Trans-Pacific Cable Chaos, Shifting Asian Hubs(blog.telegeography.com)
blog.telegeography.com
Trans-Pacific Cable Chaos, Shifting Asian Hubs
https://blog.telegeography.com/trans-pacific-cables-asian-hubs-plcn-status
57 comments
People forget that the internet is, in fact, a series of tubes, and that a measure of digital GDP is tied to bandwidth and information export/inport.
Imagine the chaos if during war-time the first thing a major power did was cut all the internet wires to their enemy?
Imagine if during peace-time, N. Korea decided to do just this for kicks and giggles and to "flex it's muscle"?
Rich people have submarines, what's stopping some rich dude from doing this and betting against the markets? (Other than jail time if caught)?
Imagine if during peace-time, N. Korea decided to do just this for kicks and giggles and to "flex it's muscle"?
Rich people have submarines, what's stopping some rich dude from doing this and betting against the markets? (Other than jail time if caught)?
Why imagine?
The 2007 attacks on Estonia [1] and the cyberattacks before the actual attacks on South Ossetia [2] are generally believed to be a Russian test of its capabilities.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2007_cyberattacks_on_Estonia
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyberattacks_during_the_2008_S...
The 2007 attacks on Estonia [1] and the cyberattacks before the actual attacks on South Ossetia [2] are generally believed to be a Russian test of its capabilities.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2007_cyberattacks_on_Estonia
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyberattacks_during_the_2008_S...
I don't exactly remember when it was, I guess around 2005 or before. In a timespan from about 6 months multiple undersee cables had been 'hit by a ship' (pre Snowden, everybody believed the story). One cable was pretty bad, so traffic to asia was almost complet broken for a few days.
I remember this panic. I, and many others, actually learned at that time that anchors damaging undersea cables are actually a common occurrence.
> Rich people have submarines, what's stopping some rich dude from doing this and betting against the markets? (Other than jail time if caught)?
Now, that makes me think. What, if any law would you be breaking presuming this was done in international waters?
I mean, I'd assume you'd probably just cause an armed response from /someone/, but I imagine it'd probably be a extra-judicial process.
Now, that makes me think. What, if any law would you be breaking presuming this was done in international waters?
I mean, I'd assume you'd probably just cause an armed response from /someone/, but I imagine it'd probably be a extra-judicial process.
There are plenty of approaches that have been developed over the centuries for dealing with nefarious actors (usually pirates) on the high seas.
The tools employed can be blunt and destructive.
The tools employed can be blunt and destructive.
The venn diagram of people who can afford autonomous wire-cutting submarines and people who can hire accountants to hide white collar insider trading fraud is a circle.
Most "evil plans" are subverted by the fact that it's literally easier to just become rich and powerful in traditional/corrupt ways than to try to execute some elaborate scheme with espionage and robotic inventions.
Most "evil plans" are subverted by the fact that it's literally easier to just become rich and powerful in traditional/corrupt ways than to try to execute some elaborate scheme with espionage and robotic inventions.
Cables are cut all the time just by eg anchors; I don't think you'd need a sub. The hard part would be finding the cables though, since their position isn't publicized to prevent this sort of thing. Plus the place where it'd be easy to do this, on the continental shelf, is probably in territorial waters.
> Imagine the chaos if during war-time the first thing a major power did was cut all the internet wires to their enemy?
Britain cut the telegraph cables to Germany at the start of WWI, it lead to being able to intercept the Zimmermann Telegram [1].
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zimmermann_Telegram
Britain cut the telegraph cables to Germany at the start of WWI, it lead to being able to intercept the Zimmermann Telegram [1].
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zimmermann_Telegram
I think this is more or less assumed to be the case already. It would be foolish to initiate your nuclear retaliation without first burning all your zero-days on widespread infrastructure failure.
For more localized conflicts this is also already routine, lots of countries in civil war order ISPs under their jurisdiction to start blocking websites or the entire Internet whenever blocking it benefits the incumbents (which is always).
In any case there are counter-measures and counter-counter-measures for such situations. It's why Starlink has always been presumed to be a financial success even if civilians don't get behind it; every government in the world (and especially the DoD) would want a satellite network that can provide Internet connectivity to any part of the world, and you would have to literally shoot down dozens of satellites to impact its availability.
For more localized conflicts this is also already routine, lots of countries in civil war order ISPs under their jurisdiction to start blocking websites or the entire Internet whenever blocking it benefits the incumbents (which is always).
In any case there are counter-measures and counter-counter-measures for such situations. It's why Starlink has always been presumed to be a financial success even if civilians don't get behind it; every government in the world (and especially the DoD) would want a satellite network that can provide Internet connectivity to any part of the world, and you would have to literally shoot down dozens of satellites to impact its availability.
> you would have to literally shoot down dozens of satellites to impact its availability.
I'm not a satellite engineer, but I'd be surprised if this is true. What's preventing jamming a small, distant satellite signal with a big strong local transmitter?
It's trivially easy to jam GPS [0] and GPS is a much less complex signal than internet traffic.
[0] https://gizmodo.com/jamming-gps-signals-is-illegal-dangerous...
I'm not a satellite engineer, but I'd be surprised if this is true. What's preventing jamming a small, distant satellite signal with a big strong local transmitter?
It's trivially easy to jam GPS [0] and GPS is a much less complex signal than internet traffic.
[0] https://gizmodo.com/jamming-gps-signals-is-illegal-dangerous...
Any jamming attempts would have to be localized within a certain radius. Jamming an entire country's worth of area is probably untenable unless you are a really small country. Even then you could e.g. route communications across the border with a meshnet and then shoot them up to Starlink in a location that isn't being jammed.
This is the castle and invader problem; the castle builders must guarantee that there is no hole anywhere in the castle, and the invaders only have to find or make one hole to render the castle useless. Whereas you could cut an underwater cable and guarantee outages for at least a few days or weeks, an adversary only needs to move to an un-jammed area in order to resume communication with the greater world.
This is the castle and invader problem; the castle builders must guarantee that there is no hole anywhere in the castle, and the invaders only have to find or make one hole to render the castle useless. Whereas you could cut an underwater cable and guarantee outages for at least a few days or weeks, an adversary only needs to move to an un-jammed area in order to resume communication with the greater world.
> What's preventing jamming a small, distant satellite signal with a big strong local transmitter?
Anti-radiation missiles which home on the strong local transmitter.
I'm not saying this flippantly. Obviously not all Starlink consumers have access to such a thing. The scenario I'm talking about here is when a country is trying to choke the military communications of an other one.
The big benefit of these LEO satellite constellations is that they have hundreds of satellites in them which makes anti-sat weaponry not cost effective. (Or at least that's the hope.)
Anti-radiation missiles which home on the strong local transmitter.
I'm not saying this flippantly. Obviously not all Starlink consumers have access to such a thing. The scenario I'm talking about here is when a country is trying to choke the military communications of an other one.
The big benefit of these LEO satellite constellations is that they have hundreds of satellites in them which makes anti-sat weaponry not cost effective. (Or at least that's the hope.)
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There are usually a few undersea cable cuts every year just from accidents with ships dragging their anchors in bad weather. Most places have redundant connectivity now so it isn't a major problem.
But are they really accidents? I know they are blamed on random ships but some of the time if you dig a little there will also be some geopolitical posturing you can tie it to, or the potential for bugging should be considered.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/hisutton/2020/08/19/how-russian... this article is about Russians but you can be what ever they are doing, 'we' are doing too.
Globalization and the detriment of their own counties economy is what limits the likelihood of this happening. Russia definitely has a plan to do this and the capability. But they won't.
...or, leave them intact? Nothing worse than an enemy you can't spy on, or feed disinformation to.
I can imagine major power or North Korea doing those sort of things when the circumstances come, but the 'rich people' part is pure non-sense.
First of all they have no interest in doing such.
Secondly, Attacking cable infrastructure using submarines is in effect a declaration of war (or act of terrorism). I understand this world gives you this illusion that money = power, but just remember who prints the currency, who owns the army. Only because this sort of things are not in your daily life so often like the rich people are doesn't mean they don't exist.
The last but not the least, they likely won't be rich at all when the governments of countries affected freezes their assets, which should be the least of their concerns if that actually happens.
First of all they have no interest in doing such.
Secondly, Attacking cable infrastructure using submarines is in effect a declaration of war (or act of terrorism). I understand this world gives you this illusion that money = power, but just remember who prints the currency, who owns the army. Only because this sort of things are not in your daily life so often like the rich people are doesn't mean they don't exist.
The last but not the least, they likely won't be rich at all when the governments of countries affected freezes their assets, which should be the least of their concerns if that actually happens.
But that would is a bit of a stretch, some rich countries, say UAE (Dubai) and Saudi Arabia, do not have a direct access to " super fast nodes, they connect through Singapore, while countries in the Mediterranean basin have better access, yet it does not give them that big edge.
Is Starlink also a "tube"?
Starlink is a series of tubes connected by airgaps :)
From an future economic perspective Indonesia seems to have the most potential.
From a defensability perspective (from diego garcia), it wins there as well. Indonesian government has also sunk the most (Chinese) ships operating illegally in its waters so it's government seems most willing/able to assert its sovereignty in SEA (esp considering that these "fishing" boats are likely to be used in lieu of conventional naval forces in any conflict that could erupt initially).
From a defensability perspective (from diego garcia), it wins there as well. Indonesian government has also sunk the most (Chinese) ships operating illegally in its waters so it's government seems most willing/able to assert its sovereignty in SEA (esp considering that these "fishing" boats are likely to be used in lieu of conventional naval forces in any conflict that could erupt initially).
100% Agree on Indonesia for economic future. I've spent so much time in HK, PH and Indonesia and Indonesia has always impressed me with ease of business, infrastructure and somewhat "freedoms."
There is internet censorship in all three though, and most of SEA. Philippines Censorship is mostly about pornography and going after some people that talk bad about politicians. Indonesia is same, but they have a more compelling action to stop both and actively DNS hijack if you use default ISP dns configs. Indonesia also actively semi blocks reddit on some ISP's.
If you set the DNS A record correct then it works fine, so it's very trivial to bypass, but that is something to be aware off for the region.
The one thing though is the navy of both the Philippines and Indonesia are not armed, nor strong enough to defend against China. The island infrastructure is critical for their defense, but it will also hamper logistics greatly, still. Satellite communications AFAIK can be routed via USA owned sats so that wouldn't be an issue provided these SEA countries didn't attack first but that just opens up more speculation...
Interesting future the next two decade will be.
There is internet censorship in all three though, and most of SEA. Philippines Censorship is mostly about pornography and going after some people that talk bad about politicians. Indonesia is same, but they have a more compelling action to stop both and actively DNS hijack if you use default ISP dns configs. Indonesia also actively semi blocks reddit on some ISP's.
If you set the DNS A record correct then it works fine, so it's very trivial to bypass, but that is something to be aware off for the region.
The one thing though is the navy of both the Philippines and Indonesia are not armed, nor strong enough to defend against China. The island infrastructure is critical for their defense, but it will also hamper logistics greatly, still. Satellite communications AFAIK can be routed via USA owned sats so that wouldn't be an issue provided these SEA countries didn't attack first but that just opens up more speculation...
Interesting future the next two decade will be.
> If you set the DNS A record correct then it works fine, so it's very trivial to bypass, but that is something to be aware off for the region.
Or /etc/hosts, which is what I use to bypass things like reddit or crypto related stuff that's blocked (but can be done for things like pornography).
> The one thing though is the navy of both the Philippines and Indonesia are not armed, nor strong enough to defend against China.
If you exclude the 2 attack subs in the Indonesian Navy (and the 3 more on order [0], which signals intent to build up this capacity), I understand that, but in order to pull off an attack/invasion, much more distance needs to be covered and actively defended (i.e, supply chain for such attacks/invasion must not be ignored) which is a lot easier for China to engage in such operations against Philippines compared to Indonesia.
> Satellite communications AFAIK can be routed via USA owned sats so that wouldn't be an issue provided these SEA countries didn't attack first but that just opens up more speculation...
Satellite links can also be compromised by surveillance spaceships/satellites as well, so even routing through ones own sats is not a panacea.
> Interesting future the next two decade will be.
Agreed.
[0] https://military.wikia.org/wiki/Indonesian_Navy
Or /etc/hosts, which is what I use to bypass things like reddit or crypto related stuff that's blocked (but can be done for things like pornography).
> The one thing though is the navy of both the Philippines and Indonesia are not armed, nor strong enough to defend against China.
If you exclude the 2 attack subs in the Indonesian Navy (and the 3 more on order [0], which signals intent to build up this capacity), I understand that, but in order to pull off an attack/invasion, much more distance needs to be covered and actively defended (i.e, supply chain for such attacks/invasion must not be ignored) which is a lot easier for China to engage in such operations against Philippines compared to Indonesia.
> Satellite communications AFAIK can be routed via USA owned sats so that wouldn't be an issue provided these SEA countries didn't attack first but that just opens up more speculation...
Satellite links can also be compromised by surveillance spaceships/satellites as well, so even routing through ones own sats is not a panacea.
> Interesting future the next two decade will be.
Agreed.
[0] https://military.wikia.org/wiki/Indonesian_Navy
Curious which part of Indonesia are u referring to? Indonesia rank 73 out of 190 countries. Indonesia trying to reform the law but it is still problematic. Corruption and bureaucracy is till problematic in Indonesia. Legal system is inconsistent and difficult to navigate. Infrastructure still lacking. Ethnic violence and Islam Radicalization is always pose challenge to the Indonesia political stability.
What are the "security concerns" for a direct cable between the Americas and Hong Kong?
It's not just communicating between the US and Hong Kong, it's all the transit traffic. If there is a high capacity, low cost link between the US and Hong Kong, traffic to other Asian countries will then transit Hong Kong.
At that point, the Chinese government gets to dictate whether or not that traffic is allowed, and to snoop on any part of it they can.
At that point, the Chinese government gets to dictate whether or not that traffic is allowed, and to snoop on any part of it they can.
At a large US cloud provider I formerly worked at our fiber between colos in HKG were all tapped, with unexplained db losses. Seemed to be not a secret this goes on there.
a really good tap won't even have a perceptible loss if they're doing it right, it'll be indistinguishable when the link is first brought up (assuming you're renting dedicated dark strands) from just some older fiber with a very slightly higher dB per km loss figure. Modern singlemode for inter-city use can be 0.03 to 0.07 dB/km better than old stuff from 15, 20, 23 years ago.
if you're paying for lit L2 transport service between two sites then all bets are off, you don't get to see the underlying optical characteristics except for the customer hand off port on each side, and the carrier can of course just mirror an entire port to some capture entity.
if you're paying for lit L2 transport service between two sites then all bets are off, you don't get to see the underlying optical characteristics except for the customer hand off port on each side, and the carrier can of course just mirror an entire port to some capture entity.
>a really good tap won't even have a perceptible loss if they're doing it right
I'm curious, how does one "do it right"? Is there a technical explainer somewhere on how this works (in theory)?
I'm curious, how does one "do it right"? Is there a technical explainer somewhere on how this works (in theory)?
singlemode fiber splitters come in various ratios of light passed to light split off to your own thing. You fusion splice it in place. It's basically just a prism in a box. If you want to tap a circuit such as between two datacenters at the most fundamental (OSI layer 1) level, before the dark fiber is ever handed off to the customer, you would put in place a tap that passes 90% of the light and keeps 10% of it, splits it off, then feed that into your own local amplifier if needed before passing the tap to your interception/storage equipment, if the received signal level from the 10% is too low.
the general principle is actually not much different from some things you do in ordinary DWDM system engineering (where you want to give an analysis port to a spectrum analyzer) or the various types of splitters that exist for GPON network builds.
there are also lots of ways to hand-wave away the loss from a tap to a carrier customer, like "oh yeah there's some dirty patch panels over there" or "that segment of fiber was fusion spliced in an emergency repair at 3am eight years ago after it got taken out by a truck, there may be some slightly higher loss on some strands". And even more so for an inter-city fiber link that's way under 80 km (more like 30-40km, tops), where the optical link budget POP-to-POP isn't in question, and well within the reach of ordinary optics even when considering old or dirty fiber in between. The ISP customers might not look too hard at it.
google "fiber plc splitter" for some manufacturer info and datasheets.
the general principle is actually not much different from some things you do in ordinary DWDM system engineering (where you want to give an analysis port to a spectrum analyzer) or the various types of splitters that exist for GPON network builds.
there are also lots of ways to hand-wave away the loss from a tap to a carrier customer, like "oh yeah there's some dirty patch panels over there" or "that segment of fiber was fusion spliced in an emergency repair at 3am eight years ago after it got taken out by a truck, there may be some slightly higher loss on some strands". And even more so for an inter-city fiber link that's way under 80 km (more like 30-40km, tops), where the optical link budget POP-to-POP isn't in question, and well within the reach of ordinary optics even when considering old or dirty fiber in between. The ISP customers might not look too hard at it.
google "fiber plc splitter" for some manufacturer info and datasheets.
> google "fiber plc splitter" for some manufacturer info and datasheets.
See also "optical tap".
See also "optical tap".
Most insightful, same excuse for beigeboxing back in the day but with fiber/glass. Wow.
[deleted]
I'd be surprised if there are any large players who don't encrypt everything e2e these days. (By e2e, I mean while data is in transit between datacenters.)
That's at least been the case at Google for something like a decade since the China hacks, the Snowden revelations, etc.
That said, I imagine there would be a big capacity crunch if all fibers transiting HKG were completely disrupted. As I understand it, HKG is primarily a stepping stone between SIN and TPE / NRT. There are comparably direct alternatives (e.g. MNL), but the capacity just isn't there yet.
(Networking often uses airport codes to describe metros, e.g. TPE for Taipei or NRT for Tokyo (Narita).)
That's at least been the case at Google for something like a decade since the China hacks, the Snowden revelations, etc.
That said, I imagine there would be a big capacity crunch if all fibers transiting HKG were completely disrupted. As I understand it, HKG is primarily a stepping stone between SIN and TPE / NRT. There are comparably direct alternatives (e.g. MNL), but the capacity just isn't there yet.
(Networking often uses airport codes to describe metros, e.g. TPE for Taipei or NRT for Tokyo (Narita).)
By E2E you mean SSL and not actually end-to-end right? AFAIK no provider transports HTTP packets over the wire E2E in the same way that Signal or Telegram transports text messages E2E. It's not actually possible since there is no way to transmit a shared secret without first establishing a secure channel (which itself cannot be E2E).
Anyways point being, China/HK could just subpoena the private keys for individual SSL certificates and decrypt traffic on their end while it passes through the pipeline. Having sovereignty over the cable is still an advantage for them.
Anyways point being, China/HK could just subpoena the private keys for individual SSL certificates and decrypt traffic on their end while it passes through the pipeline. Having sovereignty over the cable is still an advantage for them.
I mean e2e as far as the connection is concerned, whether it's a server talking to end-users via HTTPS, or a server in a datacenter in Singapore talking to a server in a datacenter in Atlanta using GPG or TLS or whichever proprietary encryption algorithm you want to use.
If China / HKG has that subpoena power for arbitrary SSL certificates, then we've already lost. As I mentioned, significant traffic already transits through HKG. But even so, what enforcement mechanism does China have? Facebook as well as many other services are already blocked...
And honestly, if China starts using subpoena power to take control of SSL certs, that's a _very_ strong incentive to leave that market entirely, as not only can they decrypt your traffic; they can also impersonate you.
"True e2e" as offered by Signal / Telecom still relies on Diffie-Hellman key exchange, and therefore some notion of public / private keys with custom PKI servers. It's no different from an attacker's perspective -- instead of the global PKI infra underpinning the web, you're just dealing with a single entity. Compromise the PKI, and you can MitM to your heart's content.
If China / HKG has that subpoena power for arbitrary SSL certificates, then we've already lost. As I mentioned, significant traffic already transits through HKG. But even so, what enforcement mechanism does China have? Facebook as well as many other services are already blocked...
And honestly, if China starts using subpoena power to take control of SSL certs, that's a _very_ strong incentive to leave that market entirely, as not only can they decrypt your traffic; they can also impersonate you.
"True e2e" as offered by Signal / Telecom still relies on Diffie-Hellman key exchange, and therefore some notion of public / private keys with custom PKI servers. It's no different from an attacker's perspective -- instead of the global PKI infra underpinning the web, you're just dealing with a single entity. Compromise the PKI, and you can MitM to your heart's content.
Fair point. I was under the assumption that subpoenaing certs at least for domestic entities was common place. I guess that barrier hasn't been crossed yet, or at least we assume so?
After some amount of poking around, I've found exactly one case where that happened (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lavabit in connection with Snowden).
Law enforcement might subpoena, say, search result records in connection with a specific crime (certain keywords + location + timeframe), but larger companies with the resources would absolutely have the ability and incentive to fight something as overly broad as requesting SSL keys.
Law enforcement might subpoena, say, search result records in connection with a specific crime (certain keywords + location + timeframe), but larger companies with the resources would absolutely have the ability and incentive to fight something as overly broad as requesting SSL keys.
couldn't they just wrap up the lines at the U.S. embassy, and give U.S. full control over any "snooping" and "transit"?
Right of way between the ocean and embassy and gives the consulate way to much power, you don't do that.
I found the FCC filings at [1] to be useful to understand the government's position here. Particularly the "Provisional National Security Agreement" that the cable now operates under[2].
It seems to boil down to:
(1) The PRC likely has visibility into the traffic, while the NSA wouldn't, and
(2) The President has the authority to unilaterally deny the operation of undersea cables, so you'd better play by our rules.
[1]: https://licensing.fcc.gov/cgi-bin/ws.exe/prod/ib/forms/repor...
[2]: https://licensing.fcc.gov/myibfs/download.do?attachment_key=... (PDF download)
It seems to boil down to:
(1) The PRC likely has visibility into the traffic, while the NSA wouldn't, and
(2) The President has the authority to unilaterally deny the operation of undersea cables, so you'd better play by our rules.
[1]: https://licensing.fcc.gov/cgi-bin/ws.exe/prod/ib/forms/repor...
[2]: https://licensing.fcc.gov/myibfs/download.do?attachment_key=... (PDF download)
The article cites “security concerns”, but I think “geopolitical concerns” are more likely.
However, MITM has always been an advantageous position for bad actors. So this is probably the concern, without evidence.
However, MITM has always been an advantageous position for bad actors. So this is probably the concern, without evidence.
The Navy hasn't tapped these cables yet.
We already know that the US monitors internet traffic on a global scale, so it’s a bit rich of them trying to police the rest of the world on this.
The US doesn't operate a great firewall. I don't dispute the capabilities that the NSA, CSE, GCHQ/five eyes partners have, or presently operate, but what matters to me is the results in human rights abuses, freedom of the press and freedom of speech abuses, arbitrary detention, and censorship of the Internet that results from it.
If I had to make the purely pragmatic lesser of two evils choice between the US domestic telecom system as it's run right now (day job is senior network engineer for an ISP), and how telecom is done in China, I'll take the US/NATO approach any day of the week. I don't have time to go into great detail without violating a whole boatload of NDAs and other restrictions, but to use a crude metaphor, suffice to say that I've seen how the sausage is made.
Also if I may point out, a low effort comment engaging in nothing but "whataboutism" is barely a step above flamebait.
If I had to make the purely pragmatic lesser of two evils choice between the US domestic telecom system as it's run right now (day job is senior network engineer for an ISP), and how telecom is done in China, I'll take the US/NATO approach any day of the week. I don't have time to go into great detail without violating a whole boatload of NDAs and other restrictions, but to use a crude metaphor, suffice to say that I've seen how the sausage is made.
Also if I may point out, a low effort comment engaging in nothing but "whataboutism" is barely a step above flamebait.
Well there's no whataboutism when the US block us (Im in HK) from a peering connection because they re scared we ll betray their precious secrets to our chinese overlord while frankly, when we took Snowden, they didn't make it easy either. And that was way more important for national security and freedom to protect americans against the NSA outreach. I mean, it's annoying that when we point the absurd contradiction of the US claims, we get turned down to whataboutism.
For Americans, freedom and security only matter when it apply to their own economical interests (rarely their oppressed citizens), which is fine, but you cant claim you d prefer NATO to the China model: they are both exactly the same from the point of view of someone a external...
Whether you're american or chinese doing the right thing when the State does the wrong thing, lands you in jail after monitoring turned you to secret services. The diff may be the US State does less wrong things, and that jail in the US is a bit better, but you know... you still cant do the right thing when needed so a cable or not with Hong Kong, what exactly are they trying to protect...
For Americans, freedom and security only matter when it apply to their own economical interests (rarely their oppressed citizens), which is fine, but you cant claim you d prefer NATO to the China model: they are both exactly the same from the point of view of someone a external...
Whether you're american or chinese doing the right thing when the State does the wrong thing, lands you in jail after monitoring turned you to secret services. The diff may be the US State does less wrong things, and that jail in the US is a bit better, but you know... you still cant do the right thing when needed so a cable or not with Hong Kong, what exactly are they trying to protect...
The US and PRC are not exactly the same in terms of where freedom and security matter.
Maybe i'm not understanding what you wrote, but are there any recent examples of US 'monitoring' our own citizens, and then turning them into (whatever our form of) secret services? besides criminal behavior?
from my reading you imply that someone 'doing the right thing' like speaking out against for instance the overreach of our government - like i'm decrying right now - could land a US citizen in some Xinjiang-like interment camp for 're-education.'
prima face ridiculous comparison. so it goes with every CCP thread that spirals with attempts to distract and deflect. And hey maybe it works since I always seem to get sucked in.
and how is the overreach snowden revealed comparable to the active (as opposed to passive dragnet surveillance), constant, oppressive digital intervention of CCP in the lives of its citizens, let alone the gross misuse of tracking technology to perpetrate an ongoing genocide?
Maybe i'm not understanding what you wrote, but are there any recent examples of US 'monitoring' our own citizens, and then turning them into (whatever our form of) secret services? besides criminal behavior?
from my reading you imply that someone 'doing the right thing' like speaking out against for instance the overreach of our government - like i'm decrying right now - could land a US citizen in some Xinjiang-like interment camp for 're-education.'
prima face ridiculous comparison. so it goes with every CCP thread that spirals with attempts to distract and deflect. And hey maybe it works since I always seem to get sucked in.
and how is the overreach snowden revealed comparable to the active (as opposed to passive dragnet surveillance), constant, oppressive digital intervention of CCP in the lives of its citizens, let alone the gross misuse of tracking technology to perpetrate an ongoing genocide?
A submarine cable is much more than just a peering connection.
You mean like banning search results on inconvenient genocides?