now
https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2021...
I suspect, most systems will continue to move underwater for the navy. We will also likely couple it with autonomous drones and decoys
The US hasn't been transitioning off tanks. One of the US's ground forces (the USMC) is getting rid of tanks, but the other ground forces (the actual US Army) is still retaining them. Indeed, one of the reasons that the USMC is getting rid of tanks is because it's arguing that the US Army can provide them when needed.
yeah, I remember that was the whole idea re the Stryker divisions of the army too.
reading that article, maybe that means there are longer range standoff weapons than Javelin/Stinger up the infantry's sleeve that we may not know about yet?
reading that article, maybe that means there are longer range standoff weapons than Javelin/Stinger up the infantry's sleeve that we may not know about yet?
No, there's no magic bullets waiting to be unveiled for the infantry or Marines. Stinger is old, in some ways out of date, and a planned replacement was never given enough funding to proceed. Javelin? It's fine for the foreseeable future, until top-attack defenses get good enough to reduce its effectiveness. Things like Trophy APS might be the solution, but those aren't cheap.
Eventually, the AGM-179 will replace the TOW/Hellfire/Maverick missiles, but this isn't really something soldiers will be humping around on raids like in Ukraine. These are heavy missiles (not counting their launch hardware), that require vehicles or aircraft to employ.
Eventually, the AGM-179 will replace the TOW/Hellfire/Maverick missiles, but this isn't really something soldiers will be humping around on raids like in Ukraine. These are heavy missiles (not counting their launch hardware), that require vehicles or aircraft to employ.
"Flagship" needs some clarification. If you follow naval affairs, this may seem too obvious to mention, but the term "flagship" does not indicate anything about the technical capabilities of a vessel. It just means the ship where the commander of a fleet has his office. The Moskva, despite being antiquated, was probably chosen as flagship just because it had the most room.
Also, a plea to everyone posting technical details. Please provide links to sources. It has been extremely hard finding solid data on this war.
Also, a plea to everyone posting technical details. Please provide links to sources. It has been extremely hard finding solid data on this war.
I don't understand the USMC. They were active in Afghanistan- a landlocked country with zero.zero beaches.
Reminds me of the German "paratroopers" who spend most of the war as overly qualified infantry.
Reminds me of the German "paratroopers" who spend most of the war as overly qualified infantry.
Part of the capabilities of the Marines is being able to move quickly and rapidly deploy anywhere which is useful in a shock or front line component to move in in front of slower sustainment forces like the Army.
They are assault/shock troops.
The Army has a sprawling operation and mission, but the Marines focus around that shock infantry model. The entire organization is focused around that, which has good and bad attributes.
The Army has a sprawling operation and mission, but the Marines focus around that shock infantry model. The entire organization is focused around that, which has good and bad attributes.
Let's put it like this: The South China Sea isn't called Sea because it's landlocked.
“Generation kill”, the book and the miniseries, is about marines invading Iraq in 2003 in unarmored humvees. Didn’t make sense then either.
The USMC has long been fighting for relevance. Fighting in Afghanistan was simply them doing literally anything just to do something
The Marine Corps proposed to take over most of the fighting in Afghanistan:
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/11/washington/11military.htm...
Agree that it was playing the game to justify its existence. Personally I think "the nation's ready response force" is a good and necessary mission.
Agree that it was playing the game to justify its existence. Personally I think "the nation's ready response force" is a good and necessary mission.
One thing I noticed about this war is that in the beginning a lot of planes were downed, this slowed to a trickle and then almost entirely stopped once the Western front disappeared and only the Eastern remained. I'm not quite clear on whether that is because they are no longer flying sorties because they're too afraid of surface-to-air defenses, whether they are out of planes or some other reason (such as the defenders no longer being able to down enemy planes).
I think there's still a trickle of SU-25s being shot down.
“So far, in Ukraine, the signature land weapon hasn’t been a tank but an anti-tank missile: the Javelin. The signature air weapon hasn’t been an aircraft, but an anti-air missile: the Stinger.”
Weren’t these the signature weapons because Ukraine doesn’t have much of an air force? It’s true that the Javelin and Stingers (etc.) have been remarkably effective; however, it’s not like the US ought to ditch its expensive aircraft in favor of shoulder-launched weapons.
Weren’t these the signature weapons because Ukraine doesn’t have much of an air force? It’s true that the Javelin and Stingers (etc.) have been remarkably effective; however, it’s not like the US ought to ditch its expensive aircraft in favor of shoulder-launched weapons.
> Weren’t these the signature weapons because Ukraine doesn’t have much of an air force?
It's because they're cheap, easy to deploy, and effective. And Russian planes need to fly low because of other anti air weapons and a general lack of precision munitions.
It's because they're cheap, easy to deploy, and effective. And Russian planes need to fly low because of other anti air weapons and a general lack of precision munitions.
[deleted]
Anti-platform weapons have met their match with countermeasures like the Israeli Trophy system against ATGMs which brought tanks back into warfare in full force.
Anti drone weapons are everywhere.
Aircraft have stealth and DIRCMs.
The problem with Moskva was tactical - it was a sitting duck without adequate protection. I wouldn’t read too much into it.
The problem with Moskva was tactical - it was a sitting duck without adequate protection. I wouldn’t read too much into it.
A cool thing about Neptune is the technology wasn't property tested for the prime time before and is relatively fresh technology! Ukrainian forces had used them successfully and have proven the high precision weapon know-how is still going strong in the country.
Neptune is just an upgraded Russian antiship missile tech from the late 80s. But clearly still pretty effective with the right targeting.
[deleted]
Wasn't the Turkish Bayraktar drone also involved in the sinking of Moskva?
Not to rain on the "feel-good" parade, but Moskva was laid down in 1976 and launched in 1979. It was older than most people on HackerNews. Don't treat it as bleeding edge technology.
Not to rain on the "feel-good" parade, but Moskva was laid down in 1976 and launched in 1979. It was older than most people on HackerNews. Don't treat it as bleeding edge technology.
Also, It was decommissioned then reinstated. However it was still a flagship.
Absolute garbage of an article. It is S300 an ancient AA platform that denied Russia Air supremacy, it is combination of Artillery and drones not Javelin that been most lethal and it most definitely not a completely unimpressive Neptune that is equivalent of a missiles that went into device half a century ago.. wait Russia still easily blockades Odessa
In Donbas now war resembles most the WW2 with mass of artillery being exchanged for drone directed artillery. Not Javelin, not any other man portable anything can dislodge Russian or Ukranians for that matter. Massed drone directed artillery and rocket artillery is the current go to.
Those ideas of infiltrating marines to Chinese islands are so idiotic as to defy all belief.. I hope whoever came up with that is on the first boat there
Last but not least perhaps journalist writing for Atlantic can read some book about WW1? Like something basic that covers eastern front? Offense did not go anywhere and no Somme was not a bayonet charge ffs
In Donbas now war resembles most the WW2 with mass of artillery being exchanged for drone directed artillery. Not Javelin, not any other man portable anything can dislodge Russian or Ukranians for that matter. Massed drone directed artillery and rocket artillery is the current go to.
Those ideas of infiltrating marines to Chinese islands are so idiotic as to defy all belief.. I hope whoever came up with that is on the first boat there
Last but not least perhaps journalist writing for Atlantic can read some book about WW1? Like something basic that covers eastern front? Offense did not go anywhere and no Somme was not a bayonet charge ffs
The sooner we fully adopt loitering munitions (like the switchblade), drones, and divest of easy targets for drones, missiles and loitering munitions (which are really suicide drones) the better.
I'm guessing the B52's will outlive the switchblades by a factor of 10.
Switchblades are a bit like 1914 "bombers". Useless by 1916.
Switchblades are a bit like 1914 "bombers". Useless by 1916.
Agreed. In fact, you know what a B-52 can hold a whole lot of? Little drones that can loiter for an hour or so looking for whatever their ML aglos think is 'enemy' before devolving down to essentially cluster munitions when their battery is about to die.
Yes, switchblades themselves are probably not the long term answer, but the point is that missiles and loitering munitions really obsolete lumbering, large vehicles.
Interesting take. But your use of missiles can actually be extended back tens of thousands of years.
I think it has happened many times that the invention of some new missile weapon (or other defensive weapon) had people think that some kind of offensive form of combat became obsolete. Maybe the first time would be when thrown spears or stones made the big brute with a club obsolete.
While in fact, up until now, this has gone back-and-forth numerous times.
Disciplined infantry made chariots obsolete, until cataphracts and knights arrived.
Longbows defeated knights for a moment, until they switched to plate armor.
Pikes/crossbows defeated knights, until they dismounted and picked up a Pollaxe, or later, as cuirassiers used pistols to harass.
Muskets and rifles defended well, until Napoleon used artillery, cavalry and manouver to give the attacker an advantage again.
Automatic rifles and machine guns led to trench warfare, until the Brits invented tanks.
Anti-tank guns defended pretty well vs tanks, until Guderian invented Blitzkrieg.
Shaped charges threatened tanks, until reactive armor was invented.
Actually, the general pattern that may be surprising to many, is that the key attribute for a weapon/platform to act offensively, is usually high survivability tactically, which allows them to advance, strategically. By comparison, platforms that have high firepower, but low survivability are often great defensively, as they allow counterattacks, but less useful when advancing.
So my prediction, going forward, as that at some point (next month or in a 100 years, I don't know), the large platforms will be equipped with defenses that allow them to regain enough survivability to be used offensively.
I think it has happened many times that the invention of some new missile weapon (or other defensive weapon) had people think that some kind of offensive form of combat became obsolete. Maybe the first time would be when thrown spears or stones made the big brute with a club obsolete.
While in fact, up until now, this has gone back-and-forth numerous times.
Disciplined infantry made chariots obsolete, until cataphracts and knights arrived.
Longbows defeated knights for a moment, until they switched to plate armor.
Pikes/crossbows defeated knights, until they dismounted and picked up a Pollaxe, or later, as cuirassiers used pistols to harass.
Muskets and rifles defended well, until Napoleon used artillery, cavalry and manouver to give the attacker an advantage again.
Automatic rifles and machine guns led to trench warfare, until the Brits invented tanks.
Anti-tank guns defended pretty well vs tanks, until Guderian invented Blitzkrieg.
Shaped charges threatened tanks, until reactive armor was invented.
Actually, the general pattern that may be surprising to many, is that the key attribute for a weapon/platform to act offensively, is usually high survivability tactically, which allows them to advance, strategically. By comparison, platforms that have high firepower, but low survivability are often great defensively, as they allow counterattacks, but less useful when advancing.
So my prediction, going forward, as that at some point (next month or in a 100 years, I don't know), the large platforms will be equipped with defenses that allow them to regain enough survivability to be used offensively.
> Interesting take. But your use of missiles can actually be extended back tens of thousands of years
I think drones and loitering munitions are much more interesting than traditional missiles. A missile is a threat for a matter of minutes, and can be defended. But drones and loitering munitions... the idea that something up in the air can wait... for the exact right moment... and hit with such accuracy... it changes how you think about fighting.
I think drones and loitering munitions are much more interesting than traditional missiles. A missile is a threat for a matter of minutes, and can be defended. But drones and loitering munitions... the idea that something up in the air can wait... for the exact right moment... and hit with such accuracy... it changes how you think about fighting.
Large vessels, aircraft carriers are sitting ducks for rockets. Even with some anti rocket defense.
It costs large amounts of money to build big ships and it costs little to sink them.
It costs large amounts of money to build big ships and it costs little to sink them.
This is the whole reason carriers move in groups. Plus in modern naval warfare, if you can see the enemy on the horizon, they are already too close.
After WW2 European countries came to this conclusion that war between technologically advanced industrial nations no longer makes economic sense.
Obviously it all predicates on politicians making somewhat rational decisions.
Obviously it all predicates on politicians making somewhat rational decisions.
An aircraft carrier can operate 400-1000km from a target, while moving at 40 kph. Much more time to mount an adequate defense compared to the Moskva 50km distance from the coast while sitting idle.
the issue is - what is the D21 (and brethren) capability? I think the war gaming w/ the late USSR and now China as the opposing force worried re theater-capable ICBMs. It's not like the carrier can hide these days...
Can it not? I'd reverse the question: Can China find it?
That's the part that I find missing from these discussions. Missiles like the D21 sound really deadly, but the information and communications needed to successfully target a carrier hundreds or thousands of miles away and deliver the weapon successfully is the much more difficult part of the equation. As the U.S. Navy (paraphrasing) said themselves, "The D21 has a long kill chain, and plenty of places to disrupt that kill-chain."
Likewise, the carrier goes around with much more than it's planes and escorts. It has the information being fed to it from ISR elsewhere, from satellites overhead to pre-mission information, communications eavesdropping, etc to know what they're up against and when and where they might encounter it. That, in my opinion is far more important than the specifics and specs of such and such weapon.
The success or defeat of a carrier battle group I think is going to depend far more on who knows what and when, and therefor, what's going on in the electromagnetic spectrum, than any singular missile.
That's the part that I find missing from these discussions. Missiles like the D21 sound really deadly, but the information and communications needed to successfully target a carrier hundreds or thousands of miles away and deliver the weapon successfully is the much more difficult part of the equation. As the U.S. Navy (paraphrasing) said themselves, "The D21 has a long kill chain, and plenty of places to disrupt that kill-chain."
Likewise, the carrier goes around with much more than it's planes and escorts. It has the information being fed to it from ISR elsewhere, from satellites overhead to pre-mission information, communications eavesdropping, etc to know what they're up against and when and where they might encounter it. That, in my opinion is far more important than the specifics and specs of such and such weapon.
The success or defeat of a carrier battle group I think is going to depend far more on who knows what and when, and therefor, what's going on in the electromagnetic spectrum, than any singular missile.
'Can it not? I'd reverse the question: Can China find it?'
You can find it yourself on free satellite imagery collected by the european sentinel satellites, provided globally free of charge. All ships are really easy to see from space, especially giant carriers.
Ofcourse sentinel takes images once every few days, and how that compares to spy satellites and how you target a missile from there i dunno
You can find it yourself on free satellite imagery collected by the european sentinel satellites, provided globally free of charge. All ships are really easy to see from space, especially giant carriers.
Ofcourse sentinel takes images once every few days, and how that compares to spy satellites and how you target a missile from there i dunno
Ships move around. Those satellites don't provide the real-time target tracks needed by ballistic missiles. Reconnaissance satellites are themselves no longer survivable.
Spot on. To add to this, the Navy knows those satellite tracks. It's one thing to spot a carrier in port from a days old image. It's another to find it actively evading you in wartime.
And regarding the satellites themselves, also agreed. I really believe that success at sea is going to depend a large part on success in space, and many countries know it.
And regarding the satellites themselves, also agreed. I really believe that success at sea is going to depend a large part on success in space, and many countries know it.
What possible action can a carrier take to evade satellite that can take daily photographs? Its not a plane, it cant travel a thousand kilometers in a day. It can only be withing a limited radius of it's initial position
I would expect that every major nation keeps track of every carrier on a daily basis
I would expect that every major nation keeps track of every carrier on a daily basis
Precision targeting of hypersonic ballistic projectiles is very difficult. While landing ballistic missile within 100 miles of a carrier is trivial, direct hits with conventional weapons require high precision measurements of carrier velocity, and position. The inbound weapon has very little time to correct its trajectory, and few sensors which will be effective at hypersonic velocity at the ranges required.
It's like finding a needle in a haystack. Find an extremely tiny object (relatively speaking) in millions of square miles of ocean.
A carrier is fast. 30+ knot speed, likely more (top speed is classified.) Going with 30 knots gives you 720 nautical mile radius of action, or 2,156,746 square miles.
This is to say nothing of the satellite's capabilities, or the back-end systems needed to find objects in the photographs.
There's better ways to go about it though, and the open source satellites taking photos are probably the worst for this job, to be brutally honest. But some examples:
The Soviets use to fly radar satellites to search for US carrier groups. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/US-A
The Chinese are suspected to have their own satellites for this purpose, though they are passive in nature, searching for electromagnetic emissions from the ships: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yaogan (Look up EMCON on how this is countered.)
But in short, it yes a carrier can still hide, though it's tricky. And this is without active measures being taken. And the Carrier Group Commander will have intelligence notifying them of when the overhead passes are. With that, they can start piecing together what the kill chain looks like, from getting that data down to the ground, the time it takes their analysts to find the carrier in it, get that data to command, and then down to the assets to take action against it, plan a sortie, and get the weapon out to where it is...during all that time of which the carrier is free to maneuver and take other counter measures. It becomes a game of cat and mouse.
It's rather dated now, but the classic book "Red Storm Rising" illustrates some of this and how it plays out.
A carrier is fast. 30+ knot speed, likely more (top speed is classified.) Going with 30 knots gives you 720 nautical mile radius of action, or 2,156,746 square miles.
This is to say nothing of the satellite's capabilities, or the back-end systems needed to find objects in the photographs.
There's better ways to go about it though, and the open source satellites taking photos are probably the worst for this job, to be brutally honest. But some examples:
The Soviets use to fly radar satellites to search for US carrier groups. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/US-A
The Chinese are suspected to have their own satellites for this purpose, though they are passive in nature, searching for electromagnetic emissions from the ships: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yaogan (Look up EMCON on how this is countered.)
But in short, it yes a carrier can still hide, though it's tricky. And this is without active measures being taken. And the Carrier Group Commander will have intelligence notifying them of when the overhead passes are. With that, they can start piecing together what the kill chain looks like, from getting that data down to the ground, the time it takes their analysts to find the carrier in it, get that data to command, and then down to the assets to take action against it, plan a sortie, and get the weapon out to where it is...during all that time of which the carrier is free to maneuver and take other counter measures. It becomes a game of cat and mouse.
It's rather dated now, but the classic book "Red Storm Rising" illustrates some of this and how it plays out.
The carrier strike group commander also has some limited capability to shoot down satellites in LEO.
A carrier can travel ~700 nautical miles in a day, which would be around the width of Texas. That is not a small area to search, ~1,539,380 SNM. Obviously you could narrow it down based on where you think the group is travelling to, etc, but if they are trying to not be found, day old data puts you in a tough position.
Also, China has it's own spy satellites. They're supposedly about equal to US versions in capabilities, China just doesn't have nearly as many of them.
You can destroy carriers even without sattelites and firing rockets from far away.
Small fast vessels can be used to search for the carrier and they can fire missiles.
Also, carriers have to be at a certain distance from the shore to mount an attack from them. Once they are close to the shore I'd say they are easy to spot.
A carrier in the middle of the ocean is harder to find and destroy, but it can't be used for attacking, and that's what a defending nation needs: enough deterring power to keep the carrier far from its shore.
Small fast vessels can be used to search for the carrier and they can fire missiles.
Also, carriers have to be at a certain distance from the shore to mount an attack from them. Once they are close to the shore I'd say they are easy to spot.
A carrier in the middle of the ocean is harder to find and destroy, but it can't be used for attacking, and that's what a defending nation needs: enough deterring power to keep the carrier far from its shore.
khinzals are supposed to be carrier killers.
Same way Russia is supposed to have a 2nd army in the world.
AFAIK at this point Kinzhal was successfully used only once, against a barn.
AFAIK at this point Kinzhal was successfully used only once, against a barn.
Kinzhal has been used multiple times according to western sources. Once against an underground weapons store where it's kinetic energy acted as a bunker buster. And a few other times against high level targets like foreign weapon stores and mercenaries.
This "underground weapons store" sounds exactly like how Russian sources described what later turned out to be a barn.
[deleted]
Some of the costs are hidden. The Neptune missile was cheap. The hidden, often unaccounted for part of that system however are the ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) capabilities to find the target. Anti-Ship missiles (AShMs) like the Neptune and practically any others have a limited ability to see what's around them because of the altitude they fly at and the overall small frame for radar power. This means the operator has to identify where the ship is, where it's going, and then fire their missiles to intercept. There's practically no communication afterwards (certainly not in Neptune's case) so the further away the ship it, the greater the chances it will move in that time and the missiles will fail to acquire it. (Firing closer as you can imagine brings its own risks.)
So you need a system or system of systems to find your target, relay that information down to your launchers (securely, quietly, and timely!) so you can launch your relatively cheap weapon. That's where all of the investment in communications, radars, overhead platforms (drones, aircraft, satellites) comes into play. The GlobalHawk that had been flying over the Black Sea for weeks at 40,000 feet isn't cheap, but without one, one's firing missiles blind.
The further out you get, the more eyes and links you need to find and track your target, and that's where it gets expensive. It also becomes less of a sure bet.
So you need a system or system of systems to find your target, relay that information down to your launchers (securely, quietly, and timely!) so you can launch your relatively cheap weapon. That's where all of the investment in communications, radars, overhead platforms (drones, aircraft, satellites) comes into play. The GlobalHawk that had been flying over the Black Sea for weeks at 40,000 feet isn't cheap, but without one, one's firing missiles blind.
The further out you get, the more eyes and links you need to find and track your target, and that's where it gets expensive. It also becomes less of a sure bet.
This is true-ish but the eleven US supercarriers and their accompanying carrier battle groups are vastly different from any other navy on the planet. Other nations do not have ships of a comparable size.
Two UK carriers come closest to the way the US Navy works, but are smaller. Russia's lone, damaged carrier is 25% smaller and may travel with a roughly comparable escort, if and when it becomes operational again.
Many other nations' carriers are one half to one fifth the size of a supercarrier. They exist to provide STOL/helicopter platforms.
Two UK carriers come closest to the way the US Navy works, but are smaller. Russia's lone, damaged carrier is 25% smaller and may travel with a roughly comparable escort, if and when it becomes operational again.
Many other nations' carriers are one half to one fifth the size of a supercarrier. They exist to provide STOL/helicopter platforms.
French carrier has proper catapult launch capability and seemingly so does the new chinese carrier. They sorties are smaller, but that's another matter
Which is why aircraft carriers aren’t tooling around the ocean on their lonesome.
Moskva sinking stands as just one of the numerous Russian failures in Ukraine. Just look at Belohorivka disaster where whole battalion tactical group was wiped out in the most stupid of circumstances. It doesn't mean that surface ships are outdated or cannot resist anti-ship missiles.
U.S. Aegis-equipped destroyers faced multiple strikes of essentially, same missiles in the Gulf of Aden, launched by pro-Russian Howthi (both based on Soviet Kh-35), with no hits and no even close calls (as far known, CIWS was never activated).
U.S. Aegis-equipped destroyers faced multiple strikes of essentially, same missiles in the Gulf of Aden, launched by pro-Russian Howthi (both based on Soviet Kh-35), with no hits and no even close calls (as far known, CIWS was never activated).
It was helped by the fact that they were more or less launching them blind. The Ukrainians had the help of intelligence telling them where the Moskava was and where it was going, and that's crucial information for an AShM strike. I doubt the Howthis had that sorta targeting.
They had direct targeting from a ground-based radar (which was later bombed by a Navy plane).
When you bet on your current ship defences to intercept new hypersonic missiles, you are taking too big of a bet.
Huh? Neptune isn't hypersonic. In fact, it is subsonic.
pueblito(3)
It didn’t sink, it literally pulled into port 4 days later.
This is disinformation posing as analysis.
Atlantic is the war mongers journal of choice after the economist lol
Movska was an old ship, and was under consideration for scuttle, and like lots of old things had things that didn't work. From what I've read, the Moskva didn't even have its anti-missile defense systems online. Probably never saw the attack coming.
https://twitter.com/KofmanMichael/status/1522608680595865606
https://twitter.com/GrangerE04117/status/1522643831736332288
https://news.usni.org/2022/05/05/warship-moskva-was-blind-to...
Don't have other sources handy, sorry.
https://twitter.com/KofmanMichael/status/1522608680595865606
https://twitter.com/GrangerE04117/status/1522643831736332288
https://news.usni.org/2022/05/05/warship-moskva-was-blind-to...
Don't have other sources handy, sorry.
In fact Moskva was refurbished in 2021, played a critical role in protecting the entire Black Sea Fleet whenever it left port with its very much online S-300 SAM, and likely didn't see the attack coming because of operator error and being distracted by the Bayraktar drone, not because of any lack of equipment.
I find it hard to believe that a flag ship of a navy that was repaired in 2020 and was set to be in use until 2040, was meant to be scuttled in 2022.
https://tass.com/defense/1173927
https://tass.com/defense/1173927
It couldn't have it's main missile defence system engage these missiles because it only operates in 180 degree sector and the ship was turned into opposite direction because it was alerted by a decoy force of Bayraktar drones.
CIWS could fire though, and apparently they did fire, but missed.
CIWS could fire though, and apparently they did fire, but missed.
The Moskva had been recently refitted (possibly this involved embezzling the pertintent funds, but still), "it was ready to be scuttled" is just propaganda aimed at understating the loss.
It was - for western standards. For Russian standards it was a flagship, and - as mentioned above - a critically important one.
Absolutely incorrect analysis. The signature marine weapon is the Poseidon P8. This is a heavily modified Boeing 737 NG configured for maritime intelligence and attack. This is what sank the Moskva.
If you read the analysis from intelligence reports, the Neptune is a rather unremarkable anti-surface missile with underwhelming capabilities. The Poseidon hovered hundreds of miles away and relayed the combat information to Ukraine commanders when the Moskva was weakened; and more than likely, when its short range defenses were down (likely due to Russian Incompetence). No doubt the Poseidon has watched every Russian Naval asset to figure out they were taking down defense radars and they devised a plan to sneak a relatively crappy Neptune missile in.
I think the defining age is intelligence, but then again, hasn't it always been? It's just taking on new forms. One of the most important and urgent projects the Air Force will undertaken is AWACs replacement with another 737 variant that has PESA, AESA, ELINT, AEW capabilities to this platform and provide the same level of battlefield intelligence on solid ground as we have that the P8 provides for maritime.