Hiroshima (1946)(newyorker.com)
newyorker.com
Hiroshima (1946)
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1946/08/31/hiroshima
272 comments
I am one of those that think that the dropping of the bombs was unnecessary.
The decision is complicated and multifaceted. It's also difficult to know what could have happened if they hadn't done it. If my brother had been born a woman, he'd have been my sister.
To your point of some people refusing to surrender on the Japanese side, on the US side Generals Douglas MacArthur and Dwight D. Eisenhower, and Admiral William Leahy opposed the dropping of the bombs, and viewed it as completely unnecessary. Does this then demonstrate it was not needed, because there were elements who did not support it?
The Japanese had no navy to speak of at the time, America had complete air superiority, and had no qualms of firebombing Japanese cities and killing its civilians. They were essentially already defeated. There were peace envoys from the Japanese side towards the end of 1944 onwards exploring a negotiated peace. Peace was already likely without the need of a ground invasion, if it had been explored seriously.
What seems likely is that dropping the bombs was an attempt to end the war on American terms, with no Soviet involvement in a negotiated peace. It likely had little to do with avoiding a ground operation; those plans were never approved, and it's unlikely they would have been needed.
I don't discount that people may really have believed and intended that this would save American lives. I do think there were other reasons behind dropping the bombs, however, things are rarely binary.
Edit: I should also add here that from the Japanese perspective (for example, Tsuyoshi Hasegawa), the invasion of the Soviets is considered to be the deciding factor in ending the war, and not the dropping of the bombs, so even the assertion that the bombs were responsible is questionable.
The decision is complicated and multifaceted. It's also difficult to know what could have happened if they hadn't done it. If my brother had been born a woman, he'd have been my sister.
To your point of some people refusing to surrender on the Japanese side, on the US side Generals Douglas MacArthur and Dwight D. Eisenhower, and Admiral William Leahy opposed the dropping of the bombs, and viewed it as completely unnecessary. Does this then demonstrate it was not needed, because there were elements who did not support it?
The Japanese had no navy to speak of at the time, America had complete air superiority, and had no qualms of firebombing Japanese cities and killing its civilians. They were essentially already defeated. There were peace envoys from the Japanese side towards the end of 1944 onwards exploring a negotiated peace. Peace was already likely without the need of a ground invasion, if it had been explored seriously.
What seems likely is that dropping the bombs was an attempt to end the war on American terms, with no Soviet involvement in a negotiated peace. It likely had little to do with avoiding a ground operation; those plans were never approved, and it's unlikely they would have been needed.
I don't discount that people may really have believed and intended that this would save American lives. I do think there were other reasons behind dropping the bombs, however, things are rarely binary.
Edit: I should also add here that from the Japanese perspective (for example, Tsuyoshi Hasegawa), the invasion of the Soviets is considered to be the deciding factor in ending the war, and not the dropping of the bombs, so even the assertion that the bombs were responsible is questionable.
>It's also difficult to know what could have happened if they hadn't done it
This sort of emotional hand waving in the direction of uncertainty is always employed in these discussions. What is the path from the status quo of late summer 1945 to peace without atomic bombs and how much death and destruction are the high and low end estimates? The status quo is/was well documented at the time and has been scrutinized with a microscope from all sides with the benefit of hindsight since. You are going to have a hard time charting a path from the status quo to piece that causes less death and destruction than what actually happened without a case where a bunch of exceptional things happen in a row.
You might not like that "basically fire bombing but with extra science to make it cheaper" was employed to end the war because of the 2nd and 3rd order implications of this extra cheapness but it's nearly certain that it was the least bad way to end the war.
>the invasion of the Soviets is considered to be the deciding factor in ending the war, and not the dropping of the bombs, so even the assertion that the bombs were responsible is questionable.
These sort of statements are always weasel worded so as to avoid comparing the relative size of the factors. They stood to have their entire country bombed into oblivion. The soviet invasion was simply the final straw on the same way someone who's lost everything may choose to go postal over a minor slight.
This sort of emotional hand waving in the direction of uncertainty is always employed in these discussions. What is the path from the status quo of late summer 1945 to peace without atomic bombs and how much death and destruction are the high and low end estimates? The status quo is/was well documented at the time and has been scrutinized with a microscope from all sides with the benefit of hindsight since. You are going to have a hard time charting a path from the status quo to piece that causes less death and destruction than what actually happened without a case where a bunch of exceptional things happen in a row.
You might not like that "basically fire bombing but with extra science to make it cheaper" was employed to end the war because of the 2nd and 3rd order implications of this extra cheapness but it's nearly certain that it was the least bad way to end the war.
>the invasion of the Soviets is considered to be the deciding factor in ending the war, and not the dropping of the bombs, so even the assertion that the bombs were responsible is questionable.
These sort of statements are always weasel worded so as to avoid comparing the relative size of the factors. They stood to have their entire country bombed into oblivion. The soviet invasion was simply the final straw on the same way someone who's lost everything may choose to go postal over a minor slight.
This sort of emotional hand waving in the direction of what actually happened is always employed in these discussions. "What is the path to the defeat of the Nazis, without the Holocaust? Therefore the Holocaust was necessary?" Please, no it wasn't.
> Japanese had no navy to speak of at the time, America had complete air superiority, and had no qualms of firebombing Japanese cities and killing its civilians. They were essentially already defeated.
This roughly aligns with some of the island hopping campaign, but still the Japanese just wouldn't surrender. It was not on their culture to do so (at the time).
I'm not saying you're overall wrong, but saying I would not infer too much from your premise.
This roughly aligns with some of the island hopping campaign, but still the Japanese just wouldn't surrender. It was not on their culture to do so (at the time).
I'm not saying you're overall wrong, but saying I would not infer too much from your premise.
> To your point of some people refusing to surrender on the Japanese side, on the US side Generals Douglas MacArthur and Dwight D. Eisenhower, and Admiral William Leahy opposed the dropping of the bombs, and viewed it as completely unnecessary. Does this then demonstrate it was not needed, because there were elements who did not support it?
MacArthur wanted to invade. He wanted to invade with Olympic even though Kyūshū had been built-up extensively by the Japanese so that the initial plans having a 3:1 US troop advantage dropped to a 1:1 ratio:
* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Downfall#Allied_re-e...
This was lunacy.
MacArthur wanted to invade. He wanted to invade with Olympic even though Kyūshū had been built-up extensively by the Japanese so that the initial plans having a 3:1 US troop advantage dropped to a 1:1 ratio:
* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Downfall#Allied_re-e...
This was lunacy.
I forget who exactly, but someone correctly said after Versailles that it was no armistice but a twenty-year ceasefire. What you advocate would have been another.
Can you explain why you think that's what I'm advocating?
> I am one of those that think that the dropping of the bombs was unnecessary.
I have never been able to credit the idea that, after decades of the very liveliest and most systematically institutional brutality, the Empire of Japan was suddenly seized by a new dovish spirit of peace and cooperation, one second before the initiation of the Hiroshima device killed a quarter million people, or one second before the Nagasaki device killed a hundred thousand or so more.
I have never even understood where in that dream lies its appeal.
(See also https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=44797067 wherein is belatedly addressed your actual question.)
I have never been able to credit the idea that, after decades of the very liveliest and most systematically institutional brutality, the Empire of Japan was suddenly seized by a new dovish spirit of peace and cooperation, one second before the initiation of the Hiroshima device killed a quarter million people, or one second before the Nagasaki device killed a hundred thousand or so more.
I have never even understood where in that dream lies its appeal.
(See also https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=44797067 wherein is belatedly addressed your actual question.)
Your use of the term "peace" instead of "surrender". As a result of this unconditional surrender Japan was reformed in a way that's very beneficial to the rest of the world (and, you could say, itself). A different way could have left an adversary with grudge just waiting to rebuild, but how things turned out completely took the fighting spirit out of Japan.
That's not my intention of the word peace. Whether through surrender or negotiation, it's the end goal I'm referring to.
Oh, I see. I misread your earlier comment as asking what I thought you advocated, rather than why I thought so. Let me try here to answer your actual question there.
I consider generally that to have left the Imperial flower intact through a negotiated surrender - even if achievable which I seriously doubt - would have led in about a generation to a dangerously resurgent sense of revanchism, as actually occurred in the 1960s, but was a matter largely of fringe comedy because the 1960s in Japan were not really such as to make anyone other than cranks wish for the return of the empire. In a future drawn with the gentler hand you describe, I think that time would not have been funny at all; that would, historically speaking including in my own earlier reference to Versailles, in fact be just the sort of movement to prompt yet another Pacific war - which if prevented would only be so because if not occupied by the United States, Japan would have faced Soviet conquest (remember Tsushima!), which famously left no flowers of any kind intact within its reach: they would surely have had a constant and enormous problem with civilian "misbehavior," no doubt resulting in collective punishment, but would succeed in keeping the victim off the world stage.
The idea of Soviet occupation as preferable is heterodox to say the least, but I'm still also very confused as to what sort of terms you think could have been achieved by either Truman or Hirohito, in the absence of the demonstration strikes whose necessity you discount, when even in their aftermath there was a somewhat credible military coup attempt, the so-called "Kyūjō incident," with the aim of continuing the war. That attempt failed because attack orders, sent under the name of a murdered major general, were ignored. They did not have to be. And you don't seem more interested in considering Stalin's extremely compelling reasons to spoil any multilateral peace negotiations that might occur, and the again potentially war-starting impact of an attempt at unilateral negotiations which it is hard to imagine even (the admittedly somewhat bellicose in comparison with his predecessor) Truman seriously contemplating.
You say peace is the goal, and no one disagrees. The problem that remains is to explain how peace is a consequence of the course of action you would prefer had been taken. It isn't so much that I disagree with your historical analysis as that I am asking you to present it.
I consider generally that to have left the Imperial flower intact through a negotiated surrender - even if achievable which I seriously doubt - would have led in about a generation to a dangerously resurgent sense of revanchism, as actually occurred in the 1960s, but was a matter largely of fringe comedy because the 1960s in Japan were not really such as to make anyone other than cranks wish for the return of the empire. In a future drawn with the gentler hand you describe, I think that time would not have been funny at all; that would, historically speaking including in my own earlier reference to Versailles, in fact be just the sort of movement to prompt yet another Pacific war - which if prevented would only be so because if not occupied by the United States, Japan would have faced Soviet conquest (remember Tsushima!), which famously left no flowers of any kind intact within its reach: they would surely have had a constant and enormous problem with civilian "misbehavior," no doubt resulting in collective punishment, but would succeed in keeping the victim off the world stage.
The idea of Soviet occupation as preferable is heterodox to say the least, but I'm still also very confused as to what sort of terms you think could have been achieved by either Truman or Hirohito, in the absence of the demonstration strikes whose necessity you discount, when even in their aftermath there was a somewhat credible military coup attempt, the so-called "Kyūjō incident," with the aim of continuing the war. That attempt failed because attack orders, sent under the name of a murdered major general, were ignored. They did not have to be. And you don't seem more interested in considering Stalin's extremely compelling reasons to spoil any multilateral peace negotiations that might occur, and the again potentially war-starting impact of an attempt at unilateral negotiations which it is hard to imagine even (the admittedly somewhat bellicose in comparison with his predecessor) Truman seriously contemplating.
You say peace is the goal, and no one disagrees. The problem that remains is to explain how peace is a consequence of the course of action you would prefer had been taken. It isn't so much that I disagree with your historical analysis as that I am asking you to present it.
> I consider generally that to have left the Imperial flower intact through a negotiated surrender - even if achievable which I seriously doubt - would have led in about a generation to a dangerously resurgent sense of revanchism, as actually occurred in the 1960s […]
See also Germany post-World War One: the other side (as a collective/society) not only has to be defeated they have to accept the fact they were defeated.
This was one of the hindsight things that I've heard said about Japan post-WW2: it may have been 'fine' to allow Hirohito to stay on as Emperor in 1945 and for a few years afterwards, but at some point the Japanese leadership should have been tried, and this includes Hirohito: he should have had to abdicate and then be tried.
See also Germany post-World War One: the other side (as a collective/society) not only has to be defeated they have to accept the fact they were defeated.
This was one of the hindsight things that I've heard said about Japan post-WW2: it may have been 'fine' to allow Hirohito to stay on as Emperor in 1945 and for a few years afterwards, but at some point the Japanese leadership should have been tried, and this includes Hirohito: he should have had to abdicate and then be tried.
> See also Germany post-World War One
Yes, exactly.
The instrument concluding Germany's surrender and nominally ending the First World War, and for which my prior use of the name is metonymous, is known to history as the Treaty of Versailles [1]. Its terms were notoriously punitive largely at the insistence of the French, who regarded themselves with some justification as having paid the majority of the victory's cost, and Germany was denied any participation in the negotiations which determined the surrender terms to be imposed.
Combined with the Dolchstosslüge ("'stab in the back' lie") serviceably excusing the military failure and logistical collapse which made further hostilities impractical for Germany to pursue, thus leaving no options but to sign or be occupied, so were the conditions laid for "World War 2: The Sequel," as of course eventuated in practice. The actions taken with respect to the defeated powers thirty years later were designed with enormous and successful care to avoid a second, nuclear-armed, repeat. In this connection and as minimally an example of earnest intent, consider the so-called "Marshall Plan." [2] (Therein also see 'Aid to Asia' within 'Areas excluded'.)
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Versailles
[2] https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marshall_Plan
Yes, exactly.
The instrument concluding Germany's surrender and nominally ending the First World War, and for which my prior use of the name is metonymous, is known to history as the Treaty of Versailles [1]. Its terms were notoriously punitive largely at the insistence of the French, who regarded themselves with some justification as having paid the majority of the victory's cost, and Germany was denied any participation in the negotiations which determined the surrender terms to be imposed.
Combined with the Dolchstosslüge ("'stab in the back' lie") serviceably excusing the military failure and logistical collapse which made further hostilities impractical for Germany to pursue, thus leaving no options but to sign or be occupied, so were the conditions laid for "World War 2: The Sequel," as of course eventuated in practice. The actions taken with respect to the defeated powers thirty years later were designed with enormous and successful care to avoid a second, nuclear-armed, repeat. In this connection and as minimally an example of earnest intent, consider the so-called "Marshall Plan." [2] (Therein also see 'Aid to Asia' within 'Areas excluded'.)
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Versailles
[2] https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marshall_Plan
> Your use of the term "peace" instead of "surrender". As a result of this unconditional surrender Japan was reformed in a way that's very beneficial to the rest of the world (and, you could say, itself).
In the novel The Man in the High Castle by Philip K. Dick it is argued that Japan and Germany lost WW2 by winning it. IRL, they won WW2 by losing it.
* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Man_in_the_High_Castle
In the novel The Man in the High Castle by Philip K. Dick it is argued that Japan and Germany lost WW2 by winning it. IRL, they won WW2 by losing it.
* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Man_in_the_High_Castle
I wouldn't really say those were the subjects of Dick's thesis here. 'Close, but no cigar.'
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I agree with you in that decisions like this are always the outcome of multiple forces pushing different ways. But I would lean more to thinking it would have been very difficult for Trueman to have not ordered the use of the bombs.
It would have been electoral suicide because of the extra US casualties.
It would probably have led to the partition of Japan as well as Korea, leading to problems for the US in the post-war world. Although the Iron Curtain didn't descend till a few years later, by 1945, the USSR was already being very possessive about countries in Eastern Europe. Trueman was more aware of the dangers posed by the USSR that Roosevelt had been.
Just because a country had been defeated, it doesn't mean the government will surrender. Nazi Germany was effectively defeated with Bagration and the breakout from Normandy in 1944 but their government fought on to the bitter end. (In a way, the V1 and V2 missile programs did benefit Germany because they drained off resources which would otherwise have prolonged the war and allowed the use of the atom bomb on Berlin.)
And rushing to finish a war to minimise the influence of one party on the peace negotiations did have a precedent. It was what the French and British did at the end of WW1 to prevent the US from dominating the peace process. (But that didn't turn out very well.)
I think things like this would have been in Trueman's mind when he made the descision.
It would have been electoral suicide because of the extra US casualties.
It would probably have led to the partition of Japan as well as Korea, leading to problems for the US in the post-war world. Although the Iron Curtain didn't descend till a few years later, by 1945, the USSR was already being very possessive about countries in Eastern Europe. Trueman was more aware of the dangers posed by the USSR that Roosevelt had been.
Just because a country had been defeated, it doesn't mean the government will surrender. Nazi Germany was effectively defeated with Bagration and the breakout from Normandy in 1944 but their government fought on to the bitter end. (In a way, the V1 and V2 missile programs did benefit Germany because they drained off resources which would otherwise have prolonged the war and allowed the use of the atom bomb on Berlin.)
And rushing to finish a war to minimise the influence of one party on the peace negotiations did have a precedent. It was what the French and British did at the end of WW1 to prevent the US from dominating the peace process. (But that didn't turn out very well.)
I think things like this would have been in Trueman's mind when he made the descision.
> it would have been very difficult for Trueman to have not ordered the use of the bombs.
He didn't really though, did he?
Hiroshima and Nagasaki were both on the "to be bombed" list since at least a month before Truman became President, well before he even learned of the existence of the ultra secret atomic bomb program.
The March 1945 Tokyo bombing marked the beginning of a total war aerial bombardment campaign that included civilian residences that might include factory workers.
That campaign had a target list of 100+ cities, 72 of which were destroyed prior to the bombing of Hiroshima.
Truman more or less did no more than agree that the new secret weapons, the Little Boy and Fat Man designs, be tested on targets already slated to be bombed.
He had little choice, not because of an electorate that knew nothing of the secret weapons and wouldn't know if they were not used, but because of the near unstoppable force of the greatest R&D weapons expenditure in the world to that point .. viewed by many in the know as entirely wasted unless used in war against the Japanese now that the Germans had surrendered before they could be used there.
The "extra US casualties" are entirely hypothetical, existing only on the assumption that there would be ground invasion of the mainland which was hypothetical given the program started before Truman became POTUS to flatten Japan to eliminate any resources of resistance and to continue to do so until the country surrendered.
He didn't really though, did he?
Hiroshima and Nagasaki were both on the "to be bombed" list since at least a month before Truman became President, well before he even learned of the existence of the ultra secret atomic bomb program.
The March 1945 Tokyo bombing marked the beginning of a total war aerial bombardment campaign that included civilian residences that might include factory workers.
That campaign had a target list of 100+ cities, 72 of which were destroyed prior to the bombing of Hiroshima.
Truman more or less did no more than agree that the new secret weapons, the Little Boy and Fat Man designs, be tested on targets already slated to be bombed.
He had little choice, not because of an electorate that knew nothing of the secret weapons and wouldn't know if they were not used, but because of the near unstoppable force of the greatest R&D weapons expenditure in the world to that point .. viewed by many in the know as entirely wasted unless used in war against the Japanese now that the Germans had surrendered before they could be used there.
The "extra US casualties" are entirely hypothetical, existing only on the assumption that there would be ground invasion of the mainland which was hypothetical given the program started before Truman became POTUS to flatten Japan to eliminate any resources of resistance and to continue to do so until the country surrendered.
> He had little choice, not because of an electorate that knew nothing of the secret weapons and wouldn't know if they were not used, but because of the near unstoppable force of the greatest R&D weapons expenditure in the world to that point .. viewed by many in the know as entirely wasted unless used in war against the Japanese now that the Germans had surrendered before they could be used there.
He allowed the first two bombings to occur as President, as was intially planned when he was still VP. He knew they would occur and was okay with it.
He could have stopped them. This evidenced by the fact that there were also plans for bombs 3+ but he ordered that any further bombings were to be under his explicit (as opposed to implicit) orders.
To think that somehow the Manhattan Project was "unstopped" is ludicrous. Every order Truman gave was followed, and if want want to argue it was "unstoppable" you would have to produce some kind of evidence that people were willing to disobey Truman's orders. (And object to or think is a bad idea is not the same as disobey.)
He allowed the first two bombings to occur as President, as was intially planned when he was still VP. He knew they would occur and was okay with it.
He could have stopped them. This evidenced by the fact that there were also plans for bombs 3+ but he ordered that any further bombings were to be under his explicit (as opposed to implicit) orders.
To think that somehow the Manhattan Project was "unstopped" is ludicrous. Every order Truman gave was followed, and if want want to argue it was "unstoppable" you would have to produce some kind of evidence that people were willing to disobey Truman's orders. (And object to or think is a bad idea is not the same as disobey.)
Yes, actually try and put yourself in the shoes of American leadership responsible for making the decision to continue with an invasion of Japan without using nuclear weapons.
American casualty estimates exceeded 500,000, and Japanese fatalities were expected to be in the millions—with some projections placing them between 5 million and 10 million depending on the length and scope of the conflict.
The U.S. had limited understanding of the full effects of nuclear weapons before using them. The Manhattan Project scientists estimated 70,000 to 100,000 deaths for a medium-sized Japanese city (depending on weather, geography, and building density). These were very rough estimates, focused mainly on blast and heat, not long-term radiation, which was unknowable.
Why is this discussion always a binary choice between a land invasion of Japan or dropping the bombs exactly how we did? For example, there is rarely any discussion of whether another target with fewer civilian casualties could have accomplished the same result.
The same result as what? The OP just explained how the bombs being deployed in the manner they were barely led to a surrender.
Anyways, the battle of Okinawa alone killed as many people as both atomic bombs combined and that's the most remote part of (what is today considered) Japan.
Anyways, the battle of Okinawa alone killed as many people as both atomic bombs combined and that's the most remote part of (what is today considered) Japan.
>The same result as what? The OP just explained how the bombs being deployed in the manner they were barely led to a surrender.
The result of surrendering. What makes you think they wouldn't have surrendered if other targets were bombed?
The result of surrendering. What makes you think they wouldn't have surrendered if other targets were bombed?
I'm sure there could have been other targets that would have led to a surrender but if the goal is to do so with a minimal amount of casualties then i find it extremely difficult to believe that it is possible considering that the two targets which were bombed nearly failed to produce the desired result even after a brutal 8-year war.
You're assuming a linear relationship between civilian casualties and Japanese military leadership's willingness to surrender. Why would e.g. dropping the first bomb on a less-populated shipyard and the second on a city centre have been less effective?
That was Hiroshima. Although there was a high number of civilian casualties it was actually chosen on the basis of its importance to the Japanese imperial army, both as a base and an industrialized city.
>Hiroshima was a supply and logistics base for the Japanese military.[117] The city was a communications center, a key port for shipping, and an assembly area for troops.[78] It supported a large war industry, manufacturing parts for planes and boats, for bombs, rifles, and handguns.[118]
Source: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atomic_bombings_of_Hiroshima...
>Hiroshima was a supply and logistics base for the Japanese military.[117] The city was a communications center, a key port for shipping, and an assembly area for troops.[78] It supported a large war industry, manufacturing parts for planes and boats, for bombs, rifles, and handguns.[118]
Source: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atomic_bombings_of_Hiroshima...
It wasn’t like they were sitting on a pile of nukes. They had to make the maximum concrete, visceral impact with the couple they had such that there would be minimal second-guessing on the part of Japan.
You are suggesting that they should have selected a target that was virtually guaranteed to have less impact and leverage with a very scarce resource. They couldn’t afford to take that risk with American lives.
You are suggesting that they should have selected a target that was virtually guaranteed to have less impact and leverage with a very scarce resource. They couldn’t afford to take that risk with American lives.
>They had to make the maximum concrete, visceral impact with the couple they had such that there would be minimal second-guessing on the part of Japan.
And yet they didn't decide to bomb Tokyo or Kyoto. There was clearly a calculus done in selecting the targets to find the right balance of all the various factors involved. I don't see the problem in questioning whether they came to the right decision. Too often the target selection decision is assumed to be right and the only decision that is questioned is the yes or no of actually going through with the bombing.
And yet they didn't decide to bomb Tokyo or Kyoto. There was clearly a calculus done in selecting the targets to find the right balance of all the various factors involved. I don't see the problem in questioning whether they came to the right decision. Too often the target selection decision is assumed to be right and the only decision that is questioned is the yes or no of actually going through with the bombing.
Tokyo was (fire) bombed a few months earlier causing ~100k deaths.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombing_of_Tokyo_(10_March_194...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombing_of_Tokyo_(10_March_194...
Yes, and millions of people survived those bombings. If the only goal was "maximum concrete, visceral impact", a prior bombing would not have eliminated Tokyo from the list of targets for the nuclear bomb which goes to show that there were other factors in play.
They did decide to bomb Kyoto, for exactly that reason. The secretary of war, Henry Stimson, objected to it, due to cultural significance, and convinced Truman to choose an alternate, which was Nagasaki.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-33755182
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-33755182
Yes, I know this and it was part of my point. If "cultural significance" was part of determining bombing sites, then we know "maximum concrete, visceral impact" was clearly not the only goal.
NTA but Tokyo is the worst place you could possibly drop an atom bomb if your goal is to minimize civilian casualties.
Yes, that was the point I was making. The bombs were not dropped on the largest cities which shows the argument that "maximum concrete, visceral impact" was not the only priority. There was some consideration for civilian casualties which opens up the discussion of whether the right balance was struck.
> The bombs were not dropped on the largest cities which shows the argument that "maximum concrete, visceral impact" was not the only priority.
The atomic bombs were not dropped on the largest cities because the largest cities were already levelled. Nothing would be demonstrable on an already-destroyed city.
The atomic bombs were not dropped on the largest cities because the largest cities were already levelled. Nothing would be demonstrable on an already-destroyed city.
> For example, there is rarely any discussion of whether another target with fewer civilian casualties could have accomplished the same result.
There weren't many targets left. The US had been fire bombing Japan for months—which did nothing to lead the Japanese leadership to surrender.
The leadership didn't seem to care about losses—or rather the honour of Japan as a country/collective was more important than the losses (?). Some internal Japanese estimates had up to 20M dead from defending against a US landing and the Japanese leadership was fine with that.
There weren't many targets left. The US had been fire bombing Japan for months—which did nothing to lead the Japanese leadership to surrender.
The leadership didn't seem to care about losses—or rather the honour of Japan as a country/collective was more important than the losses (?). Some internal Japanese estimates had up to 20M dead from defending against a US landing and the Japanese leadership was fine with that.
This is the type of argument that immediately folds in on itself. If they didn’t care about civilian losses, why do people believe the civilian losses in these bombings were necessary? Why is it assumed that the US needed to kill civilians and ended up killing just the right amount of civilians to force surrender?
> If they didn’t care about civilian losses, why do people believe the civilian losses in these bombings were necessary? Why is it assumed that the US needed to kill civilians and ended up killing just the right amount of civilians to force surrender?
The number of people killed (civilian and military) was irrelevant. The fire bombings killed as much, if not more, people. The Japanese leadership didn't care about numbers: after the first bomb dropped the War Cabinet ignored it thinking it was a bluff on the US part, and they didn't have any more bombs.
It was only after the second bomb that they started re-considering. Even then, after two bombings, the War Cabinet was still deadlocked at 3-3. The Emperor had to be called in to break the stalemate.
The difference was in the psychological effect of a new type of weapon. From Hirohito's statement:
> Furthermore, the enemy has begun to employ a new and cruel bomb, causing immense and indiscriminate destruction, the extent of which is beyond all estimation. Should we continue to fight, not only would it result in the ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but it would also lead to the total extinction of human civilization.
* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hirohito_surrender_broadcast#C...
I would recommend reading the book, which goes over the Japanese government deliberations using internal Japanese minutes/documents and interviews of those involved:
* https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/51089656-140-days-to-hir...
* https://www.nationalww2museum.org/about-us/notes-museum/140-...
The number of people killed (civilian and military) was irrelevant. The fire bombings killed as much, if not more, people. The Japanese leadership didn't care about numbers: after the first bomb dropped the War Cabinet ignored it thinking it was a bluff on the US part, and they didn't have any more bombs.
It was only after the second bomb that they started re-considering. Even then, after two bombings, the War Cabinet was still deadlocked at 3-3. The Emperor had to be called in to break the stalemate.
The difference was in the psychological effect of a new type of weapon. From Hirohito's statement:
> Furthermore, the enemy has begun to employ a new and cruel bomb, causing immense and indiscriminate destruction, the extent of which is beyond all estimation. Should we continue to fight, not only would it result in the ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but it would also lead to the total extinction of human civilization.
* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hirohito_surrender_broadcast#C...
I would recommend reading the book, which goes over the Japanese government deliberations using internal Japanese minutes/documents and interviews of those involved:
* https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/51089656-140-days-to-hir...
* https://www.nationalww2museum.org/about-us/notes-museum/140-...
You are not engaging with the heart of the question. If "The number of people killed (civilian and military) was irrelevant", why do you think it was necessary that they were killed? If "The difference was in the psychological effect of a new type of weapon", why could the goal of forcing surrender not be accomplished by demonstrating that new weapon in a way that wouldn't kill hundreds of thousands? Why are options like dropping the bomb in Tokyo Bay, further off the coast, or in less populated areas not treated as serious alternatives? Why did the bombs have to be dropped on cities?
> Why are options like dropping the bomb in Tokyo Bay, further off the coast, or in less populated areas not treated as serious alternatives? Why did the bombs have to be dropped on cities?
To show their destructive power. That one plane could do as much damage as dozens / hundreds.
What would blowing up water show? What would blowing up an empty field show? What would blowing up an already-flatten city (like Tokyo) show? There is no shock value to dropping an atomic bomb on a non-target.
Arthur Compton, the scientist who led the plutonium side of the Manhattan Project recalled that:
> It was evident that everyone would suspect trickery. If a bomb were exploded in Japan with previous notice, the Japanese air power was still adequate to give serious interference. An atomic bomb was an intricate device, still in the developmental stage. Its operation would be far from routine. If during the final adjustments of the bomb the Japanese defenders should attack, a faulty move might easily result in some kind of failure. Such an end to an advertised demonstration of power would be much worse than if the attempt had not been made. It was now evident that when the time came for the bombs to be used we should have only one of them available, followed afterwards by others at all-too-long intervals. We could not afford the chance that one of them might be a dud. If the test were made on some neutral territory, it was hard to believe that Japan's determined and fanatical military men would be impressed. If such an open test were made first and failed to bring surrender, the chance would be gone to give the shock of surprise that proved so effective. On the contrary, it would make the Japanese ready to interfere with an atomic attack if they could. Though the possibility of a demonstration that would not destroy human lives was attractive, no one could suggest a way in which it could be made so convincing that it would be likely to stop the war.
Even with dropping the first bomb the Japanese War Cabinet wasn't willing to consider surrendering. It took two bombings for the message to sink in (and even then it was a 3-3 tie, and the Emperor had to be called in to break the stalemate): that is the fact any counterfactual has to contend with, that the two bombings barely got the ball over the line.
And even after the Emperor and Cabinet had made the decision there were still people willing to fight on and overthrow the government:
* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kyūjō_incident
To show their destructive power. That one plane could do as much damage as dozens / hundreds.
What would blowing up water show? What would blowing up an empty field show? What would blowing up an already-flatten city (like Tokyo) show? There is no shock value to dropping an atomic bomb on a non-target.
Arthur Compton, the scientist who led the plutonium side of the Manhattan Project recalled that:
> It was evident that everyone would suspect trickery. If a bomb were exploded in Japan with previous notice, the Japanese air power was still adequate to give serious interference. An atomic bomb was an intricate device, still in the developmental stage. Its operation would be far from routine. If during the final adjustments of the bomb the Japanese defenders should attack, a faulty move might easily result in some kind of failure. Such an end to an advertised demonstration of power would be much worse than if the attempt had not been made. It was now evident that when the time came for the bombs to be used we should have only one of them available, followed afterwards by others at all-too-long intervals. We could not afford the chance that one of them might be a dud. If the test were made on some neutral territory, it was hard to believe that Japan's determined and fanatical military men would be impressed. If such an open test were made first and failed to bring surrender, the chance would be gone to give the shock of surprise that proved so effective. On the contrary, it would make the Japanese ready to interfere with an atomic attack if they could. Though the possibility of a demonstration that would not destroy human lives was attractive, no one could suggest a way in which it could be made so convincing that it would be likely to stop the war.
Even with dropping the first bomb the Japanese War Cabinet wasn't willing to consider surrendering. It took two bombings for the message to sink in (and even then it was a 3-3 tie, and the Emperor had to be called in to break the stalemate): that is the fact any counterfactual has to contend with, that the two bombings barely got the ball over the line.
And even after the Emperor and Cabinet had made the decision there were still people willing to fight on and overthrow the government:
* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kyūjō_incident
>To show their destructive power. That one plane could do as much damage as dozens / hundreds.
>What would blowing up water show? What would blowing up an empty field show? What would blowing up an already-flatten city (like Tokyo) show? There is no shock value to dropping an atomic bomb on a non-target.
Is knocking down buildings the only way people can perceive the power of a bomb? Would a huge mushroom cloud over Tokyo Bay not be shocking? Could that "psychological effect of a new type of weapon" you mentioned in the previous post have been intensified if the Japanese War Cabinet saw that mushroom cloud with their own eyes?
>Arthur Compton, the scientist who led the plutonium side of the Manhattan Project recalled that...
That is an argument against "an advertised demonstration". It is not an argument for killing a hundred thousand civilians. Why wouldn't "the shock of surprise" apply to a demonstration that happened without notice? Why are you presenting this as a binary choice between "an advertised demonstration" and dropping the bomb on a city?
>Even with dropping the first bomb the Japanese War Cabinet wasn't willing to consider surrendering. It took two bombings for the message to sink in (and even then it was a 3-3 tie, and the Emperor had to be called in to break the stalemate): that is the fact any counterfactual has to contend with, that the two bombings barely got the ball over the line.
You keep on repeating this as if the decision being close means that any deviation from the history would have caused them to reach a different conclusion. You have no way of knowing that. I don't know why you seem to believe that the only path to surrender was the exact events that transpired.
>What would blowing up water show? What would blowing up an empty field show? What would blowing up an already-flatten city (like Tokyo) show? There is no shock value to dropping an atomic bomb on a non-target.
Is knocking down buildings the only way people can perceive the power of a bomb? Would a huge mushroom cloud over Tokyo Bay not be shocking? Could that "psychological effect of a new type of weapon" you mentioned in the previous post have been intensified if the Japanese War Cabinet saw that mushroom cloud with their own eyes?
>Arthur Compton, the scientist who led the plutonium side of the Manhattan Project recalled that...
That is an argument against "an advertised demonstration". It is not an argument for killing a hundred thousand civilians. Why wouldn't "the shock of surprise" apply to a demonstration that happened without notice? Why are you presenting this as a binary choice between "an advertised demonstration" and dropping the bomb on a city?
>Even with dropping the first bomb the Japanese War Cabinet wasn't willing to consider surrendering. It took two bombings for the message to sink in (and even then it was a 3-3 tie, and the Emperor had to be called in to break the stalemate): that is the fact any counterfactual has to contend with, that the two bombings barely got the ball over the line.
You keep on repeating this as if the decision being close means that any deviation from the history would have caused them to reach a different conclusion. You have no way of knowing that. I don't know why you seem to believe that the only path to surrender was the exact events that transpired.
>I don't know why you seem to believe that the only path to surrender was the exact events that transpired.
Maybe dropping the bombs in Tokyo Bay would have changed things. Maybe writing the emperor a love song would have changed things. We don't know. There are two aspects that get mixed together with this.
>Given the situation and knowledge at the time, was this or that military action reasonable and necessary?
>Knowing things unknowable at the time, can we now say this or that military action was unnecessary?
I think it is clear that the first question is yes, it was a reasonable and necessary decision at the time.
The second question is interesting to think about, but I think you are getting so much pushback because you are mixing both questions, using after the fact "what ifs" to say what people should have done at the time, as if they could just try different things and get a do over if it didn't work.
Maybe dropping the bombs in Tokyo Bay would have changed things. Maybe writing the emperor a love song would have changed things. We don't know. There are two aspects that get mixed together with this.
>Given the situation and knowledge at the time, was this or that military action reasonable and necessary?
>Knowing things unknowable at the time, can we now say this or that military action was unnecessary?
I think it is clear that the first question is yes, it was a reasonable and necessary decision at the time.
The second question is interesting to think about, but I think you are getting so much pushback because you are mixing both questions, using after the fact "what ifs" to say what people should have done at the time, as if they could just try different things and get a do over if it didn't work.
>I think you are getting so much pushback because you are mixing both questions, using after the fact "what ifs" to say what people should have done at the time
What have I mentioned here that couldn't have been considered before the bombings? If anything, that other person's insistence on focusing on the exact votes of Japanese leadership is more reliant on hindsight than anything I have said.
What have I mentioned here that couldn't have been considered before the bombings? If anything, that other person's insistence on focusing on the exact votes of Japanese leadership is more reliant on hindsight than anything I have said.
> What have I mentioned here that couldn't have been considered before the bombings?
Of course they could, and they did consider many options. But they only had a couple of bombs and any additional ones were weeks away. We know now that the bombs helped to end the war but they didn’t know then that they would. Detonating the bombs with no result could be looked at similar to firring your limited ammunition over your enemy’s head to hope it makes them surrender, but if it doesn’t, you have less ammo to fight them.
Firebombing leveled over 60 Japanese cities and killed between 330,000 and 900,000 people (though we will never know for sure because the very records needed were obliterated in the conflagrations). Yet leading up to the atomic bombings, Japan was well underway preparing Operation Ketsu-Go, the Japanese defense of the home islands, meant to inflict immense casualties on the American troops and undermine the American publics’ will to continue fighting [1]. Japan planned to lose a million men in this operation, and enlisted every male age 15 to 60 and every female age 17 to 40 in and around Kyushu [2]. There is no reason to believe this wouldn’t happen, given what we saw in Okinawa, where children were mobilized, civilians died by the tens of thousands in the crossfire (since Japan would not evacuate them intentionally to increase casualties), and civilians killed themselves by the hundreds rather than be captured [3].
Americans and Japanese were dying every second the war went on. Wasting your most powerful weapon, that you have almost none of, with your fingers crossed that this will make the country, where not one military unit has surrendered during the entire course of the war, just give up. This is naiveté and hindsight bias at its finest.
[1] “We will prepare 10,000 planes to meet the landing of the enemy. We will mobilize every aircraft possible, both training and "special attack" planes. We will smash one third of the enemy's war potential with this air force at sea. Another third will also be smashed at sea by our warships, human torpedoes and other special weapons. Furthermore, when the enemy actually lands, if we are ready to sacrifice a million men we will be able to inflict an equal number of casualties upon them. If the enemy loses a million men, then the public opinion in America will become inclined towards peace, and Japan will be able to gain peace with comparatively advantageous conditions”- IGHQ army staff officer in July 1945, from “The Last Great Victory: The End of World War II, July/August 1945” by Stanley Weintraub
[2] https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/there-are-no-...
[3] https://www.tamucc.edu/library/exhibits/s/hist4350/page/okin...
Of course they could, and they did consider many options. But they only had a couple of bombs and any additional ones were weeks away. We know now that the bombs helped to end the war but they didn’t know then that they would. Detonating the bombs with no result could be looked at similar to firring your limited ammunition over your enemy’s head to hope it makes them surrender, but if it doesn’t, you have less ammo to fight them.
Firebombing leveled over 60 Japanese cities and killed between 330,000 and 900,000 people (though we will never know for sure because the very records needed were obliterated in the conflagrations). Yet leading up to the atomic bombings, Japan was well underway preparing Operation Ketsu-Go, the Japanese defense of the home islands, meant to inflict immense casualties on the American troops and undermine the American publics’ will to continue fighting [1]. Japan planned to lose a million men in this operation, and enlisted every male age 15 to 60 and every female age 17 to 40 in and around Kyushu [2]. There is no reason to believe this wouldn’t happen, given what we saw in Okinawa, where children were mobilized, civilians died by the tens of thousands in the crossfire (since Japan would not evacuate them intentionally to increase casualties), and civilians killed themselves by the hundreds rather than be captured [3].
Americans and Japanese were dying every second the war went on. Wasting your most powerful weapon, that you have almost none of, with your fingers crossed that this will make the country, where not one military unit has surrendered during the entire course of the war, just give up. This is naiveté and hindsight bias at its finest.
[1] “We will prepare 10,000 planes to meet the landing of the enemy. We will mobilize every aircraft possible, both training and "special attack" planes. We will smash one third of the enemy's war potential with this air force at sea. Another third will also be smashed at sea by our warships, human torpedoes and other special weapons. Furthermore, when the enemy actually lands, if we are ready to sacrifice a million men we will be able to inflict an equal number of casualties upon them. If the enemy loses a million men, then the public opinion in America will become inclined towards peace, and Japan will be able to gain peace with comparatively advantageous conditions”- IGHQ army staff officer in July 1945, from “The Last Great Victory: The End of World War II, July/August 1945” by Stanley Weintraub
[2] https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/there-are-no-...
[3] https://www.tamucc.edu/library/exhibits/s/hist4350/page/okin...
Because purpose of bombing Hiroshima and Nagasaki wasn’t to inflict as many casualties as possible? They were two major military hubs.
Roughly 18 potential cities were considered, which were narrowed down to a shortlist of five, and eventually finalized into four reserved targets (Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata, and Nagasaki as alternate).
> American casualty estimates exceeded 500,000, and Japanese fatalities were expected to be in the millions—with some projections placing them between 5 million and 10 million depending on the length and scope of the conflict.
Per Barrett, some Japan leadership said that as many as 20M Japanese (civilians) would die in a defence of an invasion (but also because of starvation and such), and the leadership was fine with that.
Per Barrett, some Japan leadership said that as many as 20M Japanese (civilians) would die in a defence of an invasion (but also because of starvation and such), and the leadership was fine with that.
Many of the top US generals at the time thought that the blockade and imminent Soviet invasion would have been enough to force the Japanese into surrender. The land invasion comparison was propped up as a good "justification" for dropping the bomb, though.
Where goes the line?
I don't know exactly, but at least they could have dropped one bomb instead of two.
Isn’t it clearly a horrific crime against humanity to knowingly, instantaneously, and with premeditation, murder hundreds of thousands of civilians?
The normal response to this line of reasoning is that they were / could have been doing the same to us. Two wrongs does not make a right does it?
The normal response to this line of reasoning is that they were / could have been doing the same to us. Two wrongs does not make a right does it?
The firebombing of Tokyo[0] on 10 March 1945 is often considered even more destructive and lethal than either of the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, or at the very least in the same ballpark. However, popular discourse never treats it as a crime against humanity.
What is the qualitative difference between the killing 100,000 Japanese civilians in one morning using an atomic bomb and the killing 100,000 Japanese civilians in one night using explosive and incendiary devices?
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombing_of_Tokyo_(10_March_194...
What is the qualitative difference between the killing 100,000 Japanese civilians in one morning using an atomic bomb and the killing 100,000 Japanese civilians in one night using explosive and incendiary devices?
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombing_of_Tokyo_(10_March_194...
[deleted]
> Isn’t it clearly a horrific crime against humanity to knowingly, instantaneously, and with premeditation, murder hundreds of thousands of civilians?
What does "civilian" mean when it comes to Imperial Japan?
* https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/there-are-no-...
The official Japanese plan to defend against a US landing was to have children attack the invading US soldiers:
* https://www.hiroshimapeacemedia.jp/?p=141048
* https://apjjf.org/mark-ealey/1689/article
* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Downfall#Operation_K...
What does "civilian" mean when it comes to Imperial Japan?
* https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/there-are-no-...
The official Japanese plan to defend against a US landing was to have children attack the invading US soldiers:
* https://www.hiroshimapeacemedia.jp/?p=141048
* https://apjjf.org/mark-ealey/1689/article
* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Downfall#Operation_K...
Of course it is, much more humane is to mount amphibious assault and kill millions.
Japan was the one who started the war. Japan was the aggressor. Defending yourself by winning a war against an aggressor is not a "wrong".
Many more people were saved by dropping the bombs than people died in it. And, while it is a tragedy that those people died, that fault lies with Japan, not the US.
Many more people were saved by dropping the bombs than people died in it. And, while it is a tragedy that those people died, that fault lies with Japan, not the US.
The point of the concept of war crimes is that it applies to you regardless of whether you think you’re in the right. Even if the other side is committing them, it still applies. That’s why the definitions take pains to not make them a winning strategy or unilaterally avoiding them a losing one: why we talk about (deliberately) targeting civilians, not (incidentally) killing them; why putting munitions in a Red Cross-marked hospital annuls all protections for it; etc.
My thoughts about this after 50 years of thinking about it is that war results in a relentless normalization of deviance. It's a good reason not to start wars.
The notion of "crimes against humanity" is a very modern construct. The Japanese civilian society paid a price for its militaristic adventures. Armies don't operate in vacuum, they're an extension of their society.
I did not read that book, and I had venimently disagreed with it, until I read Hirohito's book. The military and the nationalists wanted to fight to the very last man, and cause as much death as possible. Estimates of that strategy were 22 million japanese dead 1.1M to 1.5M American deaths.
Hirohito fought through 4 cabinets, and finally was able to surrender. He did so simply for the lives of the japanese people. He said so. He saved American lives and he saved a huge amount of japanese lives. ( Keep in mind 'fight to the last man' )
Japan would not have surrendered if we had not dropped the bombs. The second one was essential.
I am anti-war and anti nuke, but there was no other solution.
My father knew Oppy, and I knew he knew, but because of what the US did to him, my father never spoke of him,but spoke of every other physisasist involved. I caught he saying Ed for Edwin Teller, but he would never admit to knowing Oppy. Those were dangerous times.
Hirohito fought through 4 cabinets, and finally was able to surrender. He did so simply for the lives of the japanese people. He said so. He saved American lives and he saved a huge amount of japanese lives. ( Keep in mind 'fight to the last man' )
Japan would not have surrendered if we had not dropped the bombs. The second one was essential.
I am anti-war and anti nuke, but there was no other solution.
My father knew Oppy, and I knew he knew, but because of what the US did to him, my father never spoke of him,but spoke of every other physisasist involved. I caught he saying Ed for Edwin Teller, but he would never admit to knowing Oppy. Those were dangerous times.
Under which conditions is nuking a city not a horrific warcrime?
Under which conditions is nuking a city any more or less a horrific warcrime than the destruction of city via HE and incendiary bombs?
Recall that 72 Japanese cities, including Tokyo, were destroyed prior to Hiroshima, which was on a target list to be destroyed whether by atomic or conventional means already.
https://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/2014/09/22/tokyo-hiroshima/
Outside of Japan many other cities received the same treatment, famously but not only Dresden.
Recall that 72 Japanese cities, including Tokyo, were destroyed prior to Hiroshima, which was on a target list to be destroyed whether by atomic or conventional means already.
https://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/2014/09/22/tokyo-hiroshima/
Outside of Japan many other cities received the same treatment, famously but not only Dresden.
those are all war crimes but the victors never get prosecuted.
Most war criminals don't get meaningfully prosecuted, victor or defeated.
International law is more of a series of suggestions and norms than an actual set of codes one must operate by lest they spend time in prison. Nations have the ability to dodge them, so they do. It's that way from war crimes to counterfeiting to freedom of navigation on the high seas.
Is it right? No. Should we do better? Yeah. Is rehashing something that happened in 1945 going to do anything for today? Not at all, unless we're going to start rehashing other things along the way, like the status of Imperial Japanese commanders in war dead shrines and a lot of other things.
International law is more of a series of suggestions and norms than an actual set of codes one must operate by lest they spend time in prison. Nations have the ability to dodge them, so they do. It's that way from war crimes to counterfeiting to freedom of navigation on the high seas.
Is it right? No. Should we do better? Yeah. Is rehashing something that happened in 1945 going to do anything for today? Not at all, unless we're going to start rehashing other things along the way, like the status of Imperial Japanese commanders in war dead shrines and a lot of other things.
No, the firebombing of cities (e.g. Dresden, Tokyo) and the use of nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were not legally considered war crimes under international law as it stood, which is why they could not have been and were not prosecuted.
They are horrendous war crimes. The only reason they aren't called as such is we were the victors.
The conduct of the allies in WW2 was atrocious.
The conduct of the allies in WW2 was atrocious.
What's the moral lesson: if we have a WW3, don't target civilians? What if our enemies are doing exactly that without compunction? What if civilians and military infrastructure are colocated? What if those civilians simply want us all to die and will work to any ends for that result (e.g. they may have been effectively brainwashed as the allies were indeed preparing for with Japan)?
It's not that the answers are morally good, but rather if you're already in a world war then the ethical part (diplomacy) has already failed and it's just going to be the degree of horrific things, not their absence, that we have to plan for.
It's not that the answers are morally good, but rather if you're already in a world war then the ethical part (diplomacy) has already failed and it's just going to be the degree of horrific things, not their absence, that we have to plan for.
Targeting civilians is a war crime. No excuse for that.
Targeting civilians in places like Tokyo or Dresden didn't even help the war cause much. The Soviet Union defeated the Nazis without mass bombings of German cities.
Yes war is the supreme crime and what we should avoid in the first place. Still there are different ways you can conduct war.
A nuclear exchange would necessarily target civilians and be unlike anything before in history. It's a nightmare scenario that has to be opposed at all cost.
Targeting civilians in places like Tokyo or Dresden didn't even help the war cause much. The Soviet Union defeated the Nazis without mass bombings of German cities.
Yes war is the supreme crime and what we should avoid in the first place. Still there are different ways you can conduct war.
A nuclear exchange would necessarily target civilians and be unlike anything before in history. It's a nightmare scenario that has to be opposed at all cost.
> Targeting civilians is a war crime. No excuse for that.
What does "civilian" mean when it comes to Imperial Japan?
* https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/there-are-no-...
The official Japanese plan to defend against a US landing was to have children attack the invading US soldiers:
* https://www.hiroshimapeacemedia.jp/?p=141048
* https://apjjf.org/mark-ealey/1689/article
* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Downfall#Operation_K...
What does "civilian" mean when it comes to Imperial Japan?
* https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/there-are-no-...
The official Japanese plan to defend against a US landing was to have children attack the invading US soldiers:
* https://www.hiroshimapeacemedia.jp/?p=141048
* https://apjjf.org/mark-ealey/1689/article
* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Downfall#Operation_K...
Unfortunately in total war situations the line between civilian and not is blurred and not just blurred by the aggressor (as a sibling comment has pointed out). That doesn't really justify anything though, I agree, and something like a nuclear war targeting civilians is just terminal for civilisation.
>The Soviet Union defeated the Nazis without mass bombings of German cities.
You're reading from a curiously misinformed understanding of history. The USSR defeated the Nazis by killing millions of them while also burning, bombarding and destroying their cities and anything else in its way en masse during a ferociously bloody campaign of revenge mixed with genuine military imperatives. Soviet soldiers also committed what are probably some of the biggest mass rape epidemics in modern history against their German enemy's women once they entered their territory. This in particular was immaterial to Soviet victory and not an official Soviet policy, but I mention it to underscore that there was absolutely no shortage of war crime-worthy targeting of civilians in many ways, and on a colossal scale by the Soviets too.
Read about the invasion and ethnic cleansing of East Prussia if you like. At least couple hundred thousand German civilians died as a result of that alone. None of this at all compares to what the Nazis did during their eastern conquests of course, but while a war crime is a war crime, degrees exist. Thus, it's not surprising if allied moral and military conduct was on a very long leash given such extremely savage enemies as Germany and Imperial Japan.
You're reading from a curiously misinformed understanding of history. The USSR defeated the Nazis by killing millions of them while also burning, bombarding and destroying their cities and anything else in its way en masse during a ferociously bloody campaign of revenge mixed with genuine military imperatives. Soviet soldiers also committed what are probably some of the biggest mass rape epidemics in modern history against their German enemy's women once they entered their territory. This in particular was immaterial to Soviet victory and not an official Soviet policy, but I mention it to underscore that there was absolutely no shortage of war crime-worthy targeting of civilians in many ways, and on a colossal scale by the Soviets too.
Read about the invasion and ethnic cleansing of East Prussia if you like. At least couple hundred thousand German civilians died as a result of that alone. None of this at all compares to what the Nazis did during their eastern conquests of course, but while a war crime is a war crime, degrees exist. Thus, it's not surprising if allied moral and military conduct was on a very long leash given such extremely savage enemies as Germany and Imperial Japan.
> The Soviet Union defeated the Nazis without mass bombings of German cities.
In our shared reality(?) the Soviet Union defeated the Nazi's in parallel with the mass bombing of industrial areas, factories, ports, dams, and general war making infrastructure, much of which was within German cities.
The Soviet Union defeated an increasingly under supplied resource starved German military.
In our shared reality(?) the Soviet Union defeated the Nazi's in parallel with the mass bombing of industrial areas, factories, ports, dams, and general war making infrastructure, much of which was within German cities.
The Soviet Union defeated an increasingly under supplied resource starved German military.
> They are horrendous war crimes. The only reason they aren't called as such is we were the victors.
Who says they aren't called it? LeMay, for one, recognized it.
* https://iro.uiowa.edu/esploro/outputs/undergraduate/If-We-Ha...
There is a paradox called “logical insanity.” The novel Catch 22 deals with this irony: basically, the idea was that the war was killing thousands daily, so in order to end it as fast as possible, they planned to be as brutal as possible. But what were alternatives?
Drop the bomb somewhere 'harmless': how would that convince the War Cabinet of anything? The point of all weapons is to harm to convince the enemy to stop and re-evaluate their costs.
Blockade and starve the Japanese out? Possibly millions dead. Invasion? The Japanese leadership thought that up to 20M of their own people would perish trying to repel the US landings.
And that's just the Japanese numbers: what about all the peoples that were still living under Japanese rule in Manchuria, Korea, etc?
And what about the American lives, which were Truman et al's first responsibility?
Who says they aren't called it? LeMay, for one, recognized it.
* https://iro.uiowa.edu/esploro/outputs/undergraduate/If-We-Ha...
There is a paradox called “logical insanity.” The novel Catch 22 deals with this irony: basically, the idea was that the war was killing thousands daily, so in order to end it as fast as possible, they planned to be as brutal as possible. But what were alternatives?
Drop the bomb somewhere 'harmless': how would that convince the War Cabinet of anything? The point of all weapons is to harm to convince the enemy to stop and re-evaluate their costs.
Blockade and starve the Japanese out? Possibly millions dead. Invasion? The Japanese leadership thought that up to 20M of their own people would perish trying to repel the US landings.
And that's just the Japanese numbers: what about all the peoples that were still living under Japanese rule in Manchuria, Korea, etc?
And what about the American lives, which were Truman et al's first responsibility?
If you're going to rip off one of Dan Carlin's show titles this way, be so courteous as to provide the reference. It's pretty good, as so is a lot of his stuff, him hailing from back when podcasts were still delivered synchronously via terrestrial broadcast.
https://www.dancarlin.com/product/hardcore-history-42-blitz-...
https://www.dancarlin.com/product/hardcore-history-42-blitz-...
> those are all war crimes but the victors never get prosecuted.
Neither did (some of) the losers in the case of Japan
* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unit_731
* https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6...
Neither did (some of) the losers in the case of Japan
* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unit_731
* https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6...
Best not to lose a war. Having started it, doubly so. Signed, a Mississippi son.
No, but interestingly at least one case of Allies doing a 'war crime' was used as a defense in the Nuremberg Trials; Karl Dönitz was convicted of unrestricted Submarine warfare, however since both Britain and the US were doing the same, they more or less let it slide.
This is a fallacy, not that you're not right, but what is the alternative? The alternative is never "just do nothing and everyone lives"
Life isn't about choosing the best option but choosing the lesser evil imo
Life isn't about choosing the best option but choosing the lesser evil imo
When the alternatives of nationalism are to fight to the very last man, and cause 8 times the number of casualties. ( Perhaps somewhat more...). Hirohito knew that the military was going to do that.
You are saying the responsibility for the instant incineration of hundreds of thousands of civilians lies with the bombed, and not the bomber?
One thing that's rarely considered is that by any metric Japan had already lost the war.
And what's interesting - and definitive - about both Japan and Germany is that the regimes kept fighting when this was obvious.
There was plenty of insanity to go around, but it takes an extra special kind of insanity to ignore defeat when outmatched by a superior force, and when continuing to fight will cause massive casualties for your own population when failure is already guaranteed.
This isn't just irrational, it's compulsively self-harming.
At the same time it's recognised now that Germany and Japan both had very limited prospects of victory in WWII. There were voices in the military in both countries making this point before the fighting started. But the regimes chose irrational violence for irrational ends, with horrific self-destructive consequences.
What killed millions wasn't the weapons, it was the culture of mass delusion that made the weapons necessary.
It's the nature of authoritarianism to deny reality until pushed into collapse.
That's the only real enemy in war, and we're still fighting it today - unsuccessfully.
And what's interesting - and definitive - about both Japan and Germany is that the regimes kept fighting when this was obvious.
There was plenty of insanity to go around, but it takes an extra special kind of insanity to ignore defeat when outmatched by a superior force, and when continuing to fight will cause massive casualties for your own population when failure is already guaranteed.
This isn't just irrational, it's compulsively self-harming.
At the same time it's recognised now that Germany and Japan both had very limited prospects of victory in WWII. There were voices in the military in both countries making this point before the fighting started. But the regimes chose irrational violence for irrational ends, with horrific self-destructive consequences.
What killed millions wasn't the weapons, it was the culture of mass delusion that made the weapons necessary.
It's the nature of authoritarianism to deny reality until pushed into collapse.
That's the only real enemy in war, and we're still fighting it today - unsuccessfully.
>At the same time it's recognised now that Germany and Japan both had very limited prospects of victory in WWII.
I'd beg to differ about this being widely recognized. For Japan perhaps, but even they could have considerably forestalled their eventual defeat if they'd done a few logical things better, or won the battle of Midway (which they should have won numerically and tactically, if they'd been a bit more careful with their encryption and estimation of U.S naval force disposition), or prioritized their targets at Pearl Harbour more carefully, or maybe better, not even bothered to attack it in the first place while performing the rest of their conquest of Asia.
As for Germany, it could have outright won the war. No debate at this point has settled that this isn't so. Indeed, at several key points Germany emphatically had both means and opportunity to secure its total hegemony at least over Europe and its surroundings in a way that would have resulted in a Nazi-version alternative to the dual superpower bipolar world that instead existed between the USSR and USA after 1945.
Fortunately this didn't happen, since as bad as the USSR was (especially under Stalin) I'd hate to imagine an alternative in which the other hegemonic nuclear power is one built on the even more murderously fanatical legacy of Hitler, Himmler or Heydrich and the rest.
I'd beg to differ about this being widely recognized. For Japan perhaps, but even they could have considerably forestalled their eventual defeat if they'd done a few logical things better, or won the battle of Midway (which they should have won numerically and tactically, if they'd been a bit more careful with their encryption and estimation of U.S naval force disposition), or prioritized their targets at Pearl Harbour more carefully, or maybe better, not even bothered to attack it in the first place while performing the rest of their conquest of Asia.
As for Germany, it could have outright won the war. No debate at this point has settled that this isn't so. Indeed, at several key points Germany emphatically had both means and opportunity to secure its total hegemony at least over Europe and its surroundings in a way that would have resulted in a Nazi-version alternative to the dual superpower bipolar world that instead existed between the USSR and USA after 1945.
Fortunately this didn't happen, since as bad as the USSR was (especially under Stalin) I'd hate to imagine an alternative in which the other hegemonic nuclear power is one built on the even more murderously fanatical legacy of Hitler, Himmler or Heydrich and the rest.
> You are saying the responsibility for the instant incineration of hundreds of thousands of civilians lies with the bombed, and not the bomber?
The Japanese leadership knew they could not win the war for about a year before the bombings. Yet they chose to continue the war regardless of the suffering it caused their own people.
Was the US supposed to give up?
Would it been okay if Germany was allowed to surrender on the following conditions:
* Hitler stayed in power
* the Nazis stayed in power
* all land conquered by Germany was kept by Germany
* any allegations of war crimes would be handled internally by the Germans themselves
Because those were the terms Japan was waiting for:
* Emporer stayed in power
* the government stayed in power
* all land conquered by Japan was kept by Japan
* any allegations of war crimes would be handled internally by the Japanese themselves
Would you have been okay with WW2 ending against either party on those terms?
The Japanese leadership knew they could not win the war for about a year before the bombings. Yet they chose to continue the war regardless of the suffering it caused their own people.
Was the US supposed to give up?
Would it been okay if Germany was allowed to surrender on the following conditions:
* Hitler stayed in power
* the Nazis stayed in power
* all land conquered by Germany was kept by Germany
* any allegations of war crimes would be handled internally by the Germans themselves
Because those were the terms Japan was waiting for:
* Emporer stayed in power
* the government stayed in power
* all land conquered by Japan was kept by Japan
* any allegations of war crimes would be handled internally by the Japanese themselves
Would you have been okay with WW2 ending against either party on those terms?
When the bombed is credibly threatening to essentially suicide its entire citizenry despite no chance of victory, then yes, the rules of war must necessarily be relaxed to achieve the greater good. I would argue that the WW2 Imperial Japanese situation was unique in a way that nations had not yet had to deal with in the modern era (and haven’t had to deal with since).
With your logic, it would be ok for Isreal to nuke Gaza now ond for Russia to nuke the Ukraine.
Both Israel and Russia are aggressors in the wars. It’s really not comparable.
Would Ukraine have every right to use atom bomb if it had one? Absolutely.
Would Ukraine have every right to use atom bomb if it had one? Absolutely.
"Both Israel and Russia are aggressors"
Yeah, for anyone with more then one functioning brain cell, Russia attacked Ukraine. Gaza attacked Israel. Both Muslims and Russia are the same axis.
Yeah, for anyone with more then one functioning brain cell, Russia attacked Ukraine. Gaza attacked Israel. Both Muslims and Russia are the same axis.
Gaza is an existential threat to Israel more then Japan ever was to the U.S.
so, yeah.
If UKR was fascist and on the path to genocide everywhere, it's acceptable to nuke them.
Again, no, not necessarily a war crime.
> Under which conditions is nuking a city not a horrific warcrime?
When the alternative was millions of Japanese dead instead of a few hundred thousand.
(Never mind American lives, or all of those living under Japanese rule in Manchuria, etc.)
When the alternative was millions of Japanese dead instead of a few hundred thousand.
(Never mind American lives, or all of those living under Japanese rule in Manchuria, etc.)
Throwing around these terms without understanding, how and why they apply is foolhardy. The use of nuclear weapons is not explicitly prohibited under current international law, and is not automatically classified as a war crime per se. Their use could constitute a war crime depending on the circumstances, especially if they violate core principles of international humanitarian law (IHL).
How could detonating a nuke over a city not violate humanitarian law … ?
Is it the means (atomic bomb) or the destruction that raise that question for you?
Tokyo had a higher death toll from conventional bombing and incendiaries, and Dresden raised the question of whether destruction of a city was justified.
Japan had 72 cities destroyed prior to Hiroshima, which was on the "to be destroyed" list before the wider military outside of the Manhattan project knew of the atomic bomb.
* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombing_of_Dresden
* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombing_of_Tokyo
Tokyo had a higher death toll from conventional bombing and incendiaries, and Dresden raised the question of whether destruction of a city was justified.
Japan had 72 cities destroyed prior to Hiroshima, which was on the "to be destroyed" list before the wider military outside of the Manhattan project knew of the atomic bomb.
* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombing_of_Dresden
* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombing_of_Tokyo
The only conceivable (and highly hypothetical) way a nuclear detonation over a city might not violate IHL would require a very narrow set of improbable conditions, which are highly theoretical and borderline implausible in reality.
Empty city scenario:
The city is completely evacuated (e.g. warning issued and civilians withdrawn). The target is a purely military installation (e.g. underground command center, missile base). A low-yield nuclear weapon is used with tightly controlled fallout and blast effects.
Extremis Self-Defense:
The attacking state faces an existential threat (e.g. imminent nuclear attack from another state). A nuclear weapon is used as a last resort, targeting a high-value military asset in a city. The attacker argues that this was the only available means to defend itself.
Hypothetical “Clean” Nuclear Technology:
Some future nuclear weapon is designed with minimal blast, heat, and no residual radiation. It targets a completely isolated, fortified military position within a city. Civilians have been evacuated, and the use is precisely calibrated to avoid harm.
But this is where the fantasy ends. Cities are full of civilians. Nuclear weapons cannot distinguish civilian from combatant. Blast radius, thermal radiation, EMP, and fallout affect vast areas, even with “low-yield” weapons. Hospitals, schools, water systems, food supply chains would all be devastated. Environmental destruction and long-term radiation would cause unnecessary suffering.
The attack would likely violate the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks, the principle of proportionality, and environmental protections (under Additional Protocol I).
Empty city scenario:
The city is completely evacuated (e.g. warning issued and civilians withdrawn). The target is a purely military installation (e.g. underground command center, missile base). A low-yield nuclear weapon is used with tightly controlled fallout and blast effects.
Extremis Self-Defense:
The attacking state faces an existential threat (e.g. imminent nuclear attack from another state). A nuclear weapon is used as a last resort, targeting a high-value military asset in a city. The attacker argues that this was the only available means to defend itself.
Hypothetical “Clean” Nuclear Technology:
Some future nuclear weapon is designed with minimal blast, heat, and no residual radiation. It targets a completely isolated, fortified military position within a city. Civilians have been evacuated, and the use is precisely calibrated to avoid harm.
But this is where the fantasy ends. Cities are full of civilians. Nuclear weapons cannot distinguish civilian from combatant. Blast radius, thermal radiation, EMP, and fallout affect vast areas, even with “low-yield” weapons. Hospitals, schools, water systems, food supply chains would all be devastated. Environmental destruction and long-term radiation would cause unnecessary suffering.
The attack would likely violate the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks, the principle of proportionality, and environmental protections (under Additional Protocol I).
Burning entire cities to the ground and immolating their inhabitants was common practice at the time. Doing that with a single bomb simply made the process more efficient. They had not yet had time to start thinking of atomic power as something fundamentally different from what had come before: there were only three weeks between the Trinity test and the bombing of Hiroshima.
> How could detonating a nuke over a city not violate humanitarian law … ?
Would you rather have millions of Japanese die—either from trying to repel a US landing or through starvation if a blockade was enact—or 'just' a few hundred thousand?
The atomic bomb was strangely the most humane way, that probably saved the most Japanese lives, of ending the war.
Would you rather have millions of Japanese die—either from trying to repel a US landing or through starvation if a blockade was enact—or 'just' a few hundred thousand?
The atomic bomb was strangely the most humane way, that probably saved the most Japanese lives, of ending the war.
It was total war (1), all civilian infrastructure was there to facilitate the war, all bets were off.
(1) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Total_war
(1) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Total_war
It definitely is a warcrime, but just about every major battle in WWII is a war-crime by modern standards. The concept of warcrimes exists largely because we don't ever want WWII to happen again. Before that there were geneva conventions which defined war crimes but they were far more limited to the extent that even the Nazis were able to come up with supposed justifications for much of what they did based around [according to them, at least] their having not violated the geneva conventions which existed at the time.
Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined weren't even the biggest war crimes committed by America against the Japanese. I'm avoiding mentioning war-crimes committed by the other side because I don't want to inadvertently make the fallacious argument that they would somehow justify the war crimes we committed, but the argument I do want to make is that these sorts of arguments should be based around who was killed.
Torture is an exception to this because it implies the deliberate infliction of more pain than is necessary to kill the victim, but these sorts of discussions should never be based around the choice of weapon. When I see people constantly criticize the atomic bombings of hiroshima and nagasaki at a far greater rate than similar-scale events such as the repeated firebombings of tokyo or even "normal" battles with massive collateral damage such as Okinawa or Berlin it seems to me that the implication is that you would've been fine with America killing 250k people as long as we had done so with conventional weapons.
Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined weren't even the biggest war crimes committed by America against the Japanese. I'm avoiding mentioning war-crimes committed by the other side because I don't want to inadvertently make the fallacious argument that they would somehow justify the war crimes we committed, but the argument I do want to make is that these sorts of arguments should be based around who was killed.
Torture is an exception to this because it implies the deliberate infliction of more pain than is necessary to kill the victim, but these sorts of discussions should never be based around the choice of weapon. When I see people constantly criticize the atomic bombings of hiroshima and nagasaki at a far greater rate than similar-scale events such as the repeated firebombings of tokyo or even "normal" battles with massive collateral damage such as Okinawa or Berlin it seems to me that the implication is that you would've been fine with America killing 250k people as long as we had done so with conventional weapons.
Never. They could have blockaded Japan. They could have negotiated with the Russians, as at the time they were “sharing” Germany and were more or less on the same side. They could even just go home, Japan was already no military threat after the horrific fire bombing. The fact that they chose to do the unthinkable, and that Americans defend that decision to this day, goes to show what kind of people they really are. They only seek peace and diplomacy when it’s other people’s wars.
> They could have negotiated with the Russians
And got second Korea in the long run? No, thanks.
And got second Korea in the long run? No, thanks.
[deleted]
America also could've just ditched Europe and let the Nazis rebuild their empire if that's what you want.
The Soviets would almost certainly have taken Berlin either way, given they were fighting 80% of the Nazi Army, while all of the Western Front was concerned only with the "minor" side. Thinking America saved Europe in WWII is one of the many misconceptions perpetuated to this day about the War.
Well if all that counts is who's fighting >= 51% of the Axis, then you have to take into consideration that the USSR didn't even join the Asian theater until the day after Hiroshima happened despite sharing a border with Imperial Japan and having struggled through a brutal war of attrition with the Japanese just a couple decades earlier.
This idea you and many other armchair historians have that the USSR can solo 1v1 the axis powers and win isn't any less naive than saying America saved Europe, because it ignores the significant amounts of foreign aid that the US donated to other allied nations. This includes the USSR, who would not have been able to carry out a successful war of attrition against the Germans without a consistent pipeline of supplies and weapons. It certainly would not have been able to win a war on two fronts if the Japanese felt free to invade the soviet far east. I will concede that the Chinese deserve way more credit than they generally get for waging their own war of attrition against the Japanese which prevented them from going to war in the soviet far east, but that was also made possible with significant American logistical support.
But more importantly, you seem to have an oddly eurocentric view of history in which the european theater is the only one of any import. Japan's eventual defeat was never a foregone conclusion, and they were just as cruel to their conquered foes as the Germans were. They were also the only Axis that posed a credible threat to the United States, having successfully established a foothold in the Aleutian Islands with an aim towards invading Canada and the United States. Realistically I don't think it ever would have worked (again, they were pre-occupied with China) but they certainly have a better track record of attacking the North American continent than the krauts ever did.
This idea you and many other armchair historians have that the USSR can solo 1v1 the axis powers and win isn't any less naive than saying America saved Europe, because it ignores the significant amounts of foreign aid that the US donated to other allied nations. This includes the USSR, who would not have been able to carry out a successful war of attrition against the Germans without a consistent pipeline of supplies and weapons. It certainly would not have been able to win a war on two fronts if the Japanese felt free to invade the soviet far east. I will concede that the Chinese deserve way more credit than they generally get for waging their own war of attrition against the Japanese which prevented them from going to war in the soviet far east, but that was also made possible with significant American logistical support.
But more importantly, you seem to have an oddly eurocentric view of history in which the european theater is the only one of any import. Japan's eventual defeat was never a foregone conclusion, and they were just as cruel to their conquered foes as the Germans were. They were also the only Axis that posed a credible threat to the United States, having successfully established a foothold in the Aleutian Islands with an aim towards invading Canada and the United States. Realistically I don't think it ever would have worked (again, they were pre-occupied with China) but they certainly have a better track record of attacking the North American continent than the krauts ever did.
AFIK they were looking for ways to surrender while saving face. They were using the Russians as the negotiators. The US didn't want that so they bombed instead.
> AFIK they were looking for ways to surrender while saving face.
They were also looking to keep all the land they had conquered.
If Nazi Germany was willing to surrender would we have been okay with it if they got to keep the Czech Republic, Poland, northern France?
They were also looking to keep all the land they had conquered.
If Nazi Germany was willing to surrender would we have been okay with it if they got to keep the Czech Republic, Poland, northern France?
The US had no other bomb ready to be dropped actually. preparing the fissile material took a lot of time.
Is that true? I thought they had a core at Los Alamos.
They had Fat Man and Little Boy, after detonating Trinity, so one down, two ready to go, a few near ready cores, and a production pipeline in place to produce more at one a month or so .. (the exact number is on Alex W's Nuclear Secrecy blog .. my recollection is poor and from five+ years past).
The production rate of 3 bombs per month in August was expected to rise to 5 bombs per month in November, and 7 bombs per month in December. In 1946, it could rise much higher.
https://www.dannen.com/decision/bomb-rate.html
https://www.dannen.com/decision/bomb-rate.html
Cheers, cheers, cheers, for that, that.
obligatory Philip Glass rep-rep-repition
obligatory Philip Glass rep-rep-repition
This was the third core: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demon_core
> The Emperor himself had to be called in multiple times (which was unprecedented) to ensure that the surrender was 'pushed' through
Why didn't they drop the bomb in Tokio then ? This surely would have been more convincing for the emperor.
Why didn't they drop the bomb in Tokio then ? This surely would have been more convincing for the emperor.
The Americans had already bombed Tokyo into ruins five months prior, killing at least 100,000 people and leaving a million homeless. It was the most violent air raid in history, doing more damage than either of the atomic bombings. The Japanese did not surrender.
The point of Hiroshima was not that the USAF could destroy a city, because they had already done that sixty-seven times over the preceding year, but that they could now do it with a single plane and a single bomb. They specifically selected a city which had never been raided before so it would be clear that all the damage had been done by the new weapon.
The Japanese were used to watching hundreds of American bombers destroy a city overnight. Now they had to fear a raid in which hundreds of bombers destroyed hundreds of cities overnight, and then the war would be over because their society would no longer exist.
The point of Hiroshima was not that the USAF could destroy a city, because they had already done that sixty-seven times over the preceding year, but that they could now do it with a single plane and a single bomb. They specifically selected a city which had never been raided before so it would be clear that all the damage had been done by the new weapon.
The Japanese were used to watching hundreds of American bombers destroy a city overnight. Now they had to fear a raid in which hundreds of bombers destroyed hundreds of cities overnight, and then the war would be over because their society would no longer exist.
One important thing the US could have done to get the Japanese to surrender without dropping the bomb would have been to promise that Japan would not be turned into a republic after the war but allowed to keep its imperial family as ceremonial heads of state. As, you know, actually happened after they surrendered.
Promising to do what we actually did would have been more than enough to save a huge number of lives, and honestly we should have had Hirohito "go into seclusion" in favor of a successor.
Promising to do what we actually did would have been more than enough to save a huge number of lives, and honestly we should have had Hirohito "go into seclusion" in favor of a successor.
But you don't know that promising that wouldn't have emoldened the Japanese leadership. That they wouldn't have seen that as a weakening of Allied resolve and a willingness to end the war on Japan's terms. Japan was already using Iwo Jima and Okinawa to fight to the last man while exacting high American causalities, in an attempt to make the US reassess the cost of taking mainland Japan.
Much of what you state is basically true, but bear in mind that other options, that didn't involve nuclear terror, would still have worked, and weren't used for reasons a bit more cynical than exasperation at Japanese truculence, or mere ignorance of radiation's insidious effects (which wasn't as deep as one might think, even in 1945)..
Even without concretely knowing just how long the Japanese government would attempt to hold out in the face of conventionally inevitable defeat, political and military planners in the U.S. could have -and knew they could have- simply sealed off the Japanese Home Islands and starved them into submission while continuing to bomb their cities to ashes with ordinary bombs.
Well before July of 1945, Japan was essentially defenseless against aerial bombardment and its cities aside from the famous cases of Nagasaki and Hiroshima had already been absolutely devastated by repeat massive bomber raids that the feeble Japanese air defense systems at the time could do next to nothing against. Many, many more people had already died in these firestorm raids than were eventually killed by Little Boy and Fat Man.
What's more, the Japanese Navy was by that point basically in scattered, useless tatters while U.S. naval and aerial might was so total, so all-encompassing, that the severely import-dependent Japanese homeland could have been brought completely to its knees in misery, to the point of eventually just succumbing, without having to send so much as a single American soldier onto the the main islands.
It would have been a longer and less "glorious" way of leveraging a surrender than one big military invasion by all those shiny war tools and soldiers you now have geared up in such abundance to fight and finish the whole mess, but it indisputably would have worked; even nationalist fanaticism short circuits when literal mass starvation becomes completely inescapable, ravages every corner of society, and the most basic essentials of modern civilization are gone, while every single one of your cities is now ashes and rubble. All of these horrors could have been achieved without invasion.
The United States knew all this. However, as mentioned above, its Marine Corps and vast navy were already at maximum deployment, so the political sacrifice of a decisive invasion was the alternative to which the atomic bombs were compared. Secondly, the U.S leadership now had the bomb, after all that cost and effort, and felt a pressing need to showcase its live military use to themselves, to the world, and very crucially, to Stalin. By that point, in July and August, he was no longer quite the friendly "Uncle Joe" that American wartime propaganda had painted him as for the sake of political convenience, while the Nazis were still in the picture.
Personally, i'm glad the bombs were used then, in that context, while their destructive power was still s relatively weak. It showed the world the monstrosity of atomic bombing used against an actual society, while the consequences for using it live were much less than they would have been if delayed to just a decade later. If at that future date, someone had decided to finally get an itchy trigger finger for the first time, they'd have been doing it with many more, far more powerful bombs, claiming many more lives..
Even without concretely knowing just how long the Japanese government would attempt to hold out in the face of conventionally inevitable defeat, political and military planners in the U.S. could have -and knew they could have- simply sealed off the Japanese Home Islands and starved them into submission while continuing to bomb their cities to ashes with ordinary bombs.
Well before July of 1945, Japan was essentially defenseless against aerial bombardment and its cities aside from the famous cases of Nagasaki and Hiroshima had already been absolutely devastated by repeat massive bomber raids that the feeble Japanese air defense systems at the time could do next to nothing against. Many, many more people had already died in these firestorm raids than were eventually killed by Little Boy and Fat Man.
What's more, the Japanese Navy was by that point basically in scattered, useless tatters while U.S. naval and aerial might was so total, so all-encompassing, that the severely import-dependent Japanese homeland could have been brought completely to its knees in misery, to the point of eventually just succumbing, without having to send so much as a single American soldier onto the the main islands.
It would have been a longer and less "glorious" way of leveraging a surrender than one big military invasion by all those shiny war tools and soldiers you now have geared up in such abundance to fight and finish the whole mess, but it indisputably would have worked; even nationalist fanaticism short circuits when literal mass starvation becomes completely inescapable, ravages every corner of society, and the most basic essentials of modern civilization are gone, while every single one of your cities is now ashes and rubble. All of these horrors could have been achieved without invasion.
The United States knew all this. However, as mentioned above, its Marine Corps and vast navy were already at maximum deployment, so the political sacrifice of a decisive invasion was the alternative to which the atomic bombs were compared. Secondly, the U.S leadership now had the bomb, after all that cost and effort, and felt a pressing need to showcase its live military use to themselves, to the world, and very crucially, to Stalin. By that point, in July and August, he was no longer quite the friendly "Uncle Joe" that American wartime propaganda had painted him as for the sake of political convenience, while the Nazis were still in the picture.
Personally, i'm glad the bombs were used then, in that context, while their destructive power was still s relatively weak. It showed the world the monstrosity of atomic bombing used against an actual society, while the consequences for using it live were much less than they would have been if delayed to just a decade later. If at that future date, someone had decided to finally get an itchy trigger finger for the first time, they'd have been doing it with many more, far more powerful bombs, claiming many more lives..
>the U.S. could have -and knew they could have- simply sealed off the Japanese Home Islands and starved them into submission while continuing to bomb their cities to ashes with ordinary bombs.
A blockade was estimated to kill multiple millions of Japanese. The reason to avoid this was not because it was less glorious, but because it was far more horrific for the Japanese.
A blockade was estimated to kill multiple millions of Japanese. The reason to avoid this was not because it was less glorious, but because it was far more horrific for the Japanese.
udev4096(3)
Gar Alperovitz wrote the definitive book on the subject "The Decision to use the Atomic Bomb".
Many US military experts and top generals believed it was unnecessary. Japan was defeated, particularly with the entry of the Soviet Union into the war, it was over for them.
Many US military experts and top generals believed it was unnecessary. Japan was defeated, particularly with the entry of the Soviet Union into the war, it was over for them.
> Many US military experts and top generals believed it was unnecessary. Japan was defeated, particularly with the entry of the Soviet Union into the war, it was over for them.
Yes, Japan was defeated a year before the bombs were dropped. The problem was Japan decided not to surrender even though themselves they knew they lost.
That's the problem.
Japan not surrendering even when they knew.
Per Japanese documents even after one bomb was dropped they still would not surrender. It took the second bomb, and even then the war cabinet was split on 3-3 on whether to surrender.
Two bombs dropping only got them to the point of a tie. The Emperor had to be called in to break the tie after two bombings.
And the Japanese knew the Soviets were going to enter the war. That was already in their calculations and they still were for fighting.
Yes, Japan was defeated a year before the bombs were dropped. The problem was Japan decided not to surrender even though themselves they knew they lost.
That's the problem.
Japan not surrendering even when they knew.
Per Japanese documents even after one bomb was dropped they still would not surrender. It took the second bomb, and even then the war cabinet was split on 3-3 on whether to surrender.
Two bombs dropping only got them to the point of a tie. The Emperor had to be called in to break the tie after two bombings.
And the Japanese knew the Soviets were going to enter the war. That was already in their calculations and they still were for fighting.
But you do realize that in cabinet meetings after the atomic bombings, the bombings themselves were only scarcely discussed? It is unknown how much impact the atomic bomb had on their decision to surrender, but it is certainly only one of many factors.
> Gar Alperovitz wrote the definitive book on the subject "The Decision to use the Atomic Bomb".
"definitive"? What does that even mean in a field of study like history? You're telling me there has been zero new analysis on the subject since 1995? No new insights?
And even that assumes that Alperovitz's initial premises were valid, that he did not miss any evidence,or exclude or discount any because his own biases and such, and so that is conclusions followed logically from all of that.
How is it "definitive"?
"definitive"? What does that even mean in a field of study like history? You're telling me there has been zero new analysis on the subject since 1995? No new insights?
And even that assumes that Alperovitz's initial premises were valid, that he did not miss any evidence,or exclude or discount any because his own biases and such, and so that is conclusions followed logically from all of that.
How is it "definitive"?
There is nothing comparable to this particular book or study, that I know of. The entire book is dedicated to that question, and investigates all the key players and decision makers deeply.
It's exhaustive and extremely well documented.
It's exhaustive and extremely well documented.
fair enough to notice though that while the Soviet Union may have had agreed to enter the war with Japan (at the Potsdam conference ?), it had not done so by the time the nuclear bomb on Hiroshima was dropped. It did declare war on Japan the day before the Nagasaki bombing. In a way ... Stalin chose the "let's go to war with Japan" date opportunistically. When it was clear there could be much gain without too much pain.
Which is not a dissimilar thing to the US "wavering" over the commitment to an invasion of Japan. The nuclear bombs "resolved" that. We'll never know what would have happened otherwise.
Which is not a dissimilar thing to the US "wavering" over the commitment to an invasion of Japan. The nuclear bombs "resolved" that. We'll never know what would have happened otherwise.
The atrocities that the Japanese military committed, consistently and repeatedly and combined with their attack on pearl harbor, meant that Americans of the time on the front lines had few qualms or issues with dropping the bomb.
Truman famously called Oppenheimer a "cry baby" when Oppenheimer expressed doubt. Truman had spent the past decade dealing with the war in his capacity as senator and vice president - seeing the effects it was having first (or second) hand.
Now, this isn't to say that America was right or not right to drop one or both bombs. It may "feel" like I'm saying "the Japanese deserved it for their behavior" - that's not a belief I hold, either.
I just want to provide color for why American leadership seemed so relatively unconcerned with the lives of Japanese civilians in 1945.
Truman famously called Oppenheimer a "cry baby" when Oppenheimer expressed doubt. Truman had spent the past decade dealing with the war in his capacity as senator and vice president - seeing the effects it was having first (or second) hand.
Now, this isn't to say that America was right or not right to drop one or both bombs. It may "feel" like I'm saying "the Japanese deserved it for their behavior" - that's not a belief I hold, either.
I just want to provide color for why American leadership seemed so relatively unconcerned with the lives of Japanese civilians in 1945.
> Now, this isn't to say that America was right or not right to drop one or both bombs. It may "feel" like I'm saying "the Japanese deserved it for their behavior" - that's not a belief I hold, either.
Some contemporaries of note didn't think it was justified either [1]. Eisenhower, a decorated war hero who later cautioned against the over-expansion of the military industrial complex in his Presidential farewell speech, said of the bombing in his memoir:
> I was one of those who felt that there were a number of cogent reasons to question the wisdom of such an act. [...] I had been conscious of a feeling of depression and so I voiced [...] my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly, because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives
I vacationed in Japan a few months ago via a tour group and we went to Hiroshima. It was one of the most emotionally-taxing experiences of my life. The bomb was literally dropped on a hospital [2]. The heat of the explosion melted the tops of headstones in a neighboring graveyard and seared some poor soul's shadow into the nearby steps that they were sitting on. Hundreds of thousands of civilians' lives were erased or permanently altered in a matter of seconds. Grabbing a sandwich from the 7-11 next door and eating it while I stared at where it all happened 80 years prior definitely fucked with me a bit.
I've never experienced war or lost somebody I care about to an enemy combatant. All things considered I've led a rather easy life. I can't say how I'd feel otherwise, but the me that exists right now thinks that our military shouldn't have done what it did. That they haven't done it again makes me wonder whether they realize this too.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Debate_over_the_atomic_bombing...
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shima_Hospital
Some contemporaries of note didn't think it was justified either [1]. Eisenhower, a decorated war hero who later cautioned against the over-expansion of the military industrial complex in his Presidential farewell speech, said of the bombing in his memoir:
> I was one of those who felt that there were a number of cogent reasons to question the wisdom of such an act. [...] I had been conscious of a feeling of depression and so I voiced [...] my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly, because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives
I vacationed in Japan a few months ago via a tour group and we went to Hiroshima. It was one of the most emotionally-taxing experiences of my life. The bomb was literally dropped on a hospital [2]. The heat of the explosion melted the tops of headstones in a neighboring graveyard and seared some poor soul's shadow into the nearby steps that they were sitting on. Hundreds of thousands of civilians' lives were erased or permanently altered in a matter of seconds. Grabbing a sandwich from the 7-11 next door and eating it while I stared at where it all happened 80 years prior definitely fucked with me a bit.
I've never experienced war or lost somebody I care about to an enemy combatant. All things considered I've led a rather easy life. I can't say how I'd feel otherwise, but the me that exists right now thinks that our military shouldn't have done what it did. That they haven't done it again makes me wonder whether they realize this too.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Debate_over_the_atomic_bombing...
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shima_Hospital
I find it is important to be skeptical of people's descriptions of what they were supposedly thinking years earlier. Much better is to find contemporaneous accounts. For example:
>...my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary,
The last major battle before the dropping of the atomic bombs was the battle for Okinawa and it was the bloodiest and fiercest battle fought against the Japanese. Absolutely no one who knew about that battle would have claimed that Japan was already defeated.
>...When the guns fell silent, more than 240,000 people had lost their lives in the campaign for Okinawa. The American loss rate was 35 percent of the force, totaling 49,151 casualties.
>...So close to the home islands, most Japanese soldiers refused to surrender and fought to the death. Their fanaticism contributed to a dreadful toll. Some 110,000 Japanese and conscripted Okinawan defenders were killed in action.
https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/okinawa-costs...
>...my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary,
The last major battle before the dropping of the atomic bombs was the battle for Okinawa and it was the bloodiest and fiercest battle fought against the Japanese. Absolutely no one who knew about that battle would have claimed that Japan was already defeated.
>...When the guns fell silent, more than 240,000 people had lost their lives in the campaign for Okinawa. The American loss rate was 35 percent of the force, totaling 49,151 casualties.
>...So close to the home islands, most Japanese soldiers refused to surrender and fought to the death. Their fanaticism contributed to a dreadful toll. Some 110,000 Japanese and conscripted Okinawan defenders were killed in action.
https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/okinawa-costs...
Don't forget the thousands of civilians that committed suicide. There are accounts of soldier interpreters pleading with civilians through loudspeakers on their ship to just surrender and be taken care of, while they jumped from cliffs into the sea. Every option (invasion, mass starvation via blockade, atomic bombing) was a horrific nightmare of death for the Japanese.
> Absolutely no one who knew about that battle would have claimed that Japan was already defeated.
On a strategic level they were. The archipelago was being blockaded, they had no way to contest Allied air supremacy, they were reduced to send children into battle, etc.
On a strategic level they were. The archipelago was being blockaded, they had no way to contest Allied air supremacy, they were reduced to send children into battle, etc.
Yes, they had no chance of winning and it should have been obvious long before Okinawa. Unfortunately, it doesn't mean they were ready to surrender.
but the me that exists right now thinks that our military shouldn't have done what it did.
It's worth remembering that if it weren't for them doing what they did, you might not have the life you do now.
It's worth remembering that if it weren't for them doing what they did, you might not have the life you do now.
Maybe? We can go around in circles on this but there were so many other options the Allies could have tried:
- Drop the first bomb in the ocean in front of an envoy of observers and give Japan a week to deliberate their response
- Blockade the island, threaten land invasion, and wait for the emperor to call for surrender as they gradually run out of fuel
- Drop a bomb on Hiroshima but give more than 3 days for the government to understand what happened and consider surrendering before dropping a bomb on Nagasaki
- Allow the USSR to go ahead with a ground invasion while the US sits on the sidelines
etc...
But sure, in the fine grained detail, if the US has not dropped nuclear bombs on Japan, we would not today be commenting on Hiroshima (1946) saying "they shouldn't have dropped nuclear bombs on Japan"
- Drop the first bomb in the ocean in front of an envoy of observers and give Japan a week to deliberate their response
- Blockade the island, threaten land invasion, and wait for the emperor to call for surrender as they gradually run out of fuel
- Drop a bomb on Hiroshima but give more than 3 days for the government to understand what happened and consider surrendering before dropping a bomb on Nagasaki
- Allow the USSR to go ahead with a ground invasion while the US sits on the sidelines
etc...
But sure, in the fine grained detail, if the US has not dropped nuclear bombs on Japan, we would not today be commenting on Hiroshima (1946) saying "they shouldn't have dropped nuclear bombs on Japan"
> - Drop the first bomb in the ocean in front of an envoy of observers and give Japan a week to deliberate their response
Seventy scientists on the Manhattan Project signed a petition [0] to president Truman about doing something like that before actually using the bomb, but the petition was intercepted and Truman didn't even hear about it in time.
0: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Szil%C3%A1rd_petition
Seventy scientists on the Manhattan Project signed a petition [0] to president Truman about doing something like that before actually using the bomb, but the petition was intercepted and Truman didn't even hear about it in time.
0: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Szil%C3%A1rd_petition
Keep in mind that every day the war continued meant thousands of innocent lives being lost under the brutal Japanese occupation that still covered vast areas of east Asia. Blockading Japan and waiting for them to starve might have been the best thing to save American lives. I think it’s unlikely to have been the best thing to save innocent lives overall.
Blockading Japan would have probably killed countless Japanese civilians via starvation, right? At least, I don’t think the island could sustain itself at that population level, particularly without fuel…
The aerial mining operation was literally called Operation Starvation, so, yeah. The big question is how quickly it makes them surrender. If they decide they’re cooked and give up fast, it might not have been too bad. If they hold out a long time then it would have been terrible.
Given how ideological they were? It would take 5 mil dead at least.
A blockade would mean a slow death for thousands or potentially millions of Japanese, as well at the cost and risk of tens of thousands of American troops, as well as a stupid amount of resources and infrastructure.
The message in Hiroshima and Nagasaki was "We can put eleven men on a fancy plane and make one of your main cities simply disappear, and you can do nothing about it."
That made not surrendering simply and objectively not worth it.
The message in Hiroshima and Nagasaki was "We can put eleven men on a fancy plane and make one of your main cities simply disappear, and you can do nothing about it."
That made not surrendering simply and objectively not worth it.
> Allow the USSR to go ahead with a ground invasion while the US sits on the sidelines
Geopolitics 101 from HN.
Geopolitics 101 from HN.
I'm not suggesting this is would have been a good idea or had good outcomes. I mention it specifically because I frequently hear the false-dichotomy (from Americans in particular) that "we had to use nuclear bombs because a ground invasion would have cost hundreds of thousands of American lives". I rarely if ever hear them say that "we had to use nuclear bombs because we didn't want the USSR to invade Japan before they surrendered".
That is to say, I think it's important to hear the argument against this alternative explicitly raised as a justification for the use of nuclear weapons, because ignoring that motivation is intellectually dishonest.
That is to say, I think it's important to hear the argument against this alternative explicitly raised as a justification for the use of nuclear weapons, because ignoring that motivation is intellectually dishonest.
>..I rarely if ever hear them say that "we had to use nuclear bombs because we didn't want the USSR to invade Japan before they surrendered".
People rarely say that because there is little evidence for it - it was the USA that was pressuring Stalin to declare war on Japan. Little Boy was dropped on Aug 6, the Soviet Union finally declared war on Japan on Aug 9 as they agreed to at Yalta. (While the Soviets considered invading Hokkaido after Japan surrendered, very few people think they would have succeeded. The USA had given the Soviet Union some ships that could be used, but they would not have been nearly enough.)
People rarely say that because there is little evidence for it - it was the USA that was pressuring Stalin to declare war on Japan. Little Boy was dropped on Aug 6, the Soviet Union finally declared war on Japan on Aug 9 as they agreed to at Yalta. (While the Soviets considered invading Hokkaido after Japan surrendered, very few people think they would have succeeded. The USA had given the Soviet Union some ships that could be used, but they would not have been nearly enough.)
Maybe, but it's a very uncomfortable precedent to say that sometimes burning a lot of civilians alive is acceptable.
Hell, if America breaks out in civil war...
Hell, if America breaks out in civil war...
I don't think a lot of the other things the Japanese did during WW2 were acceptable either.
Nor was attacking Pearl Harbor.
Nor was attacking Pearl Harbor.
If you go sufficiently far back in history, this is true for every event.
> you might not have the life you do now.
I mean, yeah. The act is one of many countably infinite quantum events that contribute to the reality that I experience. My point is that there's a strong argument to be made that the US not dropping the bomb would have resulted in largely the same state of the universe with significantly less suffering in it.
I mean, yeah. The act is one of many countably infinite quantum events that contribute to the reality that I experience. My point is that there's a strong argument to be made that the US not dropping the bomb would have resulted in largely the same state of the universe with significantly less suffering in it.
Not really. The war was practically over, and we could just have blockaded Japan until it surrendered without invading. And the Soviets' entrance in the war did as much, if not more to push the surrender as the atomic bombs.
You say “blockade” without thinking about the consequences.
The US blockades Japan causing food shortages. The military prioritizes what little food is available for themselves. The know the population will starve, but it’s necessary to defend Japan against the foreign Invaders. As long as there is enough food for the military, the war can continue.
Now you have a mass famine where millions of women and children slowly starve to death. Japan uses it for propaganda showing how cruel the West is and how if the West would just sign an armistice leaving the military junta in charge, all these people could be saved.
Is that better?
The US blockades Japan causing food shortages. The military prioritizes what little food is available for themselves. The know the population will starve, but it’s necessary to defend Japan against the foreign Invaders. As long as there is enough food for the military, the war can continue.
Now you have a mass famine where millions of women and children slowly starve to death. Japan uses it for propaganda showing how cruel the West is and how if the West would just sign an armistice leaving the military junta in charge, all these people could be saved.
Is that better?
I was responding to:
> It's worth remembering that if it weren't for them doing what they did, you might not have the life you do now.
My response was not wrong as to that. The Allies did care a great deal about the Japanese people, and you can see that in the Potsdam declaration, but they also cared about their own soldiers' lives. If we hadn't had, or did not want to use, the nukes, then maybe we might have tried blockading for a while, who knows -- it's what the then leadership surely would have considered, and you can't blame someone today for mentioning it.
> It's worth remembering that if it weren't for them doing what they did, you might not have the life you do now.
My response was not wrong as to that. The Allies did care a great deal about the Japanese people, and you can see that in the Potsdam declaration, but they also cared about their own soldiers' lives. If we hadn't had, or did not want to use, the nukes, then maybe we might have tried blockading for a while, who knows -- it's what the then leadership surely would have considered, and you can't blame someone today for mentioning it.
Sadly we've all seen this unfold in current times.
> the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives
FYI it is estimated that the war would go on until 1947 if the bombs were not dropped. There would be millions of American lives lost in that case.
FYI it is estimated that the war would go on until 1947 if the bombs were not dropped. There would be millions of American lives lost in that case.
> FYI it is estimated that the war would go on until 1947 if the bombs were not dropped
FYI it is also estimated that the war would end within a few months if the bombs were not dropped. It really depends on whoever was estimating lol
This is a heavily contested issue that has been actively discussed for almost a century by full time professional historians and analysts. Making confident assertions isn’t particularly helpful
FYI it is also estimated that the war would end within a few months if the bombs were not dropped. It really depends on whoever was estimating lol
This is a heavily contested issue that has been actively discussed for almost a century by full time professional historians and analysts. Making confident assertions isn’t particularly helpful
What is the argument that the war would have ended in a few months? Is it that the US would have reached Tokyo by then? Or Japan would have surrendered before then? Both are hard to believe
The core point of my post has not sunk in. Your personal belief does not mean that you get to confidently issued judgment on this matter, as if there are no other perspectives.
Again, this is a hotly contested issue, contested by people who in some cases, have a full-time profession in studying this issue
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Debate_over_the_atomic_bombing...
Again, this is a hotly contested issue, contested by people who in some cases, have a full-time profession in studying this issue
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Debate_over_the_atomic_bombing...
> I just want to provide color for why American leadership seemed so relatively unconcerned with the lives of Japanese civilians in 1945.
They were concerned about Japanese lives. They were more concerned about American lives, but they concluded the shorter the war was the more lives of everyone involved could be saved.
The Japanese food situation was also very dire: there was a very real risk of famine during Winter 1945-46, and so if the war could be ended before that many millions of Japanese civilians could be saved.
They were concerned about Japanese lives. They were more concerned about American lives, but they concluded the shorter the war was the more lives of everyone involved could be saved.
The Japanese food situation was also very dire: there was a very real risk of famine during Winter 1945-46, and so if the war could be ended before that many millions of Japanese civilians could be saved.
I agree. With the information they had at the time it made total sense to drop the bomb. After seeing how tough the Japanese military fought during the invasion of the various islands it was reasonable to assume that the invasion of the mainland would be extremely bloody.
I think whatever we learned (I have read that Japan was already ready to surrender). after should be applied to future wars but not be applied to situations where the information was not available.
If anybody is responsible for Japanese suffering it’s clearly Hirohito and his generals who were too cowardly to accept defeat and instead chose to have killed hundreds of thousands of Japanese while they were hesitating.
I think whatever we learned (I have read that Japan was already ready to surrender). after should be applied to future wars but not be applied to situations where the information was not available.
If anybody is responsible for Japanese suffering it’s clearly Hirohito and his generals who were too cowardly to accept defeat and instead chose to have killed hundreds of thousands of Japanese while they were hesitating.
My favorite terrifying fact about the WW2 Pacific theater: The US expected that invading the Japanese home islands would be so bloody that they manufactured tons of Purple Heart medals, and they’re still giving them out today because they haven’t run out.
That is the terrifying fact, and I can confirm it. It was mentioned in a large volume on World war II.
"Japan was ready to surrender." It was not. The military, was ready to fight to the last man,and that was the resistance that Hirohito had to over come. And why there were 4 cabinets that the Emperor had to go though. A thuough understanding about what was actually occuring would help you understand. Read Hirohito's book.
Hirohito surendered, and insisted on doing so, that he would spare the lives and culture of the japanese people, and TO SPARE LIVES IN GENERAL.
The generals went scorched earth and they plan would have killed 20~22 million japanese people, that is what it means to fight to the last man.
Clearly, you need to read Hirohito's book.
Hirohito surendered his divinity, and instead of his people calling him a coward, they continued to worship him, in a way very few non-japanese can understand. Two of my best friends in school were japanese, and when I got to Jr high, my counselor had the internment order on his wall. I hated that the US dropped the bomb for decades, until I read Hirohito's book. Then it mostly fell into place, and I had to check with a bunch of historians, and with the senior members of the peace organization. I belonged to for decades.
Hirohito surendered, and insisted on doing so, that he would spare the lives and culture of the japanese people, and TO SPARE LIVES IN GENERAL.
The generals went scorched earth and they plan would have killed 20~22 million japanese people, that is what it means to fight to the last man.
Clearly, you need to read Hirohito's book.
Hirohito surendered his divinity, and instead of his people calling him a coward, they continued to worship him, in a way very few non-japanese can understand. Two of my best friends in school were japanese, and when I got to Jr high, my counselor had the internment order on his wall. I hated that the US dropped the bomb for decades, until I read Hirohito's book. Then it mostly fell into place, and I had to check with a bunch of historians, and with the senior members of the peace organization. I belonged to for decades.
I find it a little questionable to make Hirohito the victim and hero of this story.
The problem is that the Americans saw no difference between soldiers committing atrocities and old people and children living in a city (fight aged men were out fighting).
They were targeting old people and children because it was easier to kill them than the soldiers.
They were targeting old people and children because it was easier to kill them than the soldiers.
Sorry they didn’t invent HIMARS and satellite precision strikes yet.
The please explain why Kyoto was taken off the lists of targets?
Because the secretary of war spent his honeymoon there and didn't want to tarnish his memory.
I sometimes feel many Americans are relatively unconcerned about lives of foreign civilians. Still.
A surprising number of the people of Hiroshima remained more or less indifferent about the ethics of using the bomb.
While people far from Japan made much of the uniqueness and power of a single bomb destroying a single city for those on the ground it was just another single city destroyed overnight by bombing .. the 73rd such city destroyed in a relatively short duration of time.
The destruction and death in Hiroshima was on par with the destruction and death in Tokyo when that was firebombed.
Yes, I understand that Japan gave up, not so much because of the bomb, but mostly because of the Soviet invasion and capture of Manchuria (and the implied threat of an invasion of the mainland), after the war in Europe had been won.
But I still struggle to understand the Japanese mentality. Were they OK with the prospect of city after city being atom- or fire-bombed, so long as no ground invasion occurred?
But I still struggle to understand the Japanese mentality. Were they OK with the prospect of city after city being atom- or fire-bombed, so long as no ground invasion occurred?
Additionally, the Japanese leadership was welcoming a land invasion. They believed that a land invasion would result in unacceptable casualties, forcing the United States into a peace that would allow Japan to continue occupying China and many of the sized territories. That's how disconnected from reality the leadership was.
The sad thing is that there is a non-zero chance they where right. There was considerable concern about that from the war leadership at this point. The allies _dramatically_ underestimated the forces that the Japanese had marshalled at the two invasion sites, and it would have been not very good. The alternative that the Navy was pushing was a starvation blockade of Japan. This probably would have been succesful but led to millions more lives lost in Japan, and a almost inevitable civil war in Japan.
The sad thing is that there is a non-zero chance they where right. There was considerable concern about that from the war leadership at this point. The allies _dramatically_ underestimated the forces that the Japanese had marshalled at the two invasion sites, and it would have been not very good. The alternative that the Navy was pushing was a starvation blockade of Japan. This probably would have been succesful but led to millions more lives lost in Japan, and a almost inevitable civil war in Japan.
> The allies _dramatically_ underestimated the forces that the Japanese had marshalled at the two invasion sites, and it would have been not very good.
They did not underestimate the Japanese forces.
They did an assessment in early 1945 and did calculations and the needed invasion force. But the Japanese could read a map just as well as the Americans, and could guess where Olympic would happen and redeployed, which the Americans detected:
* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Downfall#Ground_thre...
They did not underestimate the Japanese forces.
They did an assessment in early 1945 and did calculations and the needed invasion force. But the Japanese could read a map just as well as the Americans, and could guess where Olympic would happen and redeployed, which the Americans detected:
* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Downfall#Ground_thre...
The question I addressed was about the specific ethics of the specific case of "using the (atomic) bomb".
For survivors of a city destroyed overnight, with a great many friends and relatives dead, others injured or suffering the follow on results of malnutrition, disease, etc. there's little to separate the ethics of the use of an atomic weapon from the ethics of the use of tonnes of HE and incendiary weapons.
The most famous comparison, Tokyo Vs Hiroshima, has little to distinguish them from the PoV of a survivor.
https://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/2014/09/22/tokyo-hiroshima/
Again, for context, 72 Japanese cities, including Tokyo, were each leveled in single bombing raids before Hiroshima.
Any debate about the killing of civilians to "save US soldiers" from invaders predated the use of atomic weapons by a number of months when the policy to flatten all of Japan from the air first started.
Atomic weapons were developed for use against Germany, with the German surrender prior to a field testable weapon being built, with the imminent collapse of Japan on the horizon, it was a race by those military at the head of the Manhattan project to have clean field targets before the conventional bombers worked through their list.
Hiroshima was to be destroyed by US forces either way.
The question should be less about the ethics of spending an ungodly amount of money to destroy a city with a single bomb, and more about the ethics of destroying a city for considerably less cost with multiple bombs in a mass raid.
I very much suspect a great many regular people in Japan were very much not okay with seeing their fellow citizens destroyed in a war being pursued by other elements of Japanese society.
For survivors of a city destroyed overnight, with a great many friends and relatives dead, others injured or suffering the follow on results of malnutrition, disease, etc. there's little to separate the ethics of the use of an atomic weapon from the ethics of the use of tonnes of HE and incendiary weapons.
The most famous comparison, Tokyo Vs Hiroshima, has little to distinguish them from the PoV of a survivor.
https://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/2014/09/22/tokyo-hiroshima/
Again, for context, 72 Japanese cities, including Tokyo, were each leveled in single bombing raids before Hiroshima.
Any debate about the killing of civilians to "save US soldiers" from invaders predated the use of atomic weapons by a number of months when the policy to flatten all of Japan from the air first started.
Atomic weapons were developed for use against Germany, with the German surrender prior to a field testable weapon being built, with the imminent collapse of Japan on the horizon, it was a race by those military at the head of the Manhattan project to have clean field targets before the conventional bombers worked through their list.
Hiroshima was to be destroyed by US forces either way.
The question should be less about the ethics of spending an ungodly amount of money to destroy a city with a single bomb, and more about the ethics of destroying a city for considerably less cost with multiple bombs in a mass raid.
I very much suspect a great many regular people in Japan were very much not okay with seeing their fellow citizens destroyed in a war being pursued by other elements of Japanese society.
This is mostly untrue. Most of this narrative comes from Soviet propaganda that was later propagated by anti-Western and anti-war groups in the United States. More recently, it's gotten more attention as Vladimir Putin and Vladimir Rudolfovich Solovyov use it as a useful tool to build their narrative that only Russia was responsible for World War II's victory and to justify their constant threats of nuclear warfare.
The historical record is very clear, as is Hirohito's own statement at the time:
"Furthermore, the enemy has begun to employ a new and cruel bomb, causing immense and indiscriminate destruction, the extent of which is beyond all estimation. Should we continue to fight, not only would it result in the ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but it would also lead to the total extinction of human civilization.
How, then, are We to protect the millions of Our subjects and atone before the spirits of my Imperial ancestors?
This is why We have ordered the Empire to accept the terms of the Joint Declaration. "
The historical record is very clear, as is Hirohito's own statement at the time:
"Furthermore, the enemy has begun to employ a new and cruel bomb, causing immense and indiscriminate destruction, the extent of which is beyond all estimation. Should we continue to fight, not only would it result in the ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but it would also lead to the total extinction of human civilization.
How, then, are We to protect the millions of Our subjects and atone before the spirits of my Imperial ancestors?
This is why We have ordered the Empire to accept the terms of the Joint Declaration. "
The other thing that gets glossed over in the "it was the soviets, not the bomb that caused the surrender" is that the USSR knew the US had the atomic bomb and realized it might end the war. They had territorial objectives of their own and wanted to join the conflict with (understandably) minimal casualties. If they had thought the war was going to last another year they might waited a bit longer to join.
I really strongly recommend Ian Toll's histories of the Pacific war, because there is information that is not in the early histories (at least the ones I read a while back) that is because things in the US and former USSR are more declassified. In particular, the US had a pretty good understanding of what is going on in the Japanese government. They knew a lot of civilian leaders wanted to surrender before Hiroshima, but were afraid they would be associated by a coup, as had happened in the 1930s. That's also what the Japanese leaders who wanted to surrender were worried about as well.
I really strongly recommend Ian Toll's histories of the Pacific war, because there is information that is not in the early histories (at least the ones I read a while back) that is because things in the US and former USSR are more declassified. In particular, the US had a pretty good understanding of what is going on in the Japanese government. They knew a lot of civilian leaders wanted to surrender before Hiroshima, but were afraid they would be associated by a coup, as had happened in the 1930s. That's also what the Japanese leaders who wanted to surrender were worried about as well.
The USSR entered the war against Japan precisely 3 months after the defeat of Nazi Germany, exactly as they promised to the Western Allies at Yalta.
Hirohito's surrender speech to the army pointed to the entry of the Soviet Union into the war as the main reason for surrender:
"Now that the Soviet Union has entered the war against us, to continue the war under the present internal and external conditions would be only to increase needlessly the ravages of war finally to the point of endangering the very foundation of the Empire's existence."
Hirohito said different things to different audiences.
"Now that the Soviet Union has entered the war against us, to continue the war under the present internal and external conditions would be only to increase needlessly the ravages of war finally to the point of endangering the very foundation of the Empire's existence."
Hirohito said different things to different audiences.
> The historical record is very clear, as is Hirohito's own statement at the time
thats just the official word. The coming Soviet invasion was definitely a factor.
thats just the official word. The coming Soviet invasion was definitely a factor.
The Soviets could never have done a large invasion of Japan. They had a few ships that the USA had given them as part of Project Hula, but that is nothing compared to what would be needed for a full scale invasion of Japan.
In comparison, the proposed allied invasion was planned to have 42 aircraft carriers, 24 battleships, and 400 destroyers and destroyer escorts.
In comparison, the proposed allied invasion was planned to have 42 aircraft carriers, 24 battleships, and 400 destroyers and destroyer escorts.
What came before the "Furthermore, ..."?
But now the war has lasted for nearly four years. Despite the best that has been done by everyone — the gallant fighting of the military and naval forces, the diligence and assiduity of our servants of the state, and the devoted service of our one hundred million people — the war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan’s advantage, while the general trends of the world have all turned against her interest.
That may be the greatest understatement ever written!
the English translation is. In Japanese its not surprising to talk in this way.
Hirohito spoke in a very very rare way that very few humans speak. It took years of a friend who got a masters in 'Peace and conflict studies' to get me to understand, and in the decade since, and after reading Hirohito's book it still takes a significant intellectual effort to distinguish the listening.
Beat me to it. That's exactly what I was going to say
The historical record is very clear, and I have read those words too.
[deleted]
The war was dictated by a religious leader, to some (most?) there was just no stopping it until it tells them to.
It's not useful to paint Hirohito as a religious leader. Yes, he was technically the head of State Shinto, but he was not the one issuing orders.
Depending on how you look at it (and reams of paper have been expended on this topic), he was somewhere between a puppet and a symbol. Certainly not innocent, but also not the instigator.
Depending on how you look at it (and reams of paper have been expended on this topic), he was somewhere between a puppet and a symbol. Certainly not innocent, but also not the instigator.
I'm not arguing about how much blame he should get as a person, I'm stressing out that the country's god was in favor of the war, which puts the population in a completely different mindset than otherwise.
Which religious leader? Hirohito? Hirohito rarely took any direction of the war - at best he enthusiastically endorsed what the ruling militarists wanted. As critical as one could (and should) be about this support, there is plenty of documentation that he tried to tap the brakes on the militarists, but didn't try all that hard. It wasn't until the very end of the war that he directly made a decision, and that was only enabled by a literal tie in the cabinet that allowed him to cast the deciding vote (sorta - more or less, gave him cover to break his role).
He was a war criminal, but not the leader of the war by any means. That was reserved for the militarists - Tojo and Suzuki and others.
He was a war criminal, but not the leader of the war by any means. That was reserved for the militarists - Tojo and Suzuki and others.
> he enthusiastically endorsed what the ruling militarists wanted.
That's definitely enough when you are a living god. From the point he gave his approval, he was the only one that could fully stop it.
You're right that he was a puppet for the military, exactly because of that god position he was born into.
That's definitely enough when you are a living god. From the point he gave his approval, he was the only one that could fully stop it.
You're right that he was a puppet for the military, exactly because of that god position he was born into.
There was no nuclear taboo in 1945. Looking back, people forget that.
I think we were very lucky with the timing such that atomic bombs could be used in warfare just twice.
Imagine if development had been delayed a little while and the war ended without any atomic bombs. The bomb would still be built and improved. The falling out of the USSR with the other Allies would still happen. The Soviets would still get the bomb and there would still be an arms race. But would the Cold War have stayed cold without an object lesson in what nuclear warfare actually looks like? I suspect not. Even with those object lessons, it took a while for the consensus to emerge that nuclear war must be averted no matter what. That bit in Dr. Strangelove where the general said we’d only “get our hair mussed” in a war with just 10-20 million dead was pretty much the real attitude of the Air Force leadership at the time.
Imagine if development had been delayed a little while and the war ended without any atomic bombs. The bomb would still be built and improved. The falling out of the USSR with the other Allies would still happen. The Soviets would still get the bomb and there would still be an arms race. But would the Cold War have stayed cold without an object lesson in what nuclear warfare actually looks like? I suspect not. Even with those object lessons, it took a while for the consensus to emerge that nuclear war must be averted no matter what. That bit in Dr. Strangelove where the general said we’d only “get our hair mussed” in a war with just 10-20 million dead was pretty much the real attitude of the Air Force leadership at the time.
people seem to forget that LeMay was advocating many times for a decapitating nuke strike against to soviets before they can have their own bomb. thats how hawkish they were.
I think the other thing to keep in mind is the cultural differences in how the West vs East think about government and the individual.
After living in Asia for a while, having political discussions with the people who live there, and exploring the differences in governance there, it’s not surprising there was indifference. You see this spectrum of though across many Asian countries from the authoritarian ones like China to the more democratic like Singapore.
Unlike the West which has a history of the relationship of the individual with the government and its leadership, Asia is much more influenced by Confucianism.
While people like to describe it as “what is good for the group versus what is good for the individual” I think that’s not an accurate description. It’s much more of a belief that governance happens “up there” and isn’t relevant to a commoners life.
The Eastern view of government is much more hierarchical and detached from the individual than in the West. There is strong sense that any one individual is not that important overall and that governance is a realm of the upper class, with the lower class on the receiving end rather than where power originates.
So for someone in Japan, the decisions during the war and the consequences thereafter are not theirs to judge or influence, only theirs to endure. There is a sense of fate and inability to change what happens, so it’s not really worth spending time thinking about.
After living in Asia for a while, having political discussions with the people who live there, and exploring the differences in governance there, it’s not surprising there was indifference. You see this spectrum of though across many Asian countries from the authoritarian ones like China to the more democratic like Singapore.
Unlike the West which has a history of the relationship of the individual with the government and its leadership, Asia is much more influenced by Confucianism.
While people like to describe it as “what is good for the group versus what is good for the individual” I think that’s not an accurate description. It’s much more of a belief that governance happens “up there” and isn’t relevant to a commoners life.
The Eastern view of government is much more hierarchical and detached from the individual than in the West. There is strong sense that any one individual is not that important overall and that governance is a realm of the upper class, with the lower class on the receiving end rather than where power originates.
So for someone in Japan, the decisions during the war and the consequences thereafter are not theirs to judge or influence, only theirs to endure. There is a sense of fate and inability to change what happens, so it’s not really worth spending time thinking about.
This piece made a big impact on me when I read it like five years ago, and if I recall correctly there was a young doctor there who was one of the few interviewed who stated that the bomb's use was possibly a war crime. He did like 48 hours in the hospital as thousands upon thousands of burned and dying walked from afar to the completely overrun clinic.
> […] and if I recall correctly there was a young doctor there who was one of the few interviewed who stated that the bomb's use was possibly a war crime.
Was the dropping of the bombs any worse than the fire bombings that had been taking places for months? LeMay didn't seem to think so.
Was the dropping of the bombs any worse than the fire bombings that had been taking places for months? LeMay didn't seem to think so.
"The work was originally published in The New Yorker, which had planned to run it over four issues but instead dedicated the entire edition of August 31, 1946, to a single article"
TO OUR READER: The New Yorker this week devotes its entire editorial space to an article on the almost complete obliteration of a city by one atomic bomb, and what happened to the people of that city. It does so in the conviction that few of us have yet comprehended the all but incredible destructive power of this weapon, and that everyone might well take time to consider the terrible implications of its use.
The Editors
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hiroshima_(book)
TO OUR READER: The New Yorker this week devotes its entire editorial space to an article on the almost complete obliteration of a city by one atomic bomb, and what happened to the people of that city. It does so in the conviction that few of us have yet comprehended the all but incredible destructive power of this weapon, and that everyone might well take time to consider the terrible implications of its use.
The Editors
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hiroshima_(book)
This article was 160 pages long when printed in the New Yorker. Modern nuclear warheads are around 30x more powerful than the one dropped on Hiroshima. For comparison sake the equivalent resulting story would be 4800 pages long.
There's a lot of argument about whether or not the bomb should have been dropped, and that debate will go on forever.
And while the following is not as important as the decision to drop the bomb, I think the decisions to publish "Hiroshima" and how it was published (especially in 1946) is very much worth understanding. This was not a story the US Government did not want to get out.
The US military/government tried to hide many of the facts about what happened at Hiroshima/Nagasaki for various reasons (military secrecy was one, but I think hiding the true impacts of the horrors of the bomb from the American (and world) public was the big one.)
You can read about the coverup of the nuclear weapons impact on Hiroshima in the book "Fallout" by Lesley Blune: https://scribepublications.com.au/books-authors/books/fallou...
And here's a short article that I quickly googled that discusses the story behind the story using "Fallout" as a reference: https://insidestory.org.au/the-making-of-john-herseys-hirosh...
And while the following is not as important as the decision to drop the bomb, I think the decisions to publish "Hiroshima" and how it was published (especially in 1946) is very much worth understanding. This was not a story the US Government did not want to get out.
The US military/government tried to hide many of the facts about what happened at Hiroshima/Nagasaki for various reasons (military secrecy was one, but I think hiding the true impacts of the horrors of the bomb from the American (and world) public was the big one.)
You can read about the coverup of the nuclear weapons impact on Hiroshima in the book "Fallout" by Lesley Blune: https://scribepublications.com.au/books-authors/books/fallou...
And here's a short article that I quickly googled that discusses the story behind the story using "Fallout" as a reference: https://insidestory.org.au/the-making-of-john-herseys-hirosh...
Here’s an extraordinary piece that focuses on the stories of the ordinary lives of the real people surviving 64 kilo enriched uranium exploding above their head yielding a blast of approximately 15 kiloton TNT which caused a fireball with a diameter of 370m that had the same surface temperature as the sun (source: Wikipedia). And here we are, the intellectually curious people of the internet, above all interested in offsetting these tragedies to some other suffering statistics. Why can’t we help but look away from human suffering inflicted by war, even if there’s a moving long read focusing on real people presented to us? And who does this thinking serve?
Towards the end of the piece, the author describes a science professor who, together with his son, lays buried under the rubble of his house after the blast. He ultimately survives but reflects about laying there, thinking: “It was my first time I ever tasted such a beautiful spirit when I decided to die for our Emperor.” How fascinating this is the spin you give to such a traumatising experience. Are we really nation state citizens first, human beings second? Could speaking about the fate of the people of Hiroshima in terms as ‘necessity’ and ‘justified’ be a symptom of the same thinking? How do we get out of this?
Towards the end of the piece, the author describes a science professor who, together with his son, lays buried under the rubble of his house after the blast. He ultimately survives but reflects about laying there, thinking: “It was my first time I ever tasted such a beautiful spirit when I decided to die for our Emperor.” How fascinating this is the spin you give to such a traumatising experience. Are we really nation state citizens first, human beings second? Could speaking about the fate of the people of Hiroshima in terms as ‘necessity’ and ‘justified’ be a symptom of the same thinking? How do we get out of this?
Would you let someone beat you to death? Would you let them beat your children to death? If you shot them or stabbed them or hit them in the back of the head with a shovel, would you say it was ‘necessity’ and ‘justified’ or would that be a symptom of the 'same thinking'? War is terrible, but it is pretty naive to lament Hiroshima as if it existed in isolation, and not in the context of an aggressive imperialist Japan epitomized in the rape of Nanking. While these things need to be explored and looked at, we also need to recognize that death camps and genocide were happening every day the Nazis and Japanese empire were still fighting.
I do not think Hiroshima existed in isolation. I totally agree that the Japanese empire and the Third Reich committed horrible war crimes in WW2. If there's anything I lament, it's how it seems so hard to feel empathy for the traumas of the real people who die in war, whatever side they are on. The New Yorker piece we are commenting on describes mundane lives of normal people. These were not people who were beating someone or someone's children to death. Sure, many if not all Japanese were supporting a regime that was responsible for immense crulety, and sure, I do understand how that affects our ability to feel empathy for them (it's maybe similar to how I feel less empathy for a fan of a rival football team mourning a game's loss compared to a fan of the football team I happen to support). I understand this way of thinking, but I choose to rebel against it. Because we talk about losing real lives, real suffering - and what citizenship of which empire or nation state should be so crucial that it cancels out a person's humanity? As you write yourself, "war is terrible". It really is. Call me naive, but I dream of a world where that sentence is not followed by a 'but', but by a period.
I understand what you are saying and I agree. I think it is important to look at, and empathize with, the suffering on all sides of a conflict. Thank you for taking the time to elaborate.
>As you write yourself, "war is terrible". It really is. Call me naive, but I dream of a world where that sentence is not followed by a 'but', but by a period.
Unfortunately, I think this is naive. It is akin to saying "violence is terrible", but as long as someone could decide to do violence against me, whether to take things I have, because they don’t like me, or just because they enjoy it, violence will still be around and I (or someone else like police) will have to use violence in defense. How do you stop every human from doing violence? How do you stop every nation from doing violence?
America’s failures in Mogadishu influenced their decision not to intervene in the Rwandan genocide. The violence still happened because at the end of the day, we are just very sophisticated animals. I don’t see how war, violence, and conflict could be eliminated without eliminating humanity. Would we be human without our emotions, the good and terrible ones?
>As you write yourself, "war is terrible". It really is. Call me naive, but I dream of a world where that sentence is not followed by a 'but', but by a period.
Unfortunately, I think this is naive. It is akin to saying "violence is terrible", but as long as someone could decide to do violence against me, whether to take things I have, because they don’t like me, or just because they enjoy it, violence will still be around and I (or someone else like police) will have to use violence in defense. How do you stop every human from doing violence? How do you stop every nation from doing violence?
America’s failures in Mogadishu influenced their decision not to intervene in the Rwandan genocide. The violence still happened because at the end of the day, we are just very sophisticated animals. I don’t see how war, violence, and conflict could be eliminated without eliminating humanity. Would we be human without our emotions, the good and terrible ones?
Interesting to see the difference in writing style back then. Lots of long sentences. Kind of the opposite to the LinkedIn-style writing we see today, spitting out as many sentences and paragraphs as possible. Like you can see the generations' attention spans in their form of writing.
A whole generation reared on cigarettes and black coffee with no tech addiction. Yeah, these were pretty focused times.
Been watching some old movies lately and its amazing to watch simple scenes stretch on for five minutes or more. Its almost like there was nothing else to do.
At first I'm irritated by this, but once I adapt I actually like the time it gives me as a viewer to appreciate the subtleties of what's the characters and what they're up to.
Agreed, though I feel they went overboard during the seventies. On the other hand, modern movies make me desperate for a breather.
> Its almost like there was nothing else to do.
Until now I forgot that people saw theaters as social venues, would eat buckets of popcorn, go the toilet etc.
From that lens, viewers fully focused and digesting every second of the movie was definitely not the average target.
Until now I forgot that people saw theaters as social venues, would eat buckets of popcorn, go the toilet etc.
From that lens, viewers fully focused and digesting every second of the movie was definitely not the average target.
Long sentences are fine if your value form over communication.
Marking it on attention span makes it sound like convoluted and rambling sentences were universally good in the first place. I'd argue the contrary for a magazine or news outlet.
Marking it on attention span makes it sound like convoluted and rambling sentences were universally good in the first place. I'd argue the contrary for a magazine or news outlet.
The singular horror of this event really is so difficult to describe, definitely one of the low points of human history which we must vow to never again repeat, under any circumstances.
Any global consensus on avoiding repeating this low point in human history needs to acknowledge the prime movers behind birthing the bomb into existence in the first place. Much ink has been spilt debating morality, but on the raw mechanics the historians are in alignment with each other - doesn't matter if you ask Richard Rhodes, Robert S Norris, or Alex Wellerstein:
(compsci & s/w engineers can love VB all they want for As We May Think, but the man had some serious and arguably unnecessary blood in the short term, and decades of existential fear in the long term, on his hands. The silence of his legacy has been far too effective at ducking popular criticism of his role in history)
If humanity ever chooses to avoid creating yet-to-be-developed doomsday devices in humanity's future, while _still_ harvesting benefits of new R&D (viz. nuclear power plant energy), it needs to 'debug' the social epistemology around the Advisory Committee on Uranium / Uranium Committee (leading to S-1 under the NDRC).
edit: added 'in the short term, and decades of existential fear in the long term'
Vannevar Bush, more than any single individual, scientist or non-scientist, stands at the center of the bureaucratic decision to feasibility-test the fission chain reaction.
(compsci & s/w engineers can love VB all they want for As We May Think, but the man had some serious and arguably unnecessary blood in the short term, and decades of existential fear in the long term, on his hands. The silence of his legacy has been far too effective at ducking popular criticism of his role in history)
If humanity ever chooses to avoid creating yet-to-be-developed doomsday devices in humanity's future, while _still_ harvesting benefits of new R&D (viz. nuclear power plant energy), it needs to 'debug' the social epistemology around the Advisory Committee on Uranium / Uranium Committee (leading to S-1 under the NDRC).
edit: added 'in the short term, and decades of existential fear in the long term'
In any moral framework that does not include perfect knowledge of the future, the nuclear bomb is morally defensible at worst, and morally required at best. Sheer number of lives saved? The Nuclear Bomb ended the war. Number of Japanese lives saved? Nuclear bomb wins. The "non-violent" option of a blockade? It would have resulted in millions dead. The Japanese farming system completely collapsed in 1944. Many still starved even after the surrender, as the allies rushed to get food and aid to Japan.
What about a pure Soviet entry into the war? You have to look at what happened to Poland and Eastern Europe when the Soviet army invaded. Once again, by any metric, this was the best possible outcome at the time.
But it was unquestionably a local maximum - the best solution at the time, with horrific consequences afterward.
What about a pure Soviet entry into the war? You have to look at what happened to Poland and Eastern Europe when the Soviet army invaded. Once again, by any metric, this was the best possible outcome at the time.
But it was unquestionably a local maximum - the best solution at the time, with horrific consequences afterward.
That's the pitfall these discussions invariably fall into - debating the morality of deploying rather than the wisdom of developing a capacity in the first place. The primary justification for secretly studying the feasibility of the fission chain reaction was the fear that Germany (not Japan) might be developing an atomic bomb of their own (an early form of the subsequent Cold War's 'can't prove a negative' about what weapons the Soviets might be developing).
> unnecessary blood on his hands
While the debate on the bomb is not and never will be settled, I'm not sure I'd call the bloodshed caused by Hiroshima and Nagasaki to be unnecessary: it ended up a war that had caused so far millions of death.
And what social epistemology, actually?
While the debate on the bomb is not and never will be settled, I'm not sure I'd call the bloodshed caused by Hiroshima and Nagasaki to be unnecessary: it ended up a war that had caused so far millions of death.
And what social epistemology, actually?
>I'm not sure I'd call ...
Indeed it would have been better for me to focus on the decades of existential fear rather than the immediate bloodshed because, as demonstrated, the debate descended straight to the usual about the morality of dropping the bomb in WWII.
>And what social epistemology, actually?
Karl Compton and Leo Szilard whispering in Vannevar Bush's ear about the threat that the prospective threat that a German atomic bomb would pose. Vannevar would later make the case that the physicists would have done these feasibility tests anyways with or without his support, but this is a (somewhat biased) counterfactual and therefore incapable of being evaluated.
The whole episode demonstrates that it is by responding affirmatively to the 'choice to learn' - in this case whether a unique embodiment of already known physical properties is _really_ feasible - which finds us crossing the technological Rubicon of runaway doomsday device development.
Vannevar would go on to defend his actions in saying that it was good that such a horrific capacity was demonstrated in such a 'spectacular' way. His words in his autobiography, "Pieces of the Action" strive to cement the legacy of his gift to the world:
Indeed it would have been better for me to focus on the decades of existential fear rather than the immediate bloodshed because, as demonstrated, the debate descended straight to the usual about the morality of dropping the bomb in WWII.
>And what social epistemology, actually?
Karl Compton and Leo Szilard whispering in Vannevar Bush's ear about the threat that the prospective threat that a German atomic bomb would pose. Vannevar would later make the case that the physicists would have done these feasibility tests anyways with or without his support, but this is a (somewhat biased) counterfactual and therefore incapable of being evaluated.
The whole episode demonstrates that it is by responding affirmatively to the 'choice to learn' - in this case whether a unique embodiment of already known physical properties is _really_ feasible - which finds us crossing the technological Rubicon of runaway doomsday device development.
Vannevar would go on to defend his actions in saying that it was good that such a horrific capacity was demonstrated in such a 'spectacular' way. His words in his autobiography, "Pieces of the Action" strive to cement the legacy of his gift to the world:
"The advent of the A-bomb is generally regarded as a catastrophe for civilization. I am not convinced that it was. With the pace of science in this present century it was inevitable that means of mass destruction should appear. Since the concept of one world under law is far in the future, it was also inevitable that great states should face one another thus armed. If there were no A-bombs the confrontation would still have occurred, and the means might well have been to spread among a a people a disease for a chemical that would kill or render impotent the whole population. History may well conclude, if history is written a century from now, that it was well that the inevitable confrontation came in a spectacular way that all could recognize, rather than in a subtle form which might tempt aggression through ignorance. At least we all know, we and the rest of the world, that there are A-bombs and what they can do."The bomb would have been developed one way or the other, no matter what. The time was ripe for it.
Why is this special? The Japanese killed ~7 million Chinese, 0.5 to 1 million Filipinos, 500k in Korea, you can keep adding them up. Then Japan loses 0.2% of all their atrocities and it's the worst thing ever? No, it's not the worst thing ever, not even close. Sure, we'd all like it to never happen again. But if I had to pick one thing not happening again I'd pick saving all others that died in WW2 over this one incident.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DwKPFT-RioU
There's also the argument that it saved more lives than the deaths it caused. The same can not be said for Japan's atrocities.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DwKPFT-RioU
There's also the argument that it saved more lives than the deaths it caused. The same can not be said for Japan's atrocities.
The reason this is special is because no one else used a nuclear bomb, before this event or after. That's basically the definition of "special" and the number of Chinese that the Japanese killed has nothing to do with it.
Picking anything other than the nuclear bomb to never happen again is moronic because the planet can survive the other things, but if nukes were to start flying again, it would most likely not end with just two. Other countries have those weapons now too and such a war has the potential to be last one ever fought.
Picking anything other than the nuclear bomb to never happen again is moronic because the planet can survive the other things, but if nukes were to start flying again, it would most likely not end with just two. Other countries have those weapons now too and such a war has the potential to be last one ever fought.
[deleted]
Man, the whole war was horrific.
The Japanese did things that were arguably even more horrific than the bomb; read up on unit 731 and the rape of Nanjing. I'm sure those who experienced those things would have far preferred dying in a flash.
The German did the holocaust, Babi Yar, etc.
The Allies did various fire-bombings.
The current singular taboo around nuclear weapons kind of misses how destructive and horrific the whole war was. This was total war on a scale that is hard to imagine today. To be fair modern nuclear weapons pack a punch that far exceed those atoms bombs.
The Japanese did things that were arguably even more horrific than the bomb; read up on unit 731 and the rape of Nanjing. I'm sure those who experienced those things would have far preferred dying in a flash.
The German did the holocaust, Babi Yar, etc.
The Allies did various fire-bombings.
The current singular taboo around nuclear weapons kind of misses how destructive and horrific the whole war was. This was total war on a scale that is hard to imagine today. To be fair modern nuclear weapons pack a punch that far exceed those atoms bombs.
I totally disagree about the difficulty of describing horror, since the linked article is one of many to have received critical acclaim for providing quality descriptions of WW2 experiences (my recommendation is 1952's The Naked Island).
Agree about the necessity of the never again stuff though, even though we've been failing at that continuously.
Agree about the necessity of the never again stuff though, even though we've been failing at that continuously.
Well, op may be making the point that even the best description of horror is little compared to experiencing it. Watching a video of the horror itself (e.g. combat footage, a beheading, open-heart surgery) pales in comparison to experiencing it firsthand.
> The singular horror of this event really is so difficult to describe, definitely one of the low points of human history which we must vow to never again repeat, under any circumstances.
Lower than the Holodomor? Lower than Dresden or Tokyo fire bombings? Lower than the Holocaust? Lower than Unit 731?
Lower than the Holodomor? Lower than Dresden or Tokyo fire bombings? Lower than the Holocaust? Lower than Unit 731?
It's the single worst moment in human history. Yes, those crimes were larger, but in terms of the worst instant of time, this has to take the cake.
> It's the single worst moment in human history. Yes, those crimes were larger, but in terms of the worst instant of time, this has to take the cake.
The 9/10 March 1945 caused more death and damage as an individual event, even more than each of the atomic bombings:
* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombing_of_Tokyo_(10_March_194...
The 9/10 March 1945 caused more death and damage as an individual event, even more than each of the atomic bombings:
* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombing_of_Tokyo_(10_March_194...
Indeed! I can add "lower than the butchery and sadism of the Japanese forces in SE Asia?"
Yeah I'm pretty sure Stalingrad was far, far worse.
The fault of this event lies on Japan, not the US. Japan was the aggressor who started the war. Japan was "fighting to the end" and gave no indications it would surrender. It is estimated that the war would go on to 1947 had the bombs not been dropped. That would have caused the deaths of millions or tens oof million more people. It is a tragedy that people died, but the blame lies in Japan's actions, not the US'.
"Look what you made me do!"
By the way: that same argument is used by Netanyahu and Putin today!
By the way: that same argument is used by Netanyahu and Putin today!
I guess technically Japan didn't "make" the US drop the bombs, they just started a war against the US and brought them into a situation where they had to choose between continuing to send millions of its soldiers to die in the the deadliest war of all time, or defending itself against the aggressor by dropping the bombs. Are you happy with that?
Likewise, I guess technically Hamas didn't "make" Israel defend itself. They just fired thousands of rockets indiscriminately against Israeli civilians and launched the deadliest massacre of Jews since the Holocaust, where 1200 Israelis were murdered, tortured, raped, and/or kidnapped for being Jewish, and brought Israel into a situation where it had to choose between continuing to allow for its population to be a victim of massacres threatened by a total war of annihilation, or defend itself by destroying Hamas.
Likewise, I guess technically Hamas didn't "make" Israel defend itself. They just fired thousands of rockets indiscriminately against Israeli civilians and launched the deadliest massacre of Jews since the Holocaust, where 1200 Israelis were murdered, tortured, raped, and/or kidnapped for being Jewish, and brought Israel into a situation where it had to choose between continuing to allow for its population to be a victim of massacres threatened by a total war of annihilation, or defend itself by destroying Hamas.
BTW: it doesn't make sene to compare to Russia. Japan obviously attacked the US. Hamas obviously attacked Israel. Ukraine did not attack Russia.
Part of the problem understanding this is how much the leadership of Japan was strongly split into factions with opposite goals and views.
There was no unified decision to start the war. Instead the army unilaterally precipitated the war.
There was a lack of unified views about ending the war. To say that the war was already lost was true and recognized by many, but there was a strong faction that would not support surrender.
It’s hard to prove a counterfactual, whether not dropping the bomb would result in fewer deaths or more.
There was no unified decision to start the war. Instead the army unilaterally precipitated the war.
There was a lack of unified views about ending the war. To say that the war was already lost was true and recognized by many, but there was a strong faction that would not support surrender.
It’s hard to prove a counterfactual, whether not dropping the bomb would result in fewer deaths or more.
Thank you. Scrolled for 10 minutes through predictably nightmarish comment wars for this.
I get that people have this fascination for what happened at Nagasaki and Hiroshima, but was it really worse than the incendiary bombing of other cities?
These were all horrific events only meant to harm civilians. The whole bombing campaign was and I feel that focusing on these two cities makes us underestimate the dimension of the tragedy.
These were all horrific events only meant to harm civilians. The whole bombing campaign was and I feel that focusing on these two cities makes us underestimate the dimension of the tragedy.
Example: the firebombing of Toyama on Aug 1, 1945. 99.5% of the city was destroyed, a record perhaps unequaled in the history of warfare (vs. about 1/3rd of Nagasaki).
And the conventional bombing of Japan was just getting started. It would have escalated massively had Japan not surrendered.
And the conventional bombing of Japan was just getting started. It would have escalated massively had Japan not surrendered.
I recommend again and again Alex Wellerstein's blog on all those topics:
https://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com
Verg good read
Linked there is also a related article from 1985
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1985/07/15/hiroshima-the-...
Linked there is also a related article from 1985
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1985/07/15/hiroshima-the-...
It’s pretty wild how small the numbers are relatively speaking to the significance we ascribe to the event. Under half a million. Compare that to the recent USAID changes (10m+ expected) - which barely stayed in news cycle for a week.
I want to give my thoughts to answer a few comments in this thread. If the atomic bomb was first developed by the Japanese, they wouldn't have hesitated to use it just like the USA did. Does it make it more right? Absolutely not, but as a Japanese friend put it: "it's war".
If the war went on, Operation Cherry Blossom would have gone underway and we would probably still be dealing with bubonic plague decades later.
And, as other pointed out, if a land invasion occured, millions more would have died. The atomic bombs weren't even the deadliest events of the war—see the firebombing of Tokyo.
If the war went on, Operation Cherry Blossom would have gone underway and we would probably still be dealing with bubonic plague decades later.
And, as other pointed out, if a land invasion occured, millions more would have died. The atomic bombs weren't even the deadliest events of the war—see the firebombing of Tokyo.
This came up recently on my feed (Hiroshima - the unknown images): https://youtu.be/QrqjADwzDm0
Warning: although much of the graphic medical condition of the victims of the blast are blurred out, it is still a very sad look at the effects of this weapon.
They choose photos from shortly after the bomb is detonated of some of the victims. They then use interviews and … photogrammetry? … to explain some of the effects on the unfortunate people.
Warning: although much of the graphic medical condition of the victims of the blast are blurred out, it is still a very sad look at the effects of this weapon.
They choose photos from shortly after the bomb is detonated of some of the victims. They then use interviews and … photogrammetry? … to explain some of the effects on the unfortunate people.
Many comments here defend the decision to bomb Hiroshima. Atomic bombs today are 80 times more powerful than the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. I find it difficult to defend a decision to drop an atomic bomb that powerful on a city of millions of inhabitants. No matter what war crimes have been committed.
The decision to bomb Hiroshima was made long before the existence of atomic weapons was widely known. They were classified at the highest level and not even Truman knew they existed until he became POTUS after being VP.
Hiroshima was another target, way down the list, of Japanese targets to destroy, beginning with Tokyo, after Allied command determined that simply bombing purely industrial and military targets wasn't enough.
The decision to use an atomic weapon wasn't much debated, at the time, given they were built to counter a supposed German atomic capability that didn't exist and given that Germany had surrendered by the time the atomic weapons were ready for use.
With a massive amount of money invested, German targets being off the board, and Japan nearing it's end it was considered a dwindling window to field test the post Trinity prototypes in anger.
Hiroshima and Nagasaki was chosen as near virgin targets from the existing list of cities scheduled for destruction.
Seventy two Japanese cities were destroyed before they were.
Hiroshima was another target, way down the list, of Japanese targets to destroy, beginning with Tokyo, after Allied command determined that simply bombing purely industrial and military targets wasn't enough.
The decision to use an atomic weapon wasn't much debated, at the time, given they were built to counter a supposed German atomic capability that didn't exist and given that Germany had surrendered by the time the atomic weapons were ready for use.
With a massive amount of money invested, German targets being off the board, and Japan nearing it's end it was considered a dwindling window to field test the post Trinity prototypes in anger.
Hiroshima and Nagasaki was chosen as near virgin targets from the existing list of cities scheduled for destruction.
Seventy two Japanese cities were destroyed before they were.
The European theatre of war has long shadowed the brutality and loss of the Pacific theatre. And even the Eastern front.
From what I have read, relatively speaking, the Western European front was easier than the Eastern one and the Pacific theatre.
From what I have read, relatively speaking, the Western European front was easier than the Eastern one and the Pacific theatre.
I will likely be downvoted.
Anyway, Americans needed to show off their newly acquired nuclear capabilities. Not to Germans or to Japanese. And not to Italians. It was needed to demonstrate their superiority to Soviet Union without bombing the Soviet Union.
As someone else's here already posted out, military heads made it clear that bombing Japan was not needed for their surrender.
None else had gone that far with nuclear energy and bombs. Likely.
IMHO it was needed for something else much more political.
Anyway, Americans needed to show off their newly acquired nuclear capabilities. Not to Germans or to Japanese. And not to Italians. It was needed to demonstrate their superiority to Soviet Union without bombing the Soviet Union.
As someone else's here already posted out, military heads made it clear that bombing Japan was not needed for their surrender.
None else had gone that far with nuclear energy and bombs. Likely.
IMHO it was needed for something else much more political.
This is specifically called out as a reason in the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum. I was there just a few weeks ago. It's also available here:
https://hpmmuseum.jp/modules/exhibition/index.php?action=Cor...
"The United States believed that ending the war with an atomic bombing would help prevent the Soviet Union from extending its sphere of influence."
https://hpmmuseum.jp/modules/exhibition/index.php?action=Cor...
"The United States believed that ending the war with an atomic bombing would help prevent the Soviet Union from extending its sphere of influence."
I find it fascinatig the Little Boy (uranium) technology hadn't been fully tested by the Americans before the bombings.
I especially like the idea that the USA would never have dropped the bomb in Europe but couldn't wait to try it out on the "yellow devils". Fun stuff to read speeches given in Congress about the "war-like Japanese".
I'm in no way criticizing the use of the bomb, I'm just suggesting we understand some of the many reasons why it was used.
I'm in no way criticizing the use of the bomb, I'm just suggesting we understand some of the many reasons why it was used.
I just bought this paperback.
Would the atom bomb have been used on Germany ?
Japan was giving up, but it wasn't a white majority population country. Hence the atom bomb was used to show the soviets America's new toy. & after that the world changed.
the bombs should have never been developed or even dropped.
Japan was giving up, but it wasn't a white majority population country. Hence the atom bomb was used to show the soviets America's new toy. & after that the world changed.
the bombs should have never been developed or even dropped.
It is very likely: the atomic bomb was initially built to defeat Nazi Germany, and the Manhattan program was started before Pearl Harbour. When you read The Atomic Bomb book, many scientists who worked on the bomb justified their effort by defeating the Nazis, and many had to escape from Europe.
Once it became clear Nazi were about to be defeated, there were discussions from the scientists about sharing the knowledge w/ all countries. But at that point, the scientists had long lost control over the project.
Once it became clear Nazi were about to be defeated, there were discussions from the scientists about sharing the knowledge w/ all countries. But at that point, the scientists had long lost control over the project.
Yes and Japan was not giving up.
Bombs should have been developed and must have been dropped.
Bombs should have been developed and must have been dropped.
I believe we humans have reached a point where, materially at least, everyone could live in reasonable comfort and there would be no space for wars. Yet we seem to often behave as if we're still hunting for sustenance and living in caves, having to carve out our survival.
I don't have any inclination toward socialism or communism, nor do I have an answer for how this system we live in can be changed for the better, but if we don't at least consider that there must be alternatives, we'll keep living in a world where something as absurd as war continues to be considered normal.
I don't have any inclination toward socialism or communism, nor do I have an answer for how this system we live in can be changed for the better, but if we don't at least consider that there must be alternatives, we'll keep living in a world where something as absurd as war continues to be considered normal.
For those unfamiliar with the Soviet Union's Aug'45 entry into the war against Japan:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet%E2%80%93Japanese_War
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_invasion_of_Manchuria
Japan had ample reason to fear the Red Army. Which, in overrunning Manchuria and surrounding areas, had just proven Japan's assessments of Stalin's resources and capabilities to be disastrously wrong.
So, from the Japanese PoV - if they didn't surrender, how many weeks would it take for the Red Army to conquer the Japanese home islands? They were under no delusions about the brutality of a Soviet occupation.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet%E2%80%93Japanese_War
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_invasion_of_Manchuria
Japan had ample reason to fear the Red Army. Which, in overrunning Manchuria and surrounding areas, had just proven Japan's assessments of Stalin's resources and capabilities to be disastrously wrong.
So, from the Japanese PoV - if they didn't surrender, how many weeks would it take for the Red Army to conquer the Japanese home islands? They were under no delusions about the brutality of a Soviet occupation.
Honestly, I think the Japanese deserved it. If you see the war crimes committed by the Japanese in World War II, you will know that the atomic bomb was right.
Saying that the Japanese people deserved it comes off as hateful. Not every Japanese person was complicit. Like I think it was pretty clear Japanese children were innocent casualties.
By standards of the day, absolutely. Today, probably not.
From the military and strategic standpoint of 1945, using nuclear weapons to rapidly end the war was considered justified, necessary, and effective, especially given the precedent of widespread strategic bombing and the anticipated cost of a full-scale invasion.
While moral dissent existed, it was overridden by the dominant goal of ending the war quickly and decisively. A goal that, in the minds of U.S. leaders, justified the use of overwhelming force.
From the military and strategic standpoint of 1945, using nuclear weapons to rapidly end the war was considered justified, necessary, and effective, especially given the precedent of widespread strategic bombing and the anticipated cost of a full-scale invasion.
While moral dissent existed, it was overridden by the dominant goal of ending the war quickly and decisively. A goal that, in the minds of U.S. leaders, justified the use of overwhelming force.
Civilians though?
It's a tough question, it was total war, all the civilians were working to support the military goals. Japanese supposedly had a very militarized society (1). The concept of total war adopted by the expansionist axis powers meant that the allies had to fight back in the same way, namely use strategic bombing (2) to lower their morale and destroy civilian infrastructure and industrial targets which aided the war effort.
(1)https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_militarism
(2)https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategic_bombing_during_World...
(1)https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_militarism
(2)https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategic_bombing_during_World...
* https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/51089656-140-days-to-hir...
* https://www.nationalww2museum.org/about-us/notes-museum/140-...
It documents, using Japanese source material including interviews with the principals involved, the decision making process leading up to the eventual surrender.
What was most surprising to me was the reluctance of many members to surrender even after two bombs were dropped. The Emperor himself had to be called in multiple times (which was unprecedented) to ensure that the surrender was 'pushed' through. Even after the vote to surrender happened there were still machinations to overturn it: a reminder that there was a coup attempt to prevent the surrender from being broadcast:
* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kyūjō_incident