Something wasn’t squaring between the claims that Apple has already been scanning iCloud Photos for years, that Apple reports hundreds of instances of CSAM while Facebook reports millions, and that Apple knows they have a major CSAM problem. Good to find out the problem was with the first one.
I wonder if the “you know they already do this server-side, right?” people feel the slightest bit chastened.
As skinkestek kindly pointed out, the point of my sarcastic comment was that now that the precedent of scanning the contents of users’ devices - as opposed to the contents of Apple’s servers - has been set, deciding whether to do so based on the state of a single “Store photos in iCloud?” toggle is going to start looking awfully arbitrary.
What are you referring to? I wasn’t aware of any SCOTUS ruling re: national ID, and after a brief search just now I still can’t find any relevant precedent.
Why should Apple let pedophiles store CSAM on iPhones just because they’re not uploading it to iCloud Photo Library? It’s morally reprehensible to not disable that flag when it’s such a simple thing they can do to catch so many more criminals!
There’s little point in E2E encryption if snooping is moved outside of either end. This measure is only necessary for implementing E2E in iCloud insofar as it allows the feds to do the very thing I want E2E to prevent them from doing in the first place.
It’s as if USPS invented a new type of envelope that is physically impossible to open for anyone whose name is not written on the outside of it. Just one caveat: before they’ll give you any of these envelopes, you must allow them to read the letters being put inside.
If your concern is someone intercepting your mail before it gets to its intended recipient, this is great news. If your threat model involves federal agencies reading your mail, you’re no better off than you would be without these fancy new envelopes.